

MIND IS NOT ENOUGH*

I have deliberately chosen the title "Mind is not enough" to indicate the trend of my discussion in this paper. Of late the many articles that are appearing in learned journals on the topic of body-mind relation are not only bewildering but it seems that in their attempts to establish a relation between body and mind philosophers have forgotten what their main problem itself is. Some articles seem to be analysing the linguistic possibilities of any relation while others start off with drawing scientific analogies for establishing such a relation. Ofcourse such exercises into the complexities of the problem are necessary. But an extensive preoccupation makes one forget the main problem.

What is the main problem? It is to my knowledge, the question whether a mind exists, whatever may be its form, and if it exists what is its location? These are two different problems. If the answer to the first is in the negative, the second question does not arise at all. But, considering man in all his aspects, it is impossible to say that he is a 'mind-less' being. So we have to give an affirmative answer to the question. If we agree that there is a 'mind' in man, then not only does the problem of its location arise, but even before such a problem arises, the problem of its nature and characteristics of its definition, and the characteristics by which we come to know of its existence—all these force themselves upon us and clamour for a solution.

Does a mind exist? When I frame the question in this manner, I am raising a universal question of the existence of any mind anywhere. Perhaps, this is not the proper way to frame the question. Can I then raise the question: Does *the* mind exist? Then, the question implies not only a universal mind, but also the impression of a superstructural, non-personal mind is given. How then can we frame the question to avoid both these possibilities? I can ask, Is there a mind in man? In which case the question becomes more specific for here we become concerned

* I was inspired to give this title to my paper by the title given to his paper by my most esteemed friend H. H. Price. 'Clarity is not enough'.

This paper was presented as a Faculty Seminar at Manchester University in May 1976 as part of Tagore Endowment lectures of Madras University.
I. P. Q. ...4

with what we normally understand by 'mental' in man, and without which man does not deserve the appellation of man. For me, this is an ontological question rather than logical or linguistic question. Such enquiries may come later once we agree that there is a mind, or 'mental'. We recognise the existence of the 'mental' in things which possess 'life'. Evidently, we do not use the term with reference to non-living objects. For example we do not say "The table has a mind" or that "The table has qualities which we can describe as mental." The first necessary requirement is the presence of life. To digress a little here, it is presumed that a body possesses life, as long as not only the external manifestations of life are present in it, but also, and specially so, when the nervous energy is active in the brain. Here we have the first link up between the existence of 'mental' and the existence of 'nervous impulses'. But, this is not enough. There are people who are idiots, morons etc., and whose brains do possess nervous impulses, but who, according to the psychologists lack something called 'mental'. But on the other hand, we have the problem that in the complete absence of the nervous impulses indicative of the presence of life, as in a dead body, there is nothing like the 'mental.' So now we have the question what is this mind, which makes for a normal man, which is not present in a dead body, and which seems to be necessarily correlated with the presence of the brain processes? In raising this question modern philosophers have developed a theory called the Identity theory of body-mind relation. However much it may be denied, the very use of the word 'Identity' presupposes an attempt at identifying two things which were hitherto not identified. No Identity is possible unless the existence of those which are to be so identified is granted. To take the examples given by the philosophers upholding identity theory.

(1) H_2O is identified with a molecular arrangement called water.

(2) Lightning is an electrical discharge etc. These examples have to accept first the ontic existence of water and lightning before such existences can be identified with the chemical formula H_2O or as an electrical discharge.

My concern here is to show that on a similar basis, the existence of a mind has first to be accepted before its nature is

analysed and is identified with something other than itself. Therefore to say that mind is a 'ghost in a machine' is to deny the very problem for which a solution is sought by very laborious arguments.

A very fundamental defect of the Identity theorists is that they start with a predisposed idea that mind does not exist and that identity means reducing the mind to either (1) behaviour, (2) language structure, (3) or/and neuronal activities. I do not see any reason for this presupposition. If one wants to establish an identity then it must be an identity which can move either way. We can call water as H_2O or as water. It does not matter. But if we want identity of mind with only any one of the above mentioned three then there is no strict identity. Since it functions according to these thinkers only in one way, such functioning has to be empirically established before any identity can be contemplated. But then, the problem leads as to the future possibilities of scientific discoveries and hence is highly probable identity.

There is also another question involved. Evidently thinkers in the past, including evolutionary philosophers have considered man to be a higher-order-product of nature because he exhibits characters which are not present elsewhere. This they called as mind. I do not see the need to reduce such a mind to its neurological counterpart and thus deprive man of his superiority which he built up so laboriously through the ages. Such a superiority is not merely illusory. It is borne out by many testable qualities such as imagination, aesthetic experience of a very high order, moral responsibility developed out of social relations etc. Thus the reduction of mind, taken in the meaning of a Self, to a neurological complex or even to a linguistic pattern is not appropriate.

The statement 'there is no mind' leads to a contradiction. Firstly *we can only deny something which exists*. The denial of a non-existent is an absurdity. Secondly such a denial, if made can not be with reference to the existential denotation of mind, but only with reference to its temporal and spatial denotation. We can say, "there is no mind here (in this place) and now (in this time)". An absolute denial is, therefore, not possible since there can be no such absolute denials. Granting then, that there is a mind, the questions are: What is its nature? How is it defined and recognised? What is its location? etc.

I shall use the word *mind* here to mean that aspect of the human being by the use of which he infers, perceives, doubts, instructs, imagines, dreams, perceives pleasure and pain, wills and acts and does many other cognate things. All these imply that for each person, whenever these activities take place, a series of changes occur, which, let us name for the time being, as mental changes. For example when one perceives, a series of changes take place in the body, as a result of which, there arises a resultant knowledge, in the person, of the object perceived, which evidently was not there before the physical and physiological activity started. If we take *mind* simply to mean a collection of such changes, then we are leaving out precisely that which ties all such collections together into a mind. Most philosophers shun away from recognising this factor and naming it. They are prepared to stop midway and speak not of that which puts them together into a mind. They are prepared to speak only of mental states, mental properties etc. The word 'mental' is here used as an adjective like any other adjective which would qualify substantives. The substantives here are 'states', 'processes' etc. and 'mental' is merely used to mean a totality of action and not as an adjective of mind. In extreme cases of such philosophising, the mental, although a qualifying word is reduced to a physical word like colours etc. and thus is shown not to be different from these 'states', and 'processes' themselves.

But, if we analyse our experience we find that this is not all the story. Speaking, not from a purely scientific point of view, but from the point of an experiencing individual, I am sure that while there are thoughts, feelings, and intentions, all these attain some meaning because they are mine and 'I' am the principle of continuity and awareness in the context. The widely disparate sense-impressions such as the colours I see, the sounds I hear, the touches and tastes, all these reach me simultaneously. But when I know them, they are not discrete patch-work like experience, but a single continuum which involves the knowing 'I' and gives rise to a single experience of an object. The continuity of this conscious 'I' is not affected or made discontinuous even in deep sleep, or during a state of deep anesthesia, for on awakening, we are conscious that we are the person who has had such experience. Thus the contents of experience may differ, the mode of experience may differ, the relations between cognitive and emotional contents

may differ, but the subject 'I' as that which experiences continues to be identical.

In modern philosophy of mind we not only do not find any mention of a Self who is the conscious agent, but we are slowly reaching a situation where even mind is disappearing. In certain extreme cases like that of scientific materialism, mind becomes reduced to a scientific matter and man is said to be nothing but an electro-chemical complex by-product.

Why do modern philosophers reject the existence of a conscious Self? Because for one thing it is the scientific fashion. Confronted with the homeostats which are the result of the application of the laws of physics and deriving satisfaction from the Bio-chemical analysis of the human constitution, the philosopher is chary of recognising the necessity for any other non-cognisable, non-experimentable entity the 'conscious I'. It is also easy to say that the 'I' is the product of philosophical hallucinations born out of either a stubborn use of outmoded language or an obstinacy of refusing to sail along with modern discoveries. Another reason why the Self is relegated to the limbo of the oblivion is because even those who sincerely try to understand the concept make use of linguistic or behavioural forms of thinking for doing this, and find that as a result they are not able to accept the Self as the seat of consciousness. In addition many psychologists and philosophers have equated mind with Self and maintain that it is enough if we concentrate on finding a solution to the body-mind relation without involving ourselves in a third something which is more 'Ghostly' than even the mind.

In trying to retrieve the position and establish the need for the Self, I can not but repeat some arguments which may sound outmoded, but which, I think, have not been answered. I have already suggested one such argument which is, that the Self is necessary to account for the continuity of experience. Let me elaborate on this. There is no doubt that what we understand by mind is that which provides the data for experience. When one hears sounds and sees the person playing a musical instrument, different sense-impressions reach the person. These sense impressions are discrete, individual and mutually non-transferable impressions which are received by the person via the senseorgans and mind. During the concrete experience of enjoying the music, something

else is also taking place, which evidently is correlating, conceptualising and totalising the discrete impressions into the whole of music. It does not stop there. We merely do not have a conceptual experience of music. We either enjoy, love and make the music ours, or we are indifferent, tolerant and amused by it. Given the same set of conditions why is there different reaction to it? It is not the mind which so reacts to the music but the Self which is aware of the music and enjoys or ridicules it. Several levels of experience are involved in this! the sense-impressions, the correlations of such sense-impressions into a total and the final aesthetic enjoyment of it. I am very much aware that such activities are reduced to 'dispositions' by Ryle *et al.* If I understand, a 'disposition' is a way of behaving which is constant given the same set of causal circumstances. But then how can we explain a 'disposition' which appreciates music at one time and resents the intrusion of the same music into the situation at other times? I may enjoy the music if I am relaxed, but I may resent it, if I have other pressing problems to attend to. So, the shift in response to the same causal situation is due to the presence of the conscious awareness which we call the Self or *atman* in Indian Philosophy. The variations of a human response to the same situation can not be explained either in terms of the simple stimulus reaction pattern (for there is no such thing as a simple pattern) nor can it be answered purely from a neurological activity standpoint without first answering the question of 'why'?

All of us have had the experience of being aware of two different streams of thought going on in ourselves. For example, while I am talking, my mind is racing a head planning either for the future expressions, or how you are receiving my talk or constructing further arguments which I am going to put across in specific words. The present words and thoughts expressed by me and which are ensuing from me because of one stream of thoughts, are related causally to the words and thoughts that are yet to come. This experience is something which can not be denied. Is this possible if mind, which is identical with the bodily neurological activities alone is operating?

Which philosopher can boldly assert "I am not" when he is speaking as the 'I'. To say that the 'I' does not exist, it is necessary, as already pointed out, to accept its existence before

its denial. Then there can be no absolute denial, for as Spinoza has made it clear long before, all negation is determination. Speaking in terms of the 'I' and at the same time saying 'I' does not exist is a contradiction.

My concern here is only to point out that mind by itself cannot explain some of the most important activities of man. I am not here attempting to show that the self exists as an independent entity, eternal in itself and who is the master of the individual as the traditionalists, both in India and here in the West maintain. All that I want to stress is the idea that taking the empirical person as a whole, it is not enough if we consider ourselves as only the mind and the body, omitting to consider the conscious self as part of such an empirical whole. Let us consider the following statement which a man makes after striking another person in anger. He says, "I am sorry I was not myself when I struck you." Here the person who is sorry, the person who is dissociating himself from the anger-response made by himself is definitely not the mind. Even while the response of hitting the other man is taking place, the person is already regretting his action. The 'I' is the conscious self who is aware of not only the immediate anger response, but also the larger implications of his actions. This is the conscious self. This is why we speak of the body and mind in the possessive case as 'This is my body', 'This is my feeling', 'This is my thought' etc.

According to Indian Philosophy these three, Self, mind and sense-organ and the object are necessary for empirical experience. Of these three, the Self alone is conscious awareness. The other two, mind and sensations and the object are the material things. The word mind expressed in Samskrit is *Manas* and it means that which measures. In other words, the mind is that which measures in the sense of taking into account the object given through sensations and is known as an object. This activity of 'taking into account' is carried out by a finer form of matter, which, by a transferred epithet (from activity to that which acts) is called as mind by Indian Philosophers. Mind here is not the conscious element. The conscious part of it belongs to the Self. Mind here is the receiving and coordinating instrument only. The providing of meaning, continuity and value is done by the Self. Many arguments are given by Indian Philosophical texts for adopting

this position. I shall deal here with only one argument which emphasises the fact that the mind is an instrument of cognition just like the sense-organs are and therefore cannot be the conscious awareness. We have the sense experience of colour, sound, taste and touch because there are the sense-organs responsible for the production of such experiences. We also have the experience of pleasure and pain. Which sense-organ is responsible for the production of such an experience of pleasure and pain? Evidently not the physiological sense-organs, for then every sensual perception would be a pleasure or pain. This is not so. So, there should be some other instrument which gives rise to such experience of pleasure and pain, not only as separate experiences, but also as associated with sense-organ experience. For example the sweet smell of a rose is not only a smell, but also a smell which gives rise to a sense of pleasure. Such a combination of different experiences is due to the activity of mind.

This mind is material in nature. As soon as the word material is mentioned, we have the impression of solid matter. This can not be so. Let me quote from J. J. C. Smart when he talks of materialism. "The less visualisable particles of modern physics count as matter. Note that energy counts as matter for my purposes: indeed in modern physics energy and matter are not sharply distinguishable".¹ For the Indian Philosopher mind is matter which is not sharply distinguishable from energy. In fact the school of realism in Indian Philosophy says that mind is 'atomic' in nature, meaning that it is that state of matter which is not further divisible and whose characteristic is fast movement. The idealistic schools, while maintaining that mind is the internal sensory, tell us that it is known solely by its functions. Notwithstanding such a different conception of the functions of mind according to all the schools are, not only perceiving such states of the body known as "the pleasurable", "the painful" etc. but also consists of the activity of deciding, determining, differentiating, and to act intelligently, to acquire knowledge, and many such other functions. As a material object merely, the significance of mind is nill. It is only because it is capable of certain functions that it is considered important.

One important argument for maintaining that this mind is not consciousness is derived from the fact of memory. If mind

were conscious, it should be capable of memory and recognition by itself. It is a past event that is remembered in all its detail and a future event that is not yet, which is anticipated. In memory the datum of awareness belongs to the past which is no more. If the mind were to be not only an instrument of perception, but also of memory, then perception and memory would be constantly and simultaneously be active with reference to any object.

If memories are not expressed successively than remembrances of everything would be going on *ad infinitum*. Imagine the confusion for man then ! Hence memory is that which belongs to consciousness which is the self. Such consciousness can not function by itself. It requires a mind to manifest it. However meagerly the manifestation may be, as in the case of the person in a deep coma, or however acutely it may be present, as in the case of the genius, it does require a physical and physiological medium for its functioning. Hence, for all practical purposes, Self as consciousness becomes the "indiscernible" of Leibnitz. At the empirical level, we can never practically separate the two. That is why the Indian philosopher states that to ask to perceive the self is to ask to step into one's own shadow. The existence of the shadow is not doubted. But one can never step on it and say "thus I prove its existence."

Now, having stated that mind is matter it is explained that the functions of such a mind develop from the food that we eat., Samakara the famous idealist philosopher says " Food when eaten becomes threefold: its grossest portion becomes faeces, its middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion mind."2

This food when it manifests itself as the subtlest portion of the body, namely the nervous impulses, is designated mind. As the child develops from childhood to adulthood, the functions of this energy become enriched by constant practice and constant experience.

Therefore, to an Indian Philosopher, traditionally oriented the Identity theory of body-mind relation is the most acceptable. It is not that, as already pointed out the mind is first separately conceived as an existent and then sought to be identified with the body or the brain because of scientific evidences. *The mind is the nervous energy*, It is, though mostly, understood as located in the brain, still is connected to every part of the body, becinsue the

nervous impulses are present wherever there is the presence of the body which is alive

Let us examine the situation with reference to the feeling of pain. This, as is evident, from the vast literature on the subject from Western Philosophers, is the rock on which the Identity theory flounders. The physiological explanation of pain is said to be well understood. Genuine pain-behaviour is difficult to neglect, it is compulsive and almost involuntary and requires a great deal of *will power* to refrain from reacting strongly to the situation of pain. It is a personal reaction and it is the person himself who can distinguish a painful sensation from one which is not. Physiologists tell us that the threshold of pain reaction varies from individual to individual and is not strictly a stimulus-reaction pattern of behaviour. To the question, how are pains known and distinguished from other sense experiences, there can be no mechanical answer. A person does not do anything to distinguish a painful sensation from a non-painful sensation. He simply knows pain. Here distinguishing is not an *action*. If we say pain is a quality of a sensation and as such some ostension of the quality is involved in the discrimination of pain, then, such ostension is not possible because we can not point out a quality, but only experience it as belonging to something else. We can say "there is a pain in my toe". But we can never say how we are able to distinguish that toe in which we feel the pain from other toes where there is no pain. The person's capacity for recognising and distinguishing pain is a fact and whatever may be the number and type of questions that are raised in this regard, there can be no intelligent answers to them. To the Indian Philosopher the fact of experiencing pain is easy to explain. Mind is the nervous energy which becomes affected by the external stimulus. Mind determines the nature of the sensation. But the experiencing part of it, namely, when we say "I have a pain in my toe", it is the 'I' as the consciousness, which is identical with the mental energy that is responsible. This consciousness is not what the psychologists and physiologists talk about. We can not, with reference to this, say that when a person is under anesthesia he has no consciousness. When such statements are made it indicates that the capacity of the person, during waking experience to have sense-experience, conceptualise and react to sensations is not present. This is not what is meant when I talk of consciousness. Of course

such psychological conscious awareness is an index for the existence of consciousness itself which is an ontic factor. If we were to limit the meaning of consciousness to indicate only the waking experiences of a man's life, then everytime, a man is in deep sleep or in a coma, he should become equivalent to a dead body. But on the other hand, we say "I was fast asleep and dead to the world". He is not dead. But only 'seems' to be dead because the index nature of consciousness is not functioning, while consciousness itself is present. We can not deny this, whatever may be logical, linguistic and scientific arguments which may be produced against it for it is a fact of experience. If we do so then we would be living contradictions of our own experiences. The man wakes up and the indexing nature of consciousness takes over, and then we say he is 'conscious'. Thus the ontic nature of consciousness is that which is identical with mind which is the fine electronic energy present in the nervous system of man.

At this juncture it may be asked, does consciousness then exist wherever this electronic nervous energy is present. That is, if consciousness and mind are identical, then does consciousness exist wherever mind as electronic energy exists? I should like to split this into two questions. The first would be does the mind-consciousness combination exist in all cases where life is present? I should say yes. But, at this stage, I would like to draw the attention of my readers to the evolutionary aspect of *mind as electronic matter*. Prof. J. J. C. Smart in his well-known article on Materialism raises the question "How could a non-physical property or entity suddenly arise in the course of animal evolution?". In pondering over this question, I started to wonder how life which is non-chemical or non-elemental arises out of a purely climental non-life matter? Can life be called a physical property in the sense that it is a physico-chemical entity? If the emergence of life from non-life is possible, then by the same reasoning, could we not envisage a situation where from non-conscious, the conscious could emerge. Leaving aside such evolutionary hypothesizing, taking the living organism as the starting unit, it is quite time that wherever there is a physiological structure evidencing nervous energy, there conscious awareness is present. At the lower levels of living organisms the consciousness is outgoing, i. e. concerned only with the activity of the external sense-organs, with the complexity and specialisation of the brain

functions increasing, the activity of conscious awareness becomes self-centered and starts with conceptualising and self-referencing in such statements as "I am thinking", "I am feeling happy" etc.

Coming to the other aspect of the question, does consciousness exist wherever there is electronic energy present, the answer is partially affirmative, for here we have to add the proviso that for such electronic energy to behave like a human being, the factor of life should be present. It is the person who has the motives, feelings, who can will and commit mistakes. To be able to say "I am sorry, I should not have done it" is a highly human response that is based on a human evaluation of any situation. Hence a computer or a homeostat which is activated by electronic energy might give almost human-like responses. Still it would not be a human, for the factor of consciousness would not be present there.

The thesis that I have so far outlined, no doubt, has to be examined more closely, from many angles. But it is in general a thesis, accepted by almost all classical Indian systems of philosophies with perhaps very minor differences which are not worth considering at this stage. But there is one aspect of this position which I wish to emphasize now.

We have been saying that at the empirical level consciousness and mind which is material are seen to be identical and that each can not act without the other. Mental energy by itself is an automatic, non-incentive-providing system which can only act as an instrument of consciousness. It is the consciousness who is the enjoyer, the person who wills, and for whose sake all activities are carried out. When the association between consciousness and the mind-body complex is severed at death, then the question is: does consciousness exist by itself? This is an eschatological question and goes beyond the scope of my paper. Similarly, I would not here consider the question of the eternality of such consciousness. It is sufficient for my purposes here that mind without the association of such consciousness, does not act as a person. The most important question here is, what type of a relation exists between such a consciousness and the mind which is material. All the difficulties expressed against accepting an identity theory between body and mind will now be seen to be transferred to any possible relation between any identity of

consciousness with mind. Suppose for the sake of the argument, we grant the possibility of a relation between these two which supposedly belong to different categories, then we can only think of such a relation to be an identity relation. A parallelism, an occasionalism and an ephiphenomenalism are not acceptable for the same reasons that they are not acceptable between mind and body. If we accept the relation to be an Identity relation, then it has got to be a necessary relation or a contingent relation. A necessary relation, as far as I understand it is an analytical a priori relation. A contingent relation is one which has to be verified empirically. Let us take the latter first. Suppose the relation is a contingent one. Then the identity between consciousness and the neuronal energy which is the mind has to be tested empirically. This is a self defeating task. By hypothesis, it is only a combination of mind and consciousness which can undertake such an intentional verification. We can not make use of this situation and turn around and ask if such a situation exists. This is begging the question in a most blatant manner. There is simply no way at all to prove the identity, but we can easily either infer or confirm this identity. Traditional Indian Philosophers maintain the impossibility of attending to two things at a time, and say this is due to the limitation suffered by consciousness by its association with mind. Lack of omniscience in man is a sign that the functioning of conscious awareness is limited not only by the functions of the mind, but also by the functions of the sense-organs. If this were not so, the presence of consciousness in man would make him omniscient. Sometimes the sensations may be working in perfect order, the mind would be in association with them, but there would be no resultant knowledge. For example when a man says "I am sorry I did not hear you. My mind was elsewhere" what he means is that while his sense-organs were sending impulses to the brain in the usual manner, they were not being attended to, since the attending principle of consciousness was not carrying out its function, since for the moment there was a lack of coordination between mind-consciousness and the sense organs. We can not say the 'mind' in the sense of nervous energy was elsewhere, for that is a physical impossibility. It is the invariably concomitant consciousness that did not carry out its work. That is why the soul which is the consciousness is defined in one of the Upanisads as "that by which the eye sees, the ear-

hears etc." and at the same time it maintains "where the eye goes not, where the ear goes not". Therefore the relation of identity between mind and the conscious self is to be inferred from such activities of the person. It can also be confirmed to have this association, for when the person is dead, the body with all its constituents is present except that of conscious awareness, for the man is not 'aware'.

I am very much aware that all the above arguments can be given for the existence of mind as nervous energy as well, and that accepting a third something called consciousness goes against the principle of parsimony. However it is not so. Mind is, as much an instrument of cognition as the other sense-organs are. Each sense-organ has its own object of sensation and another sense-organ can not carry out its functions. For example, a nose can not see, nor a touch smell, since the five sense-organs have their five definite objects, the perception of pain and pleasure require a different instrument of cognition which is the mind. Since the mind itself is an instrument it can not serve its own purposes, just as a saw does not cut for its own sake, but for the sake of the wood-cutter. Hence, the attending, conceiving, remembering and recognition which are actions which involve intentions can be achieved by consciousness alone since it is not an instrument.

All the above arguments which help us to either infer or confirm the identity relation between mind and consciousness do prohibit us from trying to prove it by empirical experimental proofs. The questions relating to whether the Identity is a one-to-one relation, or if it is purely a referential identity (questions posed with regard to brain-mind identity) are not applicable here. That the relation is one of Identity is not to be denied for when a person dies there is, as far as that person is concerned a cessation of all conscious activities, for there is a cessation of all actions which require nervous energy. If we can take these as proofs of identity, then there is an identity between consciousness and mind conceived as energy matter. Can this be an *a priori* or necessary Identity? If by an *a priori* and necessary identity we mean that at no time can we ever think of consciousness and mind as separate entities then, I am afraid, the relation between these two can not be such a necessary relation. According to the system of Yoga, it is quite possible for man to effect a separation between

consciousness and the mental energy, by so controlling and manipulating mental energy. While the neuronal machinery is necessary for consciousness to act, yet it is not a sufficient condition for the existence of consciousness and for its activity. I am using 'Sufficient Condition' or 'Sufficient Reason' in the sense in which Leibnitz has used it. According to Leibnitz no principle or statement can be true unless there is sufficient reason why it should be so and not otherwise. Here that consciousness can exist otherwise makes the neuronal energy not a sufficient condition, though a necessary condition for its activity.

Thus for all practical purposes there is an identity between the neuronal energy which is mind and the consciousness which is the Self. The Identity is a necessary identity, but at the same time it is not an identity of indiscernibles, since one of them the neuronal energy can be not only discerned, but also defined.

To summarise my position human activity at all levels is made up of three aspects all of which are necessary for experience. The body with the sense-organs constitutes the gross matter without which there can be no out-going activity for the person. The mind as the neuronal complex is essential for without this there can be in-ward activities such as thinking, feeling, willing, being self-conscious etc. But the neuronal energy by itself can not manifest these actions for it is material. Hence the thing that we have as persons is the presence of consciousness as identified with the whole of our being. While it is so identified, its activities are of the nature of governing, directing and manipulating through the physical body thus implying that it is different from that which it governs and manipulates. It is not possible, while limited to this body-mind complex to know or experience this consciousness either as different or separate from such a complex, though its existence can be inferred.

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NOTES

1. Paper on 'Materialism' presented at Symposium at the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical associations, December 1963.
2. Samkara Bhasya (Tr. Thibaut)

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