REVIWS

IRVING COPI, (INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC, 5th Edition. New York : Macmillan, 1978, 590 pp. $ 15.40, hardbound.)

The fifth edition of this widely used and influential text is worth reviewing, first, because changes have been made in this edition which are pedagogical improvements over the previous edition, and these deserve mention, and secondly, because a number of problems still persist into this fifth edition which deserve discussion.

The pedagogical improvements are due almost entirely to the introduction of a wealth of new illustrative exercises throughout the text. Part One, "Language," contains the most useful of these additions, with over one hundred new examples of arguments being added to previous exercises in the first chapter alone. This addition is most welcome, for Copi has chosen his examples of arguments from a diversity of areas which are relevant and up-to-date, such as feminist literature. Thankfully, Copi has reduced the number of arguments quoted from philosophical writings so that the student does conclude, erroneously, that argumentation is the exclusive prerogative of professional philosophers! A puzzling omission in Chapter 1 is the omission of examples of imperatives in the exercises for the section entitled "Recognizing Arguments" (pp. 22 - 32), notwithstanding the fact that Copi takes pains to distinguish imperatives from propositions. (Part of the problem here may be that Copi's chapter on informal fallacies contains numerous examples in the exercises of fallacies of relevance with imperative "conclusions".) Moreover, Copi includes a disproportionately large number of examples of *arguments* in the exercises to this section by comparison with non-arguments, i. e., conditionals and explanations, thereby duplicating material in previous sections of the chapter. These minor criticisms aside, Copi has strengthened the text in the area of its greatest appeal—the wealth of illustrative exercises which the student requires in order to both perfect his grasp of logical principles and to apply them effectively in practice.

If the major strength of Copi's text is its wealth of exercises, its most apparent weaknesses are found in its superficial treat-

ment of such subjects as informal fallacies and in the lack of depth and precision in its discussion of such topics as the square of opposition and the standard-form categorical syllogism. Unfortunately, Copi has not undertaken the task of extensive rewriting which is called for on these and other topics. Most of his time and energy has apparently been spent on updating and improving the exercises, with the result that topics of substantive importance continue to receive inadequate treatment. In what follows I will attempt to rectify some of the errors and omissions in Copi's presentation of the above mentioned topics.

Copi's chapter on informal fallacies is among the weakest in the text. The thirteen errors in reasoning which he classifies as fallacies of relevance are a hodge-podge. Some should not be classified as fallacies of relevance at all while still others are characterized inadequately or incompletely. Copi maintains that in all fallacies of relevance "their premisses are logically irrelevant to, and therefore incapable of establishing the truth of their conclusions" (p. 88). But this definition does not apply to the most importamt of the fallacies of relevance, the irrelevant conclusion (*ignoratio elenchi*). According to Copi, this fallacy is committed "when an argument supposedly intended to establish a particular conclusion is directed to proving a different conclusion" (p. 100). Copi even allows that the fallacy can be committed by one who may "succeed in *proving* his (irrelevant) conclusion" (my italics). The fault then is not that the premisses of such arguments are *logically irrelevant* to the conclusion drawn from them, but that the conclusion drawn is insufficient to justify the conclusion called for by the context. If a prosecutor, purporting to prove the defendant guilty of murder, shows only that he had sufficient opportunity and motive to commit the crime, he (the prosecutor) commits the fallacy of *insufficient conclusion.* If, on the other hand, he succeeds only in "proving" that murder is a horrible crime, he is guilty of an *ignoratio elenchi.* In effect, then, Copi does not distinguish between two different fallacies—the *ignoratio elenchi* and the insufficient conclusion. More importantly, his definition of a fallacy of relevance would exclude arguing "beside the point" in cases where a valid argument is produced which is (logically) irrelevant to the point

at issue. And he has defined irrelevance in a way which does not include an insufficient conclusion.

There are also difficulties in Copi's account of a number of the fallacies of relevance which have been called "appeals to the passions." It is possible, reading Copi, to conclude that in most contexts an emotional appeal results in a fallacious argument. However, an appeal to emotion (fear, pity, patriotism, etc.) to get a conclusion accepted need not involve erroneous reasoning—or any reasoning at all. An appeal to sympathy is not *per se* an argument; nor is a threat to use force. However, a fallacy can be committed in a situation in which emotion is appealed to *illicitly*, i. e., in a circumstance where argument rather than emotional persuasion is appropriate. As a result, the logician must distinguish between emotional appeals which are and are not illicit and, among the latter, those which do and those which do not result in fallacious arguments. None of these distinctions emerge from Copi's *simpliste* treatment of illicit appeals under the partially adequate heading of fallacies of relevance.

Copi recognizes (p. 83) that the fallacy of "begging the question" is not a fallacy of relevance, a point which also holds for the related fallacy of complex question, the question-begging question. This is because the "premiss of a *petitio principii* is not logically irrelevant to the truth of the conclusion" (pp. 97-8), nor is the conclusion irrelevant to the question at hand. The formula which Copi introduces *ad hoc* to cover this fallacy—"the premiss is logically irrelevant to the purpose of *proving*.... the conclusion" (p. 98) applies to almost all fallacious arguments of any sort. The difficulty here is that Copi has not worked out a satisfactory classification of fallacies within which the *petitio principii* can find a place. To do so requires a satisfactory conception of the *criteria* of proof and cannot be done solely by the consideration of the criteria of truth and validity.

Copi does not follow the practice of many modern logicians in classifying the fallacies of accident and converse accident as fallacies of ambiguity rather than as fallacies of relevance. He also errs in identifying the fallacy of converse accident with that of hasty generalization. The fallacy of accident can be renamed the "fallacy of introducing qualification," for it involves an in-

ference from the unqualified use of a term to its use as qualified. Conversely, the fallacy of converse accident involves an inference from the qualified use of a term to its use as unqualified. It can therefore be called the "fallacy of eliminating qualification."*

In previous editions of the text, Copi did not discuss the differences in truth value which hold respectively for necessary and contingent standard-form categorical propositions (having identical subject and predicate terms) on the square of opposition. In the fifth edition Copi makes an unsuccessful attempt to deal with this question. To begin with, Copi recognizes that the definition of contraries as standard-form categorical propositions (SFCP's) which cannot both be true "though they might both be false" (p. 174) does not apply to necessary propositions like "All men are animals" and "No men are animals" because the former must be true and the latter must be false, so both cannot be false. Similarly, the definition of subcontraries as SFCP's which cannot both be false although both might be true does not apply to the necessary propositions "Some men are animals" and "Some men are not animals" because only the former proposition can be true. Copi mentions such exceptions to the rules applying for contingent propositions but does not show how to resolve the difficulty painlessly. For if "All men are animals" and "No men are animals" have opposite truth values, they will be contradictories rather than contraries, a point which also applies to the subcontraries "Some men are animals" and "Some men are not animals." This difficulty can best be dealt with by defining contrariety and subcontrariety in terms of the 'opposition' of quality and quantity in SFCP's rather than in terms of their truth values. Accordingly, contraries may be defined as universal SFCP's opposed in quality, subcontraries as particular SFCP's opposed in quality, etc. The advantage of defining contrariety in this way is the elimination of much of the confusion which can result from the realization that such

* On this question, see W. T. Parry and E. A. Hacker, *Aristotelian Logic : Selected Chapters of Proposed Textbook*, 2nd revised ed. (Northeastern U. P., 1978), 32c5. I am much indebted to my former teacher and colleague, Professor William T. Parry, for his helpful discussion of numerous points in this review.

garden-variety necessary propositions as "All squares are rectangles" and "No squares are rectangles" turn out to be contradictories instead of contraries if their logical relationships are conceived in terms of truth values. On the modern definition of contrariety, for example, the A proposition must be a contrary of the E when it is a contingent proposition and must be a contradictory of the E and the subcontrary of the I (Parry and Hacker, 8F2) when it is a garden-variety necessary proposition. Medieval logicians recognized this state of affairs and we are simply following their procedure in defining contrariety, etc. in terms of 'oppositions' in quality and quantity of the four SFCP's. Accordingly, the truth values which the four SFCP's will assume as necessary and as contingent can be worked out independently of their (scholastic) definitions. Probably the best procedure is first to establish the entailments which hold *both* for necessary and for contingent SFCP's. Then the rules applying specifically to contingent SFCP's can be elaborated. Additionally, it should be noted that not all necessary propositions are of the garden-variety sort mentioned above. In the case of such SFCP's as "All numbers are prime" and "No numbers are prime", *both* contraries are necessarily false. Consequently, it is necessary to map the logical relationships both for garden-variety necessary propositions and for this less common variety of necessary proposition. These complications in the traditional square of opposition have for the most part been ignored by the authors of logic text-books.

Copi's section on the rules (pp. 215-20) for testing the validity of standard form categorical syllogisms (SFCS's) is afflicted with difficulties similar to those we discussed on the square of opposition. Copi builds his *definition* of a SFCS into his statement of Rule 1 (pp. 215-17) with the consequence that a rule of semantic validity — "a valid SFCS must contain exactly these terms, each of which is used in the same sense throughout the argument" — is introduced in a section otherwise concerned with rules for the determination of *formal validity*. But an argument in violation of Rule 1 cannot be a SFCS simply because it fails to contain exactly three terms, for this is a defining characteristic of a SFCS. As a result, Rule 1 cannot count as a rule

which is applicable to its ostensible subject matter — the SFCS. Copi's procedure would have been more satisfactory, I believe, if he had set this semantic rule apart from the formal rules which follow it (Rules 2-6). He might have simply directed the reader in this context first to examine an argument which is ostensibly a SFCS for the "Fallacy of Four Terms," after which a set of rules for testing formal validity could be given.

There is a second difficulty in Copi's Rule 1. It is not only redundant, given his earlier definition of a SFCS, but insufficient as well. Copi does not specify in Rule 1, as he does earlier, that each term "occurs in exactly two of the constituent propositions (p. 198)". This is essential if the rule is to be complete. Otherwise, someone who mistakes Rule 1 for a *complete* definition of a SFCS would conclude that the following argument is invalid : "All men are animals, no men are stones, therefore some animals are men". This argument, while it passes Rule 1, is in violation of Rule 5, stating that "if either permiss of a SFCS is negative, the conclusion must be negative" (pp. 219-20). This difficulty can be avoided simply by a restatement of Copi's definition of a SFCS (p. 198).

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PERSPECTIVES ON UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL REALITY*

In the field of Indian social sciences most of the practitioners of intellectual crafts have been rather enamoured by empiricism of the most pedestrian type. Discussions on "methodology" among social scientists, therefore, seldom transcend the boundaries of what may broadly be called as "research technology". Debates on truly substantive methodological issues have consequently tended to remain confined to the disciplinary portals of philosophy, or philosophy of science to be precise. Unfortunately the empirical traditions of social sciences and the methodological concerns of philosophers of science have largely remained estranged from each other in the process of their institutionalisation in Indian universities.

The dissociation of social sciences from the philosophy of science has resulted not only in a fragmentary understanding of social phenomena but also, and more often so, in totally inconsequential and aimless research pursuits. Conducted under the garb of "objective scientific enterprises" these have almost always evaded the basic questions and issues pertaining to goals and approaches in social enquiry. The seminar organised by the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, in November-December 1975 (Not 1976 as mentioned in the Preface page v) of which the book under review is an outcome, has timely reminded us of the need to keep the debate on 'goals and approaches in social enquiry' alive. How do we understand social reality ? What precisely constitutes 'understanding' ? and 'understanding' for what ? These are some of the questions discussed at the seminar.. Not that there are any definitive and conclusive answers to them. But, efforts to continue a lively dialogue on these issues would undeniably ensure a more purposeful and meaningful social science research in India. It is in this sense that Dr. Mullick's initiative in organising the seminar, and in editing the book containing the papers presented, deserves commendation.

**Social Euquiry* : *Goals and Approaches* (ed. Mohini Mullick, New Delhi: Manohar, 1979, ix + 130)

In her keynote article Dr. Mullick has set out some of the major methodological issues in understanding social reality. She dwells at some length on Professor Hayek's advocacy of 'the unintended consequences of the actions of many men as constituting the subject matter of social sciences'. (pp. 6-7). One obvious corollary of Hayek's argument is firm adherence to 'methodological subjectivism' on the one hand and 'methodological individualism', as May Brodbeck (1958) would put it, on the other. Though not explicitly, Dr. Mullick offers a defence of Hayek's position by quoting Watkins (pp. 7-8) according to whom the principles of methodological individualism and what Durkheim (1964) called '*sui generis*' macroscopic laws, applicable to social systems, are not that irreconcilable.

What is rather surprising is that after having discussed some of the most lively and on-going polemical issues such as voluntarism vs. determinism and so on, Dr. Mullick refutes 'that there is any real methodological debate'; and she claims that 'there are only different well-insulated, well-entrenched philosophical positions regarding the nature and scope of social sciences' (p. 8). However, the view-points of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, compared by Dr. Mullick later in her essay (pp. 11-12), clearly show their attempts to synthesize various traditions—voluntarism with determinism, subjectivism with objectivism, absolutism with relativism and theoretical monism with pluralism. Whether Marxian, Weberian or Durkheimian methodologies, far from being 'well-insulated watertight philosophical positions', they have been constantly generating new theoretical insights. Attempts are being made to integrate two or more of these and even other theoretic and methodological perspectives such as structuralism, phenomenology or existentialism. In a recent work, for example, Alain Touraine (1977) has tried to refine and integrate Marxism and structuralism much beyond their blend we find in the works of Louis Althusser and others, (Althusser and Balibar, 1970 : 13-24; O' Neill, 1979 : 121-39). Surely Dr. Mullick too has recognized the need and desirability of such theoretical integration in the understanding and explanation of social reality (p. 14).

Curiously enough, in her discussion on the methodology of Max Weber, Dr. Mullick has made no reference to Wilhelm Dilthey who raised the antipositivist banner in the last quarter

of the nineteenth century (Stuart Hughes, 1953) and who had, considerably influenced Weber's methodology. It is, of course, true that Dilthey does not belong to that genre of "grand-systems-makers" as Marx, Weber and Durkheim do. Nonetheless Dilthey's contribution to the methodology of social sciences in general, and to theoretical pluralism in particular, is no less outstanding. In fact, Weber's notions of '*exegesis*' and of 'interpretative sociology' have largely inherited Dilthey's methodological legacy—although between Dilthey's and Weber's views there are significant differences (Freund, 1972 : 87-111).

The general interest in Dilthey's works has again increased significantly in recent years due to the flourishing critique of positivism and the search for alternative modes of understanding and explanation. In spite of that it is rather suprising that the seminar organised by Dr. Mullick and the book she edited should not even obliquely mention him. Dilthey lay strong emphasis on the distinctive nature of historical experience and understanding. To him the history of science plays a significant role in the understanding of human history itself (Parsons, 1974 : 475-80). As Jensen (1978 : 421) has observed, "it was within the history of science that Dilthey thought it was possible to identify a historical process produced by diverse personal motivations and social circumstances". Dr. Mullick in a way tacitly shares this view when she emphasizes that 'the attitude a social scientist takes towards a question is often deeply rooted in different intellectual and political traditions' (p. 8). Thus, her emphasis on 'knowing attitudes and ideological predilections of social scientists as a part of the process of understanding comes quite close to the 'inseparability of historical experience and understanding' as stressed by Dilthey.

Some of the problems in understanding social phenomena arise because some, if not all, social scientists often fail to recognize the thin veil between social theory and ideology. Ideological sensitivities of social theory and concepts are very competently discussed in their essays by Professors K. J. Shah, S. N. Ganguly and S. C. Verma. In his essay : "The Concept of development adn social sciences" Ganguly has taken his cue from the writings of Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Andre Gunder Frank (whose work

has been cited by Ganguly), Samir Amin and others. The concept of development has been discussed by Ganguly in its three aspects : development (i) as an imperialist strategy, (ii) as a total structural transformation in terms of an ideology, and (iii) as a human ideal. The first two are essentially strategies of change although with differing ideological foundations. The third tends to be at best a 'utopia'.

Few would like to dispute with Ganguly's argument that 'the experience of the developing countries of South Asia shows that 'development' was nothing but a euphemism for veiled neocolonialism (pp. 47-48). But it is equally difficult to agree with his remark that 'we have wrongly described tradition, attitudes, interests and institutions as the cause of underdevelopment'. (p. 50). This outright rejection of the Weberian thesis is rather shocking.

Ganguly has very rightly decried the sterile obsession with 'objectivity' found among the proponents as well as practitioners of the 'hard-data' approach that came almost like a populist wave in the contemporary social science. The inherent dangers of this approach are twofold : (i) a possible dissociation between theory and practice, and (ii) an over-commitment to rationality and value-neutrality (p. 55). Ganguly's own perference is obviously for a value-oriented social science. He has, therefore, made a piognant plea to shift the focus in studies on 'development' from the first two paradigms to the third, namely 'development as a human ideal'. But, unfortunately, this model, which has not been adequately explicated by Ganguly, leaves an impression in readers' minds as if he was pursuing a "romanticised millennium".

Though for differing aims and in equally different styles, K. J. Shah and S. C. Verma also join the new wave and demand a 'value-based' understanding of social phenomena. Taking Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Ambedkar as illustrative cases Professor Shah suggests a mutually reinforcing triangular type of relationship between 'understanding' and 'moral perception' on the one hand and between these two and 'implementation of action' (towards the preferred future) on the other (pp. 25-30). Thus, to Shah, 'moral perception' enriches our 'understanding' of social pheno-

mena and these two together make the implementation of action more effective. Failure of one inevitably leads to failure of the other. He further argues that moral comprehension, which is an important component of social enquiry, also directs it (p. 33). Without this component, all exercises in the present day empirical social science are futile. But then Professor Shah does not state explicitly as to what precisely constitutes 'morality' or 'moral perception' nor does he tell us how do we get over the most refractory problem of the 'relative' and the 'absolute' in defining 'moral', 'amoral' and 'immoral'.

The essay: "Social enquiry for what ?" by S. C. Verma is probably the boldest and also the most unequivocal statement on the nature of relationship he posits between ideology and social sciences. Verma minces no words. He charges the bourgeois social sciences for not only upholding the *status quo* but also for depoliticizing social conflict. Here Verma has not spared even some of the Marxist intellectuals who wanted to radicalize social science enquiry but insisted on separating 'Marxism as a methodology' from 'Marxism as a political ideology and praxis'. To Verma this is yet another 'liberal bourgeois deception and diversion,' (p. 99). Verma's advocacy of the historical materialism as an approach in social enquiry emanates certainly from his honest intellectual commitment. But, then he assumes that despite the development of a number of streams of radical thought and consciousness within the dialectical materialist school, it is possible to identify a corps of ideas, concepts and analytical framework that constitutes 'Marxism'. The assumption, though optimistic, is certainly open to question.

From the welter of the general issues and problems in the methodology of social sciences, our attention is drawn to two specific disciplines (Psychology and Sociology) and their record in India in their papers by Dr. Ashis Nandy and Professor Yogendra Singh. Both of them have traced the development of their disciplines, psychology and sociology respectively, treating them primarily as intellectual movements and as reactions to alien interpretations of the Indian psyche and society. Nandy is, of course, more ruthless in attacking the uncritical acceptance of the western paradigms in Indian psychology (pp. 63-65) which he

had once aptly characterized as an "aged infant". Like Ganguly, Shah and Verma, Nandy has also scathingly criticised the growing tendency of 'unrestrained quantification' which, according to him, is chiefly responsible for the destruction of selfrespect of Indian psychology (p. 76). However, despite the depressing picture of his discipline that Nandy paints, he comes out towards the concluding part of his paper with an astonishingly robust optimism about its future prospects. He thinks that some fundamental organisational changes in the discipline and 'creating structures that would support competence, achievement and inquiry could still retrieve the situation and ensure growth of Indian psychology on the right lines' (pp. (80-81). But then, a question that immediately occurs to a scrupulous mind is : whether the present state of Indian psychology is healthy enough to generate a series of initiatives for a drastic organisational transformation of the profession and whether it can create the kind of structures Nandy has in mind. How do we break the vicious circle ? I wish Nandy had offered more down-to-earth guidelines for the regeneration of Indian psychology.

Yogendra Singh's paper, which deals with the history of sociology in India, is mostly a recapitulation of his paper (1977) prepared for another occasion. What appears in this book is apparently a *summary* of Yogendra Singh's presentation at the Seminar in I. I. T. Kanpur and not a *paper* prepared for publication. He has traced the development, professionalisation and institutionalisation of sociology in India through three different phases : (i) before the independence (i. e. before 1947); (ii) between 1947 and 1960; and (iii) thereafter. The varying impacts of different theoretical and methodological orientations on Indian sociology through these stages of development have been well brought out by Yogendra Singh. Unfortunately, the editor has not considered it necessary to summarize the comments on his (paper) presentation.

The volume in general embodies an interdisciplinary dialogue among philosophers on the one hand and social scientists on the other. It demonstrates unmistakably that Indian scholars are no less concerned about the substantive methodological, epistemological and theoretical issues and questions which their counter-

parts in the Western countries have been preoccuped with during the past decade and a half. The volume also reflects a clear shift in Indian social scientists' preference — from a "non-committed" to a "committed" social enquiry.

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(A) Publications of Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi.

(1) Plott, John C. : Global History of Philosophy Vol. I and II : pp. xix + 240 and xxiii + 344 respectively.

(2) Hindery, Roderick : Comparative Ethics in Hindu and Buddhist Traditions : pp. xvi + 307.

(3) Junankar, N. S. : Gautama : The Nyaya Philosophy: pp. xii + 664.

(4) Singh, Jaideva : Siva Sutras : pp. Lii + 278.

(5) Parimoo, B. N. (Tr) : Ascent of self : pp. xxxii + 217.

(6) Mookerjee, Satkar : Jain Philosophy of non-Absolutism : pp. xix + 289.

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(8) Hariharananda Aranya : Samkhya - Sutras of Pancasikha and the Samkhyatattvaloka : pp. vi + 106 and xx + 34.

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(14) Pandeya, Ramchandra : Indian Studies in Philosophy : pp. x + 229.

(15) Stafford, Bettyl : Vadiraja's refutation of Sankara's non-dualism : pp. xxii + 217.

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(6) Craig, William : The kalam Cosmological Argument : Macmillan Press, London : pp. vi + 216

CORRECTIONS

In the April 1979 issue of Indian Philosophical Quarterly we have published an article entitled, "Karma and Advaita" by Dr. R. Balsubramanian (pp. 567-569). The author of this article is not the same as Dr. R. Balsubramanian, Director, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, Madras - 5. The author of the article belongs to Madras but does not belong to the Radhakrishnan Institute. The error regarding his address is regretted.

The name of the author of the article, "Universality without a Universal" published in July 1979 issue of Indian Philosophical Quarterly should be read as *HARSH NARAIN* and not as *HARSH NARAYAN* as printed in the Journal.

Editors