A CONCEPTUAL LAYOUT OF GAUDAPĀDAKĀRIKĀS

I

The text of Gaudapādakārikās is usually regarded as a commentary on the Māndukya Upaniṣad. In a sense this may be so since it helps us understand the Māndukya Upaniṣad in a different perspective and more clearly. But Gaudapāda is not just a commentator since he is presenting his own independent thesis by way of a commentary. As a matter of fact an unbiased study of Gaudapādakārikās should reveal that Gaudapāda is in fact posing for the first time in Indian thought, with the exception of the Buddhists, an epistemological problem and is trying to offer a philosophical model connecting the epistemological problem with problems such as causality etc.

Since Gaudapāda makes use the Māndukya Upaniṣad to propound his own philosophical thesis, it would be useful to make a note of the thesis that is propounded in the Māndukya Upaniṣad. To use the current idiom, the Māndukya Upaniṣad begins its inquiry by making a distinction between the 'knower' and the 'known'. Thus, one would have to think of various situations,—the epistemic situations—in which knowledge becomes operative. Such a distinction between the knower and the known would also indicate the limiting case of the occurrence of knowledge. (The limiting case of the occurrence of knowledge could be defined as that situation where the distinction between the knower and the known is temporarily absent but is later on recalled. In this situation not only the knowledge does not occur, but even the minimum characteristics, i. e., the objects of knowledge and the knower are absent, although temporarily.) These various situations, which are epistemic are described in the Māndukya Upaniṣad as Jāgarita, Svapna and Suṣupti. By Turya is meant a situation where the epistemic situation lapses into the ontic. The concept of the knower which is presupposed in all the epistemic situations, however, leads to the problem of the identity or the sameness of that knower. According to the Māndukya Upaniṣad these different 'knowers' present in the various epistemic situations are one. This 'one' knower is *Ātman*. The Māndukya

Upaniṣad further says that this *ātman* is Brahman meaning thereby that it is not different from Brahman.

As has been pointed out above, Gauḍapāda makes use of Māṇdukya Upaniṣad to develop his own philosophical thesis. It would be interesting to work out a conceptual layout of some of the important Gauḍapāda Kārikās. Such an attempt to work out a conceptual layout would be useful in two ways. First, it would help us understand the development of Gauḍapāda's philosophical model and also it would help us understand the thought kernel of his thesis. However, before constructing such a conceptual layout, it must be borne in mind that Gauḍapāda's system, as it is, is not a deductive or fromal system of propositions. So when I attempt to construct a conceptual layout of Gauḍapāda's philosophy, it is not with the intention of converting Gauḍapāda's system into a deductive or formal system.

II

Gauḍapāda, accepting the Upaniṣadic intuition as is expressed in the sentence, "All this (idam sarvam) is aum and this ātman is Brahman" develops his thesis further. The following three propositions seem to have been accepted by Gauḍapāda as basic to his thought. In fact, they could be looked upon as a nucleus around which Gauḍapāda's thought is further developed. These propositions are :

(1) All this is Sat.

(2) It is only the Prāṇa which creates all Bhavas or Bhedas. (That is, it is the Prāṇa which generates the distinctions of the knower and the known. Sarvam janayati prāṇaḥ cetonsun puruṣaḥ pṛthak.)

(3) Samvṛtatva and Vaitathya are the common characteristics of all Bhāvas or Bhedas.

Around these basic propositions Gauḍapāda's thesis is framed. This thesis can be expressed in the following way :

1.1 All this (idam sarvam) is Sat. The ātman is Brahman; i. e. it is not different from Brahman.

1.2 It is only the Prāṇa which creates different Bhāvas or Bhedas i. e. it is the Prāṇa which generates differen

forms of reality such as different knowers and different states of experience.

1.21 That (knower) which is concerned with the 'outside world' is called Viśva. That (knower) which is concerned with the 'inside world' is called Taijasa. That (knower) which is not so concerned is called Prājña.

1.22 The consciousness is continuous and being so, it is one. It is the same consciousness, or it is the same one continuant 'knower' as it were which sometimes acts as Viśva and 'knows' the outside world; sometimes it acts as Taijasa and 'knows' the inside world. It also sometimes acts as Prājña when the 'knower' knows neither the inside nor the outside world. The classification of the same continuant consciousness into Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña as 'different' knowers has only practical significance.

1.23 Jāgṛita and Svapna are epistemic or knowledge situations; because it is in these situations the distinction between the knower and the object of knowledge is presupposed. The knowledge which results in these situations is due to the contact between the knower and the object of knowledge.

1.24 Suṣupti is also an epistemic situation although no 'knowledge' is said to emerge from it for want of the contact between the knower and the object of knowledge. Accepting that the knower, the object of knowledge and their cognitive contact is necessary for any knowledge to emerge, we can still imagine a situation where the knower and the object of knowledge are present, but where there is no contact between them. However, the 'knowerness' of the knower could still persist in such a situation; and to the extent the knower is regarded to be persistent, it could be said to have the capacity of knowing in the dispositional sense of the term. Assuming the knower, the object of knowledge and their contact, we can imagine certain cases such as Jāgṛta and Svapna and claim that 'knowledge' emerges therein. But we could

      also imagine a situation in which although no know-
      ledge emerges yet, it has a profile of an epistemic
      situation. Suṣupti indicates this situation.

1.25 Turya refers to the case where the distinction like
      the knower and the known is absent. Turya strictly
      speaking points to a case beyond the epistemo-
      logical situations. It serves as a base for constructing
      knowledge or epistemic situations.

1.26 Turya is to be distinguished from Suṣupti. In the case
      of Suṣupti, the 'knowerness' of the knower is still
      acknowledged. (Gauḍapāda uses the term prājña, the
      knower in Suṣupti. Prājña, i. e. the ignorant is essenti-
      ally a notion that presupposes an epistemic situation
      for its significant use.) It is a case within limits of
      knowing situation, although it may be a limiting case
      of knowing situations. Here although no knowledge
      emerges the background required for the emergence of
      knowledge is present. In the case of Turya, on the
      contrary, the very distinction between the knower and
      the object of knowledge is not thought of. Turya does
      not exhibit any characteristic symptoms of an epistemic
      situation, and is therefore a limiting case for the
      knowledge situation.

1.27 Turya, or a state of affairs which is independent of
      the epistemic reference, is something which exists in
      its own right. It is Sat.

1.28 A state of affairs, independent of the distinction between
      the knower and the objects of knowledge, can be
      described only in terms of its existence.

2.   It is only the Prāṇa (i.e. the knower) which creates
      all these Bhāvas or Bhedas. These Bhāvas or Bhedas
      refer to different forms of reality such as different
      knowers (Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña) and such states
      as Jāgrita, Svapna etc. And thus, an epistemic situa-
      tion is created with a knower and the known.

2.1   The Bhāvas etc. are only epistemic in character. As
      they are creations of Prāṇa they are bio-centric
      (anthropo-centric).

2.11 The division of one reality into the knower and the objects of knowledge would not be possible in the absence of Prāṇa or the knower.

2.12 The division of reality into different Bhāvas is only epistemic. If these epistemically different Bhāvas or forms of reality are absent, what remains is the reality qua reality (without any epistemic forms).

2.13 The reality which is all this (idam sarvam) when split up in different forms, appears to be many. One can imagine or construct infinite number of forms of reality or characterize reality in infinite number of ways.

2.14 But such creations or constructions are not real in themselves. Creation of Bhāvas does not mean creation of things existing in their own right. The reality which exists in its own right is one. It is advaya. It is also called Turya.

2.15 The Prāṇa (or jīva) which creates all these Bhāvas, itself is a creation. Prāṇa or Jīva is the primary condition for epistemic creation; but it is not the condition of the 'creation' of reality.

2.16 The conditions for knowing are to be distinguished from the conditions for something being the case.

2.17 In reality, nothing is ever 'born'. (It is always existing.) Reality as it is, is ajāta. That is, no real change takes place in the stuff of the original substance.

2.18 When the whole is divided into different parts, one cannot regard these parts as different from the whole. Similarly, different forms of reality are not different or independent of it. And because reality as reality is always existent, these parts of reality are also existent. In this sense, these different forms of reality are not 'born'.

2.19 So long as we think that the anthropo-centric constructions over the reality are born, we also think of their causes, and start believing in the cause-effect relation-

ship. But when we look upon these forms of reality
as something which is not 'born', the cause-effect
relationship becomes inoperative.

2.20   Although it is the Prāṇa or jīva which constructs
(creates) different forms of reality, it would be incorrect
to think that the Prāṇa etc. is the 'cause' of these forms.

2.21   The notion of Asparśayoga points out that from the
cosmocentric point of view, the different froms of
reality in the anthropo-centric world are not different
from reality. In fact, there are nothing like parts of
Reality as such. What exists is the reality without any
parts or division.

2.22   The mind (citta), the knower (i, e. prāṇa or jīva) the
'manas'—all these lead us to epistemic creations. The
notion of Amanībhāva (the manas ceasing to be manas)
suggests that if epistemic creations are absent, what
remains is the reality which only is.

3.   Samvṛtatva and Vaitathya are the common characteris-
tics of different Bhāvas or Bhedas that we perceive
both in dreams or in waking experience.

3.1   Samvṛta means that which is limited or that which is
covered by space and time.

3.11   Vitathā means that which is other than real. That some-
thing is vitathā could also be interpreted in this way
saying that the real (tathā) is further characterized or
qualified in a particular way. Hence it could mean
that the real which is so characterized is something
which could be taken as something other than the real.

3.12   In dreams and also in waking, we perceive things in
space and time. Things, whatever be their nature, are
camouflaged by space and time. And this is the
characteristic of things we perceive in dreams or in
waking, have in common. This fact is stated by the
proposition that Samvṛtatva is common to both.

3.13   Usually we distinguish objects perceived in dreams
from the ones which we perceive in waking on the
basis of space and time.

3·14 But since that with the help of which we distinguish between dream objects and the objects in waking experience is common to both these States, Samvṛtatva would not provide a criterion which would enable us to draw a logical distinction between the two. (But that does not mean that they are not distinct.)

3.15 In the case of dream objects, we usually determine its 'vaitathya' (unreality) with the help of the principle, "that which does not exist at the earlier and later points of time does not exist in the middle also". This is also applicable and is true in the case of objects in the waking state. Like the dream objects, objects in waking also do not exist at the earlier and the later points of time. In other words, these also have a beginning and an end. To say that something has a beginning and an end is, however, not to suggest that it is the mark of its unreality. To point out that the same feature is common to dream and waking objects is to suggest that the Schema which is presupposed in dream and waking experiences is in fact common to both these experiences.

3.16 Both the objects perceived in dreams and in waking states are presented to us in space and time. What distinguishes these presentations is the difference of the temporal durations and spatial magnitudes that characterize the waking and dream experience. But difference in terms of temporal durations and spatial magnitudes are in themselves not sufficient to draw a logical disitnction between these different presentations.

3·17 That which is Samvṛta is Vitathā. If something is further modified or characterized it acquires different qualities or assumes different forms and these cannot be said to be the real qualities or forms of that thing. In a sense, due to this further modification or characterization the thing (as it is) looks something other than what it is. This becoming of something other than what a thing really is, is described by the term Vitathā. If something is covered or limited or modified by space

and time, then it assumes certain qualities and forms and in a sense it becomes something other than what it is. Space and Time are perhaps human creation.

3.18   That which is Samvṛta does not exist in its own right. To imagine that the reality which only is, is restricted or limited by something else is to 'create' a projective system.

3.19   Projective System is to be distinguished from the reality. The reality is one which serves as the ground for its projective system and it is for this reason that the projective system does not become unreal or non-existent. The Vaitathya of a projective system only means that it does not exist in its own right.

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