

## A CRITICAL STUDY OF PROF. WISDOM'S PAPER ON 'GOD'S'

(1) Prof. Wisdom has a peculiar style of writing and manner of presenting his subject matter, such that it is not always easy to pick up the chain of thoughts presented by him. However it is not very difficult to get at the substance of his presentation, as sometimes he repeats and reviews his statements.

In the first three sections we can see a distinction being drawn between two sorts of beliefs in God or gods, which may be named as practical beliefs and theoretical beliefs. A practical belief in this context implies a belief which has a practical bearing on the behaviour and conduct of the believer. Wisdom mentions two types of practical religious beliefs which may be named as crude type of practical religious beliefs and refined type of practical religious beliefs. Examples : Farmers praying for rain at night and looking for rain in the morning. Praying for a sick friend and looking for improvement in his health condition. These are examples of crude practical beliefs in the divine being or beings. Many educated and cultured people now-a-days do not believe in the practical efficacy of prayer illustrated in the above-mentioned examples; but their religious beliefs do have some practical bearing on their conduct, in as much as they face death cheerfully because they believe in future life and a world after death. They believe that after death they would meet their relatives and friends who have passed away from this world. They believe that God resides in the world beyond death and that after death they will go to that world and see God's throne. Such beliefs are examples of the refined type.

Theoretical beliefs are beliefs which may not have any practical bearing on behaviour and conduct of the believer but for which the believer has some theoretical grounds which justify the belief.

Prof. Wisdom is more interested in the analysis of theoretical belief in God or gods. Wisdom seeks to analyse the question 'Is belief in gods reasonable?' It seems that in

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\* This paper of Prof. Wisdom appears in his book 'Philosophy & Psycho-analysis'.

this essay Wisdom concentrates on the question of God's existence, as inferred from certain facts in nature. In the books on Psychology of Religion, this is known as 'Natural element in religious belief'. The first formulation of the question appears in the following passage in the essay, p. 151. "..... in order to grasp fully the logic of belief in divine minds we need to examine the logic of belief in animal and human minds.....For the purpose of this discussion about divine minds let us acknowledge the reasonableness of our belief in human minds without troubling ourselves about its logic. The question of the reasonableness of belief in divine minds then becomes a matter of whether there are facts in nature which support claims about divine minds in the way facts in nature support our claims about human minds".

According to Wisdom, questions like 'Does God exist?', 'Do dogs think?', 'Do animals feel?'. 'Do flowers feel?' are puzzling questions; because they all involve a metaphysical difficulty. What does Prof. Wisdom mean by 'metaphysical difficulty?' He does not define this term in his essay; but the meaning is clearly indicated in his examples. On p. 152 he suggests that the question 'Is there ever any behaviour which gives reason to believe in any sort of mind?' involves a metaphysical difficulty. This example gives a clue to Wisdom's concept of 'metaphysical difficulty'. Behaviour is objectively observable, mind is not. Therefore for Mr. Wisdom inference of mind from behaviour is a metaphysical puzzle. In other words 'metaphysical difficulty' for Wisdom, means the difficulty of inferring the unverifiable from the verifiable; the difficulty of inferring the unobservable from the observable. According to Wisdom, the question about God's existence besides involving a common metaphysical difficulty also involves a sort of scientific difficulty which he presents in his characteristic manner. I quote. "Likewise, even when we are satisfied that human behaviour shows mind and even when we have learned whatever mind-suggesting things there are in nature, which are not explained by human and animal minds, we may still ask, 'But are these things sufficiently striking to be called a mind-pattern? Can we fairly call them manifestations of divine beings?'" To clarify the character of scientific difficulty mentioned

in the above statement, Wisdom refers to familiar situations in which this difficulty occurs. Such situations relate to reading a man's character from his behaviour, such as attributing any particular character traits on the basis of observation of behaviour. For instance two persons may agree to the facts of behaviour; and yet one may say "Really she hated him", and the other may say "She didn't, she loved him". In this connection Wisdom points out that "the line between using a name because of how we feel and because of what we have noticed isn't sharp".

From his statement and the illustrations, it is fairly evident that by 'scientific difficulty' involved in the question about God's existence, he means the difficulty of being absolutely certain of the nature and character of the data presented and of its relation to the hypothesis suggested by it. The term 'epistemological difficulty' would be better name for it.

To bring out the seriousness of scientific difficulty involved in the question about God's existence, Wisdom relates and then analyses an imaginary conversation between two persons about a long neglected garden in which among the weeds they find a few of the old plants surprisingly vigorous, which gives rise to a controversy. One says to the other 'It must be that a gardener has been coming and doing something about these plants'. Upon inquiry they find that no neighbour has ever seen anyone at work in their garden. The first man says to the other, 'He must have worked while people slept'. The other says, 'No, some one would have heard him and besides anybody who cared about the plants would have kept down these weeds'. The first man says, 'Look at the way these are arranged. There is purpose and a feeling for beauty here. I believe that some one comes, some one invisible to mortal eyes'. They both examine the garden carefully. They also study what happens to gardens left without attention. Each learns all that the other learns about this matter and about the garden. After all this discussion and investigation, one says, 'I still believe a gardener comes,' while the other says, 'I don't'.

After relating the imaginary conversation, as given above, Wisdom proceeds to give his analysis. He says, "their different words now reflect no difference as to what they have found in

the garden, no difference as to what they would find in the garden if they looked further and no difference about how fast untended gardens fall into disorder. At this stage, in this context, the gardener hypothesis has ceased to be experimental; the difference between one who accepts and one who rejects it is now not a matter of the one expecting something the other does not expect."

Wisdom then suggests that possibly the whole difference between them is that "the one calls the garden by one name and feels one way towards it, while the other calls it by another name and feels in another way towards it". Then more or less Wisdom concludes by saying that 'the manifestation of an attitude in the utterance of a word, in the application of a name cannot have any logic; that when all the facts are known, there cannot still be a question of fact to be considered. How can there still be a question?' But he complains that 'The disputants (about God's existence) speak as if they are concerned with a matter of scientific fact, or of trans-sensual, trans-scientific and metaphysical fact, but still of fact, and still a matter about which reasons for and against may be offered although no scientific reasons in the sense of field surveys for fossils or experiments on delinquents are to the point'.

According to Wisdom, God hypothesis is comparable with the gardener hypothesis, for we do say sometimes to believers 'you still think the world is a garden and not a wilderness, and that the gardener has not forsaken it'. The gardener hypothesis, as mentioned earlier, is claimed by Wisdom to have been proved to be an interjection as distinct from an explanatory hypothesis, though syntactically it appears to be a significant statement of fact, and is intended to be a hypothetical explanation of certain facts in nature.

Wisdom does admit the possibility of non-experimental and yet significant disputes based on reasoning, 'in which (as Wisdom says) one party may be right and the other wrong and in which both parties may offer reasons, and the one better reasons than the other'. He mentions two such types (1) Non-experimental disputes in pure and applied Mathematics and Logic. (2) Non-experimental disputes discussed in law courts. Regarding

the first type, Wisdom says "Two accountants or two engineers provided with the same data may reach different results, and this difference is resolved not by collecting further data but by going over the calculations again". Wisdom names this method as the method of vertically extensive reasoning. According to Wisdom 'the theistic issue is not settleable by such calculation'. The important point is that in such disputes the disputants settle the dispute themselves by a cooperative and jointly directed recalculation and re-reflection on the data before them. In this sense of the term 'settleable' the theistic issue is not settleable.

Regarding the non-experimental disputes discussed in law courts, Wisdom says that "In courts of law it sometimes happens that opposing counsels are agreed as to facts and are not trying to settle a question of further fact. . . . . In such cases the process of argument is a presenting and re-presenting of those features of the case which collectively cooperate in favour of calling the situation by the name by which the reasoner wishes to call it. The reasoning is horizontally extensive and not vertically extensive—it is a matter of the cumulative effect of several independent premises. And because the premises are severally inconclusive, the process of deciding the issue becomes a matter of weighing the cumulative effect of one group of severally inconclusive items against the cumulative effect of another group of severally inconclusive items. . . . . the solution of the question at issue is a decision, a ruling by the judge. . . . . the decision manifests itself in the application of a name. . . . . With the judge's choice of a name for the facts goes an attitude and the declaration, . . . . . the ruling is an exclamation evincing that attitude. But it is an exclamation which not only has a purpose, but also has a logic. "

It may be pointed out that, earlier, Wisdom condemned the gardener hypothesis as logic-less interjection or exclamation, saying that the manifestation of an attitude in the utterance of a word, in the application of a name, cannot have a logic. Wisdom takes this stand even though the method of reasoning involved in the gardener hypothesis appears to be a sort of 'horizontally extensive reasoning' similar to the method of reasoning employed in the legal disputes.

Wisdom seems to admit this similarity between the two cases when he says, "Our two gardeners even when they had reached the stage when neither expected any experimental result which the other did not, might yet have continued the dispute, each presenting and representing the features of the garden favouring his hypothesis, that is, fitting his model for describing the accepted fact; each emphasising the pattern he wishes to emphasize." It may be mentioned again that this is also what, according to Wisdom, opposing counsels do in the law courts.

What makes Wisdom describe the two cases in contradictory terms, describing one as 'an interjection without a logic', and the other as 'an exclamation with a purpose and a logic'? It seems to me that possibly Wisdom's ground is that the horizontally extensive reasoning of opposing counsels in the law courts is of the nature of objective and dispassionate reflection on the accepted facts; whereas the reasoning of the disputants in the gardener hypothesis is inextricably mixed up with their feeling reaction or lack of feeling reaction towards the accepted facts.

Wisdom himself refers to the predominance of the feeling element in the question about God's existence. He says, "The difference as to whether a God exists involves our feelings more than most scientific disputes, and in this respect is more like a difference as to whether there is beauty in a thing." Thus according to Wisdom, aesthetic propositions like 'there is beauty in a thing', and religious propositions pertaining to divine existence are of the nature of articulate exclamations without logic. Wisdom holds this view, knowing that syntactically such propositions appear to be significant statements of fact and that they are intended to be significant propositions and not verbalized exclamations by those who present them.

Wisdom seems to be categorical about his analysis of 'seeing beauty in a thing.' It should be noted that throughout in his analysis, Wisdom's style and manner of presentation are persuasive and not offensive. In this respect he is different from A. J. Ayer. According to Wisdom, a difference as to whether a thing is beautiful is not a factual difference in the sense in which a difference as to whether a thing is octagon or circular is a factual difference. The procedure for settling a dispute whether a

thing is beautiful or not consists not only in reasoning and re-description as in the legal case but also in re-looking or re-listening. For instance, to settle whether a piece of music is better than another we listen again, with a picture we look again. Wisdom's statements clearly imply that by re-listening or re-looking we do not come to discern any new features of the object under study; all that happens is that our feeling attitude gets crystallised and then it is verbalised in the form of aesthetic remark as 'this is more beautiful', 'this is more grand'.

After concluding that religious propositions about God's existence are largely verbal expressions of feeling attitudes, Wisdom suggests that their further investigation should consist in the study of their psychological genesis as distinct from logical grounds. Wisdom says, "I am well aware of the distinction between the question 'What reasons are there for the belief that S is p', and the question 'What are the sources of the belief that S is p?' There are cases where investigation of the rationality of a claim, which certain persons make, is done with very little inquiry into the causes of their beliefs. This is so when we have very definite ideas about what is really logically relevant to their claim and what is not." Further on he adds that in the critical study of 'conclusions which are largely the expression of an attitude, we have not only to ascertain what reasons there are for them but also to decide what things are reasons and how much'. This he names as the process of sifting reasons from causes.

In the next section, section 10 which is the last section in his paper on 'Gods', Wisdom proceeds to present his psychogenetic account of belief in gods.

Thus we conclude that, inspite of his habit to avoid giving direct expression to his positive views, Wisdom's general view regarding the real nature of our belief in God's existence is fairly clear; and that view is, that propositions about God or gods are only verbal expressions of feeling attitudes; and as such they are fundamentally different in kind in their logical status and character from scientific statements.

**Critical :** Wisdom's view and analysis of religious propositions is very much similar to A. J. Ayer's view and analysis of ethical

propositions. Some of my objections against Ayer's analysis of ethical propositions, which I have discussed in my paper on 'A critical study of Ayer's Analysis of Ethical Propositions' are applicable to Wisdom's analysis of religious propositions.

Wisdom's view that religious beliefs are interjections without logic should necessarily imply that religious beliefs of all types of believers must be suffused with feelings and emotions. The above view should also imply that whoever verbalises his belief in the divine being should at that moment experience a feeling and emotion stronger than the feeling involved in a scientific belief; and that apart from his religious feeling and emotion there is no mental content in his religious belief.

It may be pointed out that there is at least one class of persons whose belief in the divine involves as little feeling as may be involved in a scientific belief of a scientist. I am referring to philosophers like Dr. A. C. Ewing who reach the conclusion about God's existence in a cool and calculating manner uncoloured by any feeling attitude. Chapter on 'God' in Dr. Ewing's book 'The Fundamental questions of philosophy' clearly illustrates the above statement.

Wisdomians perhaps would seek to refute this point by saying that a religious proposition which is not primarily and largely the expression of an attitude must be a nonsensical sentence like 'Algebraic equations attend race meetings', 'arithmetical fractions attacked me in the bath room', 'Time and space take tea without sugar.' Such sentences according to Wisdom appear significant only because of their syntactical similarity to significant statements of facts.

Wisdomian refutation in this context, I suspect, is rooted in their basic postulate about Meaning. I have discussed Wisdom's theory of Meaning, along with Wittgenstein's and Ayer's theories in my short treatise entitled 'Wittgensteinian Philosophy' and in some of my published papers. For the present purpose, it may be briefly mentioned that in accordance with their basic postulate of Meaning, significant sentences are broadly divided into two classes : (1) those whose logical contents can be shown to be in 'one to one correspondence' with the empirically observable facts. This class of sentences in



Wisdomian classification corresponds to what Ayer calls 'directly and in principle verifiable statements.' In a published paper entitled 'Nature of philosophical statements' I have coined a name 'logical correspondents' for the above described class of sentences. In that paper I have written that "A word and a statement can be said to be logical correspondents when there is a possibility of using them as pointers in ostensive demonstrations." (2) The other main class of significant sentences in the Wisdomian classification is known as 'logical constructions.' This name was coined by Wisdom himself, in one of his earlier papers written (possibly in 1931) soon after being newly acquainted with Wittgenstein's thought in his *Tractatus*. According to Wisdom, a sentence becomes a logical construction if it is adequately translatable into a series of sentences whose meaning consists in one to one correspondence with facts. Following the terminology used by Wisdom in a later paper of his entitled 'Is Analysis a useful method in philosophy', a logical construction should be defined as 'a sentence which can be subjected to the different level—material analysis, ending at the level of the empirically observable facts.' He gives the example 'England is at war with France.' This is a logical construction as it is translatable into statements about English men and French men; and the statements about the latter refer to empirically observable facts.

Wisdomian argument for characterizing the religious propositions as nonsensical would then be that such propositions cannot be shown to be either as statements of facts or as logical constructions.

In this connection I maintain that there is one more class of statements which can reasonably be considered to be logically significant. In my paper on 'Nature of philosophical statements' I have named them as 'Logical emergents'. Thus, according to me, Logical correspondents, Logical constructions and Logical emergents constitute the three major classes of logically significant statements. Logical constructions and logical emergents are both ideational symbol-patterns and not situational symbol-patterns; that is, they symbolize idea-patterns and not fact-patterns or ostensible situations. A logical construction as an idea-pattern is analysable into logical correspondents; whereas a logical

emergent, as an idea-pattern, is epistemologically traceable to, suggested by and derived from logical correspondents; but it is not analysable into or reducible to logical correspondents. For instance, in Psychology, William James' concept of 'Stream of consciousness' is a logical construction definable as the sum-total of the moment to moment changing states of consciousness. Whereas M'cdougall's concept of 'Group mind', M'cdougall's concept of 'Instincts', Freud's concept of 'the Unconscious' are, according to me, logical emergents, as they are claimed to have been suggested by and derived from the study of empirically observed phenomena; and logically they are not considered to be reducible to the empirical data from which they have been derived. For example, according to M'cdougall, the concept of instincts, as innate and universal mental dispositions, was suggested to him by the study of various types of unlearned behaviour of complex patterns displayed by all human beings and higher animals. He repudiates the idea of designating 'instincts' as class name of such types of unlearned behaviour. According to M'cdougall, Instinct hypothesis is a useful explanation of unlearned forms of behaviour. For instance, sex instinct, according to him, is not a class name of sexual behaviour. Sex instinct is a plausible explanation of sexual behaviour. Instinct hypothesis may not be true; but here we are concerned with its logical character and not its truth value. Same can be said about 'Group mind' and 'the Unconscious'.

Prof. Wisdom, it seems, is aware of this class of concepts and propositions. But he maintains that a significant explanatory hypothesis must be experimental in character, implying thereby (to put in his own words) that "with difference of hypothesis goes some difference of expectation as to the facts". If two different hypotheses are formulated on the basis of the same empirical data, there must be a difference at least in their claims in regard to the future facts, experimentally produced or naturally produced. In other words, the experimental character of an explanatory hypothesis implies that its denial should involve a reference to a fact or facts, not covered in its data.

According to Wisdom, a non-experimental hypothesis is not so much an explanation of the observed facts as it is a way of naming the observed facts. But the naming of the observed facts

may have a purpose and a logic behind it; or it may be only a verbalization of a felt attitude towards the facts. A legal verdict by a judge is an instance of naming the observed facts, in which naming, according to Wisdom, has a purpose and logic behind; whereas God hypothesis is an instance of naming the observed facts (pertaining to Mind patterns in nature) in which naming, according to Wisdom, is only a Verbal expression of a felt attitude.

By characterizing the non-experimental hypotheses as the propositional manner of naming the observed facts, Wisdom does not seem to have solved the puzzle.

Whether a given hypothesis is an attempt at explaining the observed facts or it is an attempt at naming the observed facts cannot be ascertained objectively without giving careful consideration to the subjective intention of the framer of the hypothesis. When a judge in a law court, after a careful scrutiny of the facts submitted to him, says in his verdict that the death of B caused by A was a willfully committed murder, the judge's logical intention is to give the most appropriate legal label to the action performed by A, which resulted in the death of B; the judge gives the label in the light of the facts described to him. On the other hand in M'cdougall's Psychology, Instinct-hypothesis is intended to be a scientific explanation and not a scientific label for unlearned forms of behaviour. M'cdougall also formulates his Instinct-hypothesis after carefully and critically considering various facts pertaining to various forms of unlearned behaviour.

It seems to me that, in insisting on the experimental character of a significant explanatory hypothesis, Wisdom is mixing up the meaning or significance of a hypothesis with its truth value. In Science rival hypotheses suggested by one and the same set of facts are considered as equally significant. In Science, Prof. Wisdom's demand that "With difference of hypothesis goes some difference of expectation as to the facts", is not insisted on for the purpose of recognizing a hypothesis as scientifically significant. But for settling the dispute between rival hypotheses this demand is made. Between two rival hypotheses, a hypothesis, whose expectation as to the future facts results in the occurrence of the expected facts, is

accepted as more true than the other hypothesis whose expectation as to the future facts does not result in the occurrence of the expected facts.

In a broad sense an explanatory hypothesis is a logical possibility suggested by an observed data. It does not cease to be a significant hypothesis, if its truth value cannot be settled this way or that way.

Thus it can be legitimately maintained that God-hypothesis framed by cool and calculating philosophers and other reflective and intellectual minds, in response to mind-patterns in nature, is a significant explanation or a logical emergent, and not a verbal expression of an attitude, as maintained by Prof. Wisdom.

It should however, be specifically noted that it would be misleading to assume that there are no persons whose religious beliefs are largely the expression of an attitude. In many instances of religious belief the idea element or the intellectual content is obscure; the person concerned is not at all clear in his mind about the nature of God; but the feeling attitude of fear, awe or reverence is perceptibly present. The name 'God' or any picture or any other symbol associated in their minds with God-head would bring out the signs of religious attitude in their behaviour. About such persons it can safely be said that their religious belief is largely the expression of an attitude.

Wisdom however makes one package in which he puts the religious belief of the unthinking and unenlightened devotees along with the belief of learned theologians like Bishop Gore, of philosophers like C. E. M. Joad, of mystic poets like Wordsworth and all others who hold religious beliefs. Wisdom assumes that religious beliefs of all persons are of the nature of a feeling attitude, varying only in degree like members of the same family. This, I think, is not an objective and scientific approach.

That, for the purpose of Analysis, Prof. Wisdom puts on a par religious beliefs based on Animism, polytheism, monotheism and pantheism, is clearly indicated in various places in his paper on 'Gods.'

In the last section of his essay, he puts together Wordsworth's pantheistic belief and the infantile animism. Wisdom quotes a passage from Wordsworth's famous poem 'Tintern Abbey' in which the poet says,

“ . . . . . And I have felt  
A presence that disturbs me with the joy  
of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime  
Of something far more deeply interfused,  
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,  
And the round ocean and the living air,  
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man  
A motion and a spirit, that impels  
All thinking things, all objects of all thought  
And rolls through all things ”.

Prof. Wisdom then analyses the poet's pantheistic experience. Wisdom says “Wordsworth's feeling is the feeling that the world is haunted, that something watches in the hills and manages the stars.” In the same para Wisdom describes the animistic attitude of small children about stone and the wind. In the concluding sentence of the para, Wisdom states, “It is plain that Wordsworth's feeling is of this family.” He implies that the poet's pantheistic feeling about the divine presence in Nature is similar in kind to the infantile animistic feeling about stone, and the wind. In his analysis of the child's animistic attitude Wisdom points out that it is an inappropriate attitude as it is born of childish imagination, and no objective understanding of things. By implication, Wisdom suggests that Wordsworth's pantheistic attitude also is an inappropriate attitude born of his imagination and not critical understanding.

The method followed by Prof. Wisdom in his analysis of philosophical puzzles is typical of him. In his analysis of puzzles he seeks to find familiar and common instances which bear some similarity to the puzzling phenomena. He then analyses the familiar instances and attributes the characteristics found in them to the puzzling phenomena. This is what he has done in his analysis of Wordsworth's pantheistic attitude. Wisdom analyses, in his typical manner, Wordsworth's mystic feeling of the presence of the Divine in nature in the light of his psycho-

logical analysis of the child's animistic attitude to objects in nature. The similarity between the two cases is in respect of the objects of the two attitudes. Both, the child's animistic attitude and Wordsworth's pantheistic attitude are felt in regard to the objects in nature. From this similarity, Wisdom seemingly appears to infer that the two attitudes must be similar also in their character and genesis. The elevating and sublime joy which is the distinguishing mark of mystic attitude and which is prominently stated by Wordsworth in his poetic description of the divine presence, goes unnoticed by Wisdom. The poet mentions the mystics joy in the very second line of the poem, but Wisdom in his analysis concentrates on what the poet has mentioned in the 5th line and after, because that helps him in his analysis.

Here again it may be pointed out, Wisdom's analysis is dominated by his basic postulate that the significant and real is limited to the empirical; and since the feeling of the divine relates to the trans-empirical, Wisdom makes it out to be imaginary and unreal.

Sometimes in his analysis of puzzles, Wisdom compares the puzzle to familiar phenomena in order to bring out the points of dissimilarity between them. In such cases he tries to clarify the nature of the puzzling phenomena by emphasising the dissimilarities between the familiar and the puzzling. This is what he does in the earlier sections of his essay on 'Gods', wherein he tries to establish that 'belief in the divine being or beings is an interjection without logic.' On the ground of some dissimilarities between the puzzling and the familiar, he denies of the puzzling phenomena common properties found in the familiar instances. Whereas in the other type of Wisdomian analysis of philosophical puzzle, illustrated in Wisdom's analysis of Wordsworth's pantheistic attitude, on the ground of similarity between the puzzling and the familiar, he affirms of the puzzling phenomena other properties found in the familiar instances.

In the later part of the last section of his essay on 'Gods', after giving his logico-psychological analysis of the child's animistic and Wordsworth's pantheistic attitude, Wisdom proceeds to present a psycho-genetic and psycho-analytic account of

polytheistic and monotheistic beliefs and the feeling attitudes involved in them. This part of Wisdom's essay is much too obscure; and I have a feeling that it can be logically analysed only after it is psycho-analysed.

However the main purpose is indicated. Even if we grant that the religious belief of most persons is of the nature of a feeling attitude, we can still maintain that our religious belief as a feeling attitude is something sacred felt towards our God-idea, though our God-idea may be very vague, elusive and amorphous. Religious attitude of fear, awe, love or reverence felt for a being whom we cannot conceive has a morally healthy and beneficial effect on us. The purpose of his giving psycho-analytic accounts of religious belief is to show that religious beliefs are of lowly origin and as such they cannot give rise to morally and emotionally healthy attitudes.

On the philosophico-analytic level also, Wisdom maintains that religious belief, as the expression of an attitude, only implies the awareness of certain facts in nature (which he calls 'mind patterns') and a feeling attitude towards them. The feeling attitude involved in the religious belief is not directed towards the God-idea. According to Wisdom, what we call God-idea is nothing more than a name implying the awareness of certain facts and a feeling attitude evinced towards them.

To put in Wisdom's words, "The proposition 'There is God' evinces an attitude to the familiar. It also evinces some recognition of patterns in time easily missed."

Fair Field,  
B. 20, Ghodbunder Rd.  
Santacruz,  
Bombay

**G. N. Mathrani**

