

MAN AS ESSENTIALLY DIALOGIC

The Epistemic unity of the Problem and Method in Martin Buber's Philosophy of Man

This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part we shall present Buber's criticism against three anthropological types viz. Individualism, Collectivism and Scienticism on the basis of their methodological inadequacies so far as knowledge of man by man is concerned, and connect this criticism as a whole to a basic unity of the problem and method—a unity that is persistent though not explicit in his philosophy of man. We shall argue that Buber's conception of man as essentially dialogic unifies knowledge of man and dialogue as the sole method for reaching this knowledge into an epistemic whole. In the second part we shall trace back this unity of the problem and method to Buber's conception of the primitive function of human knowledge or man's basic knowledge situation as what holds between *I* and *Thou*.

PART I

Anthropology, for Buber, is not individualistic, collectivistic or scientific but dialogic. First three types derive what man is from their respective standpoints. By doing this they presuppose what they want to establish. As a result their derivative remains unjustified. The dialogical philosopher confronts man *here* and *now*—in his presence and wholeness. He does not dissect man—the *subject* of this study—from this or that point of view, in terms of his this or that aspect.

Individualistic anthropology arises out of a cosmic homelessness¹. Man by becoming aware of himself through his intentionality of perception makes an object of everything. He then discovers that in a world of objects he alone is not an object. Cosmic homelessness results from the dissolution of the assimilation of man's nature to 'nature' as a given totality. With this dissolution man discovers himself as a lone individual in isolation from everything other than himself. Individualistic anthropology emerges from the acceptance and glorification of this isolated position of man. On this point Buber says :

...he accepts his isolation as a person, for only a monad which is not bound to others can know and glorify itself as an individual to the utmost. To save himself from the despair with which his solitary state threatens him, man resorts to the expedient of glorifying it.²

But man's meaning consists not in his ability to live among objects, but in making the objects meaningful. The full picture of man includes his *conscious objectification* of objects. If we keep him away from his this meaning-assigning activity, his own meaning is lost and the meaning-governed world in relation to which he is becomes meaningless. Thus 'I' alone cannot be the starting point of philosophical anthropology. Individualistic anthropology is therefore rooted in a kind of deification of the individual—in his "having" himself. It is true that, for Buber, the strict anthropological question, (that is, the question concerning man himself) is faced by man in solitude, and a genuine philosophical anthropology build up and crystalize everything that is discovered *about* human beings "round what the philosopher discovers by reflecting about himself."³ All this is very easily susceptible to a confusion with the traditional idealists' dogma emphasizing the primacy of 'I' or self. But Buber makes it clear that to get an answer to the question raised in solitude, the solitude has to be overcome and true self-knowledge cannot be had by *having* oneself. *Having* must be distinguished from *being*. Buber says :

So long as you "have" yourself, have yourself as an object, your experience of man is only as of a thing among things, the wholeness which is to be grasped is not yet "there"; only when you *are*, and nothing else but that, is the wholeness there, and able to be grasped. You perceive only as much as the reality of the "being there" incidentally yields to you; but you do perceive that, and the nucleus of the crystalization develops itself.⁴

In other words, self-knowledge i.e. knowledge of oneself is not to be disintegrated from the knowledge of one's being which consists in 'wholeness'. The wholeness cannot be *had* or *possessed*, but confronted. This confrontation is possible only in a sphere of 'betweenness'—the sphere of *I* confronting *Thou* and *Thou* confronting *I*, where *I* posits itself as a *Thou* to the other and does not make itself an object of self-observation, self-analysis and experiment as the psychologist⁵ does. In answer to the claim that by

applying the psychologist's method we experience the "inner" world of the individual's self-hood as contrasted with his "outer" world, Buber would exclaim:

Inner things or outer things, what they are but things and things.⁶

Hence a distinction has to be strictly maintained between self-possession or self-enclosedness and self-knowledge. True self-knowledge can be reached only dialogically, by the primary reference to "Thou". When the self itself is a *Thou*, Buber says:

The "I" emerges as a single element out of the primal experiences, out of the vital primal words *I — affecting — Thou and Thou — affecting — I*, only after they have been split as under and the participle has been given eminence as an object.⁷

The in between sphere is pervaded by an element of *certainty*. As long as I do not *have* myself, but simply *am* i.e. *am a Thou* to the other, I cannot be translated into an a personal *object*, and sent to the dead past. Thus the existential certainty of my *being* owes to *Thou*. Every man has this *in-borne Thou*, or to be more precise, every man *is an in-borne Thou*,⁸ and the knowledge of man or oneself can take place only dialogically.

Collectivistic anthropology results from social homelessness which consists in the person's awareness of his isolation "in the midst of the tumultuous human world."⁹ From this viewpoint, man displaces the centrality of his concrete being into the centre of an abstraction which is society. Though man seemingly regains his being through the others, by this displacement of his identity he loses it but cannot find it again in society. Collectivistic anthropology arises when man instead of overcoming this homelessness and isolation is overpowered and numbered by it, and then glorifies society as a true citadel where he is no more lone and is in his own being. There is no programmatic criticism against positivists' notion of man and society in Buber's writings, but the critique is implicit in them. Social positivism too is based on a deification of society and reification of man into a mere instrument of society. It accepts society as a "second nature" consisting in absolute laws for the social scientist; the laws are unchangeable and man's life has to be in conformity with those laws. From the very beginning, positivism introduced "second nature" to intellectual discourse

"not as a historical phenomenon, a puzzle to be explained, but as an *a priori* assumption."¹⁰ Buber's description of collectivistic anthropology perfectly tallies with positivists' view of man and society. He says :

Here the human being tries to escape his destiny of solitude by becoming completely embedded in one of the massive group formations. The more massive, unbroken and powerful in it's achievements this is, the more the man is able to feel that he is saved from both forms of homelessness, the social and the cosmic. There is obviously no further reason for dread of life, since one needs only to fit oneself into the "general will" and let one's own responsibility for an existence which has become all too complicated be absorbed in collective responsibility, which proves, itself able to meet all complications. Likewise, there is obviously no further reason for dread of the universe, since technicized nature—with which society as such manges well, or seems to—takes the place of the universe which has become uncanny and with which, so to speak, no further agreement can be reached. The collective pledges itself to provide total security. There is nothing imaginary here, a dense reality rules, and the "general" itself appears to have become real...¹¹

Thus a notion of society as sacred by itself emerges.¹² This anthropology, instead of searching for sociality in man himself—in his interhuman dispositions, subsumes him under a presumed ontology of society. Buber says :

"...collectivism does not see *man* at all, it sees only society.¹³" According to him, while individualism distorts the face of man because it sees him only in relation to himself (and, for Buber, that is not the 'relation' in true sense), collectivism masks it.¹⁴ The method it suggests is the method of *deriving* man from an abstract entity called 'society'. With this method we do not *meet* man but *look* at him through the spectacles of a faceless crowd. We know or seem to know what he *seems* to be, but not what he is or more precisely *who* he is. He remains a *he*, and does not become a *Thou* by our act of addressing. Without envisaging the *relation*, we succumb to a *division*. But, as far as Buber is concerned, this division is unreal from the point of view of the relation. He says:

.. modern collectivism is essentially illusory. The person is joined to the reliably functioning "whole", which embraces the masses of men; but it is not a joining of man to man. Here the person is not freed from his isolation by communing with living beings; which thenceforth lives with him; the "whole" with its claim on the wholeness of every man, aims logically and successfully at reducing, neutralizing, devaluating and desecrating every bond with living beings.¹⁵

It violates the fundamental status of man as "Thou" which can be known by an "I" only through *meeting*.

For Buber the main problem of philosophical anthropology is to know the whole man. It is a problem which cannot be dealt with in a naturalistic fashion. The medical and biological sciences raise questions concerning man "in his relation to nature, to natural history, the evolution of organisms, and the physical forces regulating his body.." ¹⁶ They ask, as Friedman puts it, "what is man as a natural object, a physical or biological organism?" ¹⁷ And, Friedman writes

..it was upon this natural basis that all the other sciences of man—anthropology, sociology, political science, and finally the new freudian science of psychoanalysis—asked their question, what is man? What is the natural man, what is the primitive man, as opposed to the man created by socio-political, cultural, and economic forces? What is man in his natural inheritance, in his prehistory as the human animal or primate or primitive? Thus none of the sciences were asking the *whole* question, what is man? Nor were they asking the unique question, who am I, in my uniquely human essence..? ¹⁸

It is a mistake to think that Buber is concerned with an abstract metaphysical unity in terms of human essence. The essence of man points to his uniqueness which is not fixed, but diversified. This diversity can be experienced or grasped not in terms of any systematic knowledge structure, but in dialoguing with him as a *Thou*, in an *un-usual* cognitive sphere where he as a *Thou* unfolds himself to an *I*. This *presence* or unfolding the presence is incessant in that in-between sphere. Thus buber's approach to man is fundamentally *synchronic* as opposed to *diachronic*. Essence is *existentially necessitated* through dialogue and immediacy—in being more than an essence. It signifies a *surplus* in man.¹⁹ This sur-

plus can be sensed as man unfolds himself as a *Thou*, presents himself as a whole being. Thus the basic truth about the *whole* man turns to be dialogue itself. This truth is not in any extrinsic but in an intrinsic relation to the wholeness. It too cannot be divided or estranged from the wholeness. Man's being dialogic precedes all other conceptualizations about his nature, since it is not just another name for his essence—but concretized in "I-affecting-Thou and Thou affecting-I", in man's revelation of himself and the knowledge of man by man. It is *in* and *with* dialogue that man unfolds himself in his wholeness, as the *Thou* to be addressed by the *I*. Hence dialogue becomes the method of knowing man as well as the comprehensive essence of man. Each of the three anthropological types consists of a self-contradiction.

The contradiction in individualistic anthropology is that there the anthropologist cannot study himself because he is not an object. For him, only objects can be studied; when he attempts to study his subjectivity is reified. But, at the same time he knows that he is not an object.

In collectivistic anthropology, the basic contradiction lies in the fact that the anthropologist studies himself only as a part of a whole whose centre is outside himself.

In scientific anthropology the effort is to grasp the centrality of man's being in terms of some specificities of him in an unrelated fashion.

Buber's rejection of these three anthropological types indicates their methodological inappropriateness too in regard to the problem-situation. The methods they propose are not anchored in the perspective of the problem. Individualists, collectivists and scientists presuppose their respective standpoints and envisage the methods accordingly. Hence the methods become grounded more on standpoint than on the understanding of the problem-situation. The way we envisage a problem determines the method. In the case of individualistic anthropology, the method becomes an isolationistic introspectivism. In collectivism, it involves a misplaced holism i.e. it studies an entity not in its wholeness but in terms of another entity of which it is merely a part. It studies the entity in terms of its disintegration into that of which it is a part, and not in terms of its dynamic relations of its own being as whole. In scientific anthropology, the various facets of man's reality are taken into

consideration but not the centrality of his being in its completeness.

For Buber the very understanding of this problem requires a dialogic interaction on the part of the anthropologist. He says about this anthropologist:

In the moment of life he has nothing else in his mind but just to live what is to be lived, he is there with his whole being, undivided, and for that very reason there grows in his thought and recollection the knowledge of human wholeness.²⁰

The way Buber envisages man is neither as an object nor as a subject but a *subject-object* who can comprehend the subject-object nature of another human being into his consciousness.

Prof. Richard L. Lanigan says :

... a person can perceive himself as a self or appearing subject in contradistinction to himself as an object or material appearance. The most contemporary development of this idea is, of course, Martin Buber's "I-Thou" bifurcation which is a personal way of referring to the subject and object constitution of a person... In such a conceptual framework, the objective mode of perception in which a person engages his own thought is the process of perceiving not 'myself', but 'oneself'. The person perceives the other in himself and this perception constitutes the dimension of thought in the lived person. That is, perception as thought is the horizontal process by which the person monitors his subjectivity as a modality of his body and the objectivity of his body as a modality of his subjectivity. Thus, there is not subject and object proper, only the person as appearing subjectivity and objectivity in appearance.²¹

For Buber, the proper mode of understanding man's being is possible only by avoiding the negation of consciousness that comes through self-reflection and avoiding the negation of being through objectification. Thus the centrality of his being is retained. Now, this can be done only through a dialogue in which exists an awareness of the relationality of the mutual reflectibility of each consciousness in the other, which is dynamic, infinite and therefore living. Only a dynamic and not a static awareness of what is dynamic is possible. And a *Being-seen* nature can be grasped in its entirety only through a *Being-seen* approach. Thus a dialogical nature of man necessitates the dialogical approach for the study of man.

Hence, the essence of philosophical anthropology consists in a meta-dialogical description of the dialogic nature of man.

Dialogue i. e. living what is to be lived is not a mere means to reach the specific knowledge i. e. knowledge of man, it is an end too. It connotes a unity of means and end, of method in the subject and subject itself, of essence and existence. In this connection let us clear out one possible objection. Since the wholeness of man has to be confronted only personally, that is, between man and man, the knowledge acquired at that level cannot serve as a foundation of our knowledge of man at the universal level. Now, we should bear in mind that Buber is avowedly against the so-called personalism which *has* the man or person instead of experiencing his *being*. Thus, for Buber, knowledge is personal so far as it is dialogic—arising out of the ‘betweenness’ and not from the knower or the known taken in isolation from each other. Secondly, the objection itself is conditioned by a pre-planned abstraction. The abstraction is that of “man” — a universal concept from man—a subject of dialogue, a subject for knowing the other. In view of the Buberian perspective the *concept* of man as such is not a separate entity to be reflected upon. His approach to man is a concrete and integrated one wherein communication precedes contemplations and interpretations. Contemplations and interpretations are not irrelevant to the study of man. But they are posterior to communication. The misconception that the concept of man is to be *derived* from an abstruse essentialist level, and thus a strict split between the universal man and the existential man, is the result of putting much emphasis on the *what-ness* of what has so far been considered to be the most fundamental question of philosophical anthropology, namely, ‘what is man’? If the emphasis is shifted from *what* to *is* of the question, the situation is not changed satisfactorily. Since dialogue is the existential modality which constitutes both the essence of man as well as our method of cognizing it, the fundamental question of philosophical anthropology, we may believe, should be *who is man?* rather than *what is man?* Philosophical anthropology cannot be a sheer theoretical enterprise providing knowledge of man and methods for acquiring such knowledge. It is essentially a praxis unfolding the surplus in man in—and—through dialogic involution. We can claim to know man only when we realize his fellowship in such involution, because, he is essentially a fellow human being — a *Thou*, not an impersonal *He* or *It*.

Part II

Buber's conception of man as dialogic goes back to his view that *Thou-orientation* is the most primitive factor in the acquisition of human knowledge. The method that he advocates in philosophical anthropology has its germ in his conception of primitive man standing in an existential relation to the world. Here his view of the genesis of human knowledge as through dialogue is grounded on his insight into the lives of the primitive peoples which were charged with presentness "within a narrow circle of acts" and with a very limited stock of objects. He says : "**In The Beginning Is Relation**"²². In a rather poetic narration of "natural man", he says :

The elementary impressions and emotional stirrings that waken the spirit of "natural man" proceed from incidents — experience of being confronting him — and from situations — life with a being confronting him that are relational in character. He is not disquieted by the moon that he sees every night, till it comes bodily to him, sleeping or waking, draws near and charms him with a silent movements, or fascinates him with the evil or sweetness of its touch.²³

World as *Thou*, in its personified form unfolds itself before the primitive knower. Here knowledge becomes essentially relational. But it is at the pre-verbal level. Buber describes it as a relation which "sways in gloom, beneath the level of speech." He says about it :

Creatures live and move over against us, but cannot come to us, and when we address them as *Thou* our words cling to the threshold of speech.²⁴

This primitive function of knowledge does not know any analysis, reflection or in one word, separation. It knows the *relation*, and not the *object* as an independent being, having its very own structure. Here relation itself is the "category of being, readiness, grasping form, mould for the soul."²⁵ Another recent anthropological observation of this primitive function of human knowledge puts it in this fashion :

For modern, scientific man the phenomenal world is primarily an 'It'; for ancient and also for primitive man it is a 'Thou' The world appears to primitive man neither inanimate nor empty but redundant with life . . .²⁶

We cannot envisage any concept of Being—as—such beyond this relational sphere. The moment we do that, the *whole* is divided, and the Being is no more a Being. It becomes a scientific or metaphysical abstraction. Thus in case of Buber, fundamental ontology is mingled up with human ontology, the ontology that holds *between I and Thou* being and being.

If 'I-Thou' follows a 'natural combination', there is a 'natural separation too.'²⁷ The natural separation comes when self-consciousness or 'I' grows and 'Thou' "retires and remains isolated in memory". 'Thou' is objectified either as *He/She* or *It*. Thus man's attitude towards the world becomes two-fold in terms of two relations viz. "I-Thou" and "I-It". We can believe that Buber does not use the word 'relation' in these two spheres in an identical sense. In the case of the "*I and It*" relation, relation is conceived more in the sense of division, because, in I-It, division of the self and its object i.e. knower and the known or knowable precedes the specific form of relation that holds therein. In other words, in I—It, relation becomes *technical* demanding thereby observation, analysis, reflection on the part of the self. Here knowledge is relational precisely in this sense. This stepping down from the level of 'I-Thou' to 'I-It' has been styled by Buber as "the exalted melancholy of our fate."²⁸ It is exalted because it makes knowledge structure possible. It is necessary because we have to confront the *whole*, the *Thou* in newer and newer ways and situations; knowing the other never ends, it is an unfinished task. It is a melancholy because it gives rise to the knowledge of selfhood as differentiated from the other, and the knowledge of selfhood is always a knowledge of solitude. But this knowledge of solitude is required to raise the strict anthropological question, to launch a conscious and philosophical project to know the other by individuating him at a *distance* in his own *uniqueness* and by entering into relation with him as a *Thou*. It requires both acceptance and confirmation of the other — the *Thou*. It is a much more sophisticated use of *Thou*, and different from the primitive sense of *Thou*. The non-human world which was addressed by the primitive man becomes a *Thou* once more in the realm of art. For Buber, art is the realm of 'the between';²⁹ and "The artist is the man who instead of objectifying what is over against him forms it into an image."³⁰ Along with the formation of the world of 'I—It', we know what 'distance' and 'relation' are, that our realization of self-hood is a *by-product*

of this natural separation, not the *goal*, and that our goal is to complete the distance by entering into relation.³¹ Thus there is a constant shifting from 'I—It' to 'I—Thou' and vice-versa. The world of 'I—It' is ordered, systematized. But it is not the sole reality. If it is considered to be so, it will be a 'useless fragment'. Hence Buber points to the "other part of the basic truth" by saying "a world that is ordered is not the world—order."³² The world-order, for Buber, as it appears, consists in both 'I—It' and 'I—Thou.' 'I—Thou' is the primordial source of knowledge in the case of the primitive man as well as that of the child. The child comes to the knowledge of external reality as *It* only through his personal relation with other human beings, through his longing for a *Thou*. Buber writes :

The development of the soul in the child is inextricably bound up with that of the longing for the *Thou*, with the satisfaction and the disappointment of this longing, with the game of his experiments and the tragic seriousness of his perplexity."³³

A language cannot be taught to a child unless the teacher sets a relation of communion with the child. The child seeks a dialogue with his parents. In course of his growth he tries to get on the level of understanding his parents have. He becomes acquainted and familiar with the language-structure given in a society (the *langue*) through his individual communicative acts (the *parole*) with his parents. The urge for relation is the only initial urge on the part of a child. With this urge, he responds to a *Thou*, not an *It*; he comes to know the *It* which, in our example, is the given language-structure consisting of common usage, definite symbols for certain things and actions metaphors etc. etc., and then differentiates this world of *Its* from the world of *Thous*. In other words, the child's self is *enabled* to make the distinction between the things in the world and himself, to understand the distance between the other and himself, and then finally to build up a wholesome personality by filling up the distance between the other and himself through the cultivation of relation. This enabling of self is possible only when his in-borne thou is unfolded.³⁴ A directness to the *in-borne Thou* cannot be practised in terms of any given meaning-structure, i.e. to say that which has been hardened into an *It*. Rather, as Fridman writes :

Only I-Thou gives meaning to the world of It, for I-Thou is

an end which is not reached in time but is there from the start, originating and carrying through.³⁵

'I—It has a *projected meaning* received from 'I—Thou'. The world of 'It' does not have any vital force in itself. Buber writes :

...again and again that which has the status of object must blaze up into presentness and enter the elemental state from which it came, to be looked on and lived in the present by men.³⁶

If we imagine the world of 'I—Thou' as a whole to be a single individual and the world of 'I—It' to be his image-work, as an art-form, then we can think of a cosmic dialogue between these two worlds.

Thus, according to Buber, dialogue becomes a portentous element of human life only because of the fact that man himself is a 'Thou' innately and eternally. It signifies also the true sense of human freedom. So long as the other does not appear, I may be free *in myself*, in a sort of homogeneity. But the moment the other appears, *my* freedom ranges out to *his* freedom and *he* becomes *Thou*. As long as the other does not appear, my freedom remains in a confinement, and therefore does not become a freedom in its true and complete sense; I cannot become myself. If freedom is a norm and value of human existence, it is man's duty to unfold his *Thou* to another *Thou*, and thereby to posit the other in his presence, surplus and wholeness.

The ontological leap from both the self-enclosed self and the thinghood of the thing to an in-between sphere of 'I—Thou' is an index of a serious and significant change in the methodological enquiries of philosophical anthropology. This is rooted in its envisagement of the problem-situation in terms of approaching the whole man. Knut Hanneborg writes :

The problem arises out of the co-presence in my experience of, on the one hand, an idea of man as a *whole*, of which there is *one* truth, and on the other, the many partial and special pictures of the sciences and the other cultural forces.³⁷

If the task of understanding in Dilthey's sense is "to discover a living system in the given" and that being possible because "the system which exists in my own lived experience, and is experienced in

numberless instances with all its inherent possibilities is always present and available",³⁸ even then the question "how is the very initiation into a conceptual scheme consisting of human expressions possible?" So far as the human studies are concerned, this initiation means taking a stand in relation with the humanity of which the expressions are. Metadialogue as a method in philosophical anthropology consists in the act of initiating oneself into the human reality i.e. taking a stand in relation with the other, as well, as understanding the elements *within* the horizon. This method can be extended to other human studies too. Cross-cultural understanding, understanding the socio-economic background of a society, critical reflection on the evils of society etc. etc., are best accomplished by sociologists, anthropologists, economists and philosophers when the society under investigation is *lived*, concepts and values prevailing there are internalized and felt in dialogic interaction.

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NOTES

1. Martin Buber: *Between Man and Man*. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith, London, 1947, Kegan Paul, London, pp. 200. Hence forward *BMM*.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-125.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
6. Martin Buber: *I and Thou*. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith, New York, 1958, Charles Scribne's sons, p. 5.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
9. *BMM*, p. 200.
10. Zygmunt Bauman : *Towards a Critical Sociology*. Routledge Direct-Editions, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London & Boston, 1976, Chap. 1 p. 8.
11. *BMM*, p. 201.
12. Starley Diamond : *Towards the Definition of A Sacred Society Humanitus*. Vol : XV; No. 1; Feb 79.

13. *BMM*, p. 200.
14. *Ibid*, p. 200.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
16. Martin Buber: *The Knowledge of Man*. Edited with an Introduction by Maurice Friedman. Translated by Maurice Friedman and Ronald G. egor Smith, New York, 1965, Harper & Row, Publishers, p. 19. See the Introductory Essay by Friedman in the book.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 19. Henceforward *KM*.
18. *Ibid*, p. 19.
19. The concept of *Surplus in Man* is in Rabindra Nath Tagore's *Religion of Man*.
20. *BMM*, p. 126.
21. Richard L. Lanigan, *Speech Act Phenomenology*. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977, p. 93.
22. *I and Thou*, p. 18.
23. *Ibid*, p. 19.
24. *Ibid*, p. 6.
25. *Ibid*, p. 27.
26. H. and H. A. Frankfort, John, A. Willson and Thorkild Jacobsen: *Before Philosophy*. Baltimore Maryland, 1968, pp. 13-14.
27. *I and Thou*, p. 24.
28. *Ibid*, p. 16.
29. *KM*, p. 165 (Buber's essay *Man and His Image-work in KM*).
30. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
31. *I and Thou*, p. 31.
32. *Ibid*, p. 28.
33. *Ibid*, p. 28.
34. R. C. Gandhi in his book *Presuppositions of Human Communications*. Delhi, Oxford Univ. Press, 1974, talks about the ability of human beings to address one another as a necessary presupposition of human communication.
35. Maurice S. Friedman: *Martin Buber—The Life of Dialogue*. New York 1960, Harper & Row, p. 67.
35. *I and Thou*, p. 40.
37. H. A. Hodges: *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey* Routledge & Kegan paul Ltd. London, 1952. P. 19.