BOOK REVIEWS

(J. N. CHUBB) ASSERTION AND FACT (The Categories of Self-conscious Thinking), Bombay, Somaiya Publication, 1977. pp. IX + 228, Price Rs. 60/-.

Here is a very critical and original philosophical work by 'one of the ablest of living Indian philosophers', Dr. J. N. Chubb. The author proposes to discuss the problem of the ontological status of fact, assertion, proposition, meaning, sense-data, and of imaginary and unreal objects denoted by the definite and indefinite descriptions like 'the present King of France', 'Hamlet', 'golden mountains' and 'square circles'. He also proposes to analyse the concepts of knowledge and belief, truth and error. The work assumes that ontological problems arise in epistemology and that such ontological problems are genuine philosophical problems. Ryle, therefore, aptly describes this work as belonging to the field of 'Epistemology-cum-ontology' (Foreword). The work is very critical not only of the solutions offered to the various problems but also of the formulations of the problems themselves. Dr. Chubb is a very severe, uncompromising and sometimes unsympathetic critic of his opponent, who tries to lay bare the implications of his opponents' position which even the opponent may not be aware of and may not like to hold when made aware of. In this style, Dr. Chubb can be compared to the traditional master dialecticians of the Buddhist or the Vedanta school. Though a severe critic, he is not a 'vitandavadin' i. e. his criticism is not just for the sake of criticism. He has a definite positive view to state and his criticism is aimed at merely clearing the grounds for the statement of his positive and original thesis. Any one who goes through the pages of this well-argued work would, I believe, be impressed by these characteristic marks of Dr. Chubb's style of philosophising.

The author distinguishes the epistemological from the purely formal logical approach. According to him, an exercise in formal logic can afford to ignore logical values put on the expressions which pose problems. By 'logical value' of an expression is meant what the expression is explicitly taken as an example of, i.e. as standing for what is believed, what is

disbelieved or what is imagined (p. viii). Since epistemology is not a purely semantic enquiry but raises ontological issues, though indirectly and conditionally, it has to take into account the logical values put on the expressions or the epistemic conditions of their actual use. To adopt an epistemically neutral approach is, according to Dr. Chubb, to commit the fallacy of 'abstractionism'. Such a formalistic approach leads either to the postulation of subsistent "bastard entities" or to the refusal to recognise the ontological status of these categories and consequently to reductionism, i. e., to the reduction of epistemology to semantics or formal logic. The author, therefore, adopts the approach "which takes into account the relevance of epistemic conditions for a proper analysis of phrases and sentences which create puzzles for the philosopher" (p. 2). "The main thesis of the present work", in the words of the author himself, "is that epistemic conditions provide the indispensable context for the analysis of what I have called the categories of self-conscious thinking" (p. ix).

The author makes a distinction between a group of concepts like, 'true', 'false', 'meaning', 'assertion', 'fact', 'knowledge' and 'belief' and another group of concepts like 'object', 'qualily', 'relation', 'event', 'situation' and so on. The distinction, I believe, may find a general acceptance though it would probably be made by calling the categories of the first group 'epistemological' (with the possible exception of 'fact') and those of the second group 'ontological'. Dr. Chubb, however, marks this distinction by calling the former 'the categories of self-conscious thinking' and the latter 'the categories of conscious thinking'. His reason for marking the distinction in this way is that the categories of self-conscious thinking arise at the reflective or self-conscious level of experience of an error corrected or at least that it is only against the background of the possibility of error that these categories become intelligible. In the absence of an experience of error, the author holds, we would not have been able to distinguish meaning from assertion, assertion from fact and fact from what there is. The possibility of an error opens up a gap between what is said to be the case and what is actually the case. Dr. Chubb conceives the activity of acquiring knowledge as a gap-closing activity and it is in relation of this gap-closing

activity that these categories of self-conscious thinking become intelligible. "These concepts", says Dr. Chubb, "operate as transilient (i. e., gap-closing) concepts and do not point directly to what there is" (p. 9). Thus, while the categories of conscious thinking are ontological, characterising modes of being, those of self-conscious thinking, except that of error, are transilient and are not, at least directly, ontological.

The author devotes one chapter (Chap. 3) to the consideration of the problem of the relation between belief and knowledge. He considers and rejects the following three views about the relation between belief and knowledge, namely (i) the incompatibility view which holds that belief and knowledge are mutually exclusive; (ii) the compatibility view which regards belief as a part of knowledge; and (iii) the identity thesis that belief and knowledge are identical. All the three views, according to the author, are based on the mistaken common assumption that 'belief' and 'knowledge' are both descriptive terms. He holds that while 'belief' is a descriptive term, 'knowledge' is an evaluative term and so they belong to two different levels of thought. He also rejects the performative analysis of 'knowledge' on the ground that it entirely overlooks its descriptive function.

He explains the relation between belief and knowledge on the analogy of the relation between a painted canvas and a work of art. There aren't two things—a painted canvas and a work of art. We have a painted canvas judged as a bad work of art i. e. judged as not a work of art at all or we have a work of art i. e. when the painted canvas is evaluated as a work of art, "the canvas before us *is* (and not is a part of) a work of art" (p. 80). He adds, "even when a painted canvas is judged to be a work of art and we do not regard the painted canvas and the work of art as two distinct things, the terms 'a painted canvas' and 'a work of art' do not *mean* the same thing" (p. 80).

"Belief and knowledge are related" says Dr. Chubb, "in precisely the same way in which a painted canvas and a work of art are related. Belief is distinguished from knowledge only when what is believed is said or suspected not to be known" (p. 80). But when a belief is evaluated as knowledge, the belief *is* (and

not is a part of) knowledge; "knowledge and belief evaluated as knowledge are indistinguishable" (p. 81). I wish to make one point in criticism that though Dr. Chubb starts by saying that the terms 'belief' and 'a painted canvas' are descriptive, they are used by him in propounding his views as evaluative terms and not as descriptive terms at all.

Dr. Chubb prefers 'assertion' to the other candidates such as 'belief', 'statement', 'sentence' or 'proposition' as the bearer of the grammatical predicates 'true' and 'false'. 'Proposition' is sometimes defined as 'what is believed, disbelieved or doubted'. This implies that there is a common or identical entity—proposition, towards which different epistemic attitudes can be taken. Such a proposition is regarded as a subsistent entity or the question about its ontological status is dismissed as a pseudo-question. Dr. Chubb holds that both these views rest basically on the same error of thinking that it is possible to be aware of such an entity in an 'epistemically neutral mode of consciousness' (p. 124).

He devotes four chapters (chaps. 7 to 10) to the discussion of the various theories of truth. He rejects the semantic, the redundancy, the performatory and the idealist theories of truth. According to him, truth is a transilient concept rather than a name of a quality or relation. To say that an assertion is true is to deny the gap between what a thing is and what we say it is. To say of an assertion that it is false is to say that there is an actual gap between what is the case and what one says to be the case. When what is said is true the referent of 'what is said' is identical with the referent of 'what is the case'. The expressions 'what is said' and 'what is the case', however, do not mean the same thing, though in the case of a true belief their referents are identical. There is an identity of reference in spite of difference of meaning (p. 166-167).

Thus 'true' and 'false' according to Dr. Chubb, "are adjectives of epistemic appraisal which determine the ontological status of the assertion to which they are ascribed" (p. 204). The locutions 'I know', 'I believe', 'I disbelieve', 'I doubt', 'I imagine' express the speaker's epistemic attitudes. These epistemic attitudes, unlike other subjective attitudes of likes and dislikes, tastes and

preferences, are "attitudes of ontological appraisal" (p. 124) and so relevant, or even indispensable for discussing ontological problems. They indicate the 'logical value' put on an expression by the speaker who uses the expression.

Here I wish to express one difficulty. The difficulty is about the scope of the main thesis or contention of the present work. It is not clear whether according to Dr. Chubb, reference to epistemic conditions or attitudes is indispensable for discussing any ontological problem or only for determining "the ontological status of the concepts of self-conscious thinking" (p. 163); i. e., Whether, according to him, reference to epistemic conditions provide the indispensable context for the proper analysis of all 'phrases and sentences which create puzzles for the philosopher' (p. 2) or only for the analysis of the categories of self-conscious thinking (p. ix). There appear to be two theses running parallel—the stronger thesis that no ontological problem can be discussed without reference to the epistemic attitudes, and the weaker thesis that it is only in the case of the categories of self-conscious thinking, that the problem of their ontological status cannot be discussed without reference to the epistemic conditions. Dr. Chubb does not seem to have made this distinction and this has resulted into the ambiguity about the main thesis of this work.

Out of the various categories of self-conscious thinking, 'meaning', 'assertion' and 'fact' form what the author calls, "the 'transition-to-being' series" (p. 13). Among these three categories, 'fact' belongs to the objective side of the epistemological gap between 'what is said to be the case' and 'what is actually the case', while 'meaning' and 'assertion' belong to its subjective side. Since 'fact' is what is believed, i.e., as the notion of fact is tied up with the epistemic verb to believe and is incompatible with the attitudes of disbelief and doubt, we may say that what is conceived to be a fact is conceived as having a being. However, it would be wrong, according to Dr. Chubb, to regard fact as something 'out there', as Austin does, independently of all reference to the subjective attitude of the person who uses the concept of fact. It is equally wrong, according to the author, to regard fact as a name of a pseudo-entity having no ontological reference as Strawson does. Both Austin and Strawson have gone wrong,

according to Dr. Chubb, because of their failure to recognize the bipolar character of fact. 'Fact' has two aspects : as a transilient concept it closes the epistemological gap and as an ontological concept, it enters into the realm of being. Dr. Chubb says, "A statement of the kind 'It is a fact that A is B' is bipolar in significance...On the one hand, it carries a reference to what is out there and on the other,... it points inwards and implicitly refers to the subjective attitude of the person who uses this type of discourse " (p. 25). It is the subjective pole that accounts for the fact that though the use of the word 'fact' does not add more information, yet its use is logically non-redundant.

In the cases of meaning and assertion, the ontological question breaks up into three questions corresponding to the three epistemic attitudes of belief, disbelief and doubt. It is wrong, therefore, to raise the problem of the ontological status of meaning and assertion in general. Rather, we must ask : What is the ontological status of meaning and assertion (i) in the case of a true assertion, (ii) in the case of a false assertion, and (iii) in the case of an assertion not known to be either true or false ?

In the case of a sentence used to make a true assertion, the meaning is fulfilled in the assertion i. e. meaning *as such* disappears or rather 'the distinction between what is meant and what is truly asserted, though admitted as a possibility, is in this case declared not to be actualized' (p. 222). The assertion devours the meaning. Similarly, the assertum or what is said is non-distinct from the fact, which, in turn, is identical with what is the case. Thus in the case of a true assertion, meaning merges into assertum, assertum into fact and fact into what is the case.

In the case of a false assertion, the meaning is 'frustrated'. The unity of fact and meaning is broken up. Similarly, the assertum or what is said is a 'bracketed content', i. e., it is not specifiable in objective terms but only obliquely as the 'what' of a rejected belief. Thus, in the case of a false assertion, neither the meaning nor the assertum has any ontological status whatever and further the very question of their ontological status is not permissible. "The attempt to determine the ontological status of a content while at the same time rejecting the belief

in it as false", says Dr. Chubb, "is as intelligible as setting a trap for 'pink rats' after the hallucination is dispelled" (p. 205).

In the case of an assertion which is not known to be either true or false the meaning is neither fulfilled nor frustrated. The meaning of such a sentence is regarded as a possible existent, i. e. as existent or non-existent. I think, Dr. Chubb would say that since in the case of an attitude of doubt, one makes no assertion, the question of the ontological status of the assertum does not arise.

Thus Dr. Chubb's view, as I understand it, is that in the case of a true assertion, meaning, assertion and even fact do not have any independent ontological status. The ontological status belongs only to what there is. Similarly, in the case of a false assertion, meaning, assertion and what is falsely considered to be a fact have no ontological status. The ontological status belongs to what is the case. To take an example, in the case of a true assertion 'The earth is round', the ontological status belongs to the round earth. In the case of a false assertion 'The earth is flat', neither the meaning, nor the assertum, nor what is falsely conceived as a fact, namely, the flat earth, has any ontological status. The ontological status belongs to the round earth. It is not, therefore, clear what can be the point of raising ontological problems concerning meaning, assertion and even fact, if, apart from the real, what is the case, or what there is, they have no independent ontological status, whether the assertion is true or false, i.e., if only the real and nothing else has the ontological status. In what way does this view substantially differ from the empiricist view, which Dr. Chubb criticizes, the view that it is senseless to raise ontological question concerning meaning, assertion and other epistemological categories, if in the final analysis, nothing except the real has any ontological status? When Dr. Chubb admits that raising the question about the ontological status concerning meaning and assertion in the case of a false assertion is senseless, it is only a small step further to realise that raising the question about the ontological status concerning meaning and assertion is equally senseless even in the case of a true assertion.

The author devotes two chapters (chapters IV and V) to the consideration of the problems arising out of our use of the difinite and indefinite descriptions which fail to refer to anything. He argues that both Meinong and Russell have gone wrong in their accounts of the definite descriptions because they have ignored the logical values put on the expressions. He makes many valuable points against Russell's theory of description. But one of the points of criticism, which I wish to take up for consideration, is that Russell overlooks the difference in logical structure between the sentence 'The king of France is bald' as used today and the sentence 'The present Queen of England is married' (p. 114). Dr. Chubb thinks that though grammatically they are both definite descriptions, their grammatical similarity conceals an important difference in logical structure. This criticism that Russell confuses logical structure with the grammatical structure of an expression, however, raises the question about the distinction between the grammatical structure of an expression, the logical structure of an expression and the 'logical value' put on an expression. Even if it is granted that the logical value of the sentence 'the king of France is bald' as used today is different from that of the sentence 'the present queen of England is married', it does not follow that their logical structures are different. It does not seem to be correct to hold that the logical structure of an expression depends upon the logical value put on it or vice versa. For example, the sentences 'Socrates is wise', 'Socrates is Greek' and 'Socrates is the teacher of Plato', though grammatically similar, and though their logical value also is the same (as we use all these sentences to make true assertions) their logical structures are different. The first is a subject attribute proposition, the second is a class-membership proposition and the third is a relational one. On the other hand, the sentences 'the present king of France is bald' and 'the present queen of England is married' are not only grammatically similar, but their logical structures also are the same, though Dr. Chubb may be right in holding that logical values put on them are different. Russell would deny Dr. Chubb's charge that in these two instances grammatical similarity conceals an important difference in logical structure and that Russell ignores the difference in their logical structures.

Dr. Chubb is in agreement with Strawson in holding, as against Russell, (i) that the sentence 'the king of France is bald' as used to-day is a pseudo-assertion, i.e., neither true nor false or rather it fails to make an assertion; (ii) that it does not assert but only presupposes that France at present has a king, and (iii) that a distinction must be made between a a sentence and its use. But he also makes some points of criticism against Strawson's view. One of the points of criticism is that Strawson, on the one hand, holds that the sentence 'the king of France is bald' as used to-day is a pseudo-assertion i.e. is not false as Russell thinks and on the other hand, he is prepared to accept Russell's view as reasonable in his article published in *Theoria* in 1964. This, Dr. Chubb feels, is a plain cantradiction. I mention this objection because it raises a question about the natures of a philosophical theory and a philosphical disagreement. Dr. Chubb raises a similar objection against Ayer's view that Realism and Phenomenalism are not to be construed as two rival theories of perception but rather as two 'alternative languages' describing the same perceptual situation. Dr. Chubb finds this view of Ayer to be absurd. Dr. Chubb seems to hold that though a philosophical theory is different both from an empirical hypothesis and a mathematical system, yet it must be regarded as a theory such that if I accept one, I am not free to say of its rival that it is reasonable.

I am sure that the issue between Prof. Chubb on the one hand and Professors Ayer and Strawson on the other is not verbal in the trivial sense. Without taking sides in this controversy, I wish to make two observations : (i) This controversy reveals one important fact about the nature of philosophical controversy that the real problem in philosophy is not to prove or disprove a philosophical theory but rather to be able to find a sense for the rival view. Dr. Chubb, for instance, confesses that he fails to see what Ayer is really propounding, if he is propounding any intelligible view at all, while Ayer would find Dr. Chubb's questions about the ontological status of meaning and assertion to be equally unintelligible. (ii) Secondly, the aim or purpose of philosophical arguments seems to me to consist in laying bare the implications of adopting a particular view. If a person is prepared to accept the consequences of a particular view then

it would be reasonable for him to accept that view. If I find a particular view, accepted by another, unacceptable then I may put forward philosophical arguments with a view to make explicit those consequences which I am not prepared to accept and which necessarily follow from that view. I may also give my reasons why I am not prepared to accept those consequences. But these arguments have no power to dislodge my opponent from his position. It would not, therefore, be reasonable on my part to deny reasonableness to my opponent who is prepared to accept all the consequences which necessarily follow from his view in spite of his knowledge of my reasons for refusing to accept those consequences. This is because the only criterion of reasonableness in philosophy seems to be that one is prepared to accept all the consequences of one's position. Viewing philosophy in this way enables one to take a more tolerant approach. Such a person may not find it absurd to say "I subscribe to this view and reject all other rival views for these reasons yet I believe that if a person is prepared to accept all the consequences which follow from any of the rival views, then it won't be unreasonable for him to subscribe to it."

In the light of these remarks about the function of philosophical arguments, I think, Dr. Chubb's arguments are forceful enough to make the readers rethink on the problems which he discusses in the present work. The book is original and stimulating essentially because, in the words of Ryle, "it belongs neither to the orthodoxy of 1976 nor to any of the earlier orthodoxies". (Foreword). Whether one agrees with the views expressed by Dr. Chubb in this work or not, I think it highly important that these unorthodox criticisms of such eminent philosophers as Russell, Ayer, Austin, Ryle and Strawson do not go unnoticed.

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JAMES AND JOHN STUART MILL

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Indian concerns—both practical and theoretical—loomed large in the lives of James Mill (1773–1836) and his more famous son, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). These two utilitarian thinkers were, on the one hand, life-long functionaries at the London headquarters of the British East India Company which, it should be recalled, was charged with the administration of vast stretches of Indian territory during their time. And what is even more significant is that their official positions enabled them to exercise considerable influence over the administrative arrangements in those territories : indeed, the despatches, minutes and reports of the two Mills (still largely unexamined) bear witness to this fact.[1] But, interestingly enough, both these thinkers also had a more theoretical involvement in Indian matters; and that arose from their scholarly investigations into India's history, culture and socio-economic circumstances. It was of course James Mill who pioneered those investigations in his once famous *History of British India* (1817). And though he failed to produce anything comparable on his own on India, his son John Stuart Mill was well versed in the *History*[2], and carried with him an 'Indian awareness' which comes to the fore in many contexts of his writings : the discussions in the *Principles of Political Economy* (1848), the essay *On Liberty* (1859) and the *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861)—as well as in various other compositions—are indeed enlivened by some noteworthy (and often polemical) comments and references to India. There were, however, several 'gaps' in James Mill's and John Stuart Mill's knowledge of Indian affairs. For one thing, they failed to visit the sub-continent, and hence lacked personal understanding about its actual conditions. Both, moreover, were ignorant of Indian languages, and as a result based their investigations into Indian matters on largely second-hand European sources. But what is to be regretted most is that neither of these thinkers had much regard for India's traditional thought or culture : as is perhaps

well known, their vision of India's past in particular was sadly distorted by prejudice and misunderstanding.

Now despite these serious shortcomings in their uuderstanding of as well as attitude to India, James and John Stuart Mill need to be recognized as two Western philosophers who had a unique relationship with India. And this fact makes certain aspects of their lives and their work especially worthy objects of scholarly research for Indian students of philosophy. Still it would be a patent error to assume that their contemporary significance stems entirely from their 'Indian connection'. That significance, rather, is for the most part grounded in two circumstances of a wider nature : firstly, the historic roles which they played in the reformist movement of the nineteenth century England as the foremost among the 'philosophic radicals',[3] and secondly, the abiding value of their multi-faceted contributions to philosophy as well as a variety of other disciplines.[4] Scholarly interest in the two Mills (which reflects a recognition of their importance in view of these two circumstances) has expanded greatly in the last few decades.[5] There is now a quarterly devoted to John Stuart Mill;[6] and work on a multi-volumed collected edition of his writings is currently in progress.[7] The compilation which we have set out to examine in the sequel is yet another pointer to this revived interest in the two Mills. And it is especially noteworthy because it has originated in papers read at a conference held in Toronto in 1973 to commemorate the bicentenary of James Mill's birth, and the centenary of John Stuart Mill's death.

Because of its very origins the compilation before us is composite in character. It contains nine separate contributions by a group of acknowledged Mill scholars on various topics relating to their field of study. It may be useful to observe at the outset that what this volume as a whole actually offers, then, is not an overview, or still less, a systematic assessment of the work of the two Mills as such, but rather a glimpse of the current trends in Mill scholarship. Now the general features of these trends (which one can discern in the contributions presented) are undoubtedly worthy of initial note. What can be said in this connection firstly is that Mill scholarship is not a purely philosophic enterprise, but is, on

the contrary, increasingly tending to acquire a multi-disciplinary character. In other words, researchers from many different fields of inquiry—like sociology, literary studies, economics, political theory, education and of course philosophy—have evinced an interest in the work of the two Mills; and this fact reflects the almost encyclopaedic range of the writings which these two thinkers—most notably J. S. Mill—have bequeathed to posterity. Secondly, because of his more influential position in the history of thought, and the more substantial nature of his work itself, scholarly attention (as already hinted) has in large measure come to be focused on J. S. Mill rather than on his father : the latter, to be sure, is studied mostly for the light he throws on J. S. Mill's upbringing and training. It remains to be remarked thirdly, and lastly, that researchers who inquire into the work of the Mills have shown a particular sensitivity to the question of their 'relevance'—that is in gauging the extent to which the ideas of these two reformist thinkers of the nineteenth century can be applied or otherwise made use of in the altered circumstances of to-day's world. Indeed, Robson and Laine (the editors of the volume we are examining) consider this feature to be 'one of the striking aspects of scholarship on the younger Mill'.[8]

It would, however, be hardly worth our while in the present context to delve too deeply into these general features of modern Mill scholarship. What demands our close attention, on the other hand, are the specific characteristics of the individual contributions that are offered in the compilation that we have set out to examine. And in turning to this task it would perhaps be best to start first with the contributions of Karl Britton and J. B. Schneewind—two scholars whose interests are mainly on the philosophical side. The focus in Britton's paper is on an aspect of J. S. Mill's work which has not attracted much attention, namely his religious thought. Its actual scope (contrary to what one might be led to expect from the title, "Mill on Christianity") is, however, rather narrow : Britton does not seek to examine Mill's many and varied opinions on Christianity, but tries rather, to evaluate the implications—especially for Christianity —of the concept of 'hope' which was interestingly discussed

in the last section of Mill's posthumous essay on 'Theism'. Nonetheless, the significance of Britton's effort cannot be gainsaid; it indeed serves to bring to the fore thoughts which are perhaps as untypical as they were unsuspected in a committed utilitarian and a radical of Mill's calibre. Now Schneewind's paper (entitled, "Concerning some 'Criticisms of Mill's *Utilitarianism*, 1861-76)," in contrast, deals with a characteristic theme in the same thinker's philosophy, namely utilitarianism. But the discussion here too is quite circumscribed—what this contribution presents is a largely historical survey of contemporary reactions to Mill's epochal composition, 'Utilitarianism' (1861). Those reactions, however, throw much interesting light on the climate of opinion that had prevailed in Mill's time, and to which the modern reader of this philosopher has no easy access. Hence Schneewind's contribution can be said to furnish information of a kind that would help one to understand the basic textual source of Mill's moral philosophy better.

There are two other papers in this volume which have a definite philosophic significance though their authors are specialists in fields other than philosophy. Of these, the one by J. H. Burns (on "The Light of Reason : Philosophical History in the Two Mills") deserves our initial attention because it has the distinction of being one of those rare studies that set out to examine the views of James Mill at some length. And, interestingly enough, the views under review are those which touch on his appraisal of India's past. Still, this paper as a whole (as is evident from its title), is actually concerned with some features of the philosophy of history of the two Mills. And what is emphasized in it is the rigidly rational perspectives—often of Greek or eighteenth century inspiration—with which both these thinkers sought to look at history. Now the focus is again on both James and John Stuart Mill in the second of the two papers just mentioned, namely, J. M. Robson's "Rational Animals and Others". But unlike in the previous contribution, the aim here is not to discuss any theme in the thought of the two Mills as such : instead the author seeks to gain some insight into the meanings which the two thinkers gave to certain key terms, and also to use those insights to further the interpretative understanding of some aspects of their thought. Robson's examination

of 'nature' in this connection is particularly worthy of note : for it shows how analysis of a literary or textually oriented kind can be philosophically illuminating. All in all, the contributions of Burns and Robson are commendable for the striking freshness which they display in regard to approach and the choice of subject itself. The discussions in them, however, are somewhat compressed; this indeed is a drawback.

Most of the other contributions in this compilation may be commented upon briefly because they cover familiar ground in John Stuart Mill's celebrated work in relation to a wide array of social studies—social thought, political theory, economics and sociology. Thus Edward Alexander's "The Principles of Permanence and Progression in the Thought of J. S. Mill" deals with an aspect of Mill's social theory (especially in relation to historical development), which in some ways inspired or at least influenced his practical programmes for reform; and Joseph Hamburger's "Mill and Tocqueville on Liberty" focuses attention on a dominant theme in Mill's political theory, namely the idea of liberty. The contribution on economics (Samuel Hollander's "Ricardianism, J. S. Mill, and the Neo-classical Challenge"), examines Mill's views in this field in the context of some contemporary opinions; while the one on sociology (L. S. LFeuer's "John Stuart Mill as a Sociologist : The Unwritten Ethology") dwells on a constructive element in Mill's sociological reflections rather than the hackneyed theme of methodology which most scholars have sought to examine. Lastly, there is the biographically orieneted inquiry into the growth of Mill's economic thinking in George J. Stigler's paper on "The Scientific Uses of Scientific Biography, With Special Reference to J. S. Mill". What it serves to impress upon most notably is the relevance of Mill's background to the study and the interpretation of his views. Now, interestingly enough, much information on Mill's background enters into the other papers which we have mentioned in this paragraph. Indeed, it is in relation to the ideas of his many contemporaries—like Ricardo, Tocqueville, Carlyle and Marx, to name a few—that Mill's own ideas tend to be discussed in them. Hence the above contributions deserve the attention of even those who have no particular interest in the social sciences :

for they afford invauable information on Mill's complex intellectual background.

With these remarks we may well close our brief survey of the contents of this compilation. And that leads us on to a final task, namely the general assessment of its worth.

It needs to be recognized that some important facets of the work of James and John Stuart Mill are examined in the collection of papers which editors Robson and Laine have brought together in this volume; and it can certainly be regarded as a fitting scholarly memorial to those two singularly versatile reformist thinkers of the nineteenth century. Mill scholars in particular should welcome this presentation; it serves to convey the fruits of their fast expanding field of research to a wide circle of readers. Still it displays a few shortcomings. What needs to be mentioned at the outset in this connection is that the contents of this volume appear to have been determined by the scholarly interests of its contributors rather than by any other principle. Now this, unfortunately, has resulted in certain 'imbalances'. Thus, the emphasis throughout this book, seems, for one thing, to have been placed somewhat too heavily on J. S. Mill : and this, it must be pointed out, is much more than can be allowed for even when one concedes the greater overall significance of the younger Mill's work. There are, to be sure, areas in James Mill's thought—like education, for example—which are still noteworthy, and hence merit consideration in a volume of this kind.[9] Moreover, secondly, J. S. Mill's work itself is not dealt with in a well rounded fashion. Some aspects of his thought are not dealt with; and even the areas commented upon are not those which are crucial to the understanding or interpretation of his thought. There are, in other words, 'gaps' in the treatment of J. S. Mill himself : the informed reader is likely to regret, for example, the absence of any discussions about this thinker's training or his general philosophical outlook—subjects dealt with in such influential books as the *Autobiography* (1873) and *A System of Logic* (1843).

Though these shortcomings are noteworthy, it would be only fair to mention that the editors of this volume have not viewed the contributions which they present to constitute a comprehen-

sive critical assessment of the work of the two Mills. And such a task, needless to say, is something that cannot be accomplished within the brief compass of a slim volume which we are offered. Hence, when one considers its scope and size, this book has merits of a kind that make it essential reading for those interested in James and John Stuart Mill and also the history of philosophy.

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NOTES

1. Cf. Eric Stockes, *The English Utilitarians and India.* Oxford, 1959, George D. Bearse, *British Attitudes Towards India.* Oxford, 1961.
2. Speaking of it he wrote : 'The number of new ideas I received from this remarkable book, and the impulse and the stimulus as well as guidance given to my thoughts by its criticisms and disquisitions on the society and civilization in the Hindoo part, on institutions and the acts of government in the English part made my early familiarity with it eminently useful to my subsequent progress'. J. S. Mill, *Autobiography* ed. by J. Stillinger. New York, 1969. p. 16.
3. Cf. E. Halevy, *The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism,* London, 1952.
4. Cf. W. H. Burston, *James Mill on Philosophy and Education,* London, 1973. J. B. Schneewind, (ed.), *J. S. Mill—A Collection of Critical Essays.* New York, 1968.
5. It should be remarked that because of the wider extent and the more enduring nature of his contributions to thought, a greater degree of attention is being focused on J. S. Mill rather than his father. Indeed, James Mill is studied in many scholarly circles today primarily because of his relationship to his son and disciple, J. S. Mill. Still,

several aspects of the work of the elder Mill retain a historic as well as an intrinsic significance. Cf. W. H. Burston, *op. cit.*

6. *The Mill News Letter*, ed. by J. M. Robson and M. Laine. Toronto University Press, 1965.
7. *Collected Works of J. S. Mill*, under the general editorship of J. M. Robson, Toronto University Press, 1963.
8. Preface, p. viii.
9. In addition, those interested in Oriental thought and culture may regret the absence of any assessment of his interesting (but tendentious) views on India's civilization that are set forth in the *History of British India.*

A STUDY OF WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY By D. N. Dwivedi. Darshan Peetha, Allahabad. 1977. Price Cloth bound Rs. 35; Paper back Rs. 25

The book under review is originally a thesis submitted to the Allahabad University for the D. Phil. degree. The book consists of five chapters. It aims at critically examining the philosophical ideas of Wittgenstein. In the first chapter, the author discusses in detail, the ontological problems of the *Tractatus*. According to the author, the problem of the ultimate form or structure of the world is the ontological problem par excellence in the *Tractatus*. The auther maintains that Wittgenstein's views about the ultimate structure of the world have been determined by his views about language. In other words, Wittgenstein has arrived at his ontology through a particular type of analysis of language.

The ideas of simple and complex have been very ably set forth and examined. The author has instituted a very apt comparison between Wittgenstein's views of simple and complex and those of Descartes, Leibnitz, Locke and Hume relating to the same. His comparison of Wittgenstein's views of propositions with those of Bradley is really illuminating. Both Bradley and Wittgenstein maintain that a name or a term does not have meaning if it does not occur in any proposition or judgement. Taken out of the judgement or proposition a name or a term does not have any meaning at all. A name is a name only in the context of a proposition and a term is a term only in the context of a judgement.

Though the author starts with a bold claim that there are not two Wittgensteins, i. e., the earlier and the later, yet he does not argue out in detail and fails to establish that the later Wittgenstein is only a logical extension of the earlier one. The author makes sound hunches but does not substantiate them.

In the second chapter, the author discusses what he terms the linguistic issues of the *Tractatus*. In this connection, he discusses in detail, the idea of truth function, elementary proposition, compound proposition, names and objects and so on. He maintains that in both the works, earlier and later, Wittgenstein was concerned with investigating the nature and structure of ordinary

language. Therefore he argues, it is wrong to say that Wittgenstein has advocated two types of language in two different works, i. e. in the *Tractatus* and in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

According to the author, in both the works, Wittgenstein concerns himself with ordinary language but he applies two different methods in the two different works. In this connection, it can be pointed out that the very fact that Wittgenstein adopted two different methods of analysis of language in different works goes to prove that the later Wittgenstein is not a logical out-growth of the earlier one. It is the method, the technique, and approach to the problem and not the problem itself that distinguish one system of philosophy from another. If the author admits that Wittgenstein adopted two different methods of analysis he is bound to admit that there are two Wittgensteins and not one even if in all his works language engaged the attention of Wittgenstein.

In the third chapter, the author discusses in detail, how Wittgenstein in the *Investigations* rejected almost all the major doctrines of the *Tractatus*. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein maintains that language is truth functional in nature. Propositions have definite sense. A simple proposition consists of names and names have meaning and the meaning of a name is what it refers to. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein criticises and eliminates the doctrines one by one. The author, in this connection elaborates in detail, Wittgenstein's views of language and meaning and maintains that Wittgenstein succesfully rejects the *Tractatarian* doctrines in the *Investigations*. But it can be pointed out here that the declared objective of the auther to establish that there is only one Wittgenstein is hereby nullified in the third chapter. If the *Tractatarian* theory of language is refuted and rejected in the *Investigations* then for obvious reasons it cannot be maintained that in both the works Wittgenstein advocates only one theory of language.

In the fourth chapter, the author discusses in detail, Wittgenstein's views on language game as set forth in the *Investigations* and argues that by treating language as a dynamic and pliable instrument Wittgenstein has done a great service to the cause of philosophy. The treatment of language as a game naturally

eliminates the view that language has got only one function. The doctrine of essentialism is also thrown overboard.

It can be pointed out here that the main contention of the chapter under review goes against the initial claim of the author that the later Wittgenstein is a logical growth of the earlier one. Moreover, by following Pitcher the author characterises Wittgenstein's philosophic activities as linguistic. But the appellation "linguistic" cannot be accepted without a pinch of salt. Wittgenstein's philosophical activities are linguistic only in the sense in which conceptual or logical activities are linguistic. In fact, his activities are not linguistic in the sense in which the activity of a grammarian or philologist is a linguistic one.

In the fifth chapter, the author elaborates Wittgenstein's arguments on the concept of pain and person and the therapeutic concept of philosophy. He agrees with Wittgenstein that feelings, emotions and pains do not stand for private or clandestine occurrences. In fact, the meaning of pain language is not dependent upon private occurrences. Function of philosophy is not to unravel the nature of reality but to dispell and eliminate the conceptual cramps caused due to the misunderstanding of the logic of our language.

While commenting on pain and sensation language the author points out that Wittgenstein assimilates first person present tense sensation words to expressions of sensations. The logic of other sensation words is different. They are not a part of acquired behaviour. To say "He is in pain", is not to exhibit "pain behaviour." But these observations made by the author seemed to be based on the misunderstanding and misinterpretation of what Wittgenstein has said about pain language. Wittgenstein simply maintains that to be in pain means to exhibit pain behaviour. But to report about somebody's pain is not surely to be in pain. The author, unnecessarily without any textual evidence takes Wittgenstein to task that the latter has assimilated first person present tense sensation words to expressions of sensation in general.

In his concluding remarks, the author has tried to present his own views on the nature and function of philosophy but too sketchily. The author abruptly remarks that therapeutic philosophy leads to descriptive metaphysics, practice of analysis is pure

research and uninteresting, understanding of the nature of experience is both interesting and philosophical, alteration in the conceptual scheme gives us fresh insight into our life and experience, analytic philosophy is not opposed to speculative philosophy and above all, philosophy is a *Dristi* or vision. All these off hand remarks without sufficient arguments run the risk of turning into slogans and slogans have no place in philosophy.

Though the book abounds in a large number of printing mistakes yet it seems that the author has consulted all the available literatures on Wittgenstein and has exhibited the extraordinary ability of presenting the arguments of others in a very clear manner.

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BAHM, ARCHIE, J.; THE SPECIALIST : His Philosophy, His Disease, His Cure; The Macmillan Company of India Ltd., Madras, 1977. Rs. 45/-

Being ' fully ' aware of the amazing extremes to which specialization has spread Dr. Bahm has written the small book taking a 'hard look at specialization', its nature, philosophy, universality and the possible cure of the evils it has unfortunately given rise to. The book attempts to formulate the philosophy implicit in increasing specialization, seeks to draw one's attention to the specialist's ethical authority and growing political power with a view to expose the evils and values of pervasive specialization. The author draws his data from diversified fields of inquiry, presents the prominent features of the two important kinds of specialization—narrow and broad—, discusses the general problems both of them have given rise to as also the issues they have engendered in specific fields. He has very carefully drawn our attention to the principal evils of them : divisiveness, proliferation of complexities, competitiveness and tyranny. The author has made a commendable effort in drawing our attention to such intriguing problems in such a small compass.

The book, however, does not merely seek to diagnose the disease. Its other side is clearly therapeutic and remedial. But it is precisely on these counts that the book lamentably seems to score a low watermark. In this context we want to draw attention to two prominent points. First, as one begins reading the book right from the introduction till the end of the second chapter, one unhesitatingly gathers the impression that the author is sufficiently perturbed and agitated by the fact that specialization in various walks of life—cultural, economic, social, political, industrial, intellectual—that has become the creed and motto of our era has really been too much with us. It is quite understandable, perhaps, that his tone of complain and disapproval does not spring from his phobia of it. The mainspring and the genesis of them rather lie in the fact that specialization has almost dehumanized us giving rise to such incurable diseases that recommendation of further specialization as a remedial exercise would be adding considerable fuel to the all-devouring wild-fire that has already spread. It is this which seems to lead the author to write com-

plainingly that "the specialist's remedy for the evils of specialization is, of course, more specialization. His natural proposal for curing a disease, any disease, including his own, is more and better specialization". (p. 86) This would set the reader to expect that the remedial prescription of the learned author would not be invitation to and participation in further specialization, but perhaps something else. But soon after turning couple of pages one discovers, surprisingly, the betrayal of the expectation built so labouriously in so far as further specialization is recommended, although it is now going to be, basically and perhaps entirely, broad specialization—but specialization nonetheless. Yet, if this was the intended therapeutic prescription then the book could have as well begun from the present second chapter and ended with the present third chapter. If this was not the intended remedial prescription then at least unknowingly the complain about specialization seems to have failed to hit the mark. Thus, either the complain about and disapproval of increasing specialization is not genuine or recommendation of further specialization as a therapeutic prescription is the outcome of helplessness or arising unconsciously.

Secondly, even if one grants to the author that "the 'more specialization' that broad specialism claims is needed to cure the diseases of specialization" (p. 94), one fails to understand the need of the creation of utopian *Demo-speciocracy*. The author seems to be considerably impressed by the need of changing the world and curing of its diseases; and it is with this end in view that he has presented the blue-prints of his Demo-speciocracy. As a poet and dreamer this is good; but certainly not as a philosopher. The fundamental question is: how to bring about the desired change and why to build the expected world-organization ? The malady of even 20th century is not that we have not created institutions with high ideals. It is not, again, due to lack of them but rather in spite of them that we have not been able to get over our diseases. What we lack is not the plan and the frame but the necessary zeal, dedication and sincerity to put it in practice and make it viable. Such a kind of consequence—our coming to live on this planet as humans—however poius, and laudable shall never arise howsoever broadly we specialize, sophisticated modes of government we devise and howsoever technically we

advance, so long as we shall not cultivate a habit of living peacefully with one another as humans. But till human beings shall not learn how to live with one another as humans, Utopian frames and plans are of no therapeutic avail.

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