

BOOK REVIEWS

(I) *The Scientific Consensus and Recent British Philosophy*, Vol. 1:

Edited by Freny Mehta (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, Rs. 80).

There was a time in the early half of this century when psychological research could afford to confine itself to the study of the external patterns of behavior in man and animals. Being under the influence of the allied movement of positivism-mechanism-behaviorism in philosophy and social sciences, psychology had adopted a pose of looking for explanations of individual and group activities in terms of logico-mathematical models. The notions of soul, self, consciousness, spirit, which figured in traditional philosophy and psychology as pivots for theories, had to be thrown overboard. It was as if by sheer determination of the psychologists of the time to lift their science to the status of physics or physiology that all human behaviour was assumed to be governed by laws not unlike the laws discovered by physical sciences.

However, with the advent of the new approaches to the study of man such as psychoanalysis, phenomenology, structuralism, introspectionism and existentialism, psychology could hardly sustain its exclusive "empiricist" stance. Problems which for positivist-mechanistic-behaviourist observers appeared to be alien to the exact science of mind were seen to be meaningful in the context of the "ontological structure of the self".

Ms. Mehta's work reinstates the view that a good psychologist should necessarily be a good ontologist.

Through eight scrupulously selected papers of eminent authors like Sir Julian Huxley, Richard Wollheim, M. Polanyi, Malanie Klein, Winnicott, Money-Kyrle, John Bowlby and J. H. Rey, followed by her own monographs on what is termed as the "re-mapping of subjectivity", Ms. Mehta has argued that no worthwhile philosophical or psychological research is possible unless the researcher delves deep into the constitution of the "psyche-self." The dominant idea which acts as a bridge-thruster between her treatment of the psyche self and that of the other authors in the volume

is the idea that human reality is primordially endowed with certain "Forms", "Schemata" or "Gestalten" which act as harbingers of the entire spectrum of cognitive, affective and active functions an individual is capable of. The very innateness of these entities in the human mind should be sufficient to repudiate the purely positivist-mechanistic-behaviorist explanation of man.

Indeed the amount of literature embodying the point of view running through Ms. Mehta's and other authors' papers in this volume is, today, so vast that at some point a conscientious compiler of the best in it would face the difficult problem of identification, selection and elimination. Admittedly, Ms. Mehta has had the opportunities to meet and discuss her theory of the psyche-self with some of them. One can easily see that she has found mirroring in the papers she has selected her own paradigm.

Being a philosopher by training and a psychoanalyst by profession, Ms. Mehta attempts in her own monographs in the volume a synthesis of the ideas of the authors appearing in the volume. Perhaps here is the only such attempt in the academic psychology in India today, and should go a long way in throwing a challenge to the considerably widely prevalent positivist-mechanistic-behaviorist way of thinking among writers in psychology.

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(II) *Individuals and Worlds : Essays in Anthropological Rationalism* by Chattopadhyaya, D. P., Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1976 Pp. 219.

Individuals and Worlds by D. P. Chattopadhyaya is an exploration into the nature of relation between man and his external world, including society. To analyse the man-world relation, he presents and argues in favour of his theory of anthropological rationalism. The theory says that the demarcation between the universal and individual, form and matter, structure and stuff, simplicity and complexity, and rationalism and empiricism, and overemphasis on either one or the other is false and untenable. On one hand, this is humanly impossible to think of manless world and the man's being in the world is the key for his understanding of the world. On the other hand, the structures and processes of the world cannot be defined by man's existence. This is neither human existence, nor the human perception, that is the author of the world wherein man is obliged to live within numerous limitations. In other words, while in D. P. Chattopadhyaya's model of man, the hypothetical human actor is free, existential, and atomistic, his intentionality of consciousness has social roots, i.e., a more or less identifiable "locus" of cognitive, cretaive and emotive aspects of man's existence, his hope and his experience is to be found in "social space."

The theory of anthropological rationalism, provided by D. P. Chattopadhyaya is not an integral, organic and electro-synthetic theory of man-world relation, rather this is an affirmation of the mutual dependence of the seemingly contradictory theories of man and of his external world. Due to this fact the method of his reasoning and theoritical framework change with the object of analysis, e.g., man, culture, society, physical world, and the human purpose. However, he very consistently maintains that :

...both in subjectivity and objectivity there are different modes or grades. The inlook and outlook of man, the subjectivity and objectivity of his body-and-mind are inseparable for each other. In subject-oriented consciousness the objective pull is there, and similarly in object-oriented consciousness the role of subjectivity is not totally absent. Science is said to be paradigm of

object-oriented consciousness, and ethics of the subject-oriented consciousness.

This is true that the experience of man is his own "personal" experience, says D. P. Chattopadhyaya, but it is intentional and active, and for its communication he depends on the other man, social institutions and world at large. It is precisely for this reason that the character and media of the organization and communication of experience are contingent upon the experience and make it anthropological—historical. For instance, language that is a system of signs through which man shares his "personal" experience is an ever changing social institution. One who is faithful only to his own experience and does not care to see if it tallies with other's experience may easily become a victim of the worst form of subjectivism or psychologism. Only inter-subjective experience, which is communicable is authentic experience. This is the objective experience and its paradigm is "scientific". But I see a problem at this juncture. If experience and its definition are anthropological and relate to biographies and experiences, many discrepancies emerging in course of contacts and brought about by different respective experience unauthentic? D. P. Chattopadhyaya does not visualize possibility of this question. Though in some other context he states that the basic necessity of phenomenology is reflexive criticism, and the creative history of human being is due to criticism, he has not shown that the criticism in man transcends what he is.

D. P. Chattopadhyaya rejects the Leibniz's belief that the pre-established harmony between all beings and things and our partaking in the eternal truths *qua* God's understanding can be realized by inwardizing our consciousness, or gradually descending into the bottomless depth of our spontaneous self-consciousness for three reasons. These are : he downgrades perception as a source of knowledge; he takes the analytic (transcendental, universal, and necessary) unity of the world in God; and he underestimates the critical role of empirical in favour of the laws of Sufficient Reason. D. P. Chattopadhyaya is also opposed to Kant's doctrine of transcendental synthesis. He says that reason is neither sovereign as claimed by Leibniz nor even autonomous as suggested by Kant. Reason is essentially human. Human capacity both of thought and action is limited by the world, and

what sets the limits of human capacity also enables him to identify himself and change his identity in history without destroying his recognizability. Reason and experience influence each other. Man can order the world in an endless number of ways but not in every way. In his words :

It is true that I partly constitute the world, but I can do so only by being myself constituted, at least partly by the world. There is a circle in this inter-constitution, it is dilectic, and not vicious... The world has a constitution of its own and it does not always oblige my thought about, and honour my feelings for it.

D. P. Chattopadhyaya has made a detailed analysis of the concept of man and human purpose in the philosophical works of three major Indian thinkers viz., Tagore, Sri Aurobindo and Gandhi. According to him the central theme of Tagore's thought is harmony, harmony between science and art, finite and infinite, life and death, God, nature and man. Man cannot live by bread alone, for his disharmony intends harmony with others, and his love for others starts supervening over his separation from them. This intention of harmony and perfection make him creative, through which he intends a separationful union with others. Both for individuals and nations union without separation makes no sense and forgetting of soul-centres is a sign of decay and death. In Sri Aurobindo's system of evolutionary gradualism, the reality is integral and man can neither reject his inframental past nor can he be completely aware of his supramental future. Caught between the forces of nature and spirit, man is constantly evolving towards a definite goal. Man by his very nature 'belongs' to the whole reality and human society. Moreover the human history is governed by some definite and inexorable law. The role of individual in history is ultimately governed by his social position and the historical laws. Gandhi is presented as an example of consistency between ideas and actions. He said that he could not conceive politics as divorced from religion, and religion for Gandhi is belief in the ordained moral government of universe and religious life for him is life of progressive self realization. He believes in the essential unity of man and non-violence, which in Gandhian scheme is a question of being.

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This unnecessary long discussion of human purpose seems to me redundant and in no way contributing to understanding of fallibility of man and growing character of knowledge, that he says are two key concepts of anthropological rationalism. As a matter of fact the organization of *Individual and Worlds* is very poor and the argument has frequently moved too far from his central thesis.

Morality, says D. P. Chattopadhyaya, is social. In a hypothetical society governed by irrationality and in which events are unpredictable or unconstrained by law or any regularity, no man can be moral. Private morality is derived from public morality. This means that the question of ethics is nominalist and not essentialist i.e., the intentional dimension of morals does not presuppose any cosmic necessity. I here, do not agree with D. P. Chattopadhyaya, who says that goodness can not be defined and goodness of things and actions are instrumental or relative. He says that a person who is committed to noble ends and who fails to choose the right means can not be considered good. In taking this stand he has not only rejected the theory of action of Gītā but he has also disowned his own understanding of contemporary Indian thinkers which he earlier presented to show the implications of man-world unity in his system of thoughts.

Like morality, freedom is also social in nature. Since society always puts some constraint or compulsion on its members, this is the inherent limitation of human situation that a man can never be perfectly free. Often the causes of lack of freedom are alienation and anomy, says D. P. Chattopadhyaya. In his words :

Alienated from others, shut up within the windowless cramping space of routine day-to-day life, we feel ourselves atomic and denied the community experience of freedom, *freedom-in-relation* (to others). An atomic man does not enjoy even (what one might call spiritual) *freedom-in-solitude*. A fast changing society marked by conflict, competition and a high rate of social mobility is bound to be more or less anomic; people are compelled to abandon a set of norms before they are provided another. And in the process they are normally confused and degraded, become neurotic, psychopathic, or develop homicidal or suicidal tendencies.

There is no single way of encountering reality, says D. P. Chattopadhyaya. Since man is creative and critical, and his authenticity is derived from openness and faithfulness to experience of others, there would be endless and alternative ways of encountering reality. In this endeavour human situation is the most important part.

Now if the authentic man is free i.e., aware of what is not, responsible and creative and his task is to change and improve the world, there arises a question that D. P. Chattopadhyaya has to answer. In an unequal and anomic society marked by decline of public morality in extensional dimension, where would the intentional aspects of private goodness and morality would be derived from ? In other words what is the authentic role of a free but anthropological man in an anomic and irrational world without assuming any autonomous or universal valuation ?

D. P. Chattopadhyaya's model of man is quite similar to that of Talcott Parsons in modern sociology. Parsons has tried to resolve the problem of relation between man (internal) and world (external) by his concept of internalization of cultural standards and the congruence between functional pre-requisites of the personal and social systems. He shows that the socialization process converts a utilitarian and atomistic man to a voluntaristic man. The analysis of *Individuals and Worlds* can gain much from such a framework. Another modern scholar and sociologist Ali Shariati has developed the concept of 'rebel' especially in the context of present-day poor countries and he shows that rebellious path is the path of return toward God and the path that leads to Him by becoming Him. This is the authentic action of a free man in an exploitative world. At societal level he initiates and participates in the struggle to establish *Tauhid* i.e., a non-dualist, classless society.

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(III) *A Path to Oriental Wisdom* (Introductory Studies in Eastern Philosophy) by George Parulski, Jr. Ohara Publications, Incorporated; Burbank, California, U. S. A. Pages 192 including Introduction, Appendices, Bibliography and Index etc. Price \$4 · 50.

In contrast to Professor Murty's scholarly, serious and valuable work, George Parulski's is a work of elementary nature. Three chapters have been devoted to Taoism and Confucianism, two to Buddhism and three again to 'Hindu Philosophies'. Judged as 'Introductory Studies in Eastern Philosophy' (the subtitle of the book), it falls far below the mark of either 'studies' or 'philosophy'. The book appears to be based on the author's impressions rather than a careful study of oriental philosophies. As such it displays a lack of firm comprehension and abounds in numerous inaccuracies and errors of a serious nature.

However, this work may prove useful to those western readers, who have little knowledge of 'oriental wisdom'. For such readers there are a number of useful Appendices including one each on Yoga Āsanās & Prāṇāyāma, Chronology of Ch'an and Zen Masters, A Guide to Zen Meditative Techniques, Chronology of Oriental Philosophical Literature and Buddha's Sermon at Benaras. Seventy-three refreshing selections with some good illustrations by Mrs. Carolyn Parulski (author's wife), will be enjoyed by the seekers.

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(IV) *Hume's Moral Epistemology*, Jonathan Harrison, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976.

Since the publication of P. Ardal's *Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise*, it has come to be gradually realized that Hume's moral philosophy, reviewed in all its detail, is subtle and complex. But it is also worth remarking that, notwithstanding its subtlety and complexity, Hume's moral philosophy is derived from a small number of principles. They are partly analytical and partly psychological. One such principle is concerning the office of reason in matters of conduct. Another is about the epistemic status of actions and their moral worth. Naturally, the question whether our knowledge of right and wrong, also the difference between them, is determined by reason or sentiment begins to raise its head. In point of fact, Jonathan Harrison, in the book under review, has concerned himself entirely with, what he has called 'moral epistemology', i.e., the answers to the question 'How do we know the difference between right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice?

Hume's answers to the question above is found in Book III, Part I, Sections 1 and 2 of the *Treatise*, and Section I and Appendix I of the *Enquiry*. It appears to the present reviewer that whatever answer Hume has to offer in these passages, the unmistakable source of it lies in Book II, Part III, Section III of the *Treatise* where he has argued to the effect that since reason is inert, it cannot affect our behaviour by way of being a motive to the will. It can, at best, have a calculative function, it plays an informative role in telling us how to achieve a desired end. But setting us to desire an end is no job of reason. And here, at this point precisely, the passions come in. Moral agents are passional beings, they are moved to action by virtue of having experienced this or that passion. This is Hume's central argument, and all other arguments, such as, that 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' cannot be applied to actions, that morality is neither susceptible of demonstration nor a matter of fact, that there is a gap between fact and value; and that no reason can be given why we desire morality, etc., are but variants of the basic one based on Hume's views about the nature and function of reason *vis-a-vis* practice.

Harrison has given a detailed analysis and rigorously critical examination of the various arguments with a view to arrive at Hume's positive conclusions. In every case the arguments are first summarily stated, then analyzed and, finally commented upon in such a close manner that it gives the reader the feeling of persuing a commentary. There is an interesting independent treatment of the fact-value gap, which is something like a contribution towards the enormous bulk of literature on the subject. The sketch of Searle's argument that it is possible to deduce *ought* statements from institutional statements is admirably neat, and the observation that any given promise ought to be kept is a synthetic statement is also well argued.

Hume's critique of rationalism in ethics is easily granted than his thesis that morality is not a matter of fact. If one bears in mind Hume's notion of reason, it should not be difficult to follow or even appreciate why would Hume say that moral distinctions were not discoverable by thought or understanding. But his view that moral distinction do not consist in inferring matters of fact is less easily understood. And Hume does not give a direct proof of the matter, rather he argues *a fortiori* that there is no such thing as moral inference. The case that wilful murder, for example, is wrong, however closely it may be examined, does not exhibit any property or relation that may be described as a matter of fact. On Hume's terms, it is a feeling. What could be taken to constitute the 'wrongness' of the action are only neutral psychic entities like passions, motives and thoughts. Besides these, there is a matter of fact of another sort, i.e., a matter of fact about the spectator's sentiments aroused by the action described as wilful murder. In this context, Harrison is right in his remark that Hume, while engaged in arguing that morality is not a matter of fact ends up concluding that it *is* a matter of fact about our sentiments. But this should not appear surprising, given, of course, Hume's division of the contents of human mind into either relations of ideas or matters of fact. And recall Hume's position in analysing the idea of necessary connection. The mode of arguing is not dissimilar. And it is in this way Hume is led to deduce one set of matters of fact from another set of matters of fact in the domain of the moral. What else could feelings or sentiments be for Hume than matters of fact ?

Harrison has a well-taken point in connection with Hume's likening moral distinctions to secondary qualities. These qualities are to be contemporaneous with our perception of them, but in the case of our apprehending virtue and vice, the case of our approving or disapproving of past actions should also be incorporated. Harrison's point is that our beliefs about secondary qualities are *based* on prior sensations; and this order of temporal priority is not there in the case of our feelings of approval or disapproval. But Hume might say that secondary qualities could also be recalled by memory as well, just as much we make moral judgements on past actions. And secondly, ascriptions of moral worth to actions are, in a sense, guided by the pattern of *human* responses. The truth or falsity of moral judgements is not a story to be told by the fact of the dispositional properties in actions alone. There might be some plausibility in the view that moral questions of morality are questions of substance (*a la* Richard Hare, and of course, Hume), and these need not always square with questions of epistemology.

Harrison's concluding task has been with discounting such views as the following to be Hume's. They are: that moral judgements are about the judge's feelings; that they are about the feelings of mankind; that Hume holds to a moral sense theory; that his theory is non-propositional; and lastly, that moral judgement is a species of feeling. Harrison says any of these views "might have been" Hume's though none of them fits in with everything he says. The reason for this problematic position with regard to Hume's positive conclusions is owing to the fact, Harrison thinks that Hume was never quite clear about what his own alternative to rationalism was. But more could have been said in this respect, namely, that Hume was occupied so much with his negative dialectic against the claims of rationalism in ethics that he could not spare adequate attention to positive construction of an ethical theory on empiricist grounds. Secondly, there was Hume's literary habit, which was more persuasive than ratiocinative. It could also be said that Hume's importance as moral philosopher lay more in his formulation of conceptual point than in matters of moral substance. But the materials for building the edifice Hume's moral philosophy are certainly there in Hume's writings, and wait for a more constructivist approach than could be provided for by Harrison's book.

This is said, not in unfairness to him, but by way of pointing out the fact that if one acts from a conception of a formalist meta-ethics, much of the value and importance of Hume's type of teleological meta-ethics will go unattended. Perhaps mere consistency is not enough, moral judgements, for a student of human nature, as Hume was, needs be supported by human aims and human values.

But the fact remains that Harrison's book is unique in its scope and achievement, a new kind of a book on Hume's ethical theory. And, after going through it, with no mean profit, one would certainly be looking for his hoped for commentary.

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- (V) *Metaphysics : Past and Present* By S. B. P. Sinha, Publishers : Darshan Peeth, 177, Tagore Town, Allahabad 1981, Price Rs. 80/—

Modern scientific temperament led many modern and contemporary thinkers to condemn and dismiss the abstract and abstruse character of metaphysics. The book under review is an attempt to reconstruct and refurbish metaphysics by refuting various charges against it by anti-metaphysicians. The author has, as I think, a two-fold aim, namely, to describe the nature of metaphysics and to defend it against the onslaughts of anti-metaphysical thinking. Such an aim is to be highly appreciated.

The author adopts 'synthetic point of view' (page 13 para 2) and holds 'by metaphysics I have meant something as the highest wisdom or Parāvidyā, the vision of Truth or reality' (page 13, para 2). However, he does not convincingly explain what he means by this. He also points out the distinction between general metaphysics and special metaphysics as given by Wolff and accepts that this distinction is very important (21-1). But he does not explain in what way it is important. Had he understood and stressed that distinction he would not have made confusion between Ontology and Metaphysics, between metaphysics and philosophy which he constantly makes in the subsequent pages. On the contrary he boldly declares that the distinction is not popular now (*ibid*) and we have to believe it.

The author defines metaphysics 'as the study of reality or the vision of reality and it may be considered to be most general study or vision about the existence' (26-1). Do the study and 'vision' of reality mean the same thing? Again, when he holds that it is ('the' is missing) most general study or vision of reality, does he mean to say that reality and existence are one and the same? He does not adduce and produce any cogent arguments for such sweeping statements.

In fact in the entire book we find such unsupported and unsubstantiated sweeping remarks which instead of defending metaphysics show its weakness. See for example page 26-2 where he

says that thinkers like Plato, Descartes, Spinoza and Hegel consider metaphysical knowledge at par with science (Did they ?). In immediate next para he says 'some others, particularly Idealist thinkers' consider metaphysics as an a priori construction. This means that he does not include above thinkers among idealists. Again, in the next para he says 'some logical positivists' do not consider metaphysics as fully meaningless. He does not name them. He says that 'metaphysics has been taken differently by different persons and some of them are definitely mistaken' (28-4). At no place has he shown that they are mistaken and says that they are 'definitely' mistaken.

In the section on 'The Method of Metaphysics' he dwells more on the subject matter of metaphysics, the nature of reality, than on its method. He goes on making ambiguous statements as 'So it may be added here that one should believe in some method or methods of metaphysics' (39-2), 'So it may be suggested after Hall that metaphysics has got its own method though it may be so useful and easy and simple like the method of the science.' The latter sentence is not only ambiguous but is an instance of many grammatically faulty sentences. Apart from the apparent fact that there should have been 'not' after 'may', the author does not seem to be aware that 'so' is followed by as and not like. He says that metaphysics uses induction and the method of observation (39-5) but does not explain how they are used in metaphysics. He says that metaphysics is said to be the study of Being and in the last line of the same para (40-1) he says: 'So, in a sense, it may be said that it is concerned with everything'. Not only we find here a contradiction but also this shows how the author is confused about the specific subject matter and method of metaphysics. To support himself he wrongly quotes John Caird who talk about philosophy and the author applies it to metaphysics. The author does not seem to be clear about the distinction between philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, cosmology and theology (40-3). It is funny to say that metaphysics deals with everything (does it deal with agriculture, society, state ?) Metaphysics is different from Epistemology, Cosmology, etc., which might presuppose or lead to metaphysics.

The author confuses between the value of metaphysics and philosophy and their functions (Section 5) and goes on quoting

thinkers like Aristotle, Moore, Ayer etc., without contributing anything new. He does not seem to be clear as to whether metaphysics deals with reality, existence, scientific postulates (47-1) or everything (44-2). He says that metaphysical knowledge is very useful and does not explain what he means. He says that it is very important for society (55-2) because it is very important for individuals. Is it a logical argument? He devotes many pages on irrelevant matters, for example, pages 82-86 could have been conveniently omitted.

The entire book is full of grammatical mistakes, spelling mistakes and faulty sentences: 'phenomena...assumes' (72-3), 'pointed that' (86-3 & 99-1), 'each' (86-4), 'The reason of .. thing' (ibid), 'Is' (88-1), 'Physis' (96-3), 'Rightly it is said-quotation missing' (96-3), 'First...subjective' (101-3), 'an psychological', (109-1) 'antimetaphysical or antiphilosophical' instead of antimetaphysists or 'antiphilosopher' (122-1), 'Emancipation' (126-3), 'more strong, (150-2) 'logical necessary' (151-1), 'such branch' (152-1), 'More clear' (152-1) 'more deep' (173-4), Peirce-'Pierce' (223-2,3), 'a forementioned' (257-4) 'Principi' (299-2), 'Now...is concerned is the study' (300-4), 'We find...satisfactory' (ibid). Quotation 17 (304-2) is not found in the notes and references at all. These are only a few of the mistakes.

The learned scholar makes contradictory statements throughout the book. He says that Gorgias was a champion of antimetaphysical movement (123-1) but further he says that 'like Protagoras he also did not discredit metaphysics as such' (123-4). He says that Hume should not be considered to be sceptical (148-2) and to hide his confusion adds 'in the unqualified sense of the term'. (He does not explain what is that dignified 'unqualified sense of the term'). Again he contradicts himself by saying 'Hume does not only advocate this type of scepticism and agnosticism but goes 'further'than that and points out the impossibility of traditional studies and science like metaphysics' (151-2) and again says, 'His scepticism should not be taken in the sense of an antimetaphysical movement' (159-3). He says that Comte was an antimetaphysician (197-199) but on page 200 para 2 he says. 'Comte was not an antimetaphysical thinker *in the unqualified sense of the term.*' Similar contradictory statements he makes about Kant, Spencer, Haeckel, Lange and about all antimetaphysicians. Once he says that the

are antimetaphysicians and then says they are not so and adds his ambiguous and hackneyed expression *in the unqualified sense of the term*. For example, he says that Spencer etc., have appathy to metaphysical speculation (210). Again, Spencer is a metaphysician.. 'because in a sense he is a metaphysician' (213-1) and also (211-3). Similar contradictory statements are found about Poincare, Durkheim and Marxists. He argues that Marxism is not against metaphysics because it is prescribed in syllabus (222-4). He advises us to believe that 'Marx and his followers..should not be considered to be the opponents of Metaphysics *'in the unqualified sense of term'* (223-1 italics mine). He (Perice) should not be considered to be an anitmetaphysician *in the unqualified sense of the term* (224-4 italics mine).

In all these cases, it seems, the author is highly confused. He goes on giving advices as he cannot advance arguments to justify statements. It also appears that he is not able to say what he means or should mean. He means or should mean that various so-called opponents of metaphysics could not dismiss metaphysics as in their attempts to do so they created logical inconsistencies in their systems. Instead of saying this in the entire chapter 'Anti-metaphysical Edge of Positivism' the author argues that antimetaphysical thinkers should not be taken as opposed to metaphysics *in the unqualified sense of term*. If that is so then what is the problem? Instead of showing the inner logical inconsistency within each antimetaphysical philosophy, instead of debunking their hollowness, the learned author with his unsupported, unsubstantiated, illogical, contradictory and sweeping remarks goes on giving priestly advice that they should not be treated as opposed to metaphysics.

Similar confusions and contradictions are found in the authors discussions about Pragmatism, Moore, Russell and Logical Positivists. Actually throughout he hunts with the hound and runs with the hare. Once he says that humanism like Pragmatism cannot and should not be considered as opposed to metaphysics and then says, 'Thus the ship of pragmatism lands into a territory that it tires to shell' (235). The author does not know the difference between saying that Moore, Russell and other antimetaphysicists did not deny metaphysics and that they could not do so. He says that Wittgenstein was against metaphysics (258-4) and (260-4) and

again says that he was not opposed to metaphysics *in the unqualified sense of the term* (258-4). About Russell also he says 'He should not be described as an antimetaphysician *in the unqualified sense of the term*' (249-4). About logical Positivism he says: 'So, we observe that logical positivism does not banish metaphysics at all (278-4). I think that what the authors mean to say or should say is that logical positivism could not banish metaphysics. He draws an absurd conclusion 'So we may conclude here that is not justified to describe logical positivists as antimetaphysicians in the full sense of the term' (282-2). Thus instead of saying that logical positivists are not justified in their criticism of metaphysics he says the opposite and contradicts himself.

The last chapter is a mere repetition full of confusions, contradictions and unsubstantiated sweeping remarks. Nowhere we find cogent arguments and depth-analysis of various problems. But the author boldly draws the conclusion: 'So the positivistic attack on metaphysics is really feeble and superficial and metaphysics has survived it' (300-3). But the fact is that neither the author is able to show the feebleness of logical positivists' attack on metaphysics nor has he shown logically that metaphysics has survived. In place of logical arguments we find on every page and almost in every paragraph annoying and irritating hackneyed expressions as 'without going into further details' 'it may be further added', 'in this connection', 'it will be appropriate and proper', 'it will not be out of place', 'we may further observe', 'in the unqualified sense of the term' etc.

In order to reconstruct metaphysics we have to (i) refute all charges of antimetaphysicians against metaphysics and then (ii) offer convincing arguments as to the value of metaphysics. The author has failed on both the fronts.

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