

UNIVERSALITY WITHOUT A UNIVERSAL

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika category of universal (sāmānya/jāti) is far from universal enough to account for all notions of universality. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika way of thought, there can be a universal notion without a universal, without an ontological correlate. Let us see how.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika table of categories (padārthas) consists of six positive (bhāva) categories and a seventh, negative category. The positive categories are: substance (dravya), attribute (guṇa), motion (karman), universal (sāmānya/jāti), differential (viśeṣa), and inherence (samavāya). The negative category is called negation (a-bhāva) and is divisible into prior negation (prāg-abhāva), posterior negation (pradhvaṃsābhāva), mutual negation (anyonyābhāva), absolute negation (atyantābhāva), and relative negation (saṃsargābhāva). There are many universals, and each universal subsists in many particulars. There are nine substances: earth, water, fire, air, physical space (ākāśa), mathematical space (dik), time, monad (manas), and soul (ātman). Out of these, the first four and the last two are many each and have their respective universals, the remaining two being denied the privilege altogether, thanks to their being individuals. The number of attributes is twentyfour and of motions five, hence they, too, have their universals. The Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā school, Bhāsarvajña (950), and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (1500) deny the attribute—universal/attributeness, however.¹ Each kind of attribute and motion has many instances and, therefore, has a universal of its own. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition regards inherence as one and eternal, hence inherence cannot have a universal. The Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā school² and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi³ believe in the multiplicity of inherence. Yet Raghunātha is not prepared to grant a universal to it.⁴ Cakrapāṇi (1050), the commentator of the *Caraka-Saṃhitā*, refers to some (anyaiḥ) who propound two kinds of inherence, eternal and non-eternal,⁵ but knows no inherence-universal. Differential and universal itself are many each but are made to go without a universal of their own to assimilate them. The *Mānameyodaya*, a treatise belonging to the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsā school, holds the existence-universal (sattā) to reside in other universals.⁶ Bhartṭhari, the great

grammarians-philosophers, grants a universal to universals in general. Kayyāta, the glossator of the *Mahābhāṣya*, follows suit.⁸ Besides, he is prepared to grant a universal to negation as well.⁹

Now, the categories or their subdivisions which are many and are yet denied universals, such as differential, negation, and universal itself, are as much marked by the notion of universality as the ones granted universals; otherwise why do the various universals and differentials as well as the various subdivisions or instances of negation share the common names of universal, differential, and negation respectively? In fact, even single substances like the physical space, the mathematical space, and time give out an air of universality as spaceness and timeness. Devadatta is the name of a single person but Devadattahood appears to be the name of a universal. What is there to account for such notions of universality?

In the West, too, it was sometimes thought proper to limit the number and delimit the area of subsistence of universals. In the *Republic*, Plato starts with the assumption that there is a universal for each class of objects having a common name.¹⁰ (Here the term for universal is 'eidos', literally 'idea', 'form', or 'essence'.) In the *Parmenides*, the young Socrates expresses his puzzlement whether or not one should grant universals to man, fire, and water and is charged by Parmenides with immaturity for expression of his view that there are no universals of hair, mud, dirt, or anything else which is trivial and undignified.¹¹ Aristotle reports that the Academy of his day did not countenance universals of artificial things.¹² It appears that towards the close of his life Plato recognized universals of manufactured things as well.¹³ Plato also seems to have an inkling of the distinction between a real class ensouled by an idea and an unreal class not ensouled by an idea.¹⁴ Early Bertrand Russell gives an incredibly long inventory of universals, far longer than the *Naiyāyika*'s: 'boardly speaking, proper names stand for particulars, while other substantives, adjectives, prepositions, and verbs stand for universals...nearly all the words to be found in the dictionary stand for universals...'.¹⁵ And these universals, too, he proceeds to divide, like particulars, 'into those known by acquaintance, those known only by description, and those not known either by acquaintance or by description.'¹⁶ He neverthe-

less points out that we should accept only the basic minimum number of universals which is consistent with the following : (a) Each universal should be simple and distinct from all others, i. e., universals should not be definable in terms of each other, and (b) the total number of universals recognized should be adequate for the expression of propositions about reality.¹⁷

But, if there are certain particulars which are not bound together by a universal, what is the warrant for the common name acquired by them ? The reply to this question does not appear to have been well worked out by the universalists other than the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. They also seem to fail to suggest criteria of judging where to find universals and where not.

Udayana (1000), the great Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher, appears to have been the first to embark upon a systematic treatment of the question of universal-less universality. To this end, he draws up an inventory of the circumstances, numbering six, in which a universality or generality fails to attain the status of universal proper (jāti)—six impediments or bars to universal (jāti-bādhakas) as he calls them.¹⁸

1. Non-otherness/oneness of the individual/particular (vyakter abhedaḥ). For example, the physical space, which is only a single individual, has no universal, no space-ness.

2. Identity (tulyatva) of the individual bearing different names, or coextensiveness. Jar (ghaṭa) and pitcher (kalaśa) denote one and the same individual, hence they have only one universal, call it jar-ness (ghaṭatva) or pitcher-ness (kalaśatva), not two universals.

3. Cross-division (saṅkara). Physicality (bhūtatva) and corporeality (mūrtatva) are not universals because they involve cross-division. In the monad there is corporeality and in the physical space physicality, while in the earth and the other three material substances—air, fire, and water—there are both. How can one and the same substance be possessed of two overlapping universals?

4. Infinite regress (anavasthā). A universal cannot have a universal like universal-ness (sāmānyatva/jātitva), otherwise that

second universal will require a third, the third a fourth, and so on ad infinitum.

5. Violation of nature (rūpahāni) or self-contradiction. Differentials, though innumerable, cannot have a universal, like differential-ness (viśeṣatva), for the simple reason that they are ex-hypothesi antithetical to the notion of universal.

6. Non-relation (asambandha). Inherence cannot have a universal, like inherence-ness (samavāyatva). Inherence is the relation that holds between universal and particular, inter alia. What is there to relate the relation itself to its universal? If another inherence, then infinite regress.

So, according to Udayana, there are no such universals as space-ness, time-ness, and Devadatta-hood, jar-ness as different from pitcher-ness and vice versa; physicality and corporeality; universal-ness, differential-ness, and inherence-ness. Incidentally, to some of the Navya-Nāya logicians, crossdivision is not a bar to universal.¹⁹

Nevertheless, space-ness, time-ness etc. do appear to be universal-like. Udayana contends that the notion of generality or universality generated by differentials, which are professedly not possessed of a universal, is born of the assimilative cognition 'this is a differential', 'this is a differential,' which becomes possible owing to what he calls 'upādhi'.²⁰ He describes physicality and corporeality, too, as 'upādhis'.²¹ The epithet has ever since begun to apply to all the six cases of universal-less universality recounted by Udayana.

The term 'upādhi' has begun to be translated as 'imposed property'. In this paper we have chosen to translate it generally as 'pseudo-universal' or 'mediate universal' as the case may be.

So, according to Udayana's way of thought, the notion of universality in the six cases listed by him, where universal is barred, is caused by upādhi, i. e., pseudo-universal or mediate universal as the case may be.

Śivāditya's concept of universal (sāmānya) is broader-based than others' and comprehends both universal proper (jāti) and the bulk of pseudo-universals and mediate universals (upādhis).²² He cites existence, substancehood, attributeness, and motionness

as examples of universal proper and cookhood as an example of upādhi,²³ and describes resemblance (*sādṛśya*) as an upādhi.²⁴ According to him, a bar-less universal is universal proper, while universal suffering from a bar is upādhi.²⁵

Śivāditya defines universal as eternal, one, and inherent in many.²⁶ And, since upādhi is a kind of universal, it, too, should be eternal, one, and inherent in many. So, the only feature which distinguishes upādhi from universal proper is that the former suffers from a bar while the latter does not. But why does upādhi have to suffer from a bar while universal enjoys immunity from it? Śivāditya does not raise this issue. An answer which may possibly be proposed on his behalf is that it is the very nature of certain universals to suffer from a bar. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers' last court of appeal is what he calls experience or finding (*saṁvid*) : they must acknowledge what they experience or find.²⁷

Śeṣānanta (1459), Śivāditya's commentator, suggests that the only difference between universal proper and upādhi is that the former is related to its locus directly/immediately (*sākṣāt*) and the latter indirectly/mediately (*paramparayā*).²⁸ Universal itself is upādhi as mediately related to its locus. So, universal proper is immediate universal, whereas upādhi is mediate universal. The stock example of mediate universal is staff-holder-ness (*daṇḍitva*), the loci of which are all those who hold a staff. It is not a universal but a compound of such universals as staff-ness, manhood, and holding-ness, of which staff-ness is only mediately related to the staff-holder. The man holding the staff is the locus of staff-ness. So, he is related to staff-ness, not immediately but mediately, through the staff. Professor Ingalls puts the idea thus : 'A qualifier is an imposed property if its loci are loci of a generic character. Such a qualifier is staff-holder-ness (*daṇḍitva*). The loci of staff-holder-ness are all persons who hold staffs. These persons are loci of staffs. Staffs are loci of the generic character staff-ness.'²⁹

If upādhi is a species of universal, is nothing but a universal mediately related to its locus, it is difficult to see how space-ness can be called an upādhi. Spaceness is immediately related to its locus. Of course it does not inhere in space. In order to

be treated as a universal, mediately or immediately related to its locus, it must inhere in its locus, which it does not. The relation between spaceness and space is said to be that of qualificans and qualificand (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatā*) and not of inherence (*samavāya*). This difficulty is insoluble on Śeṣānanta's view. It is strange that he makes an elaborate reference to this question, without being able to work out an answer.

Śeṣānanta suggests a division of *upādhi* into higher (*para*) and lower (*a-para*) on the pattern of a kindred division of universal. Knowableness is cited as an example of the higher *upādhi* and 'individuality of this particular individual belonging to this particular time' (*etatkālīnaitadvyaktivīśeṣatva*) as an example of the lower *upādhi*.³⁰ But, significant as it may be otherwise, this division renders the confusion worse confounded.

Another division of *upādhi* is : simple *upādhi* (*a-khaṇḍopādhi*) and compound *upādhi* (*sa-khaṇḍopādhi*). Not being more than a unit-class, spaceness is an example of simple *upādhi*. Staff-holder-ness is an example of compound *upādhi*. What Śeṣānanta has to say on the issue raised above can at best apply to compound *upādhi* and by no means to simple *upādhi*. Simple *upādhi* is a property belonging to one and the same entity, whereas compound *upādhi* is a property belonging to different classes of entities. Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa contends that *upādhi* is supervenient upon a combination of several categories (*anekapadārtha-ghaṭito dharmah*).³¹ This applies to compound *upādhi* alone. Compound *upādhi* is a product, hence it is difficult to maintain that it is eternal. And, if it is not eternal, it is not a universal but a pseudo-universal.

In fact, spaceness and timeness are nothing apart from space and time respectively. The terms 'spaceness' and 'timeness' are used not to denote anything objective characterizing space and time respectively over and above the other characteristics (*dharma*s) of these entities but to focus attention on their individuality which is nothing but space and time as distinguished from other entities. They designate, at best, unit-classes.

Uddyotakara takes up the question : What, if there is no universal in universals, is the cause of our notion of repetition or assimilation in universals, such as 'this is a universal, this is

a universal'?, and answers that it is due to the inherence of the universal in many individuals. Cowhood inheres in many cows and horsehood in many horses. Their similarity in this respect is responsible for our notion of assimilation or unitive cognition in universals.³² Udayana contends that the universal experience of repeatability in the categories having no universal of their own is due to their co-inherence with existence (*sattaikārtha-samavāya*).³³ Substance, attribute, and motion are directly inhered in by the existence-universal, which is responsible for the repetitive notion 'existent, existent' in them. The other positive categories are also possessed of the existence-universal, albeit indirectly. The existence-universal resides with them in a common substratum. In the cow, for example, reside the existence-universal, lower universals like cowhood, substancehood, etc., differentials of the atoms of which its body is composed, and inherence. Universals, differentials, and inherence, though essentially devoid of existence and hence of the repetitive cognition 'existent, existent', derive the capacity to generate the cognition from the existence-universal residing with them in the cow-substance.

There is a serious technical flaw in Udayana's statement. His unqualified expression '*sattaikārtha-samavāyāt*' quoted above implies that all the three subsistential categories, viz., universal, differential, and inherence, co-inhere with existence in a common substratum. But it runs counter to the Naiyāyika's thesis that inherence has no inherence. That is why Vardhamāna (1325), his glossator, corrects the master as meaning that universal and differential co-inhere with existence in a common substratum but that inherence is co-supported with existence by a common substratum (*sattaikārthādheyatva*).³⁴ Padmanābha (1600), another glossator of Udayana, observes, with characteristic clarity, that existence inheres in substance, attribute, and motion; co-inheres in universal and differential; and co-resides in inherence (*samavāye ekārtha-vṛttitvam*).³⁵ Thus, it is co-inherence with existence in universal and differential on the one hand and co-residence with existence in inherence on the other which is responsible for the notion of universality in such categories as are bereft of a universal of their own.

It is pertinent to point out that the Naiyāyikas have also sought to explain the notion of repeatability in attributes,

which are attributeless by definition, by the same ingenious device of referring the phenomenon to what they call co-inherence. In fact, Udayana recalls this fact in the present context as well.³⁶ Such Śāṅkaraites as Śrīharṣa (1190), Citsukha (1250), and Ānandajñāna (1250) criticize the Naiyāyika's definition of attribute as attributeless on the ground that attributes are found to possess at least two attributes, number (saṅkhyā) and separateness (pṛthaktva), which cannot be dismissed as cases of illusion, for in that case the cognition of number and separateness in substances, too, will have to be so dismissed. The judgement 'the colour is one and separate from flavour' is no less valid than the judgement 'the pot is one and separate from cloth'. The Naiyāyika fights shy of acknowledging this fact for fear of infinite regress. Citsukha seeks to allay this fear with the remark that it is enough to stipulate that number and separateness do not possess another number and separateness, even as inherence possesses no other inherence.³⁷ Śivāditya holds that number is cognized in attributes on account of the proximity of the former with the latter.³⁸ Mādhava Sarasvatī (1500), his glossator, construes proximity (pratyāsatti) to mean co-inherence (ekārthasamavāya).³⁹ Annambhaṭṭa (1700) and Udayana also invoke co-inherence to account for the cognition of number and separateness in attributes.⁴⁰ Śrīharṣa seeks to rebut them with the remark that, if the Naiyāyika fights shy of locating number in attribute and sees parsimony in locating it in substance, he will be better advised to locate in substance even the universals etc. said to be resident in attributes etc.⁴¹

Kumārila also attacks the problem of explaining the unitive and repetitive cognition in universals in his own way. He contends that such cognition is produced not by a more inclusive universal inhering in the universals but by their presence in many things or by grasping them in a single act of cognition (ekadhī-karaṇena).⁴² Jaya Miśra (10th century), his glossator, tells us that what is meant here is that the repetitive cognition in question is due not to one universal inhering in the universals but to one property imposed on them. What is this imposed property? The fact of producing unitive cognition appearing as residence of one in many.⁴³ His imposed property (upādhi) means pseudo-universal, pure and simple.

It is also interesting to note in this connexion that Kumārila also postulates a concept called class-universal (*samūha-sāmānya*), which seems to answer to the later concept of *upādhi* to a considerable extent.⁴⁴ Significantly enough, some of the scholastic philosophers also held that universals are nothing but collections of things. In fact, Vardhamāna, too, compares Kumārila's class-universal to *upādhi*.⁴⁵

To sum up, compound *upādhis* are mere figurative expressions born of our misplaced notion of similarity or our primitive prejudice of giving a common name to every group of similar facts irrespective of whether the name stands for a real universal or a natural class, at all. Generally speaking, it is co-inherence or co-residence in a common substratum which is the basis of our mistaking universal, differential, and inherence as instantiating the existence-universal. The Naiyāyika's insistence on the exclusion of existence from the other universals is far from understandable, however. The notion 'exists' is caused as much by universals as by individuals. It is futile to argue that this is due to the co-inherence of the existence-universal with them. Such an argument is subject to the same criticism as will follow presently. Besides, if the assimilative cognition in, say, 'pots', is grounded in a potness-universal, there is no reason why the assimilative cognition in universal should not be grounded in a universality-universal (*sāmānyatva-sāmānya*). There is no fear of infinite regress, for, universality's being one, there can be no universalitiness (*sāmānyatva-tva*). So, universality will be the ultimate, highest universal, non-different from the existence-universal. Indeed, the *Mānameyodaya* seems to be perfectly in the right when it repudiates the charge of infinite regress in holding existence to be resident in other universals.

Śaṅkarasvāmin, who is quoted and criticized by Śāntarakṣita, propounds a thesis of locus-possessed universal (*upādhi-gata-sāmānya*) to account for the unitive cognition of, say, cookhood, negation-ness, etc. The repetitive cognition of cook etc. springs from the presence of the action which is related to the motion universal. That is why the notion of cook in the individual cooks survives the cessation of that action, the permanent ground (*viz.* motion-universal) of which is always there.⁴⁶ Likewise, he holds that the cause of the generic notion o

negation-ness is not a negation-universal but the universal possessed by the locus of negation. Śāntaraṅgita retorts that it passes one's comprehension how the universal of one entity can operate as the cause of the generic notion of another. Negation has nothing to do with the universal possessed by its locus, say, a pot, for the simple reason that negation is the very anti-thesis of being. If the universal possessed by the pot can function as the cause of the generic concept not only of the pot but also of the negation of the pot, then it is futile on the part of the Naiyāyika to postulate different universals, as one universal will be enough to cause all sorts of generic concepts. The existence-universal said to be resident in all individual substances, attributes, and motions. If, say, the pot-universal is responsible for the generic concept of negation, why should the existence universal not be held responsible for the generic concepts of cowhood, horsehood, etc. ? Hence the imposition of the generic property on one entity by the universal inhering in another is simply unthinkable.⁴⁷ There is much force in this argument, indeed.

In conclusion, let us remark that universal is natural class or rather natural-class essence, whereas pseudo-universal or mediate universal is in the nature of logical construction effected by importing commonness into essentially discrete individuals. And simple upādhi is not even a pseudo-universal or mediate universal. It is neither more nor less than the being of its locus, than its locus itself. The function of the simple-upādhi word is not to name some entity over and above the locus of the simple upādhi but to emphasize its distinctive individuality in the mass of entities.

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NOTES

1. See, for example, *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra-Vyākhyā*, Anantalaṅkara Thakur, ed. (Darbhanga : Mithila Research Institute, 1957), 1. 1. 25, p. 11; *Nyāya-Bhāṣaṇa*, Swami Yogindrananda, ed., Shaddarshana Prakashana Granthamala, No. 1 (Varanasi :

- Shaddarshana Prakashana Pratishthana, 1968), p. 157; *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, Vindhyeshvariprasada Dvivedi, ed., *The Paṇḍita* (1915), p. 51.
2. *R̥jvimalā-Pañcikā*, S. K. Ramanatha Shashtri, ed., with *Bṛhatī*, Madras University Sanskrit Series, No. 3 (Madras : University of Madras, 1934), 1.1.5.5, p. 164.
 3. *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, p. 76.
 4. *Loc. cit.*
 5. *Āyur-Veda-Dīpikā*, Haradatta Shastri, ed., with *Caraka-Saṁhita* and *Nirantarapada-Vyākḥā*, Vol. I (Lahore : Motilal Banarsidass, 1940), *Sūtra-Sthāna* 1.50, p. 25.
 6. *Mānameyodaya*, C. Kunhan Raja and S. S. Suryanarayana Shashtri, eds. (Adyar : Theosophical Publishing House, 1933), pp. 236-237.
 7. *Vākypadīya*, Kāṇḍa 3, with *Prakīrṇa-Prakāśa*, Samba Shiva Shastri, ed. (Trivendrum : Govt. Press, n. d.), *Saṅkhyā Samuddeśa* 11.
 8. *Mahābhāṣyā-Pradīpa*, Vol. I (with *Mahābhāṣya*, *Pradīpodyota*, and *Chāyā*), (Delhi : Varanasi : Patna : Motilal Banarsidass, 1967), 1.2.64.64, Part II, p. 101.
 9. *Loc. cit.*
 10. *Republic* 507b.
 - 11, *Parmenides* 130c.
 12. *Metaphysics* 991b, 1080a.
 13. *Epistle VII*, 342d-e; *Cratylus* 389b-d; *Republic* 596b-597a; *Timaeus* 28a-b; *Laws* 965b-c.
 14. *Statesman* 285a-b.
 15. Bertand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy* (28th reprint, London : New York : Toronto : Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 93.
 16. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
 17. See P. C. Chatterji, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* (Allahabad : Kitab Mahal, n. d.), pp. 129-130.
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18. *Kiraṇāvalī*, Shivachandra Sarvabhauma, ed., with *Praśasti-pāda-Bhāṣya* and *Kiraṇāvalī-Prakāśa*, Bibliotheca Indica, N. S., No. 1277 (Calcutta : Asiatic Society, 1911) p. 161.
19. *Dinakarī*, Atma Ram Narayana Jere, ed., with *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī* and *Ramaruḍrī* (Bombay : Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1933), verse 8, p. 78.
20. *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 132.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
22. *Saptapadārthī*, Amarendra Mohan and Narendra Chandra, eds., with *Padārtha-Candrikā* and *Mitabhāṣiṇī*, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. VIII (Calcutta : Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House, 1934), 41, p. 37.
23. *Loc. cit.*
24. *Ibid.*, 48, p. 40.
25. *Ibid.*, 145, p. 84.
26. *Ibid.*, 62, p. 50.
27. *Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparyaṭīkā*, Rajeshwara Shastri Dravid, ed. Kashi Sanskrit Series, No. 24 (Varanasi : Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1925), 2.1. 36, p. 399. For further light on the source of this thesis, see Harsh Narain, *Evolution of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Categoriology*, Vol I (Varanasi : Bharati Prakashan, 1976), p. 89.
28. *Padārtha-Candrikā*, 62, p. 118.
29. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 40 (Cambridge-Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 42.
30. *Padārtha-Candrikā*, 41, p. 111.
31. *Padārtha-Dīpikā*, Tatyā Shastri Patavardhana, ed. (Varanasi : Rajajeshwari Press, 1900), p. 40.
32. *Nyāya-Vārtika*, Vindhyeshwariprasada Dvivedi ed, (Varanasi : Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1916), 2.2.65, p 317.
33. *Kiraṇāvalī*, pp. 127-128.
34. *Kiraṇāvalī-Prakāśa*, p. 128.

35. *Kiraṇāvalī-Bhāskara*, Ganga Nath Jha and Gopinatha Kaviraja, eds., *The Princess of Wales Sarasvati-Bhavana Texts*, No. 1 (Varanasi : Govt. Sanskrit Library, 1920), p. 44.
36. *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 128.
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38. *Saptapadārthī*, 148, p. 85.
39. *Mitabhāṣiṇī*, 148, p. 85.
40. *Tarka-Dīpikā*, Satkari Sharma Vangiya, ed., with *Tarka-Saṅgraha*, *Nīlakaṇṭhī*, etc., *Kashi Sanskrit Series*, No. 187 (Varanasi : Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1969), p. 129.
41. *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*, Shankara Chaitanya Bharati, ed. Vol. II (Varanasi : Sannyasi Sanskrit College, 1940), p. 548.
42. *Mīmāṃsā-Śloka-Vārtika*, Kunhan Raja, ed., with *Śarkarikā*, *Madras University Sanskrit Series*, No. 17 (Madras : University of Madras, 1946), 1. 1. 5. 5. 13. 24, p. 7.
43. *Śarkarikā*, *ad ibid.*
44. *Tantra-Vārtika*, Subba Shastri, ed., with *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, *Anandashrama Sanskrit Series*, No. 97 (Poona : Anandashrama, 1929-34), 3.3.1. 1, pp. 804-805.
45. *Pariśiṣṭa-Prākāśa*, pp. 194-195, quoted in Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya, *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithila* (Darbhanga : Mithila Research Institute, 1958), p. 77.
46. *Tattva-Saṅgraha-Pañjikā*, Swami Dwarakadasa Shastri, ed., with *Tattva-Saṅgraha* (Varanasi : Bauddha Bharati, 1958), 767-768, Vol. I, p. 309.
47. *Tattva-Saṅgraha* 769-770.

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