

Transformation of Phronēsis of Greek Ethics into Supreme Principle of Modern Morality

**[A Hermeneutic Study of Paragraphs 1–17, of the First Chapter
of Kant's *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*¹]**

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Introduction

Kant transforms Greek ethics into modern morality in his *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*. As a part of that project in the first chapter of this book Kant effects transformation of Greek *phronēsis* into supreme principle of modern morality. It will be our endeavor in the present essay to show the correctness of the latter contention; to show the correctness of the former claim will require a full book length study which is beyond the scope of this essay.

One may be skeptical of the success of our endeavors from the very beginning. It may be argued there is nothing like Greek morality or modern morality. We find merely different theories of morality. So how can one talk of transformation of Greek ethics into modern morality at all? It calls for an explanation at the very beginning.

Plato in the so-called epistemological excursus of the *Seventh Letter* had claimed that the thing we are interested in any investigation is always more and beyond the necessary means of communicating the thing under investigation. But these instruments in the process of bringing the reality of the thing itself to disconcealment, also assert themselves as whatever particular thing they are instead of fading out of view, as they all have a reality of their own besides the thing they are disclosing. Hence there arises the danger that one may take any or all of these means of displaying a thing as the thing displayed through them, as they also suppress that, which is displayed in them.² Like Plato Kant himself makes a distinction between what a philosopher describes and the philosopher's description of it; and claims that there may be discrepancy between the two.³ Most of the commentators of Kant have failed to delve beneath the words of Kant to grasp the idea he was trying to convey.

and this holds good of our understanding of views of other philosophers as well.⁴ That is to say the knowledge of the commentators of Kantian corpus in particular and of readers of historical doctrines in general fails to rise above what Kant calls historical knowledge. Their knowledge fails to rise to the level of what Kant calls rational knowledge. Kant elaborates the distinction between historical knowledge and rational knowledge.

"However a mode of knowledge may originally be given, it is still, in relation to the individual who possesses it, simply historical, if he knows only so much of it as has been given to him from outside (and this is the form in which it has been given to him)...He knows and judges only what has been given him. If we dispute a definition, he does not know whence to obtain another. He has formed his mind on another's, and the imitative faculty is not itself productive. In other words, his knowledge has not in him arisen out of reason, and although, objectively considered, it is indeed knowledge due to reason, it is yet, in its subjective character, merely historical. He has grasped and kept; that is, he has learnt well, and is merely a plaster-cast of a living man."⁵

In contrast to the historical knowledge,

"Modes of rational knowledge which are rational objectively (that is, which can have their first origin solely in human reason) can be so entitled subjectively also, only when they have been derived from universal sources of reason, that is, from principles—the sources from which there can also arise criticism, nay, even the rejection of what has been learnt."⁶

Unity of Greek morality or the modern morality and even of these two is available only if we have rational knowledge but we are left with a multiplicity of views if we have only *historical knowledge*. It is from this failure to rise to the level of rational knowledge from historical knowledge there arises the view that there is no reality, which is at the focus of attention of the philosopher when he is philosophizing, so that we are left with only a divergence of theories and views without a common reality. Heraclites, even before Plato, had already warned us in fragment 2, "One must follow what is common; but although the Logos is common, most men live as if they had a private understanding of their own." Further Heraclites says in *fr.* 50, "Listening not to me but the Logos it is wise to agree that all things are one." The notion of 'the common' and the unity is elaborated in *fr.* 114: "One must speak with intelligence and trust in what is common to all, as a city in its law and much more firmly; for all human laws are nourished by one, the divine, which extends its sway as far

as it will and is sufficient for all and more than sufficient." It is interesting to note that the term 'reason' of Kant represents the common 'logos' of the Greeks. The phrase ζῶον λόγον ἔχον is traditionally translated as 'rational animal', "something living which has reason"⁷ on the assumption that λόγος refers to the faculty of reason. Kant, no doubt, concurs with Heraclites "...one universal characteristic of madness is loss of *common sense* (*sensus communis*) and substitution of logical *private sense* (*sensus privatus*) for it."⁸

Kant's *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* is by unanimous agreement one of the most profound works of moral philosophy. Yet, in spite of more than two centuries of scholarship, which has gone into study of this text, we are nowhere near in understanding what Kant was doing in this text. None of the existing commentaries try to harmonize all the parts of this text and also harmonize this text with what he says regarding morality in the *Critique of Judgment*⁹, like "Now, I say, the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good..."¹⁰ and the aporia of evil expounded in the *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*. By seeing the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals* as effecting a transformation of Greek ethics into modern morality not only we are able to harmonize every sentence of the text but also it becomes very clear why he had to develop the new doctrines related to morality in other texts. But to see Kant's work in this way will require us to raise our understanding to the level of Platonic reality, which is beyond the various means of communication of its knowledge. Or to put it in Kant's language we have to rise to the level of rational knowledge.

How can one rise to the level of rational knowledge? Kant says in the context of his own discussion on Plato's ideas:

"I need only remark that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed in regard to his subject, whether in ordinary conversation or in writing, to find that we understand him better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention."¹¹

So, to find out what Kant is doing in his critical works we have to understand him better than himself. This is the spirit in which I have tried to think through his text to get at what idea he was trying to convey and the reality that was the focus of his attention. The title of the present essay tries to convey this spirit of the investigation. This spirit of investigation can be satisfied provided we investigate the Kantian text hermeneutically. Regarding original philosophical endeavors Kant remarks, "But these human endeavors

turn in a constant circle, arriving again at a point where they have already been. Thereupon materials now lying in dust can perhaps be processed into a magnificent structure."¹² Isn't Kant referring to some kind of valid circular philosophical thought process, like the hermeneutic circle here? Therefore, the word 'hermeneutic' highlights the circular thought process involved in the study of the text of *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*.

When it is claimed that in Kant's critical works transformation of Greek ethics into modern morality is taking place, the word 'transformation' is used in a specific sense. Transformation does not mean change however far reaching it may be. In change what changes remains identical through the change; only something in this identical thing changes. To use Kantian categories, all change takes place in the sphere of quality or accidents, while the substance remains identical in the changing attributes and accidents of it. But in transformation 'something is suddenly and as a whole something else' and 'this other transformed thing that it has become is its true being, in comparison with which its earlier being is nothing.'¹³ It is in this sense that the word 'transformation' is used in the title.

The doctrine of *Verkehrte Welt* in the chapter on "Force and Understanding" of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where for him *Verkehrte* combines two senses—'the value free sense of inverted, backwards, upside down, inside out, etc, and ...the evaluative sense of perverted, distorted,'¹⁴ has not been understood so far by the scholars so as to uncover properly what this doctrine in the philosophy of Hegel points to. The transformation of Greek into modern morality is nothing but literally inversion-perversion of the Greek world. Hegel was referring to this Kantian inversion-perversion of the Greek world. Gadamer, a hermeneutic thinker and an admirer of Kantian ethics also notes a reversal in it. "In any case, the *Foundation of the Metaphysic of Morals* represents a reversal of the traditional sequence of legitimization."¹⁵ It will be our endeavor to explain in the present essay not only how and why inversion-perversion is taking place but also what kind of inversion-perversion is taking place in the first chapter of the *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*.

Greek *Phronēsis*

Socrates, Plato and Aristotle distinguished *phronēsis* from *technē* (skill). The latter was the model of ethics according to sophists. For all three of them knowledge of the good cannot be understood taking *technē* as a model. In *Meno* of Plato Socrates says, "...*phronēsis ara phamen aretēn einai ētoi*

sympasan ē meros ti" (we say then that *phronēsis* is *aretē*, be it either the whole of it or a part). According to Plato and Socrates *phronēsis* plays a role in *aretē* but leaving open the question whether other things beside *phronēsis* also play a role. Aristotle also makes the same point in *Nicomachean Ethics*¹⁶. The *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle opens with a distinction between two kinds of actions: (1) actions, which are ends in themselves and are designated by the Greek verb πράττειν 'doing' or 'acting' and (2) actions, which are designated by the Greek verb ποιεῖν 'making' or 'producing' and have ends different from these activities themselves and these ends are produced by these actions as consequences. According to Aristotle *technē* is the reasoned state of capacity to make while *phronēsis* is the reasoned state of capacity to act. In his view:

"...making and acting are different... so that the reasoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Hence too they are not included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor is making acting."¹⁷

So, for Aristotle making and acting are mutually exclusive categories. "For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end."¹⁸ Since *phronēsis* is concerned with action, where the good action itself is its end, it is not concerned with any action, which has an end other than itself, and hence it is not involved in *technē*.

This classical distinction of two kinds of action is further elaborated in Middle Ages. St Thomas Aquinas also elaborates Aristotelian distinction in the *Summa Theologica* under the question "Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art". He comments: "The reason for this difference is that art is the 'right reason of things to be made', whereas prudence is the 'right reason of things to be done'."¹⁹ He translates the Greek verbs ποιεῖν and πράττειν with Latin verbs *facere* and *agere* respectively. He writes,

"Now making (*facere*) and doing (*agere*) differ ...in that making (*facere*) is an action passing into outward matter, e.g. to build, to saw and so forth; whereas doing (*agere*) is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. to see, to will and the like...consequently it is requisite for prudence...that man be well disposed with regard to the end, and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. On the other hand, the good of things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good of those things themselves, whereas art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite."²⁰

A little further on he writes, "The various kinds of things made by art are

all external to man."²¹ In his commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics* Aquinas again makes the point,

"Wherefore Prudence, which is concerned with man's good (human bona) of necessity has the moral virtues joined with it ...Not however Art, which is concerned with exterior goods (*bona exteriora*)."²²

These quotations make it amply clear that art is concerned with making (*facere, ποιεῖν*) which results in modification of external matter, and morality has nothing to do with it, only the principles of evaluation of product are involved in it. Morality is concerned with acting or doing (*πράττειν, agere*) which abides in the agent himself and requires rectitude of appetite unlike making. Thomas Aquinas also in agreement with Aristotle accepts that morality or *phronēsis* (prudence) is not involved at all in making or art.

Phronēsis is concerned with action not production. What is the nature of action with which *phronēsis* is concerned? It is voluntary action. Aristotle has explained the attribution of voluntary and involuntary action in *Nichomachean Ethics*, Book iii. Aristotle writes:

"Actions are regarded as involuntary when they are performed under compulsion or through ignorance. An action is compulsory when it has an external origin of such a kind that the agent or patient contributes nothing to it, i.e., if a voyager were to be conveyed somewhere by the wind or by men who had him in their power."²³

He further explains,

"Every act done through ignorance is non-voluntary but it is involuntary only when it causes the agent subsequent pain and repentance... An act is not properly called involuntary if the agent is ignorant of his advantage for what makes an act involuntary is not ignorance in choice nor ignorance of the universal, but particular ignorance, i.e., of the circumstances and objects of the action for it is on these that piety and pardon depend, because a man who acts in ignorance of any such detail is an involuntary agent."²⁴

And so,

"If an involuntary act is one performed under compulsion or as a result of ignorance, a voluntary act would seem to be one of which originating cause lies in the agent himself, who knows the particular circumstances of his action."²⁵

According to Aristotle voluntary action need not involve any choice. He writes,

"Now choice is clearly a voluntary thing, but the two words have not the same connotation: that of 'voluntary' is wider, for both children and animals have a share in voluntary action, but not in choice, and we call action done on the spur of the moment voluntary, but not the result of choice."²⁶

Need for Inversion-Perversion of Phronēsis in Kantian Ethics

The need for transformation arises because the subjective self developed in the transcendental unity of apperception, paralogsms, and the third antinomy of his *Critique of Pure Reason* can admit of only one kind of action, which is understood only as causing an effect, where the effect is the chosen end. So the Kantian self is a homo-faber. The homo faber acts with subject object dichotomy of modern philosophy. The objective knowledge based on subject object dichotomy is of the nature of power. Hence for the subjectivity of homo faber "knowledge is power." Since knowledge is knowledge of causality operating in substance of the object in space and time it gives power to the subjective homo faber to manipulate the object by his own will and choice. Although causality and will appear to belong to different realms in Kantian Philosophy but in reality they fit with each other. The homo faber through choice with his own will can manipulate the object through knowledge of causality. Knowledge of causality is gained through science, which in turn is the basis of technology. The subjectivity of homo faber by its own will manipulates object through technology to give it a desired form to suit his own chosen purpose. This is the only form of action that can be recognized by the homo faber. So for homo faber an action is nothing but exercise of power for production of effect in the external object, which is the chosen goal of action. It must be noted the end is distinct from the action and the end is the consequence of action.

Kant recognized this much later explicitly when he himself elaborated the distinction between the two types of action designated by *facere* and *agere*. Kant elaborates the distinction between *facere* and *agere* in following words.

Art is distinguished from nature as making (*facere*) is from acting or operating in general (*agere*), and the product or the result of the former is distinguished from that of the latter as work (*opus*) from operation (*effectus*).

By right it is only production through freedom, i.e. through an act of will that places reason at the basis of its action that should be termed art. For,

although we are pleased to call what bees produce (their regularly constituted cells) a work of art, we only do so on the strength of an analogy with art, that is to say, as soon as we call to mind that no rational deliberation forms the basis of their labour, we say at once that it is product of their nature (of instinct) and it is only to their creator that we ascribe it as art.²⁷

Be it noted that for Kant 'making' (*facere*) is an action done with free will and hence it is properly a human action. But activities falling under the category of *agere* are not recognized as human action at all. This is an important consequence of inscribing the distinction between making and doing within the perspective of the subject. Hence making occupies the whole space of human action according to the subjectivity of homo faber man.

But the Greek ethics was still the prevailing conception of morality in educated circles in Europe when Kant was writing his critical philosophy and Greek *phronēsis* is concerned with action (*agere*, *πράττειν*). The distinction between art (*technē*) and morality (*phronēsis*) as Aristotle had drawn was still the prevailing doctrine. Take for example a minor English eighteenth century writer James Harris. In his *Dialogue Concerning Happiness* he draws the distinction between other arts and art of morality exactly as the distinction between art (*technē*) and morality (*phronēsis*) of Aristotle. Harris writes:

"The End in other arts is ever distant and removed. It consists not in the mere Conduct, much less in a single Energy; but is the Result of many Energies, each of which are essential to it. ...But in the Moral Art of Life, the very CONDUCT is the END; the very Conduct, I say, itself, throughout every its minutest Energy; because each of these, however minute, partake as truly of Rectitude, as the largest Combination of them, when considered collectively."²⁸

Since Kant has completely derecognized Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of moral action as human action relegating it to non-human unconscious animal action-reaction, he needs to transform Greek ethics and *phronēsis* to make it consistent with the new mode of human action. Be it noted if Kant effects this transformation of *phronēsis* then it will be complete inversion-perversion of Greek ethos. For Greeks morality and *phronēsis* is not concerned with making or production at all but Kant will have to relate morality exclusively to a kind of action, which is action of production, to effect the transformation.

It is my conjecture, which I will substantiate in the course of my analysis, that Kant has written this *Groundwork* to recast traditional morality to suit

this subject who is characterized by subjectivity as developed in the transcendental unity of apperception, paralogisms, and the third antinomy of his *Critique of Pure Reason*. To show how Kant is effecting the transformation of Greek *phronēsis* we will present our argument by way of comments on important paragraphs from the preface and all the paragraphs of the first chapter of his *Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals*.²⁹

Chapter 1 of the Groundwork

In the first chapter Kant is proceeding analytically. According to Kant analysis involves three activities of reflection, abstraction and comparison. These three activities play a role in the determination of *a priori* moral law. That is to say he is merely abstracting the supreme principle of morality through comparison by reflection. In the first chapter he is abstracting the supreme principle of morality from ordinary rational knowledge of morality, so that he can have a philosophical knowledge of the principle of morality.

Para 1: "It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a *good will*."³⁰

This is the first proposition of Kant. The second proposition will be announced in the fourteenth paragraph³¹ only. What is this subject matter of inquiry called '*good will*'?

The very first paragraph of the Preface provides the most important clue for the interpretation of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*. Kant says he just wants to add the principle on which the division of ancient Greek philosophy into *physics*, *ethics*, and *logic* is based and "there is no need to improve on it."³² By laying bare the principle behind this division "we may be able on the one hand to guarantee its completeness and on the other to determine correctly its necessary subdivisions."³³ Through this reference to the Greek philosophy Kant is signaling that the object of concern, i.e. the subject matter of concern of both the ethical investigation of Greeks and Kant's moral investigations is one and the same. But we will see how Kant through his way of laying bare the object of concern is transforming it.

In the *Protagoras*, Plato makes Socrates say: "My own opinion is more or less this: no wise man believes that any one sins willingly or willingly perpetrates any base or evil act; they know very well that every base or evil

action is committed involuntarily." This is the corollary of Socratic dictum that virtue is knowledge. Its converse is that all wrongdoing can only be due to ignorance and must be considered involuntary. And it follows that no one does wrong willingly. It is this will or *voluntas* in the Socratic-Platonic sense that Kant is interested in here. This is also confirmed when Kant writes,

"...not to mention that a rational and impartial spectator can never feel approval in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced by no touch of a pure and good will..."³⁴

A rational and impartial spectator feels approval only in contemplating the happiness of a being with a good will. The feeling of approval of the rational and impartial spectator makes it a Judgment of taste according to Kant in *Critique of Judgment*. Judgment of taste is a judgment on the beauty of the thing judged. So a happy good will is a thing of beauty for Kant. It was Greek mind, which related truth, beauty and goodness. For Aristotle *ἀγαθόν* (good) and *καλόν* (beautiful) have the same meaning, and the only difference is that *καλόν* (beautiful) is more inclusive term. *ἀγαθόν* (good) refers to actions only, but *καλόν* (beautiful) is used also where no action or movement is involved.³⁵ Both Socrates as well as Plato before Aristotle noted the close connection between *ἀγαθόν* (good) and *καλόν* (beautiful). So when Kant brings in the rational and impartial spectator in the context of good will then it indicates that the subject matter opened for discussion is the same as Socratic-Platonic will which can do no wrong. Kant himself in the *Critique of Judgment*, as mentioned earlier will declare, "Now, I say, the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good..."³⁶

Intelligence, wit, judgment etc. are talents of the mind. Courage, resolution, and constancy of purpose etc. are qualities of *temperament*. Both *talents* of mind and qualities of *temperament* are gifts of nature. A gift is not an achievement of human effort. All the gifts of nature 'are without doubt good and desirable in many respects.' But 'they can also be extremely bad and hurtful when the will is not good which has to make use of these gifts of nature.'³⁷

Be it noted for Socrates and Plato there is no such thing as *will which is not good*. For them all wrongdoing is involuntary. If Kant is introducing something called 'will' which is not good then it is a fish from different cattle. The *will involved in good will and the will*, which is not good, can never be one and the same will. The picture Kant is presenting here is that there is a neutral 'will' which can be either 'good' or 'bad' depending on how the 'will' is determined. But this is a wrong picture. Rather Kant has two notions of

will, which he has not yet distinguished. To anticipate, notion of will involved in good will is being developed in the present Groundwork and the notion of will (will as faculty of choice) involved in the bad will comes from the third antinomy of *Critique of Pure Reason*. He is writing at present under the confusion of these two notions of will. He will disentangle the two notions of will only in the *General Introduction to Metaphysic of Morals*, Sec. 1. The confusion is due to his operating with the model of substance and quality even in the context of discussion of good will. So that he thinks that a good will is a will with a 'peculiar quality' to which he applies the term 'character'. As if a bad will can be the same will with a different quality. But Kant himself will not accept it for Kant will write, "The will is absolutely good if it cannot be evil."³⁸ The will, which cannot be evil, is the will of Socratic-Platonic philosophy.

The ground of this confusion is prepared in the paralogisms of pure reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. There he allows the proposition 'The soul is substance' to stand recognizing it very well "that this concept signifies a substance only in idea, not in reality."³⁹ That is to say he takes the soul as substance not for the purposes of extending theoretical knowledge of the soul rather for the purposes of practical use of reason. Taking soul as substance, even for the purposes of practical use of reason, has created the confusion of will as a substance, even when it [will] is taken as an idea of reason, so that it can have changing qualities like *good* and *bad*. The soul is essentially a will for Kant.

Power, wealth, honour, health and contentment with one's state, which goes by the name of 'happiness' etc., are *gifts of fortune*. To reiterate once again, a gift is not an achievement of human effort. These *gifts of fortune* 'produce boldness, and as a consequence often over-boldness' unless good will is present. Good will corrects and adjusts the influence of gifts of fortune on the mind and hence also corrects and adjusts 'the whole principle of action'.⁴⁰ The influence of gifts of fortune on the mind and also the whole principle of action is corrected and adjusted to *universal ends*.

What are these universal ends? Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* divides all ends into two exclusive categories.

"EVERY art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them.

Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities."⁴¹

Do the *universal ends* Kant is talking about belong to any of these two categories? We will see that they belong to neither of the categories. Although Kant starts with the Greek conception of good will, he will in the course of his argument transform it. In the process he will transform Greek notion of 'end' too.

Will, for Kant, is neither an object of knowledge nor a *priori* condition of knowledge like the categories of understanding. That is to say, the will is not available to the subjectivity of the knowing subject. Then how can it be estimated as good or bad? We will see that for Kant 'the will is nothing but practical reason'⁴² so he cannot take help of practical reason either, since to say will is available to practical reason is to say will is available to will, which is a mere senseless tautology. So he has to introduce the idea of impartial and rational spectator to solve this problem. Only when a person takes up the point of view of the impartial spectator that he can estimate will as good or bad. So in the very first paragraph of the first chapter of the *Groundwork*, Kant introduces the idea of impartial rational spectator. If this impartial rational spectator feels approval in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of a being then it necessarily follows that he has good will. If this impartial rational spectator feels no approval in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of a being then it necessarily follows that he has a will, which is not good. We are worthy of happiness if and only if the impartial and rational spectator feels approval in contemplating our enjoyment happiness. Hence we are worthy of happiness if and only if we have good will according to Kant.

Para 2: "Moderation in affections and passions, self-control, sober reflection are not only good in many respects: they may even seem to constitute part of the *inner* worth of a person. Yet they are far from being properly described as good without qualification (however unconditionally they have been commended by the ancients). For without the principles of a good will they may become exceedingly bad..."⁴³

Kant in this passage is referring to the Greek virtues. Greek tradition recognized four cardinal virtues including self-control and sober reflection. With the advent of sophistic philosophy the traditional Greek virtues if followed turned out to be very bad. And hence in book 4 of the *Republic* Plato gives a new basis to these virtues by fusing all four cardinal virtues in the knowledge that they all are. In Gadamer's words,

"He wants to show that the old norms, the traditional aretai, having been established on a new basis, have become something different. For now justification of what is good in them is required, and merely choosing a paragon and imitating it no longer suffices. All the aretai are *phronēsis*. The question that Socrates raises in the Protagoras concerning the unity of the aretai – whether they are more like parts of a clump of gold or more like parts of a face – gives us a clear profile of Plato's new understanding of *aretē*. Both comparisons are inappropriate, for both tacitly presuppose a conventional understanding of *aretē* oriented toward external appearances. Hence, both of the alternatives are misleading. *Aretē* is not to be thought of at all as a unity or multiplicity of ways of behaving primarily presented to an observer. Rather, it is self-knowledge, *phronēsis*. In the end our behavior attains its unity when our actions are undertaken in regard to the good."⁴⁴

Good here is not the good in the sense of something produced as an effect or as a consequence of an action; rather it consisted in the very performance of action with *aretē*. That is to say now to follow the traditional virtues one needs knowledge of good i.e. one needs *phronēsis* or morally practical reason. This knowledge of good or *phronēsis* is the good will of Kant.

Para 3: We have already seen that *phronēsis* is concerned only with action, where the good action itself is its end, it is not concerned with any action, which has an end other than that action itself, and for Kant this Aristotelian 'reasoned state of capacity to act' is 'good will'. And hence it follows,

"A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes – because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alone—that is good in itself."⁴⁵

Kant has introduced a subtle difference from Aristotelian position. Kantian 'good will' is good even if it results in no action.

"Even if, by some special disfavour of destiny or the niggardly endowment of step-motherly nature, this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left (not, admittedly, as a mere wish, but as the straining of every means so far as they are in our control); even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself."⁴⁶

In the moral evaluation of Kantian good will not only proposed end is missing but also action is missing. Kant will explicitly assert it, "...for when

moral value is in question, we are concerned, not with the actions which we see, but with their inner principles, which we cannot see."⁴⁷ Is it merely an oversight? Or is it something more deep rooted?

If moral value is not concerned with *making* (*facere*) and as *doing* (*agere*) is not recognized as human action, then only recourse left for Kant is to make goodness of good will completely independent of any kind of action, so that good will is good due to its willing alone as affirmed in this passage.

There is a conceptual distinction between wishing and willing. According to Gadamer,

"Wishing is defined by the way it remains innocent of mediation with what is to be done. That is in truth what wishing is."⁴⁸ But "...wishing is not willing; it is not practice. Practice consists of choosing, of deciding for something and against something else, and in doing this a practical reflection is effective, which is itself dialectical in the highest measure. When I will something, then a reflection intervenes by which I bring before my eyes by means of an analytical procedure what is attainable...To speak with Aristotle, the conclusion of the practical syllogism and of practical deliberation is the resolve. This resolve, however, together with the whole path of reflection, from the willing of the objective to the thing to be done, is simultaneously a concretization of the willed objective itself."⁴⁹

Even Kant himself writes,

"The activity of the faculty of desire may proceed in accordance with conceptions; and in so far as the principle thus determining it to action is found in the mind, and not in its object, it constitutes a power of acting or not acting according to liking. In so far as the activity is accompanied with the consciousness of the power of action to produce the object, it forms an act of choice (*Willkür*), if this consciousness is not conjoined with it, the activity is called a wish."⁵⁰

Kant making goodness of good will completely independent of any kind of action, so that good will is good due to its willing alone transforms good will into a good wish, which remains innocent of the action to be done, not withstanding his protestation that it is "not, admittedly, ... a mere wish, but ... the straining of every means so far as they are in our control."⁵¹ Kant will later go on to claim that the moments in which we take the stance as disinterested observers "declining to take the liveliest wish for goodness

straight away as its realization", we become skeptical of genuine virtue.⁵² In this argument of Kant there is implicit an understanding of moral value i.e., "the liveliest wish for goodness" is "straight away...its realization." Kant implicitly transforms goodwill into a good wish, which remains innocent of the action to be done.

Para 4: But it is a strange doctrine, for scholars under the influence of Aristotle took morality to be concerned with performance of that action whose excellent performance itself is the end, without any further end. The Aristotelian distinction between Art (*technē*) and morality (*phronēsis*) was still the prevailing doctrine. So Kant writes,

"Yet in this Idea of the absolute value of a mere will, all useful results being left out of account in its assessment, there is something so strange that, in spite of all the agreement it receives even from ordinary reason, there must arise the suspicion that perhaps its secret basis is merely some high-flown fantasticality, and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in attaching reason to our will as its governor."⁵³

Be it noted that what is strange in the new doctrine is correctly identified by Kant, "this Idea of the absolute value of a mere will" as distinguished even from the value of an action, whose excellent performance is its own end, and which has no further end, is strange.⁵⁴ But the reason identified for the strangeness—'all useful results being left out of account in its assessment'—is wrong, as it was the prevailing opinion that morality is not concerned with those action which has useful results rather these action are the business of art. Why is Kant unable to identify the cause of *strangeness* in the doctrine correctly? Kant is not yet sufficiently conscious of the fact that it follows from his *Critique of Pure Reason* that there can be no human action, whose excellent performance is its own end, and which has no further end. He will attempt to realize this only in *Critique of Judgment* (§43).

Para 5: Teleology of nature brought in here by Kant shows once again the Greek lineage of his moral philosophy. Greeks accepted the teleology of nature. Kant has destroyed the constitutive claim of teleology in the knowledge of nature by the *Critique of Pure reason*. But teleology becomes important for Kant for making sense of the concept of universal ends since they cannot qualify as ends of human actions, even though good will adjusts the 'whole principle of action' to these universal ends. These universal ends are ends only in the context of teleology of nature. So Kant rehabilitates teleology of nature as a principle of reflective judgment in *Critique of Judgment*. Reflective

judgment provides the bridge between the theoretical and the practical use of reason.

"The intelligible towards which taste points, the supersensible substrate in man, contains at the same time the mediation between concepts of nature and concepts of freedom"³⁵ through the teleology of nature. Kant takes it as a principle that in man 'no organ is to be found for any end unless it is also the most appropriate to that end and the best fitted for it.'³⁶

What is the purpose of nature in endowing man with reason and will?

We will understand the movement of Kant's thought in answering this question if we keep in mind the Greek position here. According to the Greek thinkers the distinctively human form of life is the life of reason in common. The life of reason in common is constituted when each agent (*phronimos*) through the reasoned state of capacity to act (*phronēsis*) is "performing the functions of station" (*To αὐτὸν πράττειν*). For this the agent needs to indulge in *theoria* (speculation, contemplation) as *theoros* (spectator). For Greek thinkers the welfare of man as well as happiness consists in this life of reason in common. For them this life of reason in common – and hence welfare and happiness as well – is not an end to be achieved as a consequence of making. The common life of reason is not constituted through the exercise of reasoned state of capacity to make (*technē*). That is to say the constitution of this common life of reason is not a technical problem for them; rather it is a moral problem. The life of reason is the sphere of common use and common understanding constituted through intelligible communication and acting. Reasoned state of capacity to make (*technē*) is concerned with production. Production is the emergence of the work as the intended goal of regulated effort. "The work is set free as such and released from the process of production because it is by definition destined for use."³⁷ Hence the concept of work points to this sphere of common use and common understanding. For Greek mind the world of human activities is located within the entirety of what exists. The whole sphere of human *praxis* (action through *phronēsis*) and *poiēsis* (making through *technē*) has its place in nature.

Now let us analyze Kant's argument in answering the question raised above. Be it remembered that Kant has relegated *πράττειν* or *agere* to instinctive operation of nature. Since according to Greek mind man can achieve welfare or happiness through *πράττειν*, to Kant it will naturally appear that welfare and happiness can be better achieved through instinctive natural operation. For Greeks welfare and happiness is not a business of *technē* (art), but, for

Kant, reason is involved only in art at this stage of argument, it naturally follows that if Kant is explicating only the Greek position, then for him to be happy is not the business of reason. So Kant writes,

"Suppose now that for a being possessed of reason and will the real purpose of nature were his *preservation*, his *welfare*, or in a word his *happiness*. In that case nature would have hit on a very bad arrangement by choosing reason in the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the actions he has to perform with this end in view, and the whole rule of his behaviour, would have been mapped out for him far more accurately by instinct; and the end in question could have been maintained far more surely by instinct than it ever can be by reason."⁵⁸

According to Greeks to be happy the agent must indulge in *theoria* (speculation, contemplation) as *theoros* (spectator). In Kant's words,

"If reason should have been imparted to this favoured creature as well, it would have had to serve him only for *contemplating* the happy disposition of his nature, for admiring it, for enjoying it, and for being grateful to its beneficent Cause—not for subjecting his power of appetite to such feeble and defective guidance or for meddling incompetently with the purpose of nature."⁵⁹

Contemplation is the business of spectator for Kant too. As we noted when reason is in the service of art and man indulges in production through freedom in art, it is reason only in its theoretical use according to Kant. Theoretical reason is the technically practical reason. Practical use of reason, here, is moral action. When Kant talks of practical use of reason he means morally practical use of reason here. So what Kant is saying is that reason cannot have practical use i.e. cannot perform *πράττειν* or *agere* when its business is contemplation. So Kant infers,

"In a word, nature would have prevented reason from striking out into a practical use and from presuming, with its feeble vision, to think out for itself a plan for happiness and for the means to its attainment."⁶⁰

For Kant happiness through *πράττειν* or *agere* is the business of natural instinct as we have seen. And it follows,

"Nature would herself have taken over the choice, not only of ends, but also of means, and would with wise precaution have entrusted both to instinct alone."⁶¹

Para 6: Be it noted that the position of happiness is becoming problematic

for Kant. For Greek thinkers the welfare of man as well as *happiness* consists in indulging in *πράττειν*. For Kant *πράττειν* or *agere* is the business of natural instinct as we have seen. So it follows reason cannot achieve happiness.⁶² For Greeks welfare and happiness is not a business of *technē* (art). For Kant, reason is involved only in art and this reason is technically practical reason or theoretical reason. This theoretical reason is unable to achieve happiness. So it generates hatred of reason in people who attempt to use reason to achieve happiness.⁶³ Blessed are those who indulge in *πράττειν* or *agere*, which is natural instinctive activity. No doubt they are envied by the educated. The educated, possessed of reason.⁶⁴ Since reason is given to mankind but it cannot achieve happiness, then its purpose must be something much more worthy.

Para 7: Since reason is not suited to achieve happiness – happiness can be achieved by *πράττειν* or *agere*, which is the business of natural instinct and not of reason – yet reason is given to mankind for practical use i.e. to influence will – which is Kant's interpretation of *phronēsis* (practical reason) as 'the reasoned state of capacity to act' – its function must be to produce a good will, which is good in itself and not as a means to some further end. *Doing* (*πράττειν* or *agere*) is not recognized as a category of human action by Kant. So Kant has no option except to make it the function of practical reason to produce a good will, which is good even apart from the action in which it results or any end that is achieved.

The movement of thought of Kant is consistent with the title of the chapter he has given, 'Passage From Ordinary Rational Knowledge Of Morality To Philosophical'. Kant claims,

"Philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*)..."⁶⁵

Kant divides essential ends into one ultimate end and all others as subordinate ends, which are necessary as a means to the ultimate end.⁶⁶ "The former is no other than the whole vocation of man, and the philosophy which deals with it is entitled moral philosophy."⁶⁷

To achieve philosophical knowledge of the supreme principle of morality he has to first find out what the ultimate end of reason is so that the knowledge of the principle can be related to that end. The ultimate end of reason is good will.

Good will is not the 'sole' good. Gifts of nature like intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind or courage, resolution,

perseverance, as qualities of temperament, the gifts of fortune like power, riches, honour, or even health, and general qualities, which have been so unconditionally praised by the ancients, like moderation in the affections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation, are all good. Good will is not the 'complete' good. Civil society with a constitution based on the principle of right, kingdom of ends and kingdom of God are examples of 'complete' good. But good will is the 'highest' good, since it is the condition of all other goods. It is also the condition of our being worthy of happiness.

But, since attainability of happiness through reason has become problematic for Kant, he puts the blame for it on reason,

"...the cultivation of reason which is required for the first and unconditioned purpose may in many ways, at least in this life, restrict the attainment of the second purpose—namely, happiness—which is always conditioned; and indeed that it can even reduce happiness to less than zero...for reason, which recognizes as its highest practical function the establishment of a good will, in attaining this end is capable only of its own peculiar kind of contentment—contentment in fulfilling a purpose which in turn is determined by reason alone, even if this fulfillment should often involve interference with the purposes of inclination."⁶⁸

Para 8: Where should Kant look for good will, which he wants to study? This concept "is already present in a sound natural understanding." Hence this concept requires "not so much to be taught as merely to be clarified."⁶⁹ In the sound natural understanding it "holds the highest place in estimating the total worth of our actions and constitutes the condition of all the rest."⁷⁰ In the sound natural understanding it is present as a motive of duty. So to analyze the notion of good will we need to analyze the concept of duty. The concept of duty is the concept of good will, "exposed, however, to certain subjective limitations and obstacles."⁷¹ These subjective limitations instead of hiding or disguising the good will, "rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth more brightly."⁷²

Kant receives the idea of duty from Stoic heritage. In the words of Gadamer,

"The Stoa taught people to withdraw from everything that does not lie within our power. For otherwise we are helplessly subject to the mutability of fortune and misfortune. The Stoic ideal of equanimity thus ultimately implies, too, withdrawal from all public things, as actually had to be the case for the Greeks in the

Hellenistic period and the age of the Roman Caesars. What is more, that same withdrawal was considered appropriate to the modern scientific frame of mind, the consequences of which led inevitably to the impasses of modern subjectivism.⁷³ Hence Stoic conception of duty was eminently suitable for effecting the transformation of Greek morality into modern morality for subjective man.

So, in the analytic movement of thought Kant has to *isolate* and *abstract* the supreme principle from various other elements through comparison keeping in view the morally practical interest brought in advance by reflection.

Para 9: Where should one look for the motive of duty in sound natural understanding? First we have to abstract from "actions already recognized as contrary to duty." An action "already recognized as contrary to duty" may have been done with a view to certain ends, but it could not have been done for the sake of duty. So to grasp and analyze the motive of duty we cannot analyze such "actions already recognized as contrary to duty."⁷⁴ This is the first step in the abstraction. Is the motive of duty, then, present in all the actions "which in fact accord with duty"⁷⁵? Kant's unequivocal answer is in the negative. Now he is preparing for further abstraction.

All

"actions which in fact accord with duty, yet for which men have *no immediate inclination*" are also actions from which motive of duty is absent, since men "perform them because impelled to do so by some other inclination" i.e., mediated inclination.⁷⁶

"For there it is easy to decide whether the action which accords with duty has been done *from duty* or from some purpose of self interest."⁷⁷ Why is it easy to decide in this case? The answer is that with the good the question always is whether it is *mediately* or *immediately* good, i.e., useful or good in itself.⁷⁸

The action done under the impulsion of a mediated inclination cannot be immediately good, it is good *mediately* and hence it cannot be good in itself rather it is good as useful for "the purpose of self interest." Hence it follows that it is not done out of motive of duty but done "solely from purposes of self interest." It is to bring out this that Kant gives the example of an honest grocer.⁷⁹ So the second step in the process of abstraction is abstraction from "actions which in fact accord with duty, yet for which men have *no immediate inclination*."⁸⁰

Now does it follow that "when the action accords with duty and the subject

has in addition an *immediate* inclination to the action" then it is done from the motive of duty? It does not follow in most of the cases, according to Kant. And in the few cases even if the motive of duty is present, it is very difficult to distinguish and isolate the motive of duty for the purposes of analysis, "when the action accords with duty and the subject has in addition an *immediate* inclination to the action."⁸¹ So how does one go about isolating the pure motive of duty for the purposes of analysis? So the further abstraction is needed.

Para 10: "To preserve one's life is a duty." And "every one has also an immediate inclination to do so." Yet

"on account of this the often anxious precautions taken by the greater part of mankind for this purpose have no inner worth, and the maxim of their action is without moral content."⁸²

That is to say, "They do protect their lives in *conformity with duty*, but not *from the motive of duty*."⁸³ Be it noted Kant is *not saying* here that whenever the action accords with duty and also immediate inclination for it is present, then motive of duty is *necessarily* absent. He is merely giving an example of an action where the action is in accord with duty, which, even while done from an immediate inclination for it, is not done from the motive of duty. We should not be complacent that we have isolated the motive of duty by merely isolating an action done according to duty from immediate inclination. So how does one isolate the motive of duty for the purposes of analysis?

"When on the contrary, disappointments and hopeless misery have quite taken away the taste for life; when a wretched man, strong in soul and more angered at his fate than faint-hearted or cast down, longs for death and still preserves his life without loving it – not from inclination or fear but from duty; then indeed his maxim has a moral content."⁸⁴

That is to say the motive of duty is isolated if we can find an action where there is no immediate inclination for the action, rather there is a contrary inclination yet the action accords with duty. Now we can be sure that the motive of duty is present as that action according to duty could not have resulted but for this motive of duty as there was present not only no immediate inclination, but also a contrary inclination. So we have to *abstract* from even the action where there is immediate inclination for the action.

Be it noted that what Kant is saying would appear to be absurd if we interpret the *Groundwork* as a text to find out and establish supreme principle of morality for the purposes of teaching how to be moral as traditionally it is

interpreted. Kant is not writing the *Groundwork* to teach mankind how to be moral. Rather he is interested in preparing the possibility of transforming metaphysic of morals into a science of morality. That is to say he is inscribing morality within the point of view of the subjectivity of the subject, which he has already constituted in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. That is to say Kant is interested in subjectivisation of morality consistent with the first *Critique*. The phrase 'strong in soul'⁸⁵ is for 'strong in will' as he is showing the presence of good will here.

Para 11-12: Here Kant gives two more examples of why we should not be complacent after having an action in conformity to duty done out of immediate inclination. For it may lack the motive of duty. Rather motive of duty is isolated if we can find an action, which accords with duty, but where there is no immediate inclination for the action and there is a contrary inclination.

With the help of first example, i.e. of sympathy as inclination, Kant also answers the question: Why should we look for moral worth in motive of duty and not in immediate inclination? If we look for moral worth in inclinations, then it will depend on luck whether we can be moral since it will be pure chance whether nature will endow a person with the appropriate immediate inclinations. But Kant needs a notion of morality such that for any person of any kind it will necessarily be possible to be moral.

"Still further: if nature had implanted little sympathy in this or that man's heart; if (being in other respects an honest fellow) he were cold in temperament and indifferent to the sufferings of others—perhaps because, being endowed with the special gift of patience and robust endurance in his own sufferings, he assumed the like in others or even demanded it; if such a man (who would in truth not be the worst product of nature) were not exactly fashioned by her to be a philanthropist, would he not still find in himself a source from which he might draw a worth far higher than any that a good-natured temperament can have? Assuredly he would. It is precisely in this that the worth of character begins to show—a moral worth and beyond all comparison the highest—namely, that he does good, not from inclination, but from duty."⁸⁶

The process of abstraction is taking place keeping in view the morally practical interest brought in advance by reflection.

In the course of discussion of the second example, i.e. of inclination for happiness, Kant also brings out the problematic nature of happiness. "In this

Idea of happiness all inclinations are combined into a sum total."⁸⁷ Yet according to Kant "men cannot form under the name of 'happiness' any determinate and assured conception of the satisfaction of all inclinations as a sum"⁸⁸ since any prescription for happiness is likely to interfere negatively with some inclination or the other.

Para 13: The Scripture commands: Love thy neighbour and even thy enemy. The Scriptural injunction appears to be contrary to Kant's claim that moral worth resides in motive of duty and not in inclination, since love is an inclination. But according to Kant, "love out of inclination cannot be commanded; but kindness done from duty" can be commanded.⁸⁹ So what the Scripture commands is "kindness done from duty—although no inclination impels us, and even although natural and unconquerable disinclination stands in our way..."⁹⁰ If we persist in using the vocabulary of love then kindness done from duty is *practical* love and it is this practical love that is commanded by the Scripture. Love out of inclination is *pathological* love and the Scripture does not command it. The *practical* love resides in the will and "not in the propensions of feeling"⁹¹. It resides in principles of action and it does not grow out of melting compassion.

Kant here is misinterpreting and transforming the meaning of scriptural saying. Morality of command for the guidance of will is the Judaic Old Testament conception of morality. When Jesus expounded the morality of love and compassion he, in fact, was rejecting the morality of commands for the guidance of will.

Para 14: After isolating the motive of duty Kant announces the distinctive feature of this motive of duty as his second proposition.

"Our second proposition is this: An action done from duty has its moral worth, not *in the purpose* to be attained by it, but in the maxim according with which it is decided upon; it depends therefore, not on the realization of the object of the action; but solely on the *principle of volition* in accordance with which, irrespective of all objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been performed."⁹²

Kant is now making preparation for further abstraction.

In this proposition Kant is reformulating the Aristotelian position. According to Aristotle moral knowledge has no particular end, since it is concerned with right living in general, as it is not technical knowledge and hence, it is concerned with natural or moral laws. Aristotle stresses that

phronēsis presupposes the existence of *nomoi*. This is what keeps *phronēsis* from degenerating into the mere cleverness or calculation that characterizes the *deinos* (the clever person). The moral knowledge, for Aristotle, is concerned with the right estimation of the role that reason has to play in moral action; it must involve *nomoi*.

But a subtle difference may be noted in Aristotelian position and Kantian formulation of it. For Aristotle these laws are laws of action or conduct of man. But for Kant these laws or principles are *principles of volition* only. Hence not only they can have no reference to any end of action but also can have no reference to the matter of action and hence Kant is making a move towards making the essence of moral laws merely formal and not material. This position Kant has to adopt because he has already taken the idea of the good will to be independent of any reference to action in which it may result.

But the argument Kant gives for bringing in *a priori* formal principle in the context of motive of duty is inadequate. "That the purposes we may have in our actions, and also their effects considered as ends and motives of will, can give to actions no unconditioned and moral worth is clear from what has gone before."⁹³ From this premise Kant cannot jump to the conclusion,

"Where can this worth be found if we are not to find in the will's relation to the effect hoped for from the action? It can be found nowhere but in the principle of will, irrespective of the ends which can be brought about such action; for between it's a *a priori* principle, which is formal, and it's a *posteriori* motive, which is material, the will stands so to speak, at the parting of the ways; and since it must be determined by some principle, it will have to be determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty, where, as we have seen, every material principle is taken away from it."⁹⁴

Mere forbidding of reference to any end or purpose to be achieved, as effect of the action does not make the principle involved as formal principle. As principles of decency, courage, dignity, loyalty etc. are not ruled out, as they involve no reference to the end to be achieved as consequence of action. But these are material principle referring to the matter of the action. But how can Kant rule them out without any specific argument. Kant is ruling them out *a priori* because these principles are involved in the kind of action, which is called *agere* (or *πράττειν*), a category of action which has been de-recognized by Kant as human action as shown earlier. Since the only kind of action recognize are actions which aim at some end other than themselves which

cannot be involved in the estimation of moral worth so Kant is left with no option but to opt for *a priori* formal principle of will in determining the moral worth of action done from the motive of duty.

When moral principle is abstracted from the ends of action Kant is not deducing his principle of morality rather he is transforming Greek morality through his reflection on the motive of duty.

Para 15: "*Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law.*"⁹⁵ This is the third proposition announced by Kant. According to him this third proposition follows from the two propositions announced earlier.

One can have inclination for the object, which is the effect of the proposed action, but one cannot have reverence for it. In Kant's view one cannot have reverence for a mere effect of a will, precisely because it is not the activity of a will. Similarly one cannot have reverence for inclination. One can at most approve of one's own inclination and love inclination of someone else. To love inclination of someone else is to regard it as favorable to one's own advantage.

"Only something which is conjoined with my will solely as a ground and never as an effect – something which does not serve my inclination, but outweighs it or at least leaves it entirely out of account in my choice – and therefore only bare law for its own sake, can be an object of reverence and therewith a command."⁹⁶

So, to investigate the motive of duty in its purity we have to disregard all influence of inclination and the object of will i.e., the object as the effect of the proposed act. So, in motive of duty in its purity the determination of will takes place objectively by the law and subjectively reverence for the law. Hence, "the maxim of obeying this law even to the detriment of all my inclinations."⁹⁷

Here Kant explains what he means by a maxim in a footnote. "A *maxim* is the subjective principle of volition."⁹⁸ By a subjective principle of volition he means the principle adopted by the subject in the determination of his volition. He contrasts a maxim with the practical law.

"An objective principle (that is, one which would also serve subjectively as a practical principle for all rational beings if reason had full control over the faculty of desire) is a practical law."⁹⁹

Maxim and law are not mutually exclusive categories of principles. Same principle can be both a maxim as well as law. The distinction between maxim

and law is based in the mode of determination of will such that it is possible that the same principle determines the will in both the modes.

Be it noted that what Kant is trying to do here is to reformulate morality consistent with the only category of human action recognized by him. The way he is arguing makes it clear that morality is also concerned with action, which has an end or object, which is the effect of the action. So the action Kant is concerned with is not the traditional moral action but the new homo-faber action and he is concerned with finding the principle of morality in the changed environment of human action.

In a footnote to the next paragraph Kant explains what he means by 'reverence'. Reverence is a feeling. But "it is not a feeling *received* through outside influence,"¹⁰⁰ that is to say it is not a pathological feeling. It is a feeling which is "*self-produced* a rational concept".¹⁰¹ Since all feelings of former kind are reducible to inclination or fear, the feeling of reverence is distinct and separate from both inclination and fear. What a person recognizes immediately as law for him, he recognizes with reverence. Hence reverence means consciousness of the subordination of one's will to a law without the mediation of external influences on his senses. So it is a kind of immediate feeling. In Kant's words,

"Immediate determination of the will by the law and consciousness of this determination is called 'reverence', so reverence is regarded as the *effect* of the law on the subject and not as the *cause* of the law."¹⁰²

According to Kant, reverence is properly awareness of a value, which demolishes one's self love. Object of reverence is regarded neither an object of inclination nor as an object of fear, yet it is analogous to both.

"The *object* of reverence is the law alone – that law which we impose *on ourselves* but yet as necessary in itself. Considered as a law, we are subject to it without any consultation of self-love; considered as self-imposed it is a consequence of our will. In the first respect it is analogous to fear, in the second to inclination."¹⁰³

According to Kant even reverence for the person is nothing but reverence for the law, which he exemplifies. Even reverence for a talented man is reverence for the law.

"Because we regard the developments of our talents as a duty, we see too in a man of talent a sort of *example of the law* (the law of becoming like him by practice), and this is what constitutes our

reverence for him."¹⁰⁴ So ultimately, "All moral interest, so-called, consists solely in reverence for the law."¹⁰⁵

Kant also gives the analysis of feeling of reverence or respect in greater detail in the Critique of Practical Reason, chapter III, "On the Motives of Pure Practical Reason."¹⁰⁶ He says:

"The essential thing in all determinations of the will by the moral law is that as a free will it should be determined solely by the law and, moreover, not merely without the co-operation of sensuous impulses but even with the repulsion of all such impulses and with the breaking off of all inclinations so far as they go counter to that law."¹⁰⁷

Rupturing of sensible feelings 'is itself a feeling.'¹⁰⁸ This is in conformity to the well-known statement of Spinoza in his Ethics that an emotion can be overcome only by an emotion.¹⁰⁹ If a repulsion of sensible feeling is present, then positive feeling, which performs the repulsion is also present in it. Therefore Kant says,

"Consequently, we can see a priori [from the phenomenon of the repudiation of sensible feelings] that the moral law, as a determining ground of will, in thwarting all our inclinations [sensible feelings] must [itself] produce a feeling."¹¹⁰

According to Heidegger's analysis,

"All the sensible inclinations subjected to the break are inclinations in the sense of self-love and self-conceit. Moral law strikes down self-conceit."¹¹¹ "But as this law is something positive in itself, namely, the form of an intellectual causality, that is, of freedom, it must be an object of respect; for, by opposing the subjective antagonism of the inclinations, it weakens self-conceit; and since it even breaks down, that is, humiliates, this conceit, it is an object of the highest respect and, consequently, is the foundation of a positive feeling which is not of empirical origin, but is known a priori. Therefore respect for the moral law is a feeling which is produced by an intellectual cause, and this feeling is the only one that we know quite a priori and the necessity of which we can perceive."¹¹² This feeling of respect for the law can "be called a moral feeling"¹¹³. "This feeling (which we call the moral feeling) is therefore produced simply by reason. It does not serve for the estimation of actions nor for the foundation of the objective moral law itself, but merely as a motive to make this of itself a maxim. But what name could we more suitably apply to this singular feeling

which cannot be compared to any pathological feeling? It is of such a peculiar kind that it seems to be at the disposal of reason only, and that pure practical reason."¹¹⁴

Be it noted respect here is respect for the law as determining ground of moral will.

What Kant is explaining here is borrowed from the ancient Greek philosophy. The ancient Greek philosophy characterized practical behavior in the broadest sense, *orexis*, by *dioxis* and *phuge*. *Dioxis* signifies following in the manner of pursuit, a striving toward something. *Phuge* signifies a yielding, fleeing, retreat from, striving away from. For *dioxis*, striving toward, Kant says inclination for; and for *phuge*, giving way before, he takes fear as a shrinking standing in fear of. Be it noted the ancients explained both *dioxis* and *phuge* for the context of striving, *orexis* of outward action or practical behaviour. But this outward action is missing in Kant's explanation of reverence. It is only an inner feeling although a moral feeling. Hence he speaks of only an analogy. He says that the feeling of reverence has something analogous, something corresponding to the two phenomena, inclination and fear, striving toward and striving away from. He speaks of analogy because, these two modifications of *orexis*, feelings are sensibly determined, whereas respect is a striving toward and simultaneously a striving away from of a purely mental kind.

The nature of necessity involved in the motive of duty is not explained here or anywhere in the first chapter. Kant will explain the nature of the necessity involved in the motive of duty in the second chapter.¹¹⁵ In the Preface also Kant brings in the discussion of the nature of necessity, "Every one must admit that a law has to carry with it absolute necessity if it is to be valid morally—valid, that is, as a ground of obligation..."¹¹⁶ Although Aristotle has neither the concept of duty nor any reasonable verbal equivalent of it or 'should', he uses the expression *ὡς δεῖ*, "as is necessary". According to Gadamer,

"We find the word *δέον* in association with *ἀγαθόν*, the good, in the phrase *ἀγαθόν καὶ δέον* ('good and binding'). *Δέον* means the binding, the obligatory. It refers less to a demand that is made binding on single individuals than to a common basis of obligation on which are grounded all customs and forms of social life."¹

For Aristotle *ἀγαθόν* (good) and *καλόν* (beautiful) have the same meaning, and the only difference is that *καλόν* (beautiful) is more inclusive

term. *ἀγαθόν* (good) refers to actions only, but *καλόν* (beautiful) is used also where no action or movement is involved.¹¹⁸ If the connection of *ἀγαθόν* with knowledge is kept in mind then it follows that Greek philosophy understood this necessity as closure of any other option due to removal of doubt through the knowledge of *nomos* and *aretē* in the situation and this necessity is the necessity of fittingness to which there is no alternative. In Stoic ethics in place of *ἀγαθόν και δέον* we find *καλόν* and *καθηκον* respectively. The later Stoic concept of *καθηκον* means that which is due and suitable to some one. When Latinization of Greek concepts took place *καθηκον* and *καλόν* changed to Latin 'officium.' This change marks the decline of common life of polis and integration of Stoic thought into the life world of the Roman republic, sacred and political, with increasing dependency on officialdom. Latin 'officium' came to represent the concept of duty. With Cicero the word 'officium' or 'duty' came into general use. According to Gadamer,

"The German word 'Pflicht' (duty) is a Germanization that originates in the eighteenth century, and Garvey's translation of Cicero's 'officium' contributed to the formation of the concept of duty in which are still to be heard its Latin origins, the 'official' and the presence of the political. Then, when Kant accepted and analyzed it, the concept of the imperative first took the further step of moving from grammar into ethics."¹¹⁹

Kant also understood this necessity as closure of all other options due to its nature in the case of holy will and purely good will to begin with. But he went on to give a different interpretation to the necessity associated with moral law. Here the necessity is the necessity, which binds all rational beings individually. That is to say law has necessity only in the sense of it being necessarily universalizable over all rational beings individually. So here Kant is transforming the meaning of necessity involved in *nomos* of Greek thought. In fact Kantian law, which is necessary, need not close all options especially in the case of imperfect duties.¹²⁰

Be it noted that Kant makes a distinction between two determinants of will, in action done from motive of duty: 'objectively the law' and 'subjectively pure reverence for this practical law'. He is preparing ground for further abstraction of the basis of moral value even from this moral feeling in the next paragraph.

Para 16: In this paragraph Kant rejects all consequentialist account of moral value. Hence he further abstracts from the moral feeling of reverence. The reverence is a feeling produced by the apprehension of the law. The

reverence itself being an effect can contribute nothing to the moral worth of an action. The basis of moral worth is the bare idea of law, which is present in a rational being so far as it is the ground of determination of will. So that we can say good will is that will which is determined immediately by the mere idea of the law without mediation of anything else.

"Therefore nothing but the *idea* of the law in itself, which admittedly is present only in a rational being – so far as it, and not an expected result, is the ground determining the will – can constitute that pre-eminent good which we call moral, a good which is already present in the person acting on this idea and has not to be awaited merely from the result."¹²⁷

It may be recalled reverence is nothing but the effect of the apprehension of law on the will and hence it has to be discounted in the assessment of the moral worth.

Para 17: Nowhere is Kant more close to the basic tenets of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy in his moral philosophy than the point where Kant announces the supreme principle of morality, yet nowhere is he as removed from Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy as he is in the announcement of the categorical imperative. How can this be? It is because Kant is transforming the basic element of Greek ethics, i.e. *phronēsis* into the supreme principle of modern morality.

The 'appropriate principle' (*oikeia archē*) for moral reasoning, in Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy, is that in the context of moral reasoning the agent always finds himself in a particular situation and the task in front of him is not to subsume this particular case under a universal rule which he knows apart from the situation he is in but to define from within his situation what the general rule is of which this situation is an instance. The particular virtues and virtue in general as finding the 'mean between the extremes', are not universal principles that the agent applies to a situation but universalization of what he is doing when he does what is right. That is to say the application of moral principle is not the relating of some pre-given universal to the particular situation, rather the universal receives its meaning in the particular situation of its application, so that it is co-determination of the particular and the universal. To put it in another way in *phronēsis* it is not that only a general rule is concretized but it also involves the task of generalizing something concrete.

It is this aspect of moral reasoning which finds expression in the supreme principle of morality as announced by Kant:

"I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law."¹²²

Be it noted that the 'act' in the clause 'I ought never to act' refers not to outward action but to the inner act of determination of will since it is the principle for determination of will. Be it remembered this principle is announced as an answer to the question:

"But what kind of law can this be the thought of which, even without regard to the results expected from it, has to determine the will if this is to be called good absolutely and without qualification?"¹²³

So the principle announces: That will is good will which determines itself by only that maxim, which is such that in that act of self determination it can also will that its maxim should become a universal law. Now we can see that for Kant the particular determination of will by a maxim is also a determination of a universal law. In fact the particular determination of will takes place by the maxim precisely because of its fitness to be willed as a universal law. So that For Kant also, in moral reasoning, the particular determination of will and the universal determination of law takes place simultaneously and one is involved in the other as it happens in Aristotelian *phronēsis*. So we can say Kant is very close to the essence of Aristotelian *phronēsis* in his announcement of the categorical imperative.

Yet as we have remarked he completely departs from Aristotelian *phronēsis* and transforms it to make it applicable to the new category of human action, which he has recognized under the influence of *Critique of Pure Reason*. How has he transformed Aristotelian *phronēsis*?

In Aristotelian *phronēsis* the *phronimos* will have to refrain from applying with full rigour the law in specific instance so that for him law is not strictly universal but only general. For the

"right thoughts about life and the idea of the right and just life—the highest thing that one could learn (*megiston mathēma*)—only become visible in general outlines 'and not in regard to specifics (cf. Aristotle, EN 1098a21).'"¹²⁴

In holding back on the law he is not diminishing it but, on the contrary, finding the better law. Aristotle shows that everything that is set down in law is in necessary tension with definite action, in that it is general and hence cannot contain within itself the particular reality in its full concrete form. Aristotle expresses this very clearly in his analysis of *epieikea*, 'equity':

epieikea is the correction of the law. For Aristotle the law is always imperfect, not because it is imperfect in itself, but because, in comparison with the ordered world of law, human reality is necessarily imperfect and does not allow any simple application of the former. So changeability is inherent even in the natural law for Aristotle. So there is no possibility of laying down the law explicitly in a system of metaphysic of morals for Aristotle. The law needs to be concretized in each situation of its applicability, which is the business of *phronēsis*. But this is not acceptable to Kant. To be a moral law the maxim must be strictly universalizable. So equity plays no role in Kantian morality. It is possible for Kant to lay down the a priori laws of morality once for all in a system of metaphysic of morals. Hence Kant now will make a transition from ordinary moral philosophy to metaphysic of morals in the second chapter as he is in a position to formulate the supreme principle of morality once for all.

Kant writes,

"Here bare conformity to universal law as such (without having as its base any law prescribing particular actions) is what serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it if duty is not to be everywhere an empty delusion and a chimerical concept."¹²⁵

But Kant has merely argued for not taking the proposed end of action, or the consequences expected from it, or any principle of action that needs to borrow its motive from the expected result, in the context of duty. He has not argued for prohibiting any law prescribing particular actions in the context of duty. So the reason for this must be much deeper not apparent to Kant himself in this context. If my argument is correct Kant cannot have any reference to any particular kind of action in the context of duty because the only category of *action* accepted by Kant as human action i.e. the category of homo-faber action is inappropriate category in the context of morality. That Kant is taking action in the sense of homo-faber action even in the context of morality is very clear.

"An end is an object of the free elective will, the idea of which determines this will to an action by which the object is produced. Accordingly every action has its end, and as no one can have an end without himself making the object of his elective will his end, hence to have some end of actions is an act of the freedom of the agent, not an affect of physical nature."¹²⁶

Hence it follows that if morality and duty is not to be fictitious then bare

conformity to universal law as such (without having as its base any law prescribing particular actions) must serve the will as its principle. This makes Kantian Ethics depart from Aristotelian *phronēsis*.

"The ordinary reason of mankind also agrees with this completely in its practical judgments and always has the aforesaid principle before its eyes."¹²⁷

This holds good because mankind is also thinking of morality in Aristotelian framework but at the same time has lost the category of human action, which is performed for no end other than its excellent performance. So mankind in general is also becoming Kantian in morality.

Notes and References

¹Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, [abbreviated as *Groundwork* hereinafter] translated by H.J. Paton in his *The Moral Law*, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1948. The first page number refers to the *Moral Law* of H. J. Paton, the second and the third page numbers refer to the page numbers of two German editions of Kant's original text, given in the margins of Paton's translation.

²Gadamer, 'Dialectic and Sophism in Plato's *Seventh Letter*', *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, tr. P. Christopher Smith, (Yale University Press, London, 1980), pp. 93–123.

³"No one attempts to establish a science unless he has an idea upon which to base it. But in the working out of the science the schema, nay even the definition which, at the start, he first gave of the science, is very seldom adequate to his idea. For this idea lies hidden in reason, like a germ in which the parts are still undeveloped and barely recognisable even under microscopic observation. Consequently, since sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest, we must not explain and determine them according to the description, which their founder gives of them, but in conformity with the idea which, out of the natural unity of the parts that we have assembled, we find to be grounded in reason itself. For we shall then find that its founder, and often even his latest successors, are groping for an idea which they have never succeeded in making clear to themselves, and that consequently they have not been in a position to determine the proper content, the articulation (systematic unity), and limits of the science." *Critique of Pure Reason* [abbreviated as CPR hereinafter], tr. Norman Kemp Smith, A 834, B 862.

⁴Only philosopher like Hegel, Heidegger, Gadamer, Rawls, and Arendt could understand the reality that is being investigated or the idea that is communicated. Their knowledge rises to what Kant calls *cognitio ex principiis* and it does not remain at the level of, what Kant calls, *cognitio ex datis*. I have benefited and borrowed from their investigations knowingly and as well as unknowingly.

⁵CPR, A 836, B 864.

⁶CPR, A 836f, B 864f.

⁷Heidegger: *Being and Time*, Trs. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Basil Blackwell, 1962, p.74, H. 48.

⁸*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Tr. M. J. Gregor (The Hague, 1974), section 53, 88/219

⁹[abbreviated as *CJ* hereinafter], Tr. James Creed Meredith, from the 42nd volume of the series *Great Books of the Western World* on Kant entitled *The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason And Other Ethical Treatises, The Critique of Judgment*, The University of Chicago, Encyclopaedia of Britannica Inc. 1952, pp. 459-613. The entire volume on Kant will be referred to as *42.Kant* hereinafter.

¹⁰*CJ* §59, *42.Kant* p.547.

¹¹CPR, A314, B 370. After Kant this principle was adopted by Fichte *Werke* VI, p 337. Subsequently this principle was also elaborated by Schleiermacher. In Gadamer's words, "Thus Schleiermacher asserts that the object is to understand a writer better than he understood himself, a formula that has been respected ever since and in the changing interpretation of which the whole history of modern hermeneutics can be read" *Truth and Method*, tr. William Glen-Doepel, Sheed & Ward, London, 1975, p169. Since Schleiermacher others, including August Boeckh, Steinthal and Dilthey have also accepted this principle. "The literary critic understands the speaker and poet better than he understands himself and better than his contemporaries understand him, for he brings clearly into consciousness what was actually but only unconsciously, present in the other" Steinthal, *Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, Berlin 1881. Even Martin Heidegger accepts this principle: "We not only wish to but must understand the Greeks better than they understood themselves. Only thus shall we actually be in possession of our heritage." *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tr. By Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, p 111. See also Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp 169 – 171; and also O. F. Bollnow, *Das Verstehen*.

¹²Vorländer (ed.) *Kants Antwort an Garve, Prolegomena*, p.194.

¹³Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, tr. William Glen-Doepel, Sheed & Ward, London, 1975, p.100.

¹⁴The n.1, given by the translator, Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Hegel's 'Inverted World' ", in his *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutic Studies*, tr. P. Christopher Smith, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1976, p.35.

¹⁵Hans-Georg Gadamer: *Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics*, p.61.

¹⁶Book VI (1144b17 ff).

¹⁷*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, Sec.4.

¹⁸*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, Sec.5.

¹⁹Quoted by Charles S. Singleton, 'The Perspective of Art', in *Perspectives On Political Philosophy Vol. 1: Thucydides through Machiavelli*, Eds. James V. Downton, JR. and David K. Hart, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. New York, 1971), p.427. The article was originally published in *The Kenyon Review*, 15 (Spring 1953), 169-189.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹Quoted, *Ibid.* p.427.

²²Quoted, *Ibid.* p. 426.

²³Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, III,1109b33-1110a16.

²⁴*Ibid.* p.1110b7-1111a18.

²⁵*Ibid.* 1111a18-b5.

²⁶*Ibid.* 1111b5-31.

²⁷*CJ*, §43, 42.Kant, p. 523.

²⁸The Works of James Harris, Esq., with an Account of his Life and Character, by His Son, the Earl of Malmesbury, London, 1801, Volume I, p.109. [Note: Harris's typography, punctuation and use of capitals and italics are highly idiosyncratic.]

²⁹Unless otherwise specified, all passages quoted are from the paragraph under consideration at that point.

³⁰*Groundwork*, 59 / 393 / 1.

³¹*Groundwork*, 65 / 399f / 13.

³²*Groundwork*, 53 / 387 / i.

³³*Groundwork*, 53 / 387 / i.

³⁴*Groundwork*, 59 / 393 / 2.

³⁵See *Metaph.* 1078a31.

³⁶*CJ*, §59, 42.Kant, p.547.

³⁷*Groundwork*, 59 / 393 / 1.

³⁸*Groundwork*, p. 98 / 437 / 81.

³⁹CPR, A 350-351.

⁴⁰*Groundwork*, 59 / 393 / 2.

⁴¹Book I, Sec. 1.

⁴²*The Groundwork*, 76 / 412 / 36.

⁴³*Groundwork*, 59f / 394 / 2f.

⁴⁴*The Idea of the Good in Platonic- Aristotelian Philosophy*, tr. P. Christopher Smith, (Yale University Press, London, 1986), pp. 65-66.

⁴⁵*Groundwork*, 60 / 394 / 3.

⁴⁶*Groundwork*, 60 / 394 / 3.

⁴⁷*Groundwork*, 72 / 407 / 26.

⁴⁸*Reason in the Age of Science*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, p.81.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p.81.

⁵⁰*General Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals*, sec.I., 42.*Kant* p.386.

⁵¹*Groundwork*, 60 / 394 / 3.

⁵²*Groundwork*, 72 / 407 / 27.

⁵³*Groundwork*, 60 / 394 / 4.

⁵⁴Commenting on Plato's idea of justice Gadamer writes, "The inwardness of justice is most certainly not an inwardness of disposition, not that good will 'which alone of all things in the world may be called good' (Kant). On the contrary, Plato's inwardness is the measure and origin of all valid outward expression in human activity. It is no sanctified realm of the heart known only to God but rather an order of governance and constitution of the soul's being which maintains and fulfills itself in every action." *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, tr. P. Christopher Smith, (Yale University Press, London, 1980), p.86.

⁵⁵*Truth and Method*, p. 50.

⁵⁶*Groundwork*, 61 / 395 / 4.

⁵⁷Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, p.12.

⁵⁸*Groundwork*, 61 / 395 / 4f.

⁵⁹*Groundwork*, 61 / 395 / 5.

⁶⁰*Groundwork*, 61 / 395 / 5.

⁶¹*Groundwork*, 61 / 395 / 5.

⁶²*Groundwork*, 61 / 395 / 5.

⁶³*Groundwork*, 61 / 395f / 5f.

⁶⁴*Groundwork*, 61 / 396 / 6.

⁶⁵CPR, A839, B867.

- ⁶⁶CPR, A 840, B 868.
- ⁶⁷CPR, A 840, B868.
- ⁶⁸*Groundwork*, 62 / 396 / 7f.
- ⁶⁹*Groundwork*, 62 / 397 / 8.
- ⁷⁰*Groundwork*, 62 / 397 / 8.
- ⁷¹*Groundwork*, 62 / 397 / 8.
- ⁷²*Groundwork*, 62 / 397 / 8.
- ⁷³ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics*, p.145.
- ⁷⁴*Groundwork*, 63 / 397 / 8.
- ⁷⁵*Groundwork*, 63 / 397 / 8.
- ⁷⁶*Groundwork*, 63 / 397 / 8.
- ⁷⁷*Groundwork*, 63 / 397 / 8f.
- ⁷⁸CJ, §4, 42.Kant, p.478.
- ⁷⁹*Groundwork*, 63 / 397 / 9.
- ⁸⁰*Groundwork*, 63 / 397 / 8.
- ⁸¹*Groundwork*, 63 / 397 / 9.
- ⁸²*Groundwork*, 63 / 397f / 9.
- ⁸³*Groundwork*, 63 / 398 / 9f.
- ⁸⁴*Groundwork*, 63 / 398 / 10.
- ⁸⁵*Groundwork*, 63 / 398 / 10.
- ⁸⁶*Groundwork*, 64 / 398 / 11.
- ⁸⁷*Groundwork*, 64 / 399 / 12.
- ⁸⁸*Groundwork*, 64 / 399 / 12.
- ⁸⁹*Groundwork*, 65 / 399 / 13.
- ⁹⁰*Groundwork*, 65 / 399 / 13.
- ⁹¹*Groundwork*, 65 / 399 / 13.
- ⁹²*Groundwork*, 65 / 399f / 13.
- ⁹³*Groundwork*, 65 / 400 / 13.
- ⁹⁴*Groundwork*, 65 / 400 / 13f.
- ⁹⁵*Groundwork*, 66 / 400 / 14.
- ⁹⁶*Groundwork*, 66 / 400 / 14f.
- ⁹⁷*Groundwork*, 66 / 400f / 15.
- ⁹⁸*Groundwork*, 66n / 400n / 15n.
- ⁹⁹*Groundwork*, 66n / 400n / 15n.
- ¹⁰⁰*Groundwork*, 66n / 401n / 16n.
- ¹⁰¹*Groundwork*, 66n / 401n / 16n.

- ¹⁰²*Groundwork*, 67n / 401n / 16n.
- ¹⁰³*Groundwork*, 67n / 401n / 16n.
- ¹⁰⁴*Groundwork*, 67n / 401n / 17n.
- ¹⁰⁵*Groundwork*, 67n / 401n / 17n.
- ¹⁰⁶*Critique of Practical Reason*, 42.Kant, p.321.
- ¹⁰⁷*Critique of Practical Reason*, 42.Kant, p.321.
- ¹⁰⁸*Critique of Practical Reason*, 42.Kant, p.321.
- ¹⁰⁹Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tr. Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982, p.134.
- ¹¹⁰*Critique of Practical Reason*, 42.Kant, p.321.
- ¹¹¹Heidegger: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p.134.
- ¹¹²*Critique of Practical Reason*, 42.Kant, p.322.
- ¹¹³*Critique of Practical Reason*, 42.Kant, p.323.
- ¹¹⁴*Critique of Practical Reason*, 42.Kant, p.323.
- ¹¹⁵*Groundwork*, 76 ff/ 412 ff/ 36 ff
- ¹¹⁶*Groundwork*, 55 / 389 / vi.
- ¹¹⁷Hans-Georg Gadamer: *Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1999, p.146.
- ¹¹⁸See *Metaph.* 1078a31.
- ¹¹⁹Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1999, pp.146-147.
- ¹²⁰For a detailed discussion of this point see my essay, "The Beautiful as the Symbol of the Morally Good: The Role of Aesthetic Judgment in Kant's Critical Philosophy," *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XX, No. 3, pp. 1 – 72.
- ¹²¹*Groundwork*, 66 / 401 / 16.
- ¹²²*Groundwork*, 67 / 402 / 17.
- ¹²³*Groundwork*, 67 / 402 / 17.
- ¹²⁴Gadamer, Hans-georg, *The Idea of the Good in Platonic- Aristotelian Philosophy*, tr. P. Christopher Smith, (Yale University Press, London, 1986), p.121.
- ¹²⁵*Groundwork*, 67 / 402 / 17.
- ¹²⁶Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*, 1780, Introduction, sec. III, translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott. 42. Kant, p. 369.
- ¹²⁷*Groundwork*, 67 / 402 / 17.