

AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE CONCEPT OF INDRIYA*

We propose to study here about the definition, number, mode of exercise of *indriyas* and our knowledge thereabout and flash out some points about them which are not known to have been attempted so far. Of course, authors like Prof. Datta¹ and Prof. Sinha² have dealt with the concept of *indriya* at some length, but we find that their treatments are confused and misdirected ones. The starting point of the discussion about *indriyas* is taken to be Vidyāraṇya's critique on the subject in his *vivaraṇaprameyasam-graha*³ and we shall also take our start from this point.

Vidyāraṇya refers to three conceptions of *indriya* and rejects them one by one. The first one is of the Bauddhas who are said to advocate that *indriyas* are *golakas*,⁴ that is 'orifices'⁵ or 'sockets' in the body.⁶ But Vidyāraṇya points out that there are certain difficulties in conceiving *indriyas* in this way. The snake does not have the *golaka* called ear, but still it is said to hear. Similar is the case with trees. They are said to perceive,⁷ but allegedly do not possess any *golaka*. The Bauddhas, however, can put up a defence by saying that snakes do not actually hear and trees do not actually perceive. But allowing that snake hear sounds they can uphold their position by contending that those who say that snakes hear endow their eyes with the power of hearing. In that case, the one and the same *golaka* sees as well as hears. And in case of trees it would not be difficult to locate *golakas* on their trunks through which they can be said to perceive. But the opponent can then retort that it would be better not to identify *indriya* as *golakas* than to assign more than one specific type of functions to one and the same *golaka*.

It is for this reason perhaps that the second conception does not wish to identify *indriyas* as *golakas*, but it is unable to form a conception of *indriya* independent of *golaka*. This view which is ascribed to the Mimāṃsakas⁸ seeks to identify *indriyas* as *śakti* or potency of *golakas*. Vidyāraṇya rejects this view because

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the same difficulty that presumably confronted the Buddha's view confronts this view too. That is to say, if the Mīmāṃsaka's view is accepted, then the snakes cannot be said to hear and the trees cannot be said to perceive simply because they do not possess the requisite *golaka* and *a fortiori*, cannot be in possession of *śakti* of that *golakas*. A similar debate as imagined between the Buddhas and a follower of Vidyāraṇya can well be imagined here between the Mīmāṃsaka and a follower of Vidyāraṇya. But Vidyāraṇya makes a fresh point here. He says that if it be considered *lāghava* or parsimonious to conceive of the potency of *golaka* than to conceive of a mighty substance (*śaktisāli dravyāntara*) as the seat of the powers of sight, sound, smell, taste and touch,⁹ it would be still more parsimonious to conceive of an *Ātmā* as the seat of all these powers.

Vidyāraṇya has his own axe to grind. He intends to construct a framework with only one category. i. e., a monistic framework. He, therefore, craves for unity of all *indriyas*. *Ātmā*, as per his reasoning, subserves the ground of such unity. And for this reason he has got to reject the third view also. The third view referred to by him is advocated by the Naiyāyikas.¹⁰ According to this view, *indriyas* are neither *golakas* nor their *śaktis*, but something different from them both. Vidyāraṇya takes the Naiyāyika as postulating the existence of as many substances as there are types of perception : visual, tactual and so on and argues that there is no justification for additional substances over and above only one.

The next controversy is regarding the number of *indriyas*. According to some there is only one *indriya* and according to some others there are as many as eleven *indriyas* and in between these the number varies according to the variation of the principles as to what counts as an *indriya*. The lexicographical meaning of '*indriya*' is 'that over which the human being exercises control.' *Prima facie*, it appears that there are many parts over which the human being exercises control. According to his will, he may use and stop or refrain from using the parts called ears, eyes, nose, tongue and touch or skin to have perception of the world of objects. But then the human being exercises control over the parts called hands, feet, teeth, excreting and generating organs, vocal chord, etc. Although these parts scarcely help in having perception of the world of objects they help in reacting towards them. Again

it is not only the world of objects which the human being perceives and towards which he reacts. He also perceives and reacts towards certain states of his own like pleasure, pain, hunger, thirst, etc. which are called internal states. Some, therefore, feel obliged to postulate an internal sense for perceiving these states and reacting towards these. So depending upon the definition and logic of the term '*indriya*' its number varies. The Bauddhas fix the number at five. These are the senses of sight, sound, smell, taste and touch. But they are of the view that smell and taste are modifications of touch. So, although they do not say that *indriyas* are only three in number, namely that of sight, sound and touch, they can say that these *indriyas*, sight, sound and touch are primary ones and the others, smell and taste are secondary or derivative ones. But if this distinction between primary and secondary *indriyas* be further pursued one can very well conclude that there is only one primary *indriya* and all others are modifications of it.¹¹ The Mīmāṃsakas postulate six *indriyas* out of which five are external (*bāhyam*), namely the *indriyas* of sight, sound, smell, taste and touch and the other one is internal (*ābhyantaram*), namely mind. Although the Mīmāṃsakas admit mind as an *indriya* this admission does not appear to be quite in conformity with their basic epistemological standpoint. As already stated, the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the *indriyas* are *golaka-śaktis*. Therefore, if they will to count mind or *manas*, as an *indriya* they will have to regard it as *śakti* of a *golaka*. But then there will be difference between the *golakas* whose *śaktis* are the *indriyas* of sight, sound, smell, taste and touch and the *golaka* whose *śakti* is *manas*.¹² This results in a quandary. Yet the Mīmāṃsakas appear to be under a logical duress to admit *manas* as an *indriya*. They maintain that perception is *sākṣāt pratitḥ* or direct apprehension which arises out of sense-object contact. In order that perception of the internal states, like pleasure and pain may be possible, a sense-organ must be there to make necessary contact with these objects of experience. This seems to be an antinomy in the mīmāṃsaka's theory of perception that there cannot be an *indriya* called *manas* and that there must be an *indriya* called *manas*.

In the *Nyāya Sūtras* Gautam advocates for five *indriyas* caving out *manas*.¹³ Vātsyāyana, while commenting on them advocates for six *indriyas* counting *manas* as one.¹⁴ There seems to be a logical difficulty about Gautama's position. His definition

of *pratyakṣa* or perception is laid down in terms of *indriyārtha sannikarṣa* or sense-object contact.¹⁵ He also maintains that there are five *buddhilakṣanas* or characters of knowledge. In order that perception of pleasure, pain, etc. might be there alongside of perception of sight, sound, smell, taste and touch the characters of knowledge are required to be six in number and not just five. If the statements as 'I am happy', 'I feel pain', etc., are to be regarded as pieces of knowledge, perceptual knowledge for that matter, then an *indriya* is required to be there. This *indriya* cannot be the *indriya* of sight, sound, smell, taste and touch. It must be different from all these, but Gautama does not postulate any such. As a result, his position appears to lack consistency. In order to make such a position consistent, three alternatives appear to be open. They are :

(1) If one defines perception in terms of sense-object contact but does not admit *manas* as an *indriya* as Gautama does, then one has got to declare that such statements as 'I am happy', 'I feel pain', etc., do not signify perceptual knowledge. As it becomes absurd to treat them as signifying non-perceptual knowledge, one has got to declare that they are not at all cases of knowledge.¹⁶

(2) If one does not admit *manas* as an *indriya* and offer arguments thereto, but admits such statements as 'I am happy', 'I feel pain', etc. as cases of knowledge, particularly of perceptual knowledge, then one has got to define perception in terms of anything but sense-object contact. The author of *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* is in favour of this alternative..

(3) If one defines perception in terms of sense-object contact and at the same time regards such statements as 'I am happy', 'I feel pain', etc. as cases of perceptual knowledge, then one has got to admit an *indriya* like *manas*. Vātsyāyana chooses this alternative perhaps finding that the *Sūtras* of Gautama are inconsistent on this score.

Trying to be consistent Vātsyāyana regards the two eyes as two *indriyas*. And so he has to regard the two ears as two *indriyas* and possibly the twin-nostrilled nose as two *indriyas*.¹⁷ That is, if he wants to be thoroughly consistent, the number of *indriyas* for him would be nine. But other difficulties may arise. However, Udyotakara, regards the two eyes as one single *indriya* considering perhaps that the functions of both the eyes in the organism are not different.

The above discussion regarding the determination of the number of *indriyas* raises a pertinent question as to the method of determining the number of *indriyas*. The Bauddhas who hold the view that the *indriyas* are *golakas* would be led to say, by implication, that it is by perception that the number of *indriyas* is determined. This supposed view of the Bauddhas has to free itself from the objection, in the first place, that it involves a paradox. It is maintained that perception of any object takes place through and by means of *indriyas* and again it is maintained that *indriyas* are themselves the objects of perception. This apparent paradox can be avoided if the Bauddhas do not subscribe to a view of, what may be called, inter-perceivability of *indriyas*. That is to say, the eye does not see itself¹⁸ (the possibility of the eye seeing itself in a mirror being not admitted on the ground that the eye does not, in this case, see *itself*, but its *reflection*,¹⁹ the nose does not smell itself, the ear does not hear itself, the palate does not taste itself and the skin does not touch itself.) But the eye, as it is located in the human organism, does normally see the tongue, the nose and the skin; similarly, the skin can touch the eyes, the nose, the palate and the ears; the ears can hear the sounds produced at the areas of the eyes, the skin, the tongue and the nose; the nose can smell the skin and sometimes the tongue. Although the index finger of a particular person cannot be properly said to index itself, it is not improper to say that the index fingers of other persons can index at it.²⁰ In this way inter-perceivability of *indriyas* is possible, that is one particular *indriya* is perceivable by more than one of its co-*indriya*. But it may be objected here that this view of inter-perceivability of *indriyas* involves a vicious circle. One particular *indriya* is said to be perceived by other co-*indriyas*, but how was any *indriya* located at all? To this it may be pointed out in reply that the enquiry of the philosopher is not that of a geneticist enquiring into the very origin of things. The philosopher takes for granted the things that are there and as they are and sets out for a neat and compact categorisation of them. This point will be taken up for a more detailed discussion later on.

However, this view regarding the inter-perceivability of *indriyas* holds good only if the *indriyas* are conceived as *golakas* as the Bauddhas do. This will not hold good if the *indriyas* are conceived as *golaka-śaktis* as the Mimāmsakas do, *śakti* being supposed as non-tangible. This will not also hold good if the *indriyas* are

conceived as *buddhilakṣanas* as the Naiyāyikas do. The Mimāṃsaka would perhaps agree with the Naiyāyika in holding that the *indriyas* are *anindriyam*, that means the *indriyas* are not perceivable by themselves.²¹ According to the Naiyāyikas, as we already know, knowledge has five characters. That knowledge has so many characters can be established only by a logical analysis of the concept of knowledge.

It is a fact that the knowing being or the percipient comes in contact with the world of variegated objects through and by means of *indriyas*. The *indriyas* are conceived as door-ways of such contact with the objects. Although there is divergence of views as to whether the whole corpus of perceptual knowledge is given by the senses or not, there is general convergence that at least a chunk of perceptual knowledge is given by the senses as a result of *sannikarṣa* or contact of an *indriyas* with an *artha* or object.

Let us now explore as to how one may understand this idea of *sannikarṣa* in different conceptions of *indriyas*. According to the Bauddhas the *sannikarṣa* or the *phāssa*, as they call it, takes place exactly in the way in which two rams but together. Buddhaghōṣa, an eminent Bauddha, distinguishes the objects of sense into *asaṃpāttarūpa* and *saṃpāttarūpa*. The former includes the objects of sight and sound in which case the concerned *indriya* does not come in contact with the object and the latter includes objects of smell, taste and touch in which case the concerned *indriya* comes in contact with the object.²² But if this *sannikarṣa* is understood somewhat like the butting of two rams, then there may not be a *sannikarṣa* between the *indriya* of smell and the *artha* of smell in this way. Sometimes the smell of flowers, etc. are carried to the olfactory sense through air in which case there is perception, short of a contact. If someone puts an objection in this way, it can be met by explaining that in the instance cited above it is the scented air which is smelt by the nose and there is nothing short of a contact here. But then one may point out that such is also the case with sight and sound. In case of sight, light waves are shot out of the objects and impinge on the eye and likewise in case of sound ether waves emanate from the objects and strike against the ear drum. So the distinction drawn by Buddhaghōṣa between *asaṃpāttarūpa* and *saṃpāttarūpa* has got to be surrendered because all cases of perception can be shown to involve a contact between a sense and an object.

In fact, the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas subscribe just to the view that all cases of perception involve a contact between a sense and an object. All the *indriyas* are *prāpyakāri*, they hold. According to the Naiyāyikas the *indriyas* of sight and sound go out of their seats to the seats of the objects and apprehend them there.²³ The Mīmāṃsakas, however add a note of dissent with regard to the auditory sense. Although this sense is *prāpyakāri* like all others, it does not go out to the seat of its object, but apprehends it in its own seat. So the Mīmāṃsaka's view makes it clear that the division of *indriyas* into *prāpyakāri* and *aprāpyakāri* and again the division of them into traveller and non-traveller are independent of each other. These two types of distinctions are based upon principles of their own and they cut each other. One may distinguish between *prāpyakāri* and *aprāpyakāri* *indriyas* without asserting anything as to whether they travel out or not as Buddha-ghoṣa tries to do, though the terms of his distinction are not *prāpyakāri* and *aprāpyakāri*, but *sampāttarūpa* and *asampāttarūpa*. One can maintain that all *indriyas* are *prāpyakāri* without asserting that all of them are travellers as the Mīmāṃsakas maintain. The Bauddhas, it may be remarked, could not have, without repugnancy, talked of *indriyas* travelling out of their seats to the seats of objects because they conceive of *indriyas* as *golakas*. The view that all the senses are *prāpyakāri* may be taken to restate in other words that in all cases of perception there is contact between a sense and an object and that no cognition where such a contact is absent can be called perception. If this is so, then all these statements regarding the travelling out of the senses can be taken to be illustrative of a logical point that the idea of perception involves the idea of contact.

But the way in which some authors have tried to explain this idea regarding the travelling out of the senses blurs the area between philosophic explanation and scientific explanation. There is a difference in kind between the verbal explanation of philosophy and the factual explanation of science. The scientist tries to explain why and how different things and processes are as they are. But the philosopher tries to explain the key ideas in a particular conceptual system. He tries to sort out which ideas in this system are basic and which are derivative and whether these basic ideas will remain as basic in a different conceptual system. In other words, the scientist seeks after causal explanations whereas the philosopher seeks after logical explanations. Authors like Prof. B. N. Seal²⁴

and Prof. D. M. Datta²⁵ are very zealous to establish that everything the world knows to-day are contained in germinal form in the thoughts of the ancient Indian thinkers. They tried to show that philosophic explanations and scientific explanations differ only in degree. Because of the fact that the philosopher and the scientist both offer explanations it is thought that both explanations must be statements of the same kind. But this is not so. One is different from the other in scope and purpose and one must not be confused with the other.

When next we come to the objects of perception we at once face a volley of questions. Is there any object that is commonly perceived by all the *indriyas*? Is there any object that is specifically perceived by a particular *indriya* always? Are all the *indriyas* equally reliable in matters of perceptual knowledge or is any one *indriya* more liable to perceptual error than another? These questions in one way or the other have been dealt with by philosophers here and elsewhere in the history of philosophy. Those philosophers who seek to present a neat and a synoptic view of the entire discourse of perception are not satisfied with the ordinary discourse of perception because they are, on their showing, infested with repugnancy, and contradiction. This discourse is considered inadequate and inaccurate. The philosopher wants to replace it by a strict discourse of perception by making adjustments here and there, which he feels necessary for the purpose.

Many philosophers used to conceive knowledge as a stratified affair. Knowledge, they think, must have a foundation—a solid and a stable foundation for that matter upon which the whole edifice of knowledge is built. That foundation is provided, at least the empiricist philosophers think, by the data of perception. Again, perceptual knowledge itself is conceived as a stratified affair and it too must have a solid and stable basis. Then there are all sorts of discussions about the data of perception, about how we build upon them, about what we are immediately aware of in perception, about how those we are immediately aware of are to be characterised, about the mode of construction of the world and its contents from those rudimentary data. Until recently, philosophy of perception has been replete with such types of questions and various answers given to them. But the presuppositions around which the above questions and answers moved had never been challenged. These presuppositions are now under fire in the recent

day discussions in the philosophy of perception and with this all the theories based upon them are under fire too.

The uncritical plain man believes that what he sees, touches, smells, hears and tastes are nothing but material objects. But when the philosopher tries to analyse the discourse of perception of the uncritical plain man, he finds it loose, inaccurate and misleading. Doubts about seeing a desk or a snake, hearing a train or a trumpet, smelling a floor or tasting a lump of sugar are easily raised, but some hesitation is felt to raise similar doubts with regard to touching.²⁶ But then touching is an ambiguous expression. In one sense, any body can touch any body : I can touch the frying pan and the frying pan can touch the fire, and *vice versa*. This sense of touch is the inorganic sense of contact. But there is a sense in which I or any knowing being can touch the frying pan or the fire, but the frying pan or the fire cannot touch me nor can they touch each other. This sense of touch is the organic sense of feeling. In this latter sense doubts are also raised with regard to touching. But although the philosopher raises doubts about what is seen, heard, smelt, tasted and even what is touched, he does not raise doubts that *something* is seen, heard, smelt, tasted or touched. The philosopher brings into currency an all purpose verb to stand fast for the specific but doubtful ones like see, hear, etc., and provides it with a common accusative. Some philosophers argue that what one perceives are one's own ideas; some others argue that what one perceives are sense-data.

Even if all *indriyas* do not have any common object of perception, at least each must have one which that particular *indriya* perceives whenever it perceives. Thus some philosophers argue out in this way in their bid to build a tidy and tight language of perception. For example, Berkeley maintains that each sense has its proper object of perception.²⁷ Elaborating the view point of Berkeley, Warnock says, "...if we spoke correctly we should always assign to each sense only the objects proper to it. If we speak otherwise we do so at our peril."²⁸ The sense of taste and smell have obviously tastes and smells their proper objects. The proper object of hearing is sound. In the case of the sense of vision, Berkeley names the proper object as light and colour. This appears awkward and more so when he decides to retain materia object as the proper object of the sense of touch.

But as already stated, these traditional theories are now losing

ground because the fundamental assumption of these theories that perception is some single or unitary phenomenon has been taken away.²⁹ It is now maintained that there are as many broad types of perception as there are sense-organs, visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory and tactual and many sub-types under them too. When one takes into account the capabilities, aims or interests, expectations, the state of hesitation or confidence of the percipient as also the circumstances of particular cases, etc. The problem for the philosopher, then, would be to elucidate the various types of perception and their inter-relation. This is more interesting and illuminating a task than that the traditional philosopher was doing.

From the above discussion about the definition, number, mode of exercise and knowledge about *indriyas* one thing appears amply clear. That is the disputes centering around the above topics are philosophical disputes, not factual disputes. The disputants do not, to be sure, refer to facts in order to arrive at a conclusion this way or that. They try to draw attention to a particular linguistic use, which appears, on the face of it, to be running counter to a philosophical doctrine under discussion and to determine whether that particular linguistic use can be conveniently accommodated within the framework of the same doctrine or not.³⁰ The doctrine in question is considered to sink or swim depending upon its efficacy to explain and accommodate that particular linguistic use. While discussing about the definition of *indriya* we did have occasion to notice how Vidyāranya tries to attack the views of the Bauddhas and the Mimāṃsaka on the presumption that they are not able to explain the use, *Tasmān paśyatti pādapāḥ* (The trees perceive). We tried to show that this particular use can be explained within the bounds of the principle which the Bauddhas or the Mimāṃsakas enunciate. But if this explanation appears to be inadequate or a rigged one, then one may not persuade oneself to accept the explanation and go in for an alternative system which is able to offer an adequate and just explanation of that. Thus Vidyāranya cannot persuade himself to accept the definition of *indriya* furnished by the Bauddhas, the Mimāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas and he himself offers one thinking it as adequate and just and without the shortcomings of the stock definitions.

When, next, one comes to the discussion about the number of *indriyas*, one should not suppose that the enumeration is physical

like the counting of pups in a kennel or books in a shelf. The number of *indriyas* is determined by a process of logical analysis. One philosopher asserts that there *must be* such and such *indriyas* and bolsters his position by advancing certain arguments. Another philosopher, on the other hand, asserts that there *cannot be* such and such *indriya* and bolsters his position by advancing certain other arguments. We have already dealt with the dispute as to whether *manas* is an *indriya* or not. The contending philosophers never go to the level of facts in order to come to a conclusion this way or that. Philosophical disputes, it is worth reminding here, rise and resolve at the level of language. It may be remembered that Gautama advocates for five *indriyas* which do not include *manas*. He says that there are five characters of knowledge (*buddhilakṣaṇas*), visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual. This view that there are different characters of knowledge is a very significant one. If the philosopher who discusses epistemology sees his way right, he can but discuss what are the different characters or categories of knowledge : perceptual, inferential, etc., how they are logically viable and demarcated from one another; what further sub-categories there are under the above categories (as under the category of perception there are veridical perception and illustory perception; and again there are perception of physical objects, perception of one's own states, dream perception and so on); how they are logically viable and demarcated from one another and what ideas are involved in each without committing himself what exists or does not exist in the world as a matter of fact.

The conceptual analyst is not a geneticist trying to find out the very origin of knowledge or, for that matter, perceptual knowledge. Nor is he a psychologist dealing with causal relation, of beliefs or with stimulus-response mechanism. He is, therefore not interested in deciding which of the senses give information about the world of objects first or which of the senses are more faithful and less deceitful than others on this score. As already noted, his task is to review the whole of human knowledge and to sort out different types of it. He calls them different ways of knowing. Some say that there is one, some say that there are two/three/four/five and still others say that there are six ways of knowing. These ways of knowing should not, however, be taken as sources of knowledge. These ways of knowing are different

methods of knowledge, how one may establish one's claim to a particular piece of knowledge. These methods of knowledge are projected as independent and irreducible ways of knowing. And coming to perceptual knowledge, the conceptual analyst finds that many types are to be distinguished within this perceptual knowledge itself and tries to find out what ideas are involved in the idea of perception. One type is as distinct and defined as any other. If we try to understand things in this way there will not arise any difficulty for us in the conception of *indriyas*. But if we do not steer clear of this central point many a tangle and many a speculative device to get over these tangles await us there.

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NOTES

1. D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing*, Univ. of Calcutta, 1972.
2. J. N. Sinha, *Indian Psychology. Vol. I.*, Calcutta, 1958.
3. Ed. Srikrushna Pant, Achyuta Granthamala Karyalaya, Kashi, Saṁvat 1996, P. 613.
4. *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha*, *op. cit.*
5. *Vide*, D. M. Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
6. J. N. Sinha, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
7. 'Tasmāt payśyanti pādapāḥ', *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha*, *op. cit.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. I suppose the reference is to the Sāṁkhyaite's conception of *Mahat* or *Buddhi*.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Democritus of ancient Greece holds that there is only one sense-organ, *i. e.*, touch and all others are modifications of it. And in India this view is attributed to some Sāṁkhyaite.
12. Prof. G. Misra suggests that *manas* might be said to be the *śakti* of a *golaka* which we call brain.
13. *Nyāyadarśana*, The Kasi Sanskrit Series No. 43, III-I-60.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.* I-II-26.

16. Wittgenstein is bold enough to do it.
17. *Nyāyadarśana*, *op. cit.* Vatsyāyana's commentary.
18. Cf. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, 5.6331.
19. Cf. Shoemaker, *Self Knowledge and Self-Identity*, Allied Publishers, 1971, P. 174.
20. *Vide*, Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, Penguin Books, 1968, p. 188.
21. But Aristotle says that the senses are aware of themselves, *De Anima*.
22. There is some disagreement between Prof. Radhakrishnan and Prof. S. C. Chatterjee as to what exactly the Bauddhas say.
23. This going out is colourfully compared with the going out of water from tanks to fields in a famous piece of Advaita literature, *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1971, I-18.
24. *The Positive Science of the Ancient Hindus*, Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1958.
25. *The Six Ways of Knowing op., cit.*,
26. Berkeley in his *Essays* does this. *Vide*, G. J. Warnock, *Berkeley*, Penguin Books, 1969, p. 49.
27. In his *Essays* and also Aristotle in *De Anima*.
28. *Berkeley, op., cit.*, p. 36.
29. *Vide*, (Ed.) Warnock, *The Philosophy of Perception*, O. U. P. 1968, p. 6.
30. For a discussion of the point of illustration by the philosopher, *vide* my paper, 'Sāṅkara's Conception of Adhyāsa: Has Prof. S. K. Chattopadhyaya Refuted Prof. G. Mishra : *I. P. Q.*, Vol. IV, No. 4, p. 634.

