

THE CONCEPT OF ADHYASA AND THE VEDĀNTA OF ŚAMKARA *

II

The problem of knowledge and the problem of meaning are different items, although one, brought up in the contemporary tradition of linguistic analysis, is very much prone to get confused on this point. Knowledge, by its very nature, is informative, not merely explicative. The various *pramāṇas* are means of *knowledge*, not *methods of explication of sense or meaning*. It is, therefore, misunderstanding complete and perfect, to take *śabdapramāṇa* of Indian philosophy as a critique of language. Yet an attempt has been made to press this error of judgement as an unquestionable truth by bold pronouncement in its support, castigating at the same time, the correct classical view as unenlightened and erroneous.⁴⁷ When mango is taken to stand for jackfruit on the ground of its having the synonym 'amṛtaphala', a name incompatible with sour mangoes, it becomes an affront to conventional usage of a word as also to established practice. Understanding the meaning of sentences, getting an insight into the logical behaviour of words and expressions, a logical analysis of the function of language are very good things like other good things, but these simply *do not give śabda as a pramāṇa* in the context of Indian philosophy. *Knowing* or *recognising* a person as Devadatta from a spoken sentence 'He is that Devadatta, *knowing* (indirectly), that Ātman is Brahman from a *śrutivākya* are instances of *śabda* functioning as a *pramāṇa*. Getting the 'sense' of a sentence, and understanding the logical behaviour of words in their diverse roles, are fine accomplishments, the latter bring the basic function of a *philosophy of language*, but *śabda as a pramāṇa* is not this philosophy of language in spite of the fact that a study of language is helpful to it. It is curious, therefore, that a learned scholar, labouring under the confusion between

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śabdapramāṇa and linguistic analysis, takes the vedāntic realisation to consist, not in 'an intuitive mystic experience' but in 'the philosophical enlightenment which can be only obtained through an analysis of the function of language'.⁴⁸ It is not, therefore, surprising that beginning with Śaṅkara's own expression "Vākyaṛthavicāraṇādhyavasānanirvṛttā hi Brahmāvagati" used in the context of vedāntavākyaṛthavicāraṇā, he at first drops 'adhyavasānanirvṛttā', thereafter, the context, such as, *vedāntavākya*s, (on the ground that even an expression of ordinary speech, such as, 'so ayaṁ Devadattaḥ' is made into an illustration by the vedānta) (by śrutis?), and thereafter, takes the process 'vākyaṛthavicāraṇā' of Śaṅkara's usage to stand for 'the analysis of the function of language' in general. To repeat a phrase of Dr. Martineau, this "watering down of meaning" of Śaṅkara's own expression enables him to assert that bondage of the vedāntic conception means a state of bewilderment originating from faulty linguistic habits and that Brahmāvagati which is liberation is simply getting at the referential uses of words in identity-propositions.⁴⁹ So, there need not be any śrutyanusāri logic other than linguistic analysis, and the śruti texts, the vedānta, can be entirely left out in Śaṅkara's philosophy of the vedānta, and finally, that this is the rendering of the vedānta texts which Śaṅkara himself intended when he announced "yathā cāyamarthaḥ sarveṣāṁ vedāntānāṁ, tathā vayam asyāṁ śārīrakamīmāṁsāyaṁ pradarsāyīṣyāmaḥ."⁵⁰ Can there be a more glaring instance of a play of Hamlet without the prince of Denmark?

With Śaṅkara, the philosopher of absolute non-dualism, the case seems to have been quite different, and none of his classical commentators, and his modern interpreters, such as, Messrs. Radhakrishnan, Dasgupta, A. C. Mukherjee, D. M. Datta, referred to in the new theses on Śaṅkara, is guilty of the charge, either of misunderstanding, or of 'doing the greatest disservice to Śaṅkara.'⁵¹ Through a cogent and logical interpretation of the various *vedāntavākya*s of the upaniṣads (and not through any reflection on the logical behaviour of individual words or mystical syllables used in

their half-mystical language, idioms of which are not always at par with the idioms of English speech) Śaṅkara came to understand that the upaniṣads as an *alaukika pramāṇa* inform that transcendently, here there are no pluralities; that reality is one undifferentenced self-shining (*cit*), — an absolute, and so boundless and free (*ānanda* or *ananta*) unnegatable existence (*sat*) without a second (*advaita*); that the one undivided reality *assumes* multiple forms but that their truth lies in their absolute one-ness; that by knowing the one, all else can be known; that he who is beguiled by the sense of reality of the multiplicities is subject to privation and death; that this boundless reality (Brahman) is the same as self (Ātman); and finally, that one who knows the self gets over all sufferings and sorrows. This revealed “testimony”⁵² of the śrūtis, therefore, poses the formidable problem: how is this truth compatible with our ordinary knowledge derived from the *laukika pramāṇas*? It will not do to say, that only the transcendental truth, the knowledge imparted by śrūtis, acting here in the capacity of an indirect (*parokṣa*) *pramāṇa*, is all that is true, since the deliveries of the *laukika pramāṇas*, particularly of perception, seem to have much closer appeal to our minds, constituted as they are. Truth must not only be true, it must be convincing also. Moreover, falsity of a given knowledge is not decided by any *ā priori* criterion. Falsity is decided through *falsification*. This criterion is not logical, it is experiential. No ‘given’ experience, as it is, seems false. Otherwise, it would not have been an experience, a knowledge. A square circle is not experienced or known. It is a logical fabrication, an artful suggestion of the absurd. Nor is the snake-rope experienced. It is the rope which is experienced as a snake and, again, as a rope. When it is experienced as a snake, it is *not* experienced as a rope and when it is experienced as a rope, it is *not* experienced as a snake. But, even then, the fact remains that truth does not presuppose falsity but falsity presupposes truth; for unless there is a true experience to contradict, there is no *falsification* of a given experience and so no falsity. Truth experience admits of no vacuum. Lapsing of a known truth into falsity
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is dependent on some new truth or newly discovered truth shelving it away, throwing it out. No infinite regress is there either in the acceptance of a truth or in the knowledge of a falsity, since truth always remains in some form or other. This establishes the rule that *no two truths ever oppose each other*. Contrariwise, where there is opposition between two truths regarding the same subject-matter, one alone is true and the other false. But the false as a defunct truth is also 'given' as true *before* its eventual correction. What then is the nature of that experience in which even a falsity can be 'given' as truth and apprehended as that, so long as there is no experience of correction? It is a state of *adhyāsa*, of *avidyā*, — not in the sense of mere absence of knowledge, but in the sense of *positive ignorance*. Now, since the 'revealed' truths of the vedānta and the 'given' truths of the *laukika pramāṇas* have the self-same reference, both claiming to hold of Reality, (and this is implicit in their truth-claim), one of them must be taken as illustrative of *adhyāsa* of our common knowledge. And since an *adhyāsa* is everywhere a *given experience* and nowhere a *believed content*, the probability is that the given experience of reality is an instance of *adhyāsa*. That it is not felt to be an *adhyāsa* is no reason why it cannot be one; since an *adhyāsa* so long as it persists is never known as *adhyāsa* but only as true knowledge. But why are not the so-called revealed truths of the upaniṣads, of the vedānta *vākyas*, held as suspect, and considered as probably false, instead of passing a summary judgment upon all our ordinary knowledge through *laukika pramāṇas* and declaring them as false, as vitiated by *avidyā*? If nothing is known as false before actual contradiction, before *falsification*, why this prejudicial treatment against our normal experience as also against the behaviours and reactions based upon it?

The reason is : The revealed truths under consideration are absolutely indubitable on the ground of their being "revealed", on the ground of their '*apauruṣeyatā*' (being impersonal). Misapprehension may arise from malfunctioning of subjective conditions and encroachment of personal factors in any given knowledge. Then, again, it is beyond the

scope of an *āgamānusāri tarka* or logic to question its own credentials, to leave off its own foundation and thereby to contradict itself. There is another reason also: While the *śrutis* alone contain elucidations as to what happens when reality is experienced *as that*, and also, when it is experienced *as appearance*, while *śrutis* alone throw light upon *dual functioning* of given experience, our ordinary experience exhibits only one form and this is taking everything that is given unreservedly as the real, notwithstanding the fact that some at least prove to be false later on. This shows the *śrutis* to be more broad-based and comprehensive. So, there can be no complaint if the choice falls on the revealed truths of the *śrutis* as regards superiority.

Even, then, in the vedānta of Śaṅkara, castigation of one *pramāṇa* by another does not really take place. What actually happens is a judicial adjustment of their claims, their mutual accommodation. This grand settlement is effected by Śaṅkara by introducing his concept of *adhyāsa*—no less a 'paradigm of philosophy' than Russell's theory of description. The *laukika pramāṇas* give Reality *as it appears*, the *alaukika*, as it is in *itself*. Agnosticism, such as of Kant, is transcended. Kant's speculative reason looked for non-sensuous intuitions which under the Kantian circumstances could not be found. Śaṅkara repudiated speculative reason, and following the guidance of his *āgamānusāri tarka* discovered them in the non-sensuous intuitions embodied in the revealed truths. The given human and, therefore, *personal conditions* of knowledge as are present in the *laukika pramāṇas*, can give only the *appearances as Reality*. We do not take them as appearances. We believe in them unreservedly. We *do not*, as we cannot pry beyond them, encompassed as we are ordinarily by the *personal conditions* of experience. It requires a process of complete de-personalisation, a complete transcendence of our habitual limitations, to get at Reality *as Reality*. In the apprehension of the appearances, not as appearances but as real, and in the realisation of Reality *as Reality*, no change, formal or material, in Reality, takes place.⁵³ What takes place is a radical transformation in knowledge, and consequent thereupon, a *change in the valu-*

ation of all that was felt to have been given or known as being absolutely real. These, then, come to be known as appearances, as other than the real; and as negated by the real, as floating appearances and so as illusory. This is the accommodation that the concept of adhyāsa in Śaṅkara provides to meet the opposite claims of the alaukika and the laukikā pramāṇas. The personal is accommodated as personal along side the impersonal, the appearances are accommodated as appearances of Reality and not as Reality itself. In Reality they are rejected, and as rejected, they become false (mithyā). In laukika jñāna, the appearances figure as the very reals and neither as appearances nor as illusory. Could there be a better adjustment?

Reality, as the Śrutis inform, is non-dual, yet we all apprehend it as plural; Reality is reported to be *svapprakāśa* (self-luminous and self-manifest) and *aviśaya* (other than a content, of, and alongside knowledge), yet we take it as a *viśaya* of knowledge, either of 'I'—consciousness, or of 'that'—consciousness, and therefore, as manifested by consciousness and dependently revealed (*parādhīnaprakāśa*). What is dependently revealed is *jaḍa*.⁵⁴ But Reality has been reported to be pure self-luminous consciousness, *cit*, which is the radical opposite of *jaḍa*. Lastly, the non-dual Reality, as all exhaustive, has been reported to be *one* with the self, or to put it opposite-wise, the śrutis all declare absolute oneness of the self and Reality (*brahmātmaikatva*),⁵⁵ yet the individual feels himself as opposed to the world of Reality. How is this radical opposition of two testimonies or evidences to be removed and reconciled? This precisely was Śaṅkara's problem as an exponent of the vedānta philosophy which is the philosophy of the upaniṣads, and as a commentator of the Brahmasūtras, — the purpose of which, according to Śaṅkara, was to collect and combine the various upaniṣadic texts in the form of a garland. Śaṅkara is not a philosopher of language on his own account, nor does he interest himself with language as such on its own account. He is a philosopher of experience, not of language. His approach is through analysis of experience, and statements are

interpreted and justified or condemned by reference to experience.

Śaṅkara, as has been explained already, achieves the purpose of reconciliation of the opposite testimonies of two fundamental *pramāṇas* of Indian philosophy—*śabdapramāṇa* in a sphere where it is unchallenged, and *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*, the *primus* among all *laukika pramāṇas*, by introducing his concept of *adhyāsa*. Śaṅkara's reasoning here has taken some such shape : there is nothing so peculiar in something *appearing* as something else. This mistake of taking a thing *as* other than itself, this illicit superimposition of one thing upon another, this wrong attribution of a character (*dharma*) of one object to another object through non-observation of the distinctive character of its own, commonly happens when one *feels* : 'it is the nacre which wrongly appears (*avabhāsaté*) as silver', 'it is one moon that falsely appears as double'.⁵⁶ Such a thing happens due to *adhyāsa*, or the cases illustrated are cases of *adhyāsa* which is *avidyā* (not in the sense of absence of knowledge but in the sense of *false knowledge*). A strange question has been raised in recent times : is this phenomenon of misperception, mal-observation, and false knowledge, psychological or logical?⁵⁷ If illusions, hallucinations are not psychological, if they are not abnormal states of the mind, what are they? Any way, we shall turn to such odd questions later on. On the analogy of such commonly experienced states of illusion involving *adhyāsa*, that is, knowledge of one thing *as* something else due to some defect (*doṣa*) in the mechanism of perception, Śaṅkara explains the possibility of Reality appearing in distorted forms in the given experiences.

Be the discovery of this key-concept of non-dualistic vedānta an instance of *arthāpatti* of the vedāntic epistemology⁵⁸ in which apparent impropriety or illogicality of a situation (*anupapannatā*) is sought to be explained away by the postulation of a condition, a circumstance that explains it, or be this idea of *adhyāsa* or *avidyā* an explanatory concept, one which is contained in the upaniṣads themselves, or be it the result of a superb insight on the

part of our philosopher himself, a logical device to establish the vedānta as absolute non-dualism (*advaita*) against rival interpretations of the texts, it is not possible to minimize its importance. Not only is the fate of *advaita* vedānta bound up with it, but also on its interpretation or misinterpretation, is dependent the type of advaitism—Śāṅkarite or its parody that we are going to have. Recently, in the name of a new interpretation and re-appraisal of Śāṅkara some parodies of Śāṅkara's philosophy on the lines of the so-called conceptual or linguistic analysis have appeared.⁵⁹ It was not necessary to enter into this controversy had it not been freely, boldly, and repeatedly charged that tradition has fundamentally misunderstood and misinterpreted Śāṅkara. It appears that in connection with the analysis of Śāṅkara's concept of *adhyāsa*, either the traditionalists or these new interpreters are under the spell of *adhyāsa*, and *prima facie* at least, *this adhyāsa* is psychological, since each party is dead sure that what it sees is the very truth, while one of the contending parties must be completely wrong in spite of insistence to the contrary. How to decide in this case? Since the issue is not what the concept in question *should mean* or how *should* Śāṅkara have used it, *but how he has actually used it in his own writings*, the issue, we presume can be decided by reference to the texts. And here the traditionalists⁶⁰ are at a great advantage, since they are, unquestionably, masters of the language in which Śāṅkara wrote, and are more acquainted with the peculiar idioms of that language, as also the rules of syntax of that language.

There are several things to which we invite pointed attention of these new interpreters by way of reviewing their rendering of the opening sentence of Śāṅkara's *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* on which their subsequent misreading of Śāṅkara's texts and misinterpretations of Śāṅkara's concept of *adhyāsa* seem to be based. That first sentence has been taken to mean by their leader as: "Ideas like you and I and subject and object are opposed to one another like light and darkness. Any coupling of them, therefore, does violence against the accepted principles of Logic. But since no linguistic expressions are possible without joining ideas

which are distinct and different, language by its very nature necessarily falsifies and is not a fit instrument for delivering the truth."⁶¹ To say the least, this is not a translation, literal or free, nor is it a relevant rendering of what Śaṅkar says in the sentence. This is a fanciful and utterly irresponsible rendering of that sentence without the least regard towards the meanings of the words actually used in the sentence as also towards their syntactical combination. This is what, the interpreter, labouring under the influence of certain ideas or theories of Russell and Wittgenstein, understands Śaṅkara as having said or meant. But the facts are otherwise. They are: (1) Śaṅkara, in the sentence under reference, *does not say anything at all about language or its faulty use*. Here, Śaṅkara speaks of a certain basic error which underlies and vitiates our conventional consciousness of 'ourselves', that is, our ordinary (laukika) knowledge of ourselves as empirical individuals. Here, he does not speak of any faulty habit on the part of language to combine together all sorts of distinct and different ideas violating the law of types. He is not concerned with any such *general theory* of language. What concerns him here is that in our conventional mode of experience and behaviour we do not 'have' the true self, the self that the upaniṣads speak of as the sole reality, — the self-shining, boundless and free, and so blissful existence. The 'self' we have in our natural or conventional experience and conduct of life is a pseudo-self, an illicit conglomeration of the self and the not-self of our ordinary 'self'-feeling and 'other'-feeling, although even in our referential taking of them in 'I-feeling' and 'Thou-feeling' or 'This-feeling', these seem to be poles apart, and so incapable of being confused with one another. It is this radical misrepresentation of the true self in our natural and habitual experiences and behaviours that he complains of. He does not here speak of any violation of the so-called logic of language in the allegedly wrong combination of the *subject* and *predicate* in descriptive statements, and what is more, the combinations of a subject with a predicate is not *necessarily wrong*, and the so-called theory of types is an exercise in abstrac-

tion. (2) The illogicality that Śaṅkara points out in the opening sentence is not of the form of doing 'violence to accepted principles of logic' regulating uses of distinctive types of words in our language. The illogicality here consists in the empirical facthood of what cannot be the case, that is, what, from the very nature of the case is impossible and absurd. The self cannot be the not-self, the not-self also cannot be the self, not only logically but empirically also, since even our ordinary ways of regarding them in given experience are diametrically opposite. The 'I-sense' or the self-feeling and the 'this-sense' or the other-feeling have radically opposite references — inward and outward. The inward reference seems to point to, what looks like a transcendental presupposition of all given-ness and objectivity, not an objectivity or presentation in itself. The 'other', as distinguished from the 'I', again, is always felt as an objective presentation, as a 'this-there'. Although referentially so very distinct, and if the testimony of the revealed texts is to be accepted for guidance, as radically opposed to each other as light is to darkness, in our given experience of the empirical order, they seem somehow to pass into one another. Thus, the illogical becomes a fact of experience. This, then, so contends Śaṅkara, has to be taken as an illusion of experience, an *adhyāsa*, — not a logical error simply, but a factual error presented as an empirical datum. (3) The two instances of the *adhyāsa* of Śaṅkara's meaning have also been cited by Śaṅkara inside the very same opening sentence. These are 'I-this' or 'This-I' and 'mine this' or 'this mine' — *ahamidam*, *mamedam*. These instances are very much unlike instances like 'This is a cow', 'The cow is docile', where concepts are predicates either of the so-called sortal type or the characterising type may be said to have been employed. The wrong identification or illicit transference of natures (*dharma*) complained of, is between 'I' the verbal symbol for self and 'This', the verbal symbol for any presented objectivity, — the not-self. By the first example, Śaṅkara seeks to illustrate the subject being presented with an objective characteristic, and so in being taken as an object. The second illustrates how an objecti-

vity is wrongly endowed with a subjective character in being owned or appropriated as 'mine' when we feel and react as 'my car', 'my house'. So, it is clear that Śaṅkara takes mistaken identification of self and not-self, mistaking the not-self or the pseudo-self for the true self as the subject-matter of his discussion and analysis. And this is the *adhyāsa* or false knowledge of his meaning.

(4) The expressions 'I' and 'Thou', subject and object — *viśayī* and *viśaya*, have not been used by Śaṅkara as two distinct pairs. In fact, the symbol 'I' and the word 'subject' have the same meaning, and the same reference. Similarly, the words 'Thou' and 'object' are intended to convey the same meaning in reference. But, in the fanciful rendering of Śaṅkara's opening sentence in the *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* already quoted, the expressions have been taken as standing for distinct pairs. This initial mistake has next served as the basis of the fundamentally wrong supposition that these expressions of Śaṅkara are illustrative of the ego-centric particulars of Russell, or of the so-called 'unique individuals' which do not have any descriptive meaning but have only a certain referential meaning. This wrong supposition, in its turn, has lured our new commentators of Śaṅkara into believing that the *adhyāsa* or misrepresentation that Śaṅkara complains of in the opening sentence, is the faulty combination, otherwise called 'coupling', of 'unique particulars' with concepts (*jāti*) or predicative characteristics in the descriptive language. For the exigency of this utterly mistaken version of Śaṅkara's concept of *adhyāsa* which does not have remotest connection with Śaṅkara's text, the expressions 'subject' and 'object' — *viśayī* and *viśaya*, — have been next understood as meaning 'the logical subject' and 'logical predicate' of a descriptive proposition. This palpable mistake and the gross fabrication resulting from it has been paraded as a new appraisal of Śaṅkara's theory of *adhyāsa*. And, according to this new version, Śaṅkara's *adhyāsa* illustrates "difficulties of propositional symbolism".⁶² Suffice it to point out that one, acquainted with the original and having a clear grasp of the meanings of the expressions used by Śaṅkara and their

syntactical relation, would be incapable of committing these errors. In the face of all these patent facts, it is difficult to see how the observation that the *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara 'has been utterly misunderstood and is given a cursory treatment'⁶³ by the classical commentators can be treated *adhyāsa* or false knowledge of his meaning.

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NOTES

47. G. Misra — Analytical Studies, pp. 1-14. It is worth noting that Śaṅkara in explaining the special significance of B.S. 1.1.3 'Śāstrayonitvāt' says that since B.S. 1.1.2 may give rise to the confusion that Brahman may as well be known inferentially, so this third sūtra is added to emphasize unequivocally that the śrutis alone are the source of knowledge of Brahman. 'Tatra-sūtrākṣareṇa spaṣṭam śāstrasyānupādānāt... tamā-śaṅkāṁ nivartayitum idam sūtram pravavṛte 'śāstrayonitvā' iti. 1.1.3. In the face of such a statement, made by Śaṅkara himself charge of misunderstanding Śaṅkara as an authoritarian levelled against Radhakrishnan, Dasgupta and the whole host of Śaṅkara's classical commentators is singularly interesting!
48. G. Nayak, *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.
50. *Adyāsabhāṣya* — Concluding lines.
51. Messrs. Misra and Nayak.
52. Since it is a second hand information not yet verified in direct intuition.
53. Cf. 'Tatra evam sati yatra yadadhyāsa tatkrtena doṣeṇa guṇeṇa vā anumātreṇāpi sa na saṁvadyate', *Adyāsabhāṣya*.
54. Whatever is *cidāvabhāṣya*' as different from *cit*, the self-shining principle of illumination, is taken as *jaḍa* in the *vedānta*.
55. B.S.B. 1.1.4 — first two paragraphs.

56. Adhyāsabhāṣya.
57. G. Misra — *Ibid.*, pp. 1-8.
58. 'Upapadyajñānatvena upapādakalpanam arthāpat-
tiḥ', Vedānta Paribhāṣā, Ch. 5.
59. Cf. Dr. Misra's Revision of Śaṅkara and Dr. Nayak's
Reappraisal.
60. By traditionalists I mean here Śaṅkara's classical com-
mentators and interpreters of the two schools of vācas-
pati and vivaraṇa.
61. G. Misra — Analytical Studies, p. 5.

That Śaṅkara is not concerned at all with propound-
ing any general theory of adhyāsa but only with a
specific situation of adhyāsa of self and not-self is
evidenced by the fact that from the very first sentence
to the last sentence of adhyāsabhāṣya he postulates,
illustrates, explains by means of definition, common
examples as also by comparison with the views of other
schools the suggested notion of adhyāsa of self and
not-self. After this has been done he continues to show
the evil consequences of this adhyāsa which has its
root in beginningless avidyā. Finally, he states that it
is to circumvent this adhyāsa that the vedānta insti-
tutes the enquiry into the true nature of the self. He
speaks of nothing else, does not speak of language or
its misuse by even a single word used in the adhyāsa-
bhāṣya — he speaks of irrational experiences vitiated
by avidyā and the consequent psychological attitude and
physical behaviour — none of which is an instance of
misuse of language. Vācaspati has brought this point
into clear relief in his tika — "nanu santi sahasrama-
dhāsaḥ, tat kimarthaṁ ayamevādhyāsaḥ akṣepasamā-
dhānābhyām vyutpāditaḥ, nādhyāsamātram, ityataḥ
āha' tametamevamlakṣanamadhyāsam paṇḍitā avidyeti
manyantē' (Śaṅkāra) — Avidyā hi sarvānarthavījamīti
...eva sarvānarthahetunaḥ na punaḥrajatādivi-
bhramaḥ...iti tadeva vyutpādyam, na adhyāsamāt-
ram". This is also evident from Śaṅkara's own words
repeated at every stage of the discussion in the adhyāsa-
bhāṣya — "Tametamavidyākhyamātmā-nātmanoritareta-

rādhyāsam puraskṛtya sarvepramāṇaprameya-vyavahārā laukikā vaidikāśca pravṛttāḥ... , also 'Evamahampratyayinamaśeṣasvapracārasākṣini pratyagātmanydhyasya... Evamanādiranto naisargikódhyāso 'Asyānarthaheṭoḥ prahānāya ātmaikatvavidyāpratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante' ". Thus it is evident that Śaṅkara was not interested in any general theory of adhyāsa and 'ātmanātmanohadhyāsaḥ' is not an instance of it — the peculiarity of this adhyāsa, such as, its anirvacanīyatā precluding the possibility of its figuring as an instance of any general *logical* theory. It was the peculiar contradiction involved in the true view of the self as aviśaya and our empirically evident view of self as a given objectivity — viśaya, the disparity of the self as it is in itself and as it empirically *appears* that call for the concept of adhyāsa as the only possible explanation. This necessitated a discussion as also an analysis of what actually happens in a psychological state of illusion, such as perceiving the nacre as a piece of silver or perceiving the single moon appearing as double. There is not, therefore, the least objective evidence that Śaṅkara's adhyāsabhāṣya is, or was ever intended to be, a critique of language or a general logical theory of the nature and function of words in our language. It is also singular that to provide objective basis for his arbitrary rendering of Śaṅkara, Dr. Misra in his latest paper in the quarterly, should invent a dialogue between an objector and vācaspati in the Bhāmati which is not there in any edition of that Tika. (P. 238 of the Quarterly). It is also astounding that when the commentators like Vācaspati, Ānandagiri, Padmapādācārya and innumerable other writers of the two schools have devoted a major part of their works on analysis and explanation of adhyāsa, Dr. Misra has complained that it has been given a cursory treatment, disproportionate to its importance, Vide Analytical Studies, p. 4.

62. G. Misra — Śaṅkara's theory of adhyāsa, Ind. Phil. Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 3, 1975.
63. G. Misra — Analytical Studies, p. 4.