

THE CONCEPT OF PERSONAL GOD : SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

The theistic approach, as it is generally understood in the West, assumes first, the otherness of God to the soul and second, the personal Being of God. The two are interrelated concepts, but the first need not imply the second. That is, an emphasis on the otherness, or rather the wholly otherness of God, may lead to a refusal to ascribe to Him any personal or even rational categories, as is evident from Rudolf Otto's concept of the numen or the wholly other. On the other hand, an emphasis on the personal Being of God implies His otherness to the soul. The concept of self or person is always developed in contradistinction to the not-self. A person is also transcendent to his work. Significantly St. Thomas calls the Creator God the efficient cause of the world, who is not only distinct from His creation, but who can hardly be conceived as immanent, either in the world or in the soul, in the sense in which the *Brahman* of the Vedanta is so understood to be. A widespread confusion in the Western mind, regarding the absence of a direct reference to the Creator God in mysticism, specially that of Indian Origin,¹ may be due to this fact only, viz. that while the Personal God of theism is not only an other, but is even more or less external, to the soul, so that a reference to Him is very prominent in theistic thought, the Absolute of the mystics, being an all-comprehensive Reality, need not be an 'other' to the soul in the sense the Personal God of theism must be so.

The personal Being of God is more or less affirmed in almost all religions; that is, most religions, with very few exceptions, are not only Theo-centric, they are even theistic. That, God is a Divine Being with whom personal communication can be established or who can even be a relative in the relation of love and that, He is a Divine Person to whom prayers can be addressed with an implicit assurance of their being answered, are some of the universal assumptions of most religions. Not only the *Bhagavadgita* but all Bhakti cults describe God in highly personal terms. Even the *Quran*, which emphasises, the transcendence and uniqueness of God, describes Him in highly personal terms as the Protector, the Lord, the Judge, the Merciful, etc. But God is a Person in a special

sense in Christianity, as the belief in God's personal Being is an integral part of the basic Trinitarian creed of Christianity. For the same reason the concept of God as a Person is most discussed and best developed in Christian thought. We would discuss below the Christian concept of Personal God in so far as owing to its clearly defined character, it exemplifies best the theistic or personal approach in all religions, but for the same reason, we would leave out all reference to the Trinitarian creed which is unique to Christianity alone. Also, any criticism of the personal concept of God is not intended against the Christian creed in particular, but is meant in a general way.

The concept of person is quite a determinate one in Western thought. As explained by R. V. De Smet,² the two terms used for the concept of person in Latin and Greek were *persona* and *hypostasis* and both implied a subject of legal rights, i. e., a citizen. St. Thomas developed a more philosophical view of the self as that which exists in its own right. But then Thomas added that the term person "must comprehend the whole reality of the subject, i. e., not only its essential elements, but also its individuating qualities and other accidents." By implication, a person is an individual who is necessarily distinct from other individuals. More than this, a person is an integral unity of both body and soul, so that human immortality can not be understood without the resurrection of the body.³ Thus a person is not only distinct from other persons. the personality of man includes all the accidental individuating qualities, as also the body.

Similarly, Ernst Benz affirms the materialism of the Christian approach. The conception of human immortality in terms of the resurrection of body implies the necessity of the body, so that human person is incomplete and unfulfilled without a body.⁴

The concept of self, subject or person is always developed in Western thought in the human context and is, therefore, naturally relative and determinate. Alburey-Castell analyses the concept of the self (person) in philosophy and enumerates a few distinguishing characteristics, such as being a spiritual substance, activity, implying freedom of will and so on. But above all, a self is identical or a continuant, that is, the self is the subject to whom all these qualities, states of mind or actions belong and which persists as identical through the changing states of mind.⁵ This calls for a

distinction between the substance and qualities, essence and existence which, as we shall see, is denied by St. Thomas in God.

Furthermore, Western thinkers have always insisted that the concept of self is dynamic, that is, the self must change and develop in order to realise itself. Personality, as it is understood by them, can have meaning only in the context of potentiality, which is realised, but never fully, through, time. Thus the concept of person necessarily implies temporal existence. Also, and perhaps most important, personality implies a reference to other persons. It is said to find its greatest fulfilment in fellowship with others.⁶ A person, thus, must necessarily be a finite intelligent being, related to and confronted by other finite persons, maintaining his identity through changing mental states and at the same time constantly changing and developing into something new or yet unrealized.

If the selfhood or individuality is understood in such determinate terms, as accidental individuating qualities and development through time, such a concept would hardly seem applicable to the supreme God, who is, according to St. Thomas, an Act or pure actuality, and in whom the essence and existence are identical.

This brings us to St. Thomas Aquinas. He started with an extreme position denying any direct knowledge of non-sensible realities, including God. We can at best infer the existence of God as the Creator from the created world. We can know that God is, though we can not know what God is, that is, can have no positive knowledge of God's nature or essence through either reason or direct experience. Of course, he granted the possibility of some kind of knowledge of God by the blessed. But his general stand point favours the unknowability of God's essence through human reason. Though we can not know what God is, we can know what God is not by distinguishing Him from everything else which He is not; so that we can describe God by adding negative prefix, to all other finite concepts. God is infinite, that is not-finite immortal, that is not-mortal and so on.

Thus God is infinite, self-existent, incorporeal, eternal, immutable, impassible, transcendent and simple, according to St. Thomas. God is the supreme Being in whom the essence and existence are identical. He exists necessarily and by this Thomas means God's complete actuality, self-sufficiency and independence of any limiting

conditions. God is pure Act or pure actuality and is thus contrasted to the entire creation in which both potentiality and actuality are combined. Existence, for St. Thomas, is the most perfect of realities related to all others as their actuality.⁷ It follows that there is no duality of the actual and the potential, the existence and the essence in God. He is pure actuality or simple existence — *simplex*. The affirmation of God's infinity, eternity and self-existence, entails the affirmation of His timelessness, simultaneity or simplicity. Other negative attributes of God follow more or less necessarily from the above. God, being eternal or beyond the temporal series, is immutable. Being self-existent and self-sufficient, He is impassible, that is, does not change or suffer pain and so on.

The main emphasis in Thomas was on God's self-existence, or self-sufficiency. God being pure Act, without any potentiality, exists fully and timelessly. The best name for Him is—'He who is,' as it signifies Being itself, ever present and universal.⁸ God's self-sufficiency or perfection implies, for Thomas, the absence of any relation in Him to anything, other than Himself. All things are created by God and depend upon Him, but there is no real relation to creatures in God.⁹

Thomas adds that, God is a Mind or intelligent Being and therefore has knowledge or will, or rather 'is' knowledge and will. But his interpretation of God's knowledge and will, though quite self-consistent, is very different from the popular concepts of knowledge and will:

"His knowledge is rated by eternity. All things in time are present to God in eternity, because His glance takes in everything as present."¹⁰

St. Thomas is quite self-consistent in his approach. An ontologically supreme, eternal being is naturally transcendent to the spatio-temporal world and can not be necessarily related to that order. Even His knowledge of the events in time can not be successive or discursive like the knowledge of man. Sure, God is perfect, but His perfections are identical with His essence, so that God does not possess any perfections, such as knowledge or power but 'is' knowledge or power. Of course, Thomas acknowledges several other attributes or perfections of God, affirmed in Christian theology. But he is immediately faced by the problem as to the

sense in which the words denoting human perfections can be applied to God. We know these perfections, not as they constitute the Divine essence, but as they are found in the creatures.¹¹ So when we make some affirmations regarding God's perfections, we use the words analogically, as they are first known to us in the context of the creatures. Such words, he adds, are used primarily for God and only derivatively for men, as all the perfections signified by them flow from God to the creatures. But he admits that, from the point of view of our use of the word, we apply it first to creatures because we know them first.¹² He also contends that "terms that designate perfection, bound up with a creaturely existence, can not be applied to God, save by a figure of speech or metaphor."¹³

The use of the term person for two very different subjects — the human person and the Divine Being—has resulted in a very confused approach in Western thought. Most theologians and philosophers first use the term, person or self, in the human context, then apply it to God and argue as if the human context of the term, person does not matter. As we have seen above, the term, person implies — (a) a distinction from and a relation with other selves; (b) a distinction between the essence and existence, or subject and his attributes and activities, and (c) a distinction between potentiality and actuality which further implies (d) change in time. A person, as understood above, must be a finite being, confronted by other finite beings, and existing in the world of space time. What is more, Christian thinkers' own emphasis on the holistic view of the person, emphasising, (e) the need of the body and other accidents for a complete personality, implies that the term, person has meaning only in the context of a finite, mortal and even physical being. We do not know how the same term can be applicable to God who is, per definition, a Spirit.

True, the term person need not be applied univocally to both God and man. It is argued by the Christian theologians that the term person belongs to God in a primary sense and is used for man only in a secondary or derivative sense. But in actual practice, most of the theologio-philosophical writers use the term person for God in much the same sense in which the term is used for the human person. Since Christ is the central figure of entire Christian thought and experience, and since he is a God-Man, or a Divine Person, the concept of God, the Father, is developed mostly on the

pattern of the Son of God, that is, as a Person, Like Christ God, the Father, is also conceived to be a Person, distinct from other Persons of the Trinity, as well as other human persons, and working for the emancipation of humanity in and through history, (as exemplified in the advent of Christ).

But according to Thomas, God's eternity implies God's being beyond and unrelated to the temporal order. A God who knows all things in the form of eternity in His essence, and not discursively, is quite a different God from a God who exerts himself to realise some so far unfulfilled purpose in history. H. P. Owen seeks to reconcile the above two quite different view-points while presenting the concept of God in classical theism. To us his attempt seems to be entirely a forced one and leads to self-contradictions. For example, lest the omniscience of God lead to predetermination, he explains it in his own way that although Himself timeless, God knows all temporal events successively.¹⁴ This is not what Thomas meant by God's omniscience. A still greater difficulty is presented by such conflicting descriptions of God as immutable and impassible, on the one hand, and as not only loving and graceful, but also, as being concerned for and even involved in human history, on the other hand. As against the classical or Thomist concept of God as eternal, immutable etc., Christian experience and even modern Christian thought favour the second concept of God. According to John Caird :—

“Christian idea of God as Father of spirits... of kindred nature with our own, rejoicing in our joys, grieving with our griefs, knowing and appreciating them as not foreign to His own experience, (having) a love which is not alienated from the unworthiness of its objects.”¹⁵

John Caird goes on to elaborate the Christian idea of God :—
“True idea of His relation to the world is that of a Spirit which is ever revealing and realising itself in all things and beings, in the life of the individuals, in the order of society, in the events of history, in the progress of race.”¹⁶

John Caird was an idealist and a supporter of God's immanence in His creation. Orthodox theologians would not care for that, but would agree with his concept of God, as suffering with humanity for it is exactly what Christ did and Christ is substantially one with God. John Caird has no regard for the infinitude and impassibility

bility of God which would render Him "incapable of moral emotions of pity, compassion, delight in the good, recoil from the evil." For him the highest expression of personality is the capacity to suffer with and for others, to give or sacrifice oneself for others. And God must be such, otherwise He would fall short of the highest ideal known to man.¹⁷

Thus not only God is a Person, His personality is conceived, if not on the analogy of human personality, then, as the embodiment of the highest ideal or perfection known to us, so that :

"To conceive God as an abstract self-identical Infinite would be to make Him not greater, but less than man, to leave out from His nature elements of spiritual perfection and blessedness which finite natures contain."¹⁸

A God who suffers with mankind and even sacrifices His only Son, so that He could be free to forgive mankind, a God who seeks to realise some yet unrealised purpose through history, (and apparently often fails in His attempt, as mankind is still far, far away from the goal of the Kingdom of Heaven),¹⁹ such a God is hardly the simple, immutable, impassible God of Thomist philosophy.

Again we shall remind our readers that this is not meant as a specific critique of the Christian concept of God, but is a general critique of any determinate concept of God, which seems to reduce him to finite individual, confronted by other finite individuals (human selves) and so on. It is argued by the above group of thinkers that God must be a person, personality being the highest category known to man. This itself is a controversial contention, as within the human experience itself there are values and achievements that can be better understood in terms of transcendence of personality. Even if personality were the highest category known to man, it still does not follow that God, the Supreme, the Absolute, must not be something higher, and more comprehensive than the petty, little human person. It is a common place among mystical writers that the category of personality is a determinate one and that all determination implies negation and limitation. The concept of person implies necessarily opposition to a not-self and as such a personal God must be a finite God, confronted by His own creation and, therefore, limited thereby.

It is true that St. Thomas used the two terms *simplex* and *person* for God, and that he felt himself under no obligation to rationally coordinate the two concepts of God as a *Simplex* and as a *Person*. He started with the presumption that there are certain truths which can not be fathomed through reason and are to be accepted on the authority of revelation. Thus while God's simple, immutable, eternal Being was arrived at through reasons, God's Trinitarian and Personal nature was accepted on the unconditional authority of revelation, and as such need no philosophic justification from the Thomistic point of view. But the fact that Thomas uses the two terms—*person* and *simplex*—for God does not justify modern scholars' treatment of them as equivalent. In fact the concept of God as simple denies all that is implied in the concept of God as a *Person*. The immutable, impassible, simple God of Thomas exists in and by Himself, beyond the world of space and time. On the other hand, the concept of *person* can have meaning only in the context of space-time. Also, a *person* can neither be simple nor self-existent in the Thomistic sense. That is to say, the self-existence and simple Being of the God of Thomas presupposes a denial of God's relation or involvement in the created world, or His personal Being.

As we have seen, H. P. Owen's attempt at reconciling the two entirely different concepts of God, both affirmed in theistic thought, is not very convincing. But it has at least the merit of indirectly recognising the existence of two quite divergent concepts of God, the one developed in Thomist philosophy, and confirmed by most contemplative mystics and the other upheld in Christian theology and experience. A greater confusion is created when a thinker, like R. V. De'Smet, refuses to admit that there exists any such distinction or tension within the Christian thought. Thus R. V. De'Smet, after presenting the concept of *person* in determinate terms, as that which includes both the essence and the accidents, the soul and the body of the subject, goes on to affirm that in the case of God all these conditions are fulfilled and so God is a *Person*.²⁰ But apparently his concept of God as a *Person* is quite different, it being of a self-existent Being who does not 'possess' his perfections, but 'is' them. If so, then the term, *person*, as explained in his own essay, implying both essence and accidental qualities and including the body and so on, can hardly be applicable to the simple, undiversified Being of God. The two concepts are so

utterly different that they can hardly be treated as equivalent.

Apart from any other philosophical considerations, in the purely theistic context also we find that the attribution of personal categories to God generates a definite tension within the theistic approach. Theism, specially that of Semitic religions, insists on God's otherness, or even wholly otherness. Ninian Smart distinguishes the theistic religions approach from the mystical one and identifies the former with the numinous experience. In the numinous experience of a prophet, according to Ninian Smart, the deity stands numinously over against him. The difference between the subject and the object of numinous experience, or the creature and the Holy One, is greatly emphasised therein.²¹ Thus, the God of numinous experience is a wholly other to the soul and this implies a qualitative difference between the creatures and the Creator. The wholly otherness of the Creator, emphasised in Semitic theism, entails that no intellectual categories can be applied to Him. In the words of Rudolf Otto :

"The truly mysterious object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, because in it we come upon something inherently wholly other, whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own."²²

If so, there is no way we can apply the category of personality to God specially if the term person is first understood in terms of human personality. Significantly Rudolf Otto's numen is an 'it' for him which implies the impersonal, supra-rational being of the numen. His entire approach implicitly denies the justifiability of the application of the category of personality to the transcendental Reality.

Thus we have two types of affirmations regarding the personal Being of God. The first one not only affirms the personality of God, it naively conceives God's personality in terms of human personality. The second one tries to preserve both the transcendence, supremacy and even absoluteness of God and His personal Being. Though the first approach can hardly be defended at the philosophical level, the second has had several philosophical advocates, such as St. Thomas. One such attempt to reconcile the two apparently opposed contentions has been that of Herman Lotze. He argues for the personal Being of God on idealistic premises. He faces the argument that the self implies opposition

to the not-self and answers that the opposition from the not-self is provided by the contents of one's consciousness, so that no contrast from an external world is necessary for God. The infinite Being comprehends in Himself all that is finite, so that there is nothing outside Him. And yet in as much as He is the only self-existence, self-sufficient Substance, He is truly a personal Being. In fact personality does not belong to finite beings in a true sense, it primarily belongs to God, the personality of finite beings being but a pale copy thereof.²³

Such a concept of God would be much more defensible in philosophy, though we do not know how far it can do justice to the emotional needs of the religious soul. But more important, it is not what is meant by the term person, as it is generally understood in the theological circles. As F. C. Bradley argues :

‘For most of those who insist on what they call the personality of God are intellectually dishonest. They desire one conclusion and to reach it they argue for another. But the second, if proved, is quite different. The Deity, which they want is, of course finite, a person, much like themselves, with thoughts and feelings, limited and mutable in the process of time. They desire a person in the sense of a self amongst and over against other selves, moved by personal relations and feelings towards these others, feelings and relations which are altered by the conduct of others’.²⁴

What Bradley means here is that if the concept of personality is modified so as to be adequate for an infinite being, it would be acceptable to a mystic or a philosopher, but then that concept is not what is originally meant by the term in theistic thought. The concept of God's personal Being, as developed by such philosophers as Thomas and Lotze, is not the same as that of Christian theology and experience, or of any other theistic religious approach.

This unwillingness to treat the two concepts of *simpliciter* and person as distinct often leads Western thinkers to unwarranted assumptions. Thus R. V. De'Smet contends that the *Nirguna Brahman* of Advaita, in contradiction to *Saguna Brahman*, is the same as the personal God of Christianity. It is his argument that the concept of *Saguna Brahman* posits attributes of God that are distinct from Him and qualify Him; while according to Christian theology God does not possess attributes like knowledge and will,

but 'is' them, and therefore God's perfection do not contradict His simple nature. He also contends that the terms *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* are mistranslated as personal and impersonal. The above observations are true to a certain extent. He is also right when he contends that the concept of *Nirguṇa Brahman* can be compared to the Personal God of Christianity, if the concept of Personal God is interpreted in terms of St. Thomas.²⁵ But we must note first, that even though God's personal Being is interpreted in classical Christian theology in terms of self-existence, immutability and so on, it is not what is meant by the term, either in the popular Church theology, Christian religious experience, or even in the writings of modern Christian scholars. Secondly, though Śaṅkara's interpretation of *Sat-Cit-Anant* as the distinguishing signs (*lakṣaṇa*) of *Brahman*, identical with Him, is very similar to Thomist view of God as Simple; Śaṅkara's *Nirguṇa Brahman*, who is unqualified (*nirviśeṣa*) Pure Consciousness, is quite distinct from any concept of Personal God. The category of personality (or person) must come into the sphere of *avidyā* which is categorically distinguished by Śaṅkara from the sphere of *vidyā* or ultimate Reality (*Paramārtha satya*). As is well-known, personal being of the self is understood in Advaita as a result of the superimposition of the ego (*ahaṅkāra*) and other categories of *avidyā* on the Self (*Ātman*).²⁶ The ultimate Reality, howsoever interpreted, can never be a personal one in Advaita. This is borne out by Śaṅkara's own distinction between *Brahman* and *Īswara*.²⁷ As far as Śaṅkara is concerned, it is *Īswara* (*Saguṇa* or *Māyā-viśiṣṭha Brahman*) who is the equivalent of the Personal God of theism. Like the *Simplex* of Thomas, *Brahman* of Śaṅkara is not related to the world in his essence, the relation of Creator and created being a result of *Brahman's* false association with *māyā*. The *Brahman* of Śaṅkara, as also the *Simplex* of Thomas can not be the Personal God of theism. While the Personal God of theism must be related in the relation of love or *bhakti* (devotion), neither the *Nirguṇa Brahman* of Śaṅkara, nor the *Simplex* of Thomas, can be so related.

And yet the *Nirguṇa Brahman* of Śaṅkara is the same as the *Īswara*, even as the *Simplex* of Thomas is the same as the Personal God. While Thomas makes no attempt to rationally coordinate the two concepts, Śaṅkara is able to do so by his theory of different levels of reality and knowledge. Both philosophers clearly affirm that God or *Brahman*, as He is in Himself, can not be understood

by the limited human intellect. "What is most strikingly certain", says St. Thomas, "is that the first cause surpasses human intellect and speech. He knows God best who knows that whatever he thinks and says falls short of what God really is."²⁸

If so, then those who presume to talk of God's Personal Being, of His feeling and suffering with mankind and so on have not understood the real meaning of Thomist philosophy. Instead of treating Thomist concept of *Simplex* and Advaitic concept of *Nirguṇa-Brahman* as equivalent to the Personal God of popular Christian thought and experience, it would be better if we understood the two concepts as distinct. The two concepts can be better understood as representing the two view-points from which the self-same Reality is viewed. Śaṅkara would call these two approaches as higher and lower, absolute (*pāramārthika*) and relative (*Vyāvahārika*). Such a hierarchial arrangement may not be welcome to all. Then, we can simply distinguish them as two standpoints first refraining from saying too much about the ultimate Reality and preferring to talk of it by way of *via-negativa*, the second describing the self-same Reality as It appears to the devout soul. The latter can well be personal, while the former can not be so. If one still insists on applying the term, personal, to the ultimate Reality, as It is in Itself, then the terms must be first freed of all its relative and determinate connotations.

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NOTES

1. See R. C. Zaehner, *Mysticism Sacred and Profane*, (Oxford University Press, London, New York), Ch. s X & XII.
2. R. V. De Smet, the paper on *The Discovery of the Person*, in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol IV, No. 1, Oct., 1976, pp. 7.
3. *The Loss of the Person*, Ibid, pp 10.
4. Ernst Benz, *Concept of Man in Christian Thought*, in *The Concept of Man-A Study in Comparative Philosophy*, edited by S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju (George Allan and Unwin, London, 1966) pp. 395.
5. Alburey Castell, *The Self in Philosophy*, (The Mac-Millan Co., London, 1965), pp. 50.

6. Sec. J. E. Turner, *Essentials in the Development of Religion*, (George Allan and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1934), pp. 163 and William Temple, *Nature, Man and God* (Mac-Millan & Co., London 1935), pp. 262-3.
7. *Summa Theologia Ia* iii 7, XVI 1, 2 *Contra Gentiles* 28, from Thomas Aquinas, *Philosophical Texts*, transl. and edited by Thomas Gilby, (Oxford University Press, London, New York, 1952), pp. 70, pp. 97.
8. *Summa Theologia Ia* xiii. 11, *ibid*, p. 97.
9. *Ibid.* Ia. xiii. 7., p. 95.
10. *Ibid.* Ia. xvi. 13. p. 108.
11. *Ibid.* I. a. xiii. 2, p. 90.
12. *Ibid.* I. a. xiii. 6, p. 93.
13. *I Contra Gentiles* 30, *ibid.*, p. 91.
14. H P Owen, *Concepts, of Deity 1*(Mac-Millan, London, 1971), pp. 22
15. John Caird, *the Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, (Thomas Maclehose & Sons, Glasgow, 1904), Vol. II p. 135.
16. *Ibid*, p. 141.
17. *Ibid.* pp. 144-5.
18. *Ibid*, Vol, I, p. 70.
19. "This God is greatly bothered and thwarted by what men have doing throughout the few millenia of human existence. He takes it very seriously and thinks about little else than getting the wayward humanity into line again. To this end he has adopted various expedients." R. J. Campbell, quoted, by John Macquarrie, *Twentieth Century Religious Thought*. (S. C. M. Press, London, 1970), pp. 40.
20. R. V. De Smet, *op. cit*, pp. 13-14.
21. Ninian Smart, *The Religious Experience of Mankind*, (Collins, London 1974) pp. 366-7.
22. Rudoll Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, Transl. , by J. W. Harvey (Penguin Books, Unwin, London, 1959) p. 42.
23. Hermann Lotze, *Outlines of a philosophy of Religion*, edited by F. C. Conybeare (George Allen & Unwin, London, Charles Scribner & Sons, New York 1916). pp. 57.
24. F. H. Bradley, *Appreance and Reality*, in *Words About God*, edited by Ian, T. Ramsey (S. C. M. Press, London 1971). p. 70.
25. R. V. De'Smet, Paper on *Rediscovery of the Person*, in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* Vol. IV., No. 3, April 1971, p. 419.
26. See *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* or Śaṅkara's Introduction to *Brahma Sutras*.
27. Śaṅkara, *Bhāṣya on Brahma Sutras* 1. 2.2, I.1.14 II. 1.19 etc.
28. *Opusc. X, Philosophical Texts*, pp. 88-9.

