|
Journal
JOINTNESS’ IN
NATIONAL SECURITY PRIVATE PLANNING by Pankaj Joshi
In the last two years or so, and particularly after the Kargil
Review committee report was made public ‘jointness’ has become some
sort of a buzzword in the country’s strategic community. The
proponents feel that now that the value of jointness has begun to be
realised, there will be a sudden and dramatic change in our
strategic thinking. The detractors, on the other hand, feel that
this ‘new’ term is nothing but a load of western — and particularly
American — jargon and that we should not meddle with the things and
procedures, which have been in practice for many years and,
therefore, are time-tested. There are also doubts about what is
jointness and what exactly is it referring to. This article
discusses some of these issues. This article will not discuss in any
great detail such issues as national values, aims and interests and
such like except making a mention in passing because all of them are
irretrievably and irrevocably inter-linked. It will, however,
concentrate on the ‘elements of national power’ and see how
jointness in their development and optimum utilisation can impart
the nation a sense of security.
Before we proceed it is necessary to understand that in the
strategic sense jointness is not loss of speciality, everyone being
a jack-of-all-trades and master of none. It does not visualise
putting everyone in a uniform thinking mould. Indeed, the
multidisciplinary nature of national security makes such a thing
impossible. All it means is that various actors involved in national
security management cannot always act on their own without
consideration of the effect of their actions on other actors. Going
further, it implies that they should so plan and design their
actions so that not only do they accomplish their own purpose and
objective but also complement those of their fellow actors.
A clarification on the sense in which some of the terms are being
used would be in order.
The term ‘national security’ itself encompasses within itself two
separate concepts; that of ‘nation state’ and of ‘security.’ Without
getting into a debate on what constitutes a ‘nation,’ for the
purpose of this article we will assume that a people, residing
within a clearly defined geographical area, sharing a common past
and heritage, and having common aspirations and vision of the
future, constitute a nation state.
Similarly, any consideration of security also raises the questions
of security of ‘what’ and against what ‘threat.’ A systematic study
of the issues involved in the concept of security has been
undertaken only in recent times that. Perhaps the credit for
articulating in clear terms one view of national security could go
to Walter Lippman, an American analyst, who stated in 1943,
A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of
having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is
able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in case of war.
The emphasis in that definition is on ‘core values’ and ‘war,’
whether in its avoidance or in achieving victory in one, if one is
forced into it. However, with the end of the War and with many
erstwhile colonies becoming independent and having their own
political agendas, this definition, while still holding good to some
extent, was found to be too narrow. Jawaharlal Nehru, for example,
felt that :
For developing countries, security constitutes freedom from
economic, political and military threat to self-reliant development.
A more recent and omnibus definition, which takes into account the
fact that the threats today can manifest themselves in forms other
than purely military and that they need not necessarily be from
outside the state, is:
The ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external
threats, no matter in what form, or from what quarter they may
appear.
It needs to be noted that in this as well as in Lippman's
definition, the threat is to values and not something more concrete
and visible such as a part of a nation's territory, or its citizens,
or its trade. Of course, the threat to values can be translated in
to something more definite and defined in terms of territory and so
on. That is what definition of ‘national interests’ does. Indeed, so
close is the relation between ‘national values’ and ‘national
interests’ that they are often confused, one with the other. Lord
Palmerton’s quote of 1848 has now become almost a cliché and is
often quoted out of context and in many a distorted form. The
original and full quote is:
We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our
interests are eternal and perpetual, and these interests it is our
duty to follow.
It is obvious that national interests emerge from the values that a
nation holds dear. Where ‘values’ may be somewhat vague and
philosophical in nature, ‘interests’ are more concrete and
practical. Also, whereas values may be unalterable, the interests
may at times have to be modified if they conflict with the
environment in which a nation is placed. Seen in this light
‘national interests’ may be defined as:
A country's perceived needs and aspirations in relation to other
sovereign states constituting its external environment.
As can be seen, this definition takes into account not only the
needs and aspirations of a particular country — as perceived by that
country — but also of those of other sovereign states. It implicitly
recognises that in modern world no country can isolate itself from
the rest and pursue its own national interests without taking into
account the interests of others.
If a nation were to define its national interests they could include
defence from external aggression, economic well being of our
citizens, international peace and security, promotion of values,
such as of democracy and secularism, and so on. One could add a few
more items to this, delete some of the items or alter their order;
essentially they are likely to remain the same. But what is more
important and interesting is that it could be argued that while
there may be a difference in nuance and the degree of importance
attached to one or the other, practically all nations will have
same or similar interests. to some extent there is validity in this
argument. That is why the emphasis on “…in relation to other
sovereign states constituting its external environment” given in the
last definition.
In order to effectively safeguard its interests a nation must have
power. National power, unlike values and interest discussed earlier,
is much more tangible and measurable. Yet it also consists of many
intangibles such as national will and morale. Also, it is tangible
only in the sense that because of certain visible manifestations of
state power, such as strong military and a buoyant economy, it is
possible to form a subjective opinion about whether a nation is
powerful or not. but it is very difficult to apply scientific and
objective methods to measure it in specific units of strength. Power
is difficult to define and scores of books have been written on
‘power.’ However, for a broad understanding in modern context is can
be defined as the ability to influence others’ behaviour.
Though different authors have different views on this, essentially
it is agreed that there are six elements of national power:
demography, geography, historical-psychological sociology,
politico-administrative organisation, economy, and military. These
are only the broadest categories; there could be many sub-divisions
of these. For example one could include natural resources, which
essentially are a function of geography. It is important to note
that
Demography refers not only to the size of the population but more to
its quality. A relatively small, literate and industrious population
may endow much greater power on a nation than a large, illiterate
and lethargic one could. Demography also includes such elements as
the technological manpower base and the scientific and strategic
temper of the population. The list is endless. It is in the context
of a ‘strategic temper’ that NISDA has been created and has an
important role to perform. Most Indians are generally ignorant about
issues pertaining to national security and are quite content to
leave such an important part of their well being in the hands of a
few self-appointed ‘experts.’
The geographic element of national power manifests itself not only
in the geographic location of a nation but also from the natural
resources that geography confers on it. A nation’s history, social
system and the psychological make up of the population have a
profound bearing on national power. Nations are seen or perceived to
be historically strong or weak; pacifists or belligerent; pessimists
or optimists. The political and administrative organisations
determine whether the national government will be stable or not. The
more stable the government and more the degree of consensus amongst
the people, the stronger will be a nation. It is important that the
three pillars of state, viz. the legislature, judiciary and the
executive be strong. In the modern world, increasingly a nation’s
scientific and technological base and capabilities determine its
power. In this context the amount spent on R & D and research
facilities provides a fairly good measure of capabilities. Here
again our record leaves much to be desired.
While all the above contribute towards making a nation strong, in
the final analysis, however, the economic and the military element
are the two most crucial, visible and measurable elements of
national power. Indeed, it can be said that it is the combined
effect of the other four, which gives a nation its economic
strength, which in turn allows it to build up its military strength.
One of the lessons of the break up of the erstwhile Soviet Union is
that no country, not even a super power, can be militarily strong
unless it is first economically strong. On the other hand, as can be
seen from the example of Japan, if a nation is prepared to trust its
security with some other nation, it can build itself up economically
without resorting to heavy military spending.
The economic power must be understood in its widest sense. It
includes such diverse fields as shipbuilding industry, the merchant
marine, warehousing and banking facilities. It includes road network
and transportation industry, railway network, and telecommunication
network. Indeed, there is hardly any field of human endeavour that
does not in one way or other contribute to a nation’s economic
strength. And that is why it is important that every citizen
realises that whatever his or her station in life and whatever the
field of activity, so long he or she is participating in some
economic activity he or she is contributing to the nation’s
security. It is the combined effort of the 999 million people of
this country that sustains the effort of the one odd million men and
women in uniform.
We now come to the question of, not so much the role, but the place
of the military in national security structure and policy
formulation. Clausewitzian theory about military being an instrument
of policy and war being continuation of policy by other means is
too well known to be repeated. In this formulation it is implied
that ‘other means’ have been tried and only on their not having
achieved the desired result, has war been resorted to. If this was
true in the nineteenth century it is much more so today, when many
are shunning war as an instrument of policy. It is this author’s
belief that one of the reasons for the traditional hostility between
the military and bureaucracy, not only in India but also in all
major democracies, has its roots in the difference in perception of
their respective roles in the national security structure. While the
military tends to consider its role to be the central one, the
politicians, diplomats and bureaucrats feel that if they have their
way and succeed the military will never have to be employed.
Therefore, the place of the military forces has to be seen in a
much larger context.
A schematic showing various elements that come into play in the
national security structure and how they impinge on each other is at
Appendix. It will be noticed that the military element forms only a
small cog in the total structure with a large number of other
diverse domestic and global factors also having a bearing on the
policy. Yet, as pointed out earlier, it is also one of the most
visible. It also has the aura of being the ‘court of last resort,’
as it were, since it actively comes into play when all else has been
tried and failed. (At times the military can play a ‘passive’ role
in conduct of policy when states may hold out a ‘threat’ of use of
military force to achieve their policy objectives). In either event
there can be no argument that the military force has to be credible.
Credibility of a force is not a function of its numerical strength
or weapons inventory alone. Similarly, training, motivation and
morale of the personnel, while being important cannot be termed the
crucial factors. In the final analysis the credibility of a military
force depends on the credibility of the political will.
Thus if a nation declares a certain objective to be a vital national
interest, it must back it up with adequate military power and must
have a demonstrated political will to use that force, if necessary.
Dr Michael Roskin, an American political scientist and analyst put
it very succinctly in a recent article when he said, “Always back
your interest with adequate power. If you don’t have the power,
don’t declare something distant to be your interest. Thou shalt not
bluff." I need only add an “Amen” to that quote!
This article would not be complete without a brief look at the
internal security situation, which forms a very important facet of
national security spectrum. Aid to civil authorities and maintenance
of law and order and internal security are amongst the roles of all
armies in democratic countries. However, it is implicit in such
employment that the committal of the armed forces would be for
absolutely minimum period and that the troops would be returned to
barracks at the earliest. Regrettably in India this has not happened
and the armed forces have been continuously deployed and committed
on internal security duties in Kashmir, Punjab, North East and
various other parts of the country.
Here it may be appropriate to cite the analogy of a sick person.
When a person becomes sick, in the beginning he is treated by his
family doctor, who generally treats the patient for symptoms. When
things get out of hand and the patient’s condition deteriorates, a
specialist is called in. He, in his own turn, carries out some more
tests and administers treatment, which is intensive – and expensive.
It may involve some surgery and blood letting. Having cured the
patient, the specialist withdraws, leaving the post-operative care
in the hands of the family doctor, who nurses the patient back to
good health. Substitute the patient with the body politic of a
state, the family doctor with the local police and law enforcement
agencies, and the specialist with the armed forces; and you have the
ideal prescription for handling insurgencies.
I will end this article with the final dénouement to show the role
of jointness lies in all these things. As is apparent, ‘national
security’ includes each and every facet of national life, including
its citizens’. In theory, therefore, each and every individual must
act in concert, one with the other, so that their combined energies
and their efforts result in making the nation strong. However, it is
equally obvious that practically it is impossible to achieve this.
But even if this cannot be done at the level of the individual, at
the level of the government is certainly is possible and must be
done. This is particularly so because all the activities involved
have long gestation periods of up to 15 to 20 years. Since
‘political will’ is central to it becomes important to have a broad
consensus amongst the political parties on the general direction
that the country is to take. Without such consensus, there cannot be
continuity in effort and the nation will move in the manner of a
rudderless ship. Whether it is the development of a particular
talent in human resource, or building a merchant marine,
infrastructure development, modernisation of armed forces, forging
diplomatic relations; all these must start and proceed to a plan.
Some body must give specific directions to the various agencies.
Their progress must be monitored, mid-course corrections applied,
someone asked to slow down while others may have to be exhorted to
hasten up. This is where ‘jointness’ is required. Obviously there
has to be a body or an agency, which does this job on a full-time
basis. And all this has to be done in a democratic manner with no
body treading on any body else’s turf. This appears a tall order,
but it can be done to a substantial degree.
In the final analysis, joint ness is nothing but joint thinking,
separate execution.
APPENDIX
|
