

## INDIVIDUALISTIC MODELS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

In the recent debate over methodological individualism and collectivism a number of different aspects have been run together—a fact which partly accounts for the extremely tangled state of the controversy. We may perhaps initially isolate some of these dimensions of the debate.

### ( a ) Metaphysical or ontological.

The claim that only individuals exist and hence collectivities and groups are fictive or theoretical constructions.

### ( b ) Epistemological.

Any statement or description of groups or societies can only be based on descriptions of individual behaviour in contexts.

### ( c ) Conceptual.

Institutional or “societal” concepts can be reduced or fully analysed without loss of descriptive and explanatory content in terms of concepts of individual action and dispositions.

### ( d ) Methodological.

Explanations of social phenomena including social stability as well as social change can be given in terms of a model of individual action.

It is mainly with the last aspect that we shall be chiefly concerned.

### A misleading contrast.

G. Homans in his “Bringing back Men in”<sup>1</sup> has argued that functionalism is not a theory strictly so called but only a conceptual scheme. The distinction between a theory and a conceptual scheme is, no doubt, important, but I think, in the present context, the distinction could be somewhat misleading. I would suggest that we could regard both as alternative models.

### The structure of the two models.

( a ) Modelisation of social order. I shall briefly attempt to sketch the main assumptions of the systemic model first as a model of social order and secondly as a model of change.<sup>2</sup>

**Main postulates of the systemic model.****( a ) Systemic contexts.**

Biological organism	Personality
( Adaptation )	( Goal attainment )
Culture	Social system
( Pattern maintenance )	( Integration )

**( b ) Replication of systemic structure.**

Any one of the sub-systems of social action could, in turn, be conceptualized as a system on its own level, with a replicated structure. Take, for instance, the sub-system of social system. This has the structure :

Economy	Polity
( Adaptation )	( Goal attainment )
Socialization	Community
( Pattern maintenance )	( Integration )

**( c ) The principle of exchange.**

Each sub-system is boundary maintaining and inter-dependent. This results in exchanges between the system and these exchanges take place by way of generalized media of exchange on the model of money.

**The generalized media of exchange.**

Economy	—	Money
Polity	—	Power
Socialization	—	Commitment
Societal community.	—	Influence


**Pattern of exchange.**

Economy	↔	Polity	Money	↔	Power
Economy	↔	Socialization	Money	↔	Commitments

**( d ) Principle of Cybernetic hierarchy of systems.**

The sub-systems are ordered in a hierarchy of power ( energy ) and control ( guidance ) systems.

Biological organism ——— Culture



**(e) The crucial role of the cultural system.**

The cultural system is the highest control system in the hierarchy.

**The systemic model (b) Dynamic context.**

The systemic model can easily account for one type of social change i.e. changes within the system. This kind of intrasystematic change can be explained in terms of an imbalance between institutionalization and internalization of the cultural norms and values. The other type of change i.e. changes of the system can be explained in terms of a neo-evolutionary theory of social change in terms of structural differentiation, re-integration and adaptation at higher levels.<sup>3</sup> Such a neoevolutionary perspective accords primacy to changes in the normative system.

**II. The structure of an individualistic model.****(a) Individualistic model of social order.**

Just as we schematically isolated the components of the systemic model, we may also isolate the structural components of the individualistic model.

**(a) The Units of the model.**


Individual actors in the capacity of ego and alter.

**(b) The contexts of action.**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| (1) The ecological context                       | — power, resources, constraints.  |
| (2) The cultural context                         | — norms, values, ideals.  |
| (3) The inter-personal or inter-actional context | — The cognitive, affective and motivational dynamics of the inter-actional situation. |

**(c) The consequences of action.**

- |                             |                       |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| (1) Intended consequences   | — Manifest functions. |
| (2) Unintended consequences | — Latent functions.   |

**The schema of the model.****(d) Types of Action**

Ego — Alter ( Societal context ) Direct inter-action.

Ego — Ecology — alter ( Indirect power mediated action )

Ego — Culture — alter ( Indirect, ideology mediated action )


**(e) The dimensions of action****(1) The action frame of reference**

Social action could be described in terms of the above frame of reference. Such action is ego-alter behaviour which is oriented to each other, i.e., in terms of Weber's analysis, it is inter-subjectively meaningful.<sup>4</sup> Such action includes intended as well as unintended consequences of such behaviour. Action, in this sense, is both oriented and controlled, the mechanisms of orientation being the mutual expectations of the actors, and the mechanisms of control being the sanctions, negative and positive, which can be invoked by the actors. Both the mechanisms of orientation and the mechanisms of control are based on the institutionalization of norms and values i.e. on the shared cultural system. Hence the stability of action is provided by the cultural context. The possibility of change is provided by the ecological context, for while norms and values could be shared without relative deprivation, power cannot be so shared. Ego's power is alter's deprivation and hence such power-differentials are the possibility of change.

**The Individualistic Model of change**

The next step is to take the model over time; for the circum-

stances of action at any given time are themselves the results of action at an earlier time, schematically, we therefore have :



In this schema, the context of action at  $t^1$ , both the ecological and the cultural is modified by the intended as well as unintended consequences of action at  $t^0$ . The changes may be of three general types :

- (a) changes in the circumstances of action,
- (b) changes in the equipment of the actors,
- (c) changes in the goals of action.

### **Formulation of the model of situational logic**

The classic statement of the model of social action is in Weber<sup>5</sup> while in the writings of Hayek<sup>6</sup>, Popper<sup>7</sup> and Watkins<sup>8</sup>, we have the further refinements of situational logic. Recently, Jarvie<sup>9</sup> has sought to formulate and codify the main features of the model.

### **Main features of the model of situational logic**

- (1) The chief emphasis of the model is on rationality of action understood in the sense of rational choice of means for the attainment of given ends.
- (2) The model is logical rather than psychological—the de-

viations of actual conduct from the predicted course of action are due to non-rational factors.

(3) The rationality is imputed to the actors in the model hence the actors are anonymous rational actors, as Watkins describes the model.

#### **The model in action : Jarvie on the Cargo cults**

I. C. Jarvie has claimed in "Revolution in Anthropology"<sup>10</sup> that the model of situational logic can explain a particularly interesting type of social change, namely, the phenomenon of cargo cults. Jarvie outlines two kinds of application of the model to cult phenomena. (a) Cargo cults as due to changes in the circumstances of action, and (b) Cargo cults as due to changes in the equipment of the actors, and Jarvie holds that the unintended consequences of the cargo cult behaviour is the change from a closed to an open society. Social changes in a closed society, Jarvie holds, take a magico-religious form because in such a society, there is no cognitive distinction between the natural and the human-conventional orders.<sup>11</sup>

#### **Some comments on Jarvie's application of the model**

Jarvie tends to assimilate the white settlers into the context of action, in his model, the actors are the innovating prophets and his native followers; the presence of the white is treated as part of the context. But this is to reify what is possibly the most explosive and upsetting human factor in the colonial situation.

Once the white presence is taken in its real form as the intrusion of settlers into the life-world of the natives, the way is open to describe the shattering of that life-world; one can spell out the ruinous ecological, social and cultural impact of colonization. We have such a picture of human devastation in Strauss' "Waning of the Tropics". As it has been said, the tropics are not merely waning, the tropics are screaming.

But in Jarvie's hands the colonial situation is treated as if it were part of the context to which the natives have to adapt themselves; paradoxically enough it is not only the Melanesians who confuse the human-conventional with the natural order; Jarvie also, at a higher level does the same. In Marxist terms,

there is an element of false consciousness in the application of the model.

### **The Psychological frame of reference**

The model of situational logic, insofar as it is a model of rational action, treats actual actions as deviations from the imputed path; such deviations may be accounted for as due to the influence of non-rational factors. But this is a residual category, but within this, there are different types of belief and action. For instance, belief in witches and spirits may take any number of different forms, e. g., belief in male or female evil spirits and so on. Here a question may be asked how can we explain the diversity and specific forms of such phenomena? For this question the logic of action is not of much use; we may have to invoke a more psychologically based model.

Provisionally, we can make a distinction between reality systems and projective systems of thought and action. Reality systems are adequate to explain empirical thought and practical action, whereas projective systems deal with magical and symbolic belief and action. The model of situational logic is concerned with the former. But insofar as social action and social life also include projective elements, we have to invoke a different frame of reference. Such a frame of reference, I am calling the psycho-dynamic frame of reference.

### **The classical foundation of the psycho-dynamic model, J. S. Mill**

We can have the foundations of the psycho-dynamic model in Mill's "psychologism." For Mill, psychological laws are the ultimate principles of causal explanation. But such laws are constant and hence cannot explain social and cultural variability. Hence arises the need for middle principles or *axiomata media*. It is thus that Mill projects the possibility and need of a new science—the science of ethology.<sup>12</sup> The possibility of such a science requires us to make a three-fold conceptual distinction between human nature, typical personality and individual temperament. Another feature of Mill's discussion of psychologism also deserves special emphasis, namely, that he includes the historical, ecological and institutional dimensions of the formation of the typical personality or national character.

### Contemporary elaboration of the psycho-dynamic model.

#### A. Kardiner culture and personality theory.

Kardiner's<sup>13</sup> theory of culture and personality depends on two steps: (1) a theory of the formation of modal personality, and (2) a theory of the symbolic or expressive aspect of culture as a projection of such a modal personality. Kardiner's conception of modal personality could be summarized as below.

(1) The individual's early experiences exert a lasting effect upon his personality, especially upon the development of his projective systems.

(2) Similar experiences will tend to produce similar personality configurations in those who are subjected to them.

(3) The techniques which the members of any society employ in the care and rearing of children are culturally patterned and will tend to be similar.

(4) The culturally patterned techniques of child-care and rearing will differ from society to society.

From these postulates, it follows:

(a) The members of any given society will have many elements of early experience in common.

(b) As a result, they will also have a similar personality structure.

(c) Since the early experiences of individuals differ from one society to another, the personality norms of various societies will also differ.

The basic personality type for any society is that personality configuration which is shared by the bulk of the society's members in common as a result of their early discipline. Such a basic personality being best adapted to the social situation, such adaptation being both alloplastic (reality system) and autoplasic (projective system). The dialectic interplay of these two modes of adaptation gives us the psycho-dynamic base of social change.


#### The structure of the psycho-dynamic model.

Primary institutions      Basic      Secondary  
(Child rearing      → personality → institutions.



## Some comments on Kardiner's model

The relation between personality and culture may be viewed either as ( A ) replication of uniformity or ( B ) as organization of diversity. Kardiner overemphasizes (A). These two approaches have a dialectical relationship, whereas the psycho-dynamic approach of Kardiner is *non-dialectical*. But a more important feature is the lack in Kardiner's model, of an ecological dimension, the model takes the primary institutions as given. If we add this to the model, we have<sup>14</sup>:



## Ideological stabilization

Another feature about Kardiner's psycho-dynamic model is the lack of a truly historical dimension. Kardiner's conception of history seems to be that of a native biography, the natives of his analysis seem to live in a rich complex interior world, but this interiority contrasts strongly with their objective social historical vacuum. This forgetfulness of objective history of Dutch colonial repression in the island of Alor on the part of Kardiner comes out most strongly when he, Kardiner, reproaches Malelka the native informant who had spent many years in Dutch prisons, of forgetfulness of early childhood experiences.<sup>15</sup> Kardiner, furthermore, following Ego-psychology seems to be assuming a conflict-free sphere in ego development; this is suggested by his distinction between reality systems and projection systems. The tensions and frustrations of early socialization affect the projection system, but not the reality system. But the Marxian idea that social existence determines consciousness would suggest that reality systems are also subject to the influence of societal contradictions. This means that the entire conceptual frame or the system of categorization would have to be situationally understood. This generalization of social determination to all sectors of thought would result in the standpoint of a general sociology of knowledge, or better, to the thesis of the *social construction of reality*.

### (c) **The cognitive frame of reference**

It is this generalized perspective that I wish to call the cognitive frame of reference. According to this view, in order to understand social life and action, we must enter into the cognitive perspectives of the actors themselves. It is their categories and typifications that give expression to what they do and hence in order to study such action one must enter into the participant's own frame of reference.

### **Foundation of the cognitive frame of reference**

The philosophical foundations of the perspective are complicated and diverse. I would suggest three kinds of philosophical influence —

(a) The general thesis of sociology of knowledge with its chief emphasis on social determination of thought.

(b) Phenomenological philosophy, especially in the form of Schutz's reflections on the social construction of the life-world, and

(c) Wittgenstenian philosophy with its emphasis upon language as embedded and making sense only within a form of life. These three diverse philosophical trends nevertheless converge upon one central point—the intimate bond between concepts and social life. According to Winch<sup>16</sup>, understanding social action means the grasp of the concepts. A reference to Hayek's<sup>17</sup> distinction between constitutive and regulative concepts may perhaps be helpful in understanding Winch's position. The meaning and hence social reality of certain forms of action like marriage, ritual and patterned forms of affection and hostility depend upon the concepts of the participants themselves who define the situation in terms of such constitutive concepts. Apart from such definitions of the situation by the participants, they would not have the reality and significance they do have. Hence, the very visibility of such social facts depends upon our ability to enter into their cognitive world. Social concepts and typifications are not merely context-determined; they are also context-determining.

In contemporary times, the theory of ethnosemantics and ethnomethodology are further sophisticated developments and refinements of this point of view. Indeed William C. Sturtevant<sup>18</sup> has called this perspective in anthropological theory and research

"Cognitive anthropology". Similarly, Charles Frake<sup>19</sup> and Lienhardt<sup>20</sup> have underlined, in different ways, the cognitive substructure of anthropological theory. But I think the specificity and distinctiveness of this perspective is best reflected in ethno methodology. It is of interest to note that Garfinkel<sup>21</sup> has particularly emphasized the three philosophical background contexts, we have already noted. Ethno methodology is a systematic attempt to record the methods of every day reasoning adopted by the participants themselves, the conceptual equipment actually in use with the aim of showing how these routines of typifications build up the world of inter subjective understanding and action.

In the following I would like to indicate at first a few typical cases of such a perspective in action; here I refer to Evans Pritchard's<sup>22</sup> *Witchcraft and Magic Among the Azande* and Lienhardt's *Divinity and Experience*<sup>23</sup>. Indeed as Mary Douglas<sup>24</sup> remarks, basically Pritchard's book is a book on the sociology of knowledge. Pritchard portrays to us a world of apparent illogicality and superstition, but as chapter follows chapter, we begin to experience a profoundly disturbing cognitive conversion as we begin to see that the world of Azande beliefs about witchcraft and magical action make cognitive sense; we begin to see how a form of life ordered in terms of witchcraft could also be a humanly liveable world and this is brought about by making us see the Zande concepts in action constructing the Zande reality. Pritchard clinches his case when he remarks how he himself ordered his daily routines when he was living with them in terms of such notions and how he found this an eminently sensible arrangement. This is a positive example of how a new social reality could be made accessible to us by way of a new conceptual perspective. But in Pritchard, there is also a negative point made. He shows, in his "Zande Theology"<sup>25</sup>, how two belief systems may appear to be similar and yet be fundamentally different. Both Mgr Lagae and Captain Phillips had described Zande theology as involving belief in a supreme personal God and the prayers and incantation formulas recited by them seemed to show not merely the existence of such a belief, but its central role in their religious life. But taking the prayers and incantations and other expressions of

religion in their total social context Pritchard shows how while the monotheistic expressions may be present, yet the monotheistic concept is totally absent. But not merely that, at a deeper level we are made to understand that the religiosity of the Azande does not naturally find for itself a conceptual theological expression and the seemingly monotheistic concepts are the shadows by Christian and Islamic theology upon Azande religiosity. Here we are made to understand a type of experience which has no natural need for theology and we are made to entertain the possibility that the relation between religious experience and theological expression is similar to the relation between religion and art. Of the latter relationship we know that not all cultures associate the two. It is similarly this nontheological expression of religious experiences that is portrayed in Leinhardt's "*Divinity and Experience*"<sup>25</sup> with regard to the Dinka.

But there is a general theoretical dilemma which an 'emic' orientation has to face. According to this methodological programme, we have to consider the social situation as being defined by the actors themselves in terms of their perspectival interpretations; social concepts and the realities they define are perspectival and hence we seem committed to *conceptual relativism*. To consider an example: the concept of deviance and hence the phenomenon of deviant behaviour is situationally determined by the concept users. But when we proceed to do so, we may, in the case of certain social concepts, find that the concept users themselves claim to be using those concepts non-relativistically. I should like to illustrate this dilemma in terms of two recent examples of ethno-methodological studies—the concepts chosen are "mental illness" and "deviance". Robert B. Edgerton<sup>27</sup> in his stimulating paper "On the Recognition of Mental Illness" develops what may be called a negotiation theory of severe psychological pathologies. This is a further refinement and anthropological development of the labelling theory of mental illness. Edgerton is concerned with the processes of recognition of severe forms of mental illness in four East African tribal societies—the Hehe in Tanzania, the Kemba and Pokot in Kenya and the Sebei in Uganda. Edgerton's thesis can be summarized as below,

1. The recognition of persons as mentally ill who are both severely and chronically psychotic usually proceeds with relative ease and consensus.
2. However, most persons who behave strangely and even crazily are not extremely and chronically out of their cultures' view of rational conduct. In such cases, the recognition process is much more complex: in fact, it is a social transaction that involves extensive negotiations having both moral and jurat involvements. The negotiation is a social process of labelling. The dynamics of these long negotiations clearly reveal the social construction of the reality of mental illness. But the participants themselves do not see their discussions and deliberations as a process of social negotiation as Edgerton himself remarks, the fact of negotiation is hidden from them. They see themselves as engaged in a process of objective determination. This reification of human praxis whereby a socially constructed reality assumes the form of a non-human objectivity, becomes clearer in Becker's application of labelling theory to deviance.<sup>28</sup> Becker holds that deviance is a socially negotiated concept and one of the forms of such negotiation takes place in official court proceedings. But then Becker remarks that the lawyers and other officials engaged in such proceedings are, in fact, defining the reality of deviance, although they do not see their action in this way at all. And now Becker makes the crucial remark that the actors tend to reify what they do; they objectify their own praxis and the product of that praxis alienates the actors from their own praxis.

I think it is interesting to note how a Marxian element or addition naturally arises in every one of the contexts we have been describing so far. With regard to the model of situational logic, we have seen how the unintended consequences of action in this model have their source in the structural role of conflict; with regard to the psycho-dynamic model, we had occasion to note how the social situation shapes or moulds both reality systems and projection systems and also how social history interpenetrates individual life history and how within the perspective

of the cognitive frame of reference, we have the Marxian idea of objectification or reification of praxis. Even more importantly, it is these Marxian additions that enable the various versions of the individualistic model to become truly dynamic, capable of accounting for change as well as order.

In conclusion, I would like to suggest what theoretical contributions such a Marxist oriented theory can make to individualistic models.

(1) It can help us in adding a genuinely historical dimension to the model.

(2) It can situate the structural role of conflict in social order as well as social change.

(3) It can permit the application of the notion of dialectic to the relationships between culture and personality.

(4) It can lead to the vitally important idea of reification of human praxis and how this reification in turn leads to the phenomenon of "false consciousness" while dealing with social processes.

But in this attempt to integrate the individualistic model with certain Marxian elements we must take care to preserve the basic postulate of individualism, namely, that social action can only be attributed to individual actors and not to groups and collectivities. This means that we must start with the processes of interaction between individuals; we must show how this interaction process itself has potentialities for change and how this interactional dynamism is amplified and structured by situational factors and how in turn, these structurally located sources of strain lead to various patterns of institutional change. Such a projected theory of social change would therefore have to start with the dialectical character of inter-action. This dialectic of inter-personal relationships is the basis of what Bateson<sup>39</sup> has called schismogenesis. Both symmetrical and complementary schismogenesis is productive of change. As we saw in the model of individualistic action, the context of action has two components—the ecological and the normative-cultural. The schismogenesis of inter-action would there be registered in both the spheres of the action-context. The process of schismogenesis which sharply differentiates ego and alter, in the sphere of the

ecological context, which contains resources and facilities, means of control and coercion, leads to the formation of conflict groups. This process of group formation by which relations of dominance and sub-ordination are structurally established in turn leads to the phenomenon of relative deprivation by which we mean the perception of one group of its own situation as in relation to that of the other as structurally inferior and weak.<sup>30</sup> Schismogenesis hence leads to the perception of R. D. in the ecological context.

The other aspect of the action-context, namely the cultural system of norms, values and ideals may act either as a countervailing power or as an amplifier of the structural imbalance created in the power context. It could act as a countervailing power if the cultural system were to legitimise the inequalities of power. This legitimisation could be achieved both by the ethos (the affective motivational projective systems of the culture) and the eidos (the conceptual belief systems). The power inequalities could be invested with the sentiments of piety and reverence and also cognitively legitimised in terms of an elaborate ethics and social philosophy. In such a case the cultural system would be functioning as a countervailing power to the potentially explosive process of schismogenesis. But this type of ideological stabilization has its own basic type of contradiction to cope up with, for now, at a more abstract level there would develop a contradiction between social structure and culture, between conflict and consensus. This dialectic develops out of the very success of ideological stabilization such that as if by a miracle, the structure explodes when it appeared to be most stable. This process whereby the incipient protest movements generated by structural conflicts are attempted to be contained by ideological stabilizations, we may call *ritualization of protest*. As we have seen ritualization is an attempted containment of change but its dialectics is such that its very success is self-defeating. By attempting to choke all change it only prepares the ground for explosive changes. But the cultural system can also act as a modulator and transformer of structural contradictions. Both the ethos and the eidos may be patterned in such a way as to permit the perception of structural contradictions; the affectivity of the culture may not induce a moral flight from and a denial of inequalities,



while the cognitive structure of the cultures may help the location and identification of structural tensions and discords. This process of affective and cognitive tolerance of social conflicts may actually turn out to be the most adequate response to it, for it may permit a realistic way of dealing with protest, acts as a transformer in permitting the play of divisive forces but in a medium where such divisiveness and conflict could be under rational control. Just as individual psycho-therapy achieves ego mastery over unconscious forces not by repression, but precisely by permitting a recognition and rational understanding of such inner conflicts, so also does this process of social mastery of structural contradictions. In the case of psycho therapy, the availability of the therapist is a crucial element in the process for it is the therapist who functions as the transformer here; the clinical processes of transference and counter transference are essential to the cure. In the social case also, an element which can play the role of a transformer is necessary and I suggest that it is the political sphere that can play that role. Politicization is the first step towards a rational management of change and conflict. It is when a source of strain and conflict has been categorized in political terms, that it can become an agenda for public debate. Hence, I could suggest that politicization is one of the options while dealing with change along with ritualization. But the dialectics of social life is such that these two options themselves interact with each, such that we have on the one hand ritualization of politics as well as politicization of ritual. But even in this dialectical interpenetration and interfusion, the ethos of ritualization still remains the same. Ritualization is a cognitive moral denial of conflict, whereas the essence of the political is a rational understanding and mastery of conflict. What is so deeply perplexing and anguishing about the dialectics of social life is not that these two systems of ritualization and politicization get blurred and interpenetrate—that would only be social ambiguity, not social dialectics. Rather, the one process may appear in the form and manifestation of the other. A deeply radical and innovative intent may appear in the outward form of a return to charisma, while the rhetoric of a radical theory may function as a ritualistic anodyne.

To deal with such dialectical transformations we require a new



understanding of the relationship between social structure and culture, of base and superstructure, in Marxian terms. In the production and reproduction of their material life, men act in patterned ways which may be called relations of production. These relations of production, by the very fact that they are necessary preconditions of the vital business of living, are also power relations; they structure the productive agents in terms of domination and subjection. The productive capacity of the producers is thus expressed in terms of divisions within the associated producers. Man's metabolism with nature is mediated by way of the domination of some over others. In this situation of life-organization, certain exigencies arise, certain tensions and incompatibilities are generated. In short, the base, the structured organization of work poses certain problems and creates an agenda of tasks. These problems have to be identified and conceptualized; they have to be recognized as problems of men, i. e. symbolically, ideologically. The response therefore, is in terms of culture. Men bend their cultural resources, the meanings and morals of their immediate history, to the recognition and symbolization of these exigencies. These recognitions and identifications are legitimised or questioned, accepted or rejected in terms of more ultimate principles and concepts, of legality, or justice, of the nature of things. Morals and metaphysics become ever more refined expressions of the understandings and misunderstandings of men, of their insights and illusions into their own life process. Thus, culture, the realm of super structural forms and meanings becomes the battle ground in which men become conscious of their life-organization. But this cultural mediation of structural exigencies is undetermined. Thus, the response could either be a pacification of consciousness (ritualization) or a radicalization (politicization). In the one case, the repression in life is interiorized and dehumanized men moralize over their dehumanization, in the other case, a roused consciousness prepares the ground for a libearting praxis.

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