

CONTRIBUTION OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY TO INDIAN THOUGHT

Jaina philosophy has some similarities with the other Indian philosophical schools, as it has its own peculiarities as well. Jaina philosopher uses the terms *sat*, *tattva*, *dravya*, *artha padārtha*, *tattvārtha* etc. generally as synonyms for Reality. I think, he does not make any strict distinction among them. The other Indian philosophers do not agree with him. Vaiśeṣika uses the term *padārtha* for *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya*, but the term *artha* is reserved only for the first three¹ which are called *sat* owing to the connection of *sattā* by the *samavāya* relation.² Sāṅkhya regards *prakṛtipuruṣa* as *tattva*. A Naiyāyika calls the sixteen principles as *sat*.³

Jaina philosophy defines Reality as possessing origination, decay and permanence or as having qualities and modes.⁴ Origination and decay are nothing but the changing modes or forms. Permanence is the same as the essential qualities or attributes. Thus, Reality is possessed of both change and permanence. Here arises a question. How can change and permanence, which are contradictory, live in one and the same thing? Jaina Philosophy says that permanence is not to be understood as absolute changelessness. Similarly, change is not to be taken as absolute difference. Permanence means indestructibility of the essential nature (quality) of a substance.⁵ Change means origination and destruction of different modes. Reality is transitory as well as permanent, different as well as identical. No object can be absolutely destroyed, nothing can be absolutely permanent. The modes (*pariyāyas*) change, whereas the essential characteristics (*guṇas*) remain the same.

Our experience tells us that no object is absolutely identical. We experience also that there are various differences. Jainism accepts this commonsense view and maintains that the identity or permanence exists in the midst of all the varying modes or differences. There is no reason to call in question the reality of the changes or of the identity, as both are perceived facts. Every entity is subject to change and maintains its identity

throughout its career. Thus, Reality is a synthesis of opposites—identity and difference, permanence and change.

Vedantist starts with the premise that Reality is one permanent universal conscious existence. Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika believe in atomic particulars and momentary ideas, each being absolutely different from the rest and having nothing underlying them to bind them together. Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas hold particularity and universality to be combined in an individual, though they maintain that the two characters are different and distinct. A Real, according to them, is an aggregate of the universal, (i.e., identity) and the particular, and not a real synthesis (i. e., difference). Jainas differ from all these Indian philosophers and hold that the universal and the particular are only distinguishable traits in an object which is at once identical with and different from both. A Real, according to them, is neither a particularity nor a universality exclusively but a synthesis which is different from both severally and jointly though embracing them in its fold.⁶

There are six ultimate substances or eternal Reals in the Jaina metaphysics: 1. Soul (*jīva*), 2. Matter (*puḍgala*), 3. Medium of Motion (*dharmā*), 4. Medium of Rest (*adharma*), 5. Space (*ākāśa*), 6. Time (*Kāla*). The souls are infinite (*ananta*) in number and each soul has innumerable (*asankhyeya*) indivisible parts (*pradeśas*).⁷ By contraction and expansion of these parts the soul is capable of occupying different bodies like the light of a lamp that occupies a small room as well as a big hall.⁸ It can occupy the smallest possible body of a bacterium or the largest possible body of a whale. No other school of Indian philosophy regards the soul as equal in extent to the body it occupies. Jainism maintains that even the emancipated souls, which have no physical forms, since they are not possessed of bodies, have the psychological forms of their last bodies. Though the liberated souls possess their own form and maintain their individuality, there is perfect equality among them. They do not obstruct one another. Jainism does not believe in personal God. Every soul, which is capable of salvation, is possessed of the innate nature of Godliness. It can attain the state of Godhead through right belief, right knowledge and right conduct. This state is nothing more than final liberation.

All the liberated souls are essentially equal. None of them enjoys any privilege. Every emancipated soul perfectly shines with infinite knowledge, infinite intuition, infinite bliss and infinite power.

Matter consists of two forms : atoms (*aṇus* or *parmāṇus*) and molecules (*skandhas*). The indivisible material particle is called atom. It is the smallest possible form of matter.⁹ Each and every atom possesses touch, taste, smell and colour and is potentially capable of forming earth, water, fire and air. There are no distinct and different kinds of atoms of earth etc., i. e., the atoms are ultimately not different. Airy atoms can be converted into water, watery atoms can be converted into fire and soon. Ultimately, all the atoms belong to one and the same class, viz., the class of matter. Sometimes they form earth, sometimes they form water and so on. All this depends upon certain conditions and combinations. Air can be converted into a bluish liquid by continuous cooling, just as steam can be converted into water. Thus, according to Jainism, earth, water, fire and air are not ultimately separate and independent entities but only different forms of matter. There are no ultimate qualitative differences among them. The school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not agree to this view of Jainism. It regards earth, water, fire and air as absolutely different and independent substances, and hence, their atoms are also ultimately distinct and different.

A combination of atoms is known as molecule. It possesses a gross form and undergoes the processes of union and division. The manifestations of molecules are found in the form of different kinds of body, organs of speech, sound, heat, light, darkness, shade etc.¹⁰ Some Indian philosophers like Vaiśeṣika etc. associate sound with ether. Jainism does not accept this view. It explains the creation of sound as due to the violent contact of one material object with another. A single molecule cannot produce sound. Darkness is a positive entity. Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the existence of darkness is nothing more than the non-existence of light. Jainas hold that darkness enjoys an independent existence. It is as real as light.

No other Indian philosophical school than Jainism admits that karma is also material. According to the Jaina conception, karma is an aggregate of very fine material particles impercepti-

ble to our senses. The entire cosmos is full of that kind of matter which can take the form of karma. Through the actions of body and mind the karmic matter gets into the soul and is tied to it according to the modifications of consciousness consisting of passions. In the state of bondage the soul and karma are more intimate than milk and water.

The Medium of Motion is helpful in the movement of the souls and matter. Though the souls and matter are possessed of the capacity of movement, they cannot move unless the medium of motion is present in the universe. As water helps fish in swimming, the medium of motion assists the souls and matter in their movement. This substance is formless¹¹ and exists everywhere in the universe. The auxiliary cause of rest to the souls and matter is known as the medium of rest. It is also formless and pervades the whole of the universe. The conception of the media of motion and rest as two separate substances is a unique contribution of Jainism to the Indian philosophy.

That which provides accommodation to the souls, matter, the media of motion and rest and time is called space. It is also formless and all-pervasive. It consists of two divisions : universe space (*lokākāśā*) and non-universe-space (*alokākāśa*). That space in which all the other five substances exist is known as universe-space. That which is beyond this universe-space and has nothing in it is called non-universe-space.¹² It is empty space or pure space. No other Indian philosophical system believes in such an empty space.

Time is the auxiliary cause of change. The souls etc., which are by their own nature in the process of constant change accompanied by continuity, are helped by time or as the media of motion and rest are helpful in the movement and stoppage of the souls and matter, time is helpful in the origination and destruction, i. e., modifications of the souls etc. In other words, the function of time is to assist the other substances in their continuity of being through gradual changes or modifications. Unlike the medium of motion etc. time is not a single continuous substance. The particles of time exist throughout the universe-space, each time-particle being located in each space point. The innumerable substances (particles) existing one by one in every

point of the of the universe-space, like heaps of jewels, are the units of time.¹³ They are formless. Thus, according to Jainism, time is not one substance but comprises of innumerable substances. It consists of innumerable minute (indivisible) particles which never mix up with one another. This conception is a unique one in the history of Indian philosophy.

Jainism holds that knowledge is like light. It is self-illuminating as well as other-illuminating.¹⁴ This refutes the position of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas etc. who hold the non-perceptibility of knowledge and the conception of Yogācāra Buddhists etc. who do not accept the reality of the external world.

Knowledge is of two kinds. Is this two-fold classification to be understood in the terms of the two kinds recognised by the Buddhists, viz., perceptual and inferential, or in a different way? The Jaina classification is certainly different. It is in terms of perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) and non-perceptual (*parokṣa*). The perceptual knowledge is direct or immediate, whereas the non-perceptual cognition is indirect or mediate.¹⁵ That which knows is the soul and that which manifests itself in the soul without the operation of the senses and mind is direct or immediate knowledge, whereas that which arises with the functioning of the senses and mind is indirect or mediate knowledge.¹⁶ Here Jainas differ from those who contend that knowledge resulting from the operation of the senses is direct and that arising without the functioning of the senses is indirect.

Vaiśeṣika as well as Sāṅkhya maintain that there are three means of knowledge, viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*) inference (*anumāna*) and word (*āgama*). Naiyāyikas accept analogy (*upamāna*) in addition to these three. Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas add implication (*arthāpatti*) as the fifth. Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept negation (*abhāva*) as an additional means. All these means of valid knowledge, except negation, are included in the perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions recognised by Jainism. As regards negation, it is not accepted to be different from perception. Since Reality partakes of the nature of both being and non-being, negation cannot have an object of its own. A real, as a matter of fact is made up of both being and non-being as its constitutive elements, since it has being in respect of its own nature and non-being in respect of the others. A perceptual cogni-

tion determines its object by way of affirmation and negation. When we say that jar is not on the ground, we simply mean by it the perception of a surface of the ground and not a perception of the jar. The surface of the ground itself is the negation of the jar.

The Jain logicians divide perceptual knowledge into two categories. That perception which is directly derived from the soul is known as extra-sensory perception or real perception (*pāramārthika pratyakṣa*). The perception conditioned by the senses and mind is termed as sensory perception or pragmatic perception (*sāṃvṛyāvahārika pratyakṣa*).¹⁷ Omniscience (*kevala*), telepathy (*manahparyāya*) and clairvoyance (*avadhi*) come under the first category. The second category consists of sensation (*avagraha*), speculation (*īhā*), determination (*avāya*) and retention (*dhāranā*).

The perfect manifestation of the innate cognitive nature of the soul, emerging on the complete annihilation of all the obstructive karmic veils, is called omniscience.¹⁸ It is the highest type of perception. Omniscience is not the only instance of extra-sensory perception. There are other varieties also. Owing to the variation of the degrees of the destruction of obstructive veils, the extra-sensory perception admits of two varieties; limited knowledge, i. e. *avadhijñāna* and knowledge of the modes of mind, i. e., *manahparyaya-jñāna*.¹⁹ That extra-sensory perception which is confined to the objects having form, i. e., material objects, is called limited knowledge, i. e., clairvoyance. Mind, according to Jainism, is a particular material substance. Its modes are the different changes of state emerging into acts of thought. The direct knowledge of these modes is called *manahparyaya-jñāna*, i. e., telepathy.

The non-perceptual knowledge is of five kinds; recollection (*smaraṇa*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), induction (*tarka*), deduction (*anumāna*) and verbal knowledge (*āgama*).²⁰

Recollection is a cognition which has for its condition the stimulation of a memory-impression and which refers to its content by a form of the pronoun 'that'. It is Jainism alone that regards recollection as an independent organ of valid knowledge. As a consequence, it has to face a number of objections from the side of opponents. How can recollection be

an organ of cognition when it is not cognisant of a datum perceived at present, and thus is found to lack an objective basis? The answer is: It is certainly based on an object that has been experienced in the past. The reality of the object, and not its actually felt presence, is the condition of validity of a cognition. If the opponent thinks that the revelation of the relevant object is the criterion of validity, it is found to be equally present in recollection also. How can a dead object be the generating condition of a cognition like recollection? Jainism answers: The object is not the generating condition of knowledge. As light which comes into being on the operation of its own conditions, reveals the objects jar and the like, though not generated by them, so also a cognition, which comes into existence by its own conditions, viz., the sense-organ or the mind accompanied by the destruction-cum-subsistence of the obscuring veil, reveals its object, though it is not produced by the object. Moreover, if recollection is regarded invalid, one must be prepared to repudiate the validity of inference, since there is no possibility of inference being realised unless recollection has already taken note of the necessary concomitance. Hence, recollection has to be accepted as a valid and independent organ of knowledge.

Recognition is the synthetic cognition born of observation and recollection as typified by such forms as 'it is the same' (judgment of identity), 'it is like that' (judgment of similarity), 'this is different from that' (judgment of difference) and the like. Observation is the perceptual cognition and recollection is an act of memory. These two are the conditions of recognition which is a kind of synthetic knowledge. This refutes the view of Buddhists who hold that there is no one knowledge as recognition, because it consists of two varieties in the form of this and that which are obvious and obscure respectively.

Induction or inductive reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non-observation.²¹ Observation in this context stands for the knowledge of existence of the major term (*sādhya*) on the existence of the middle term (*sādhana*) and non-observation for the knowledge of non-existence of the middle term on the non-existence of the major term. It cannot be maintained that such knowledge is derived exclusively

from perception, since it is beyond the capacity of our ordinary perception to derive the knowledge of universal concomitance, for our sensory perception is limited, whereas the knowledge of universal concomitance is unlimited. Nor can it be maintained that such knowledge is obtained by inference, since inference itself is not possible in the absence of universal concomitance. It follows, therefore, that induction or inductive reasoning is a separate organ of knowledge. It is known as *tarka* or *ūha* in the Jaina logic.

Deduction or inference is the knowledge of the probandum (*sādhya*) on the strength of the probans (*sādhana*). It is of two kinds: for one's own self, i. e., subjective and for other, i. e., syllogistic. The subjective inference consists in the cognition of the probandum from the probans ascertained by one's own self as having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. Necessary or universal concomitance with the probandum means the impossibility of the probans apart from the probandum. In other words, the probans has inseparable relation with probandum. Inseparable relationship (*avinābhāva* or *anyathānupapatti*) consists in the universal necessity of simultaneous and successive occurrence of simultaneous and successive events. The triple characteristic of the probans maintained by Buddhists, viz., its subsistence in the subject (*pakṣadharmatva*), its subsistence in the homologue (*sapakṣa-sattva*) and the absence of the same in a heterologue (*vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti*), as well as the five-fold characteristics maintained by Naiyāyikas, viz., the absence of contradiction of the probandum (*abādhita-viśayatva*) and the absence of a countervailing probans (*asat-pratipakṣatva*) in addition to the above three, is nothing but an elaboration of this inseparable relationship, i. e., *avinābhāva* or *anyathānupapatti* recognised by Jainism.

The syllogistic inference is the knowledge of the probandum derived from the statement of the probans having the characteristic of necessary concomitance. Philosophers of different schools hold different views as regards the constitution of syllogism. Sāṅkhyas maintain that a syllogism consists of three parts: thesis (*pakṣa*), reason (*hetu*) and example (*drśānta*). Mīmāṃsakas assert four parts with the addition of application (*upanaya*).

Naiyāyikas assert five parts with the addition of conclusion (*nigamāna*). Jainism holds that the thesis and reason constitute a syllogism adequate for an intelligent person.²² For others it may have more propositions also.

The cognition produced by the statement of a reliable person is called verbal knowledge. One, who knows the object as it is and states it as he knows it, is termed as reliable or authentic (*āpta*).²³ Such a person can never tell a lie. The omniscient who is totally free from passions, is regarded by Jainism as the real or extraordinary authentic person. From the pragmatic point of view, father etc. are considered to be ordinary reliable persons. Verbal knowledge is also known as scriptural knowledge. The Jaina scriptures are neither eternal, i. e. *apauruṣeya* in the sense of Mīmāṃsaka nor God-created, i. e., *īśvarakṛta* as conceived by Naiyāyikas. They are human creations based on the preachings of the passionless omniscient *tīrthaṅkara*. Hence, they are valid means of knowledge.

Thus, Jainism has contributed a number of original ontological, epistemological and logical concepts and enriched the philosophical thought of India.

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NOTES

1. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, 1. 1. 4; 8. 2. 3.
2. Ibid, 1. 1. 8.
3. Nyāya-bhāṣya, 1. 11.
4. Tattvārtha-sūtra, 5. 29-30; 5.38.
5. Ibid., 5. 31.
6. Aṣṭasāhaśri, pp-147-8.
7. Tattvārtha-sūtra, 5.8.
8. Ibid., 5.16.
9. Sarvārthasiddhi, 5.25.
10. Tattvārtha, 5.19-20, 24.
11. without touch, taste, smell and colour.

12. Dravyasaṅgraha, 19.
13. Parīkṣā-mukha. 1.1; pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, 1.2.
14. *Ibid.*, 22.
15. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, 1.1.9-10., 13; 1.2.1.
16. Sarvārtha-siddhi, 1.12.
17. Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, 2.4.
18. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, 1.1.15.
19. *Ibid.*, 1.1.18.
20. Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka, 3.2.
21. Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, 1.2.5.
22. Jaina — tarka — bhāṣā, 1.50.
23. *Ibid.*, 1.61.