

On Kant; Off Kant

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Immanuel Kant is a philosopher of all times. Bringing out a special issue on the occasion of his 200th death anniversary is, therefore, befitting to the intellectual bequeathal he has left for posterity. In the past, several philosophy journals like *The Journal of History of Philosophy*, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, *Monist*, *Synthese*, *Inquiry*, have published special issues focusing on one or the other aspects of Kant's philosophy. This special issue of *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* reflects the same continued interest in Kant's legacy in terms of its direct or indirect influence on our contemporary ways of thinking in almost every sphere of human life.

This special issue contains, broadly speaking, two types of responses to Kant. The *first* is restricted primarily to Kant's three *Critiques* from within. These responses are illustrative of Kantian scholarship in its conventionally established mode. Remaining primarily within the bounds of the Kantian texts, they seek to clarify such issues as (a) the nature of Kant's 'Transcendental Problem', namely, how is knowledge possible? (b) the nature and source of Transcendental Illusion (c) the nature of Kant's critique of metaphysics (d) the substantiality of soul and (e) the nature of imagination and sublime in Kantian aesthetics. The *second* type of response to Kant and to some of his most inspirational ideas consists in making a somewhat unconventional presentation of Kant. It comes about by way of questioning the various concepts and distinctions through which the Kantian world-view is manifest. These interventions make the Kantian texts interact with other traditions of thinking such as the Greek, the Indian, and the phenomenological on the one hand and certain contemporary trends on the other. Notwithstanding omissions such as Kant's philosophy of mathematics, the essays included under this group discuss such issues as (a) the nature and justification of antinomies of reason as Kant has conceived and whether this very notion of reason and its antinomies ever arise in the Indian epistemological or metaphysical tradition (b) the idea of *phronesis* in the Greek tradition

and the Kantian idea of supreme moral principle (c) the implicit presence of the issue of race, gender, and community in the Kantian understanding of the nature of reflective judgment (d) Kantian understanding of entertainment and the challenge cinema poses to it (e) the issue of human rights and its Kantian understanding and (f) Kantian transcendental philosophy as a theory of limit and the need to de-transcendentalize it. Some of these essays falling in the second group have taken many issues off the Kantian texts. The later part of the above title highlights these significant extensions.

I

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is associated with the 'epistemological turn' western philosophy took during the so-called Age of Enlightenment. The overwhelming spirit of the age is expressed in acknowledging that human knowledge originates, to use Strawsonian phrase, within the 'Bounds of Sense', and that the individual human being is free and autonomous. In *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant problematizes the former by asking: what and how much can understanding and reason know apart from all experience? The answer to this question requires the acknowledgement of the limits (but not limitations) of reason. This is primarily the task of epistemology, the fulfillment of which justifies philosophy as a critical enterprise. But Kant, at the same time, highlights the moral dimension of the so-called value-neutral epistemology by further problematizing the attempts to transgress the limits of reason and enter the domain of faith. Any such attempt leads to what Kant calls Transcendental Illusion. While a perceptual illusion is a case of mistaken identity, logical illusion is a case of the misapplication of the rules of logic. But the transcendental illusion is due to the very tendency of human reason to try to transgress its own limits. In this sense, transcendental illusion is 'natural' and 'inevitable'. Therefore, it cannot be corrected in the sense in which the perceptual or the logical illusion can be corrected. The only course left open is to 'expose' it and at the same time 'caution' us against being deceived by it. In the first article in this volume, Sabhajeet Mishra, in his *Nature and Scope of Transcendental Illusion* shows how the peculiar function of human reason is itself a source of this illusion. On the one

hand, the ideas of reason, being self conscious regulative efforts, try to find out unity of the possible experience, while on the other hand, these ideas are unable to present that unity as an object. It is in this dialectical situation that antinomies of the so-called pure reason begin to appear. Mishra's essay sets the background for discussing one of the most vexed questions in Kant's philosophy, namely, the antinomies of reason. The Kantian statement about the antinomies of reason have induced the Kantian scholars to say almost everything that can be said, for or against, the Kantian statement. Two of our contributors, N. G. Kulkarni and S. S. Antarkar have dwelt upon the first antinomy (i.e. whether the world is finite or infinite as regards space and time) from within and from outside the Kantian texts. The logical structure of the antinomy is that although we must accept one of the two alternatives (e.g. time as finite or infinite) yet both can be proved or disproved indirectly by the refutation of the opposed statement. This is the pivotal part of the transcendental dialectic. Kulkarni in his *Kant's Critique of Metaphysics* argues that unless Kant's arguments or their reformulations on the problem of antinomies are accepted as standing on their own, "the project to expose the transcendental illusions, once for all, cannot be considered the last word on the subject as Kant apparently did." Referring to C.D. Broad's and Russell's criticisms of Kant's formulation of the first antinomy, Kulkarni argues that we feel uneasy in contemplating a series which has an end but no beginning rather than a series which has a beginning but no end. Kant seems to be expressing, 'in a learned way' this discomfort in contemplating a series that has an end but no beginning. According to Kulkarni, "our feelings of conceivability and inconceivability go with certain mental pictures we conjure up in contemplating these cosmic possibilities. They cannot be eliminated altogether though their influence may not be desirable in this context". It is possible to conceive a series that has a relative terminal point, but no beginning. Kant is denying even this possibility. He is asserting that "infinite duration can not have lapsed before a chosen temporal landmark and yet, if time is infinite, this is precisely what has happened..." This assertion on Kant's part, according to Kulkarni, amounts to 'begging the question'. On the other hand and at a formal level, the two suppositions, i.e. the world is finite in time and that the world is infinite in time, can be stated in purely logical-mathematical terms without any contradiction. To say that the world is finite in time is to say: choose an arbitrarily chosen 'cut off' point without further supposing that successive units

of duration have either lapsed before or will lapse after the chosen point. To say that the world is infinite in time is to say, in the same fashion, that there is no upper limit of duration, either backwards or forwards in relation to an arbitrarily chosen 'cut off' point. Kulkarni argues that none of these statements are self-contradictory. The crux of the matter is that though not self-contradictory, argues Kulkarni, some presuppositions in such contexts are 'inconceivable' or 'unintelligible' "where conceivability is not identical with our ability to picture or imagine the alleged state of affairs". Further, what is puzzling for a common man does not really involve contradiction as is shown, in this context, by the mathematics of infinite and continuous classes and series.

Like any other metaphysical question, the question whether the spatio-temporal world is finite or infinite is surrounded with certain presuppositions. S. S. Antarkar in his *Kant's First Antinomy: A Critical Appraisal from the Classical Indian Perspective* seeks to unearth Kant's presuppositions on the nature of time, space and the world. According to Kant (a) space and time are the a-priori forms of intuition, (b) the spatio-temporal world is therefore an appearance, (c) there is no higher, supra-sensuous, supra-intellectual way of knowing what is real, (d) the solution of this (i.e. first) antinomy has practical relevance for morality and religion. Antarkar's effort is to show how the classical Indian philosophers would respond to Kant in terms of these presuppositions. Antarkar's essay is thus dialogical; making Indian philosophers 'enter into a dialogue with Kant'. This dialogue cultivates in bringing out the alternative Indian formulations of and solutions to the antinomical question viz. whether the world is finite or infinite with respect to time and space. Antarkar draws on the fact that certain distinctions around which the western epistemology and metaphysics, and that of Kant's in particular, is developed are of no interest to Indian philosophers. For instance, the distinction between the a-priori form and empirical context, formal validity and material truth, analytic and synthetic judgments, formal sciences like mathematics and empirical sciences like astronomy, are absent in Indian philosophical thinking. Antarkar brings to the notice of the reader the divergent views held by Indian philosophical systems on the ontological status of time, space, and the world. These divergent views are many. To illustrate one or two, following Antarkar, we may note that for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsakas and the Jainas time and space are two independent, infinite substances, whereas for the Sāṃkhyas they are relational, and for the Advaita Vedānta they are

- 'limiting adjuncts'. But more importantly, for Kant time and space are forms of cognition of the phenomena i.e. things as they appear and not of things as they are i.e. noumena. But for Advaita Vedānta spatio-temporal world is an appearance not because space and time are forms of cognition but since they are 'Limiting adjuncts which make one single Brahman appear as divided'. In contradistinction to Kant, no classical Indian philosophical system holds that the real is unknowable. Similarly, almost all classical Indian philosophical systems (except Cārvākas and Pūrva Mīmāṃsā) accept the possibility of supra-sensuous experience through which non-empirical reality can be known as in the case of Yogaja perception of Nyāya, Śakṣātkāra of Vedānta, and the three types of supra-sensuous knowledge i.e. *avadhi*, *manaḥparyāya* and *kevala* which the Jainas recognize. Apart from these differences in conceptualizing the nature of the world, the nature of perception, etc. the point to be noted is that the classical Indian philosophical systems can not be classified in terms of 'rationalism' and 'empiricism' since these two nomenclatures have a definite meaning in the context of western philosophy. Thus, according to Kant, who is a critical rationalist, beliefs in God, Soul and Creation are necessary foundations of morality and religion. But without holding any of these beliefs, classical Indian systems like Sāṃkhya, Buddhism and Jainism, argues Antarkar, "not only provide foundation for morals but even to the supreme goal of *mokṣa*". Sāṃkhya, Buddhism, and Jainism are not 'empiricist' in the sense in which empiricism is understood in the context of western philosophy. Kant's explanation of antinomy as due to the conflict between 'theoretical' and 'practical' interests of reason does not hold good vis-à-vis the classical Indian philosophical systems. According to Antarkar, the classical Indian philosophers formulate the problem (i.e. whether the world is finite or infinite with respect to time and space) and offer its solution in the 'ways radically different from' the three main strands within the western tradition, viz. Christian cosmology, science (as in the form of such theories as the Big-Bang theory) and Kant's own views. In the context of these three views, the classical Indian thought in general accepts space and time as infinite and the cosmological time as cyclic. With these presuppositions Indian philosophers look at the universe as undergoing the cycles of beginning (*sarga*) and end (*pralaya*) without necessarily accepting the first beginning (*anādi*) and any final end (*ananta*) since time is regarded as without beginning and end.

Antarkar argues that the idea of the cyclic cosmos enables the Indian

philosophers to treat the Big Bang as a beginning of a new cycle and as an end of the prior cycle. The Big-Bang is not the first state of the beginning of the world. The classical Indian philosophers would argue with Kant that any state arrived at empirically is not to be taken as the final unconditioned state. This then becomes the problem of method. Kant is of course averse to the vulgar speculative method; but at the same time has no other option except for the empirical method which consists in going from one gross material (*sthula*) to another gross material. But the method the classical Indian philosophers adopt is that of going from gross (*sthula*) to the subtler (*sukṣma*) and still subtler (*sukṣmatara*) levels of both; the self and the world; the subject and the object. This method of experience, is neither empirical (i.e. Humean) nor rational (i.e. Kantian). Invoking K.C.Bhattacharyya's fourfold division of the 'grades of consciousness', Antarkar embarks upon one of the most intricate notion in Indian philosophy, namely, 'knowing without thinking'. Bhattacharyya's explication of this notion brings out that the sources of (at least) some forms of knowledge are 'non-cognitive'. The method to grasp this kind of knowledge is not subject-object oriented, but as one could argue, is contemplative or meditative. Antarkar's essay ends up in bringing to the notice of the reader how classical Indian thinkers of the Sāṃkhya, Advaita and the Bauddha schools use this contemplative method to arrive at the transcendental thought which is neither subjective nor objective.

II

'How is knowledge of the world possible?' is a transcendental problem that Kant raises in his third *Critique*. It cannot be answered simply by explicating the conditions of knowledge, since, as argued by Kalyan Kumar Bagchi, this problem is rooted in the 'janus-faced' encounter of man with the world. Bagchi in his *Kant's Transcendental Problem* notes that for Kant the world is constituted by the interpretative forms of knowing subject and yet appears to be alien. The tension between the constitution of the world and at the same time its being alien to the knowing mind is due to the inherent dualism between the concept (a rationalizing device) and intuition. Thus, the root of the transcendental problem lies in man's 'consciousness of foil to his reason seeking in the

world'. Bagchi insists that if the fact that the 'subject' as constitutive of 'object' is not recognized, then the transcendental character of Kant's problem will be reduced to a mere second order inquiry. Transcendental inquiry is not a second order inquiry as exemplified in such locutions as 'The philosophy of—.' Transcendental inquiry arises when 'knowledge turns inwards or reflective to understand what foils it'. With this clarification, Bagchi goes on to delineate different 'senses' of critique of knowledge in Kant's own understanding. After a progressive clarification of each of the different senses of the term critique, Bagchi concludes that the critique in the Kantian context, (i) demarcates philosophy of science of Kant's conception from methodology of science and (ii) philosophy from science (of the present day conception). Bagchi's contention is that Kant's enquiry into knowledge conditions cannot be confused with the sort of enquiry conducted in philosophy of science, i.e. into the nature of axioms, postulates and laws of science. The generality of the transcendental problem with which Kant is dealing cannot be equated with the generality of the presuppositions of philosophy of science. "Consciousness views scientific enterprise... as *its* enterprise in relation to nature which yet is foil to consciousness and then it asks itself how it can settle scores with nature. This is the general problem of reason". Given this, argues Bagchi, it is 'strange' that Kant tries to justify the very concept of science or the very transcendental presupposition of science. In Kant's language, knowledge of nature as synthetic unity justifies the a-priori synthetic principles of knowledge but given the transcendental character of Kant's problem, the justification of the a-priori principles of the possibility of knowledge turns out to be a misconceived task. Bagchi's criticism of Kant is based on his observation that Kant is 'forced to deduce' the a-priori forms through the knowledge of the world because Kant 'could not hold fast to the conception of transcendental knowledge as self-reflective or self-evident'. This alleged failure becomes significant especially in the light of Kant's conception of philosophy as the *Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft*.

Ever since Descartes has introduced his notoriously famous *cogito ergo sum* argument, it has given life to countless issues that have constituted a large part of modern western philosophy. One such issue is that of the substantiality of the human soul. This issue, like any other, has the historical as well as the conceptual aspects and it depends upon one's choice to take this issue for discussion in either, or both of these

aspects. S. V. Bokil, in his *Kant's Rejection of the Substantiality of Human Soul* chooses to discuss this issue in its historical perspective and shows that Kant rejects the substantiality of human soul. In order to understand Kant's rejection one needs to go into the pre-critical stages of his intellectual development on the theme of mind. The part of this pre-critical stage is rooted in the Cartesian rational psychology that asserts the substantiality and simplicity of the human soul. All such claims of the rational psychology were later on found to be full of metaphysical riddles like psycho-physical parallelism (Spinoza), pre-established harmony (Leibniz) or occassionalism (Guelinx and Malebrauche). Christian Wolff's objective idealism too is a part of the pre-critical stage of Kant's philosophy. Bokil takes a historical perspective on the transition from Kant's adherence to the Rationalist doctrine of the substantiality of human soul (the rationalist phase) to his rejection of this doctrine (the critical phase). This transition is set up within the three possible alternatives to the dogmatism and skepticism of the Cartesian rational psychology. These are (a) to draw from the reasonable common-sense, (b) to develop a new metaphysical system within the fold of rational psychology, and (c) to develop empirical psychology by denouncing the substantiality of human soul. Philosophers like Claude Buffier, Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley and Hume have tried out one or the other of all the three options. Kant does not subscribe to any of these options but takes 'a new direction'. Quoting Kant's famous statement about the 'dogmatic slumber', the text-book writers usually highlight the Humean influence on Kant. But one has to see, as Bokil does, the complex influences on Kant's thinking, which go beyond those exercised by Hume. Kant was faced with two alternative perspectives on the nature of the human soul. By questioning the common presuppositions of the dogmatic rationalism and the psychological empiricism, namely, that there really is such an entity called mind-whether substantial or psychological- Kant in fact transcends the whole issue and gives it a transcendental turn by making human mind a functional expression.

III

The three main strands of western moral philosophy are based on

the centrality of virtue, of obligation, and of utility in the ethical evaluation of human action. The centrality of each of these notions is historically determined. Aristotelian emphasis on virtue as the sole criterion of the moral goodness of human action presupposes and is justified in the context of the Greek conceptions of *phronesis* and *eudaimonia*. On the other hand the Kantian emphasis on the categorical imperative and J.S. Mill's on the principle of utility as the criterion of moral goodness of human action presupposes and is justified in the context of post-Renaissance 'modern' western forms of life. Usually these three, i.e. virtue-ethics, ethics of obligation and the utilitarian ethics are conceived as radically opposed to each other. This opposition, argues Binod Kumar Agarwala, appears to be real since one ignores the Platonic-Kantian distinction between historical knowledge and rational knowledge. With the historical knowledge one is left with the multiplicity of views but the unity of Greek morality or of modern morality or of both is available only if one has rational knowledge. With this distinction in mind, Agarwala in his *Transformation of Phronesis of Greek Ethics into Supreme Principle of Morality* undertakes a hermeneutic investigation of the first chapter of Kant's *Ground work of Metaphysics of Morals*. Agarwala clarifies that the transformation is not change "however far reaching it may be." Transformation is 'inversion-perversion' (*a la* Hegel) of the being itself. The transformation of the Greek ethics into modern morality is "nothing but literally inversion-perversion" of the Greek world. *The Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals*, to quote Gadamer, 'represents a reversal of the traditional sequence of legitimization.' Agarwala attempts to explain not only why and how but also what kind of inversion-perversion is taking place in the Kantian text. As part of the story, let it be noted that Kant was writing his critical philosophy at a time when, on the one hand, Greek ethics was still the prevailing conception of morality in the educated circles of Europe, and on the other hand, at a time when the Renaissance conception of the Universe as the causally determined structure had firmly established its hegemony. The need for transformation, of inversion-perversion, of Greek ethics arose in this complex situation.

Given the Aristotelian distinction between 'doing' (i.e. actions which are ends in themselves and are performed for their own sake) and 'making' (i.e. actions whose ends are different from actions themselves and are performed for their sake), *phronesis* (i.e. a man of practical wisdom) is concerned with voluntary action i.e. doing. This form of

voluntary action and the notion of virtue or of virtuous action requires a particular conception of self. For Aristotle, Self is *homo sapien*. For Kant it is the transcendental unity of apperception. This conception of self is fundamentally different from that of Aristotle's. The Kantian self, argues Agarwala, "can admit of only one kind of action, which is understood only as causing an effect, where the effect is the chosen end." The Kantian self, as Agarwala interprets, is, *homo-faber*. The Kantian self therefore, has to operate within the framework of causality and subject-object dualism. In Kantian framework, knowledge is knowledge of causality operating in objects in space and time. It gives power to the self, (the subjective self; the *homo faber*) to manipulate the object by his own will and choice. This empowerment suspends the alleged dichotomy between causality and will in Kantian text. Knowledge of causality is gained through science which is the basis of technology. The self by "its own will manipulates object through technology to give it a desired form to suit his own chosen purpose." This is the only form of action "that can be recognized by the *homo faber*." In other words, an action is nothing else but "exercise of power for production of effect in the external object, which is the chosen goal of action." In this new mode of action the end is distinct from action and it is also its consequence. Kant himself recognizes this new mode of action when he explicitly distinguishes between 'making' (*facere*) and 'acting' or 'operating in general' (*agere*). This distinction roughly corresponds to the distinction between art and nature. Kant takes 'making' (*facere*) as an action done with free will and hence a proper human action. Within the perspective of Kantian subject or self, 'making' alone is recognized as a form of action. Hence, the Greek ethics of *phronesis* has to be completely transformed in terms of this peculiar conception of self and this mode of action that Kant formulates.

IV

It may not be an exaggeration to say that the modern aesthetic theory owes its existence to Kant's third critique, *The Critique of Judgment*. The central notions Kant discusses therein are of imagination and sublime. What exactly does Kant mean by these two and how does he explicate the relationship between the two are the issues that are alive

till date among the Kantian scholars. But the contemporary discussion in aesthetics goes much beyond the basic Kantian text and in fact subjects it to a wide range of interventions. Essays contributed to this volume by Michael McGhee, V. Sanil, Kanchana Mahadevan, Ranjan Ghosh, and Deepa Nag Haksar discuss various aspects of Kant's aesthetic theory and the variety of problems that it gives rise to. Thus, while Deepa Nag Haksar in her *Imagination and the Sublime in Kant's Aesthetics* takes a brief survey of some of the recent discussions on the issue of the nature and the relationship between imagination and sublime, Michael McGhee goes beyond the textual interpretations of these notions and asks whether moral life can have an effect on aesthetic sensibility, keeping in mind the issue of the alleged beneficial effect on moral life of a developed aesthetic sensibility. While Kanchana Mahadevan views Kant's aesthetics as an attempt to overcome the same subject oriented reason implicit in the seemingly opposite autonomy claims of the artist and spectator, Ranjan Ghosh addresses the question: 'What is fine art and what makes such art possible?' in the Kantian framework. Reflecting on this very concept of fine art Sanil V. takes up an interesting issue of the relationship between time and entertainment. Within the context of Kantian aesthetics, Sanil presents the issue by asking: can Cinema propose itself as something new to Kant? All these essays illustrate the inherent richness of the Kantian aesthetic theory. It will not be out of place to dwell upon some of these essays at some length.

In *(Sailing to) Byzantium: the Kantian Sublime* Michael McGhee holds, that given the much ignored Kantian idea that if one is to be moved by the *sublime*, one must already be equipped with moral ideas, the question that can be raised is whether moral life can have an effect on aesthetic sensibility, keeping in mind the issue of the alleged beneficial effect on moral life of a developed aesthetic sensibility. McGhee argues out from the apparent circle? that Kant's notion seems to display that the experience of the *sublime* awakens us to moral ideas and that moral ideas are needed already if we are to experience the *sublime*, as we should, by the explication of the sublime. The Kantian notion that the *sublime* is an occasion for the disclosure or rediscovery of our moral freedom and we are thereby able to regard as small or of no significance those things which otherwise we attach most importance to, our worldly goods, health and our life itself, implies that the experience of the *sublime* leads us to the ordering or reordering of our priorities, and brings into play, the tension between the forces of the soul

and, what is termed by McGhee, as the forces of the flesh.

It is this conflict that McGhee wants to draw our attention to, finding its parallel in the works of the Irish poet, W.B. Yeats, when the poet speaks about the course of the soul's struggle with its own mortal flesh and its desires- the process of 'purification' or 'purging' in his works. McGhee, presents a rich understanding of Kant through the poems of Yeats and the poems of Yeats through the works of Kant.

Arguing against Gadamer's allegation that Kant subjectivizes aesthetic and thereby initiates the neglect of hermeneutics in art and social science, Kanchana Mahadevan in her *Revisiting Kant's Reflective Judgments* tries to highlight that Kant's reflective judgment of beauty is not subjectivist (in the sense of privileging the 'subject') since it emphasizes that reception is a principal feature of aesthetic experience. Mahadevan nonetheless recognizes some affinities between Kant and Gadamer in terms of inter-subjectivity and hermeneutics. Locating such continuities and discontinuities in the selective textual exposition of Kant and Gadamer, Mahadevan then shows that Kant's reflective judgments are "particularly significant in the context of contemporary hierarchical societies governed by substantive traditional and modern laws." Mahadevan claims that Kantian reflective judgments enable us to imagine "communities in an unrestricted and non-hierarchical way."

The concept of humanity plays an important role in Kantian Philosophy, especially in his latter Critiques. However, Kantian formulation of this concept is not free from troubles and there have been numerous criticisms of the way Kant formulates it. Referring to the feminist, African, and the Post-structuralist criticisms that Kant's concept of humanity is exclusive of women and non-European races, Mahadevan attempts to reinterpret Kant's conception of humanity in a way that is sensitive to women and non-European races. Mahadevan's proposed re-interpretation is founded on perspectives that are seemingly divergent but inwardly forming a context for even raising the questions about the nature of reflective judgments. Based on Gadamer's and Arendt's expositions of several aspects of Kant's aesthetic theory, Mahadevan's interpretation at the same time goes beyond it and raises such issues as reflective judgments in pluralistic societies from within the European context. At the same time Mahadevan's interpretation of Kant's reflective judgments exposes Kantian rendering of reflective judgment to our own environs. Drawing from Mahasweta Devi's famous short story

Rudali, Mahadevan seeks to illustrate Kantian version of aesthetic learning as critical enhancement of imagination and understanding. The critical enhancement is, however, not a 'subsumption' of a particular experience under the universal concept. Indeterminacy is not only an essential mark of a work of art and of art experience but is a ground for the feeling of *sensus communis* which can be unrestrictedly shared with others. Gadamer's criticism that in the Kantian rendering this feeling of *sensus communis* becomes indifferent to the ontological status of works of art and that it is even negative in abstracting from all interest is based on his claim that Kant segregates the transcendental subject from truth and morality. Consequently, the aesthetic judgment of an autonomous subject has no relation to either morality or knowledge. But judgment, according to Gadamer, 'has moral overtones of evaluation'. The aesthetic taste is not limited to what is beautiful in nature and art but embraces the whole morality. In contrast to Gadamer, Ardent's reading of Kant stresses upon Kantian anticipation of non-anthropocentric aesthetics that one finds in hermeneutics, structuralism, post-structuralism and critical theory. Kantian distinction between reflective and determinative judgment bears upon the status of the object. Determinative judgment connects subject and object of knowledge by subsuming sensations under concepts. This subsumption hinders subjects from relating to each other. Reflective judgments, not being informative in nature, on the other hand, "free the subject from the immediate existence of objects to imaginatively reflect on them." For Kant, an aesthetic idea cannot become cognition because it is an intuition of the imagination for which an adequate concept can never be found. This being the case, the subject is first confronted with imagination and subsequently searches for an appropriate concept. Aesthetic ideas are thus, "unexpoundable presentations of imagination, involving a free play of cognitive powers, accompanying a presentation by which an object is given." This state of free play is universally communicable since cognition is the only form of determination of the object. Quoting Eva Schaper, Mahadevan notes that, "such a communication is possible because human beings share a "public or critical" common sense or *sensus communis* (Kant) which confronts validity on art (Habermas)." Kant distinguishes between the pleasure of entertainment and disinterested pleasure. The former is a product of an existing object which the subject wants to own; but the latter, as Arendt notes, is "an outcome of universal communication between subjects, being non-personal and public, it is the political art

of human beings dwelling with others."

Kant's separation of epistemology, morality and art has aroused immense reactions. Thus, for Habermas, it leads to 'the growth of expert cultures.' Rectification of the Kantian separation requires a turn to uneven or even the contradictory relations that lay persons and expert critiques have to art. These relations cannot be purely epistemic or universal but are rooted in life historical situations. Mahasweta Devi's *Rudali* (a ritual mourner), argues Mahadevan, is a case in point. Mourning the loss of one's family members is a familiar phenomenon and ordinarily assumed to be a natural response to tragedy. But in a hierarchical, cast ridden and exploitative society, the expression of grief becomes socially determined necessities which are in themselves uneven. Sanichari, the protagonist, a lower cast woman, metamorphoses from landless labourer to a ritual mourner who mourns to earn her daily bread. The story of Sanichari thus demarcates a field of communication in which the complexities of caste, emotion and gender are clearly defined. This delineation reveals that the expression of grief is a socially determined interplay between the leisure seeker landlords, and leisure less poor, making grief into a commodity with exchange value. It also reveals that the caste and class privileges run through the range of customary rituals. In the given context, the tale of Sanichari also illuminates "how the antithetical poles of traditional laws (*dharma*) and modern individual rights polarize the population by setting off a series of exploitative relations." Mahadevan observes that *Rudali* illustrates the Kantian and Gadamerian versions of art as 'play'. For Kant, art is a free play between imagination and understanding. Art is 'play' because, "it dismantles the inexorability of what is given, overcomes the stringency of determinate rules and joyfully transcends individualism." For Gadamer, play is something similar to a game that 'comes to life' with the application of rules. Likewise, the application of universal laws to a concrete situation is 'integral' to judgment. In this respect reflective judgment in the aesthetic and the moral domains converge. This makes one take note of, as does Mahadevan, the Aristotelian notion of *phronesis* or practical judgment and raise the issue of the relevance of *phronesis* or reflective judgment in contemporary societies. This, in turn, involves the issue of defining the very notion of a community and the application of laws. *Rudali*, as Mahadevan notes, exemplifies the deformed contemporary application of both customary and modern laws.

Despite the claim that reflective judgment appeals to imagination and universally communicable feelings that make an aesthetic experience, African and feminist critics, notes Mahadevan, perceive race and gender bias in Kant's conception of humanity which is alleged to be exclusive of non-European races and women. The question therefore is: Does a defense of reflective judgments submit to these exclusions? While acknowledging a number of views Kant expresses on women European race which are clearly biased towards gender and eurocentricism, Mahadevan, nonetheless, pleads for the defense of Kant's reflective judgments. For Mahadevan, "one can consider the possibility of reading Kant's *Critique of Judgment* against his stated intentions of racial and gender exclusions." Thus, one can ask: Is Kant's text on reflective judgments bound by intention and context? Can a work be bound by intention and context? Can a work bound by race/gender exclusions have a constructive role in egalitarian context? Mahadevan notes that the resolution of these questions is to be found in the 20th century philosophy's shift from the subject of thought to language. Interpreters of the text are language users who relate themselves to the text by following their own social conventions, their own contemporary points of view. But Kantian text does present a problem for the 'fusion of horizons' via the act of interpretation. But this is not peculiar to Kant's text, existing conventions of language and society, notes Mahadevan, "contain residues of race, caste and gender oppression. Hence, one cannot appeal to conventional meanings of language while interpreting reflective judgments." A critical reinterpretation of Kant's reflective judgment will involve a translation from subjective thought to language. On the other hand, and in this particular context, notes Mahadevan, "one would also have to explore linguistic excess, which serves as the point of departure for the language of resistance adopted by antiracists and feminists." The notion of 'linguistic excess' is crucial here. Quoting Habermas, Mahadevan notes that language contains communicative excess. Language neither represents the subjective thoughts, nor is it a pool of conventional practices. Both these limits impose passivity on language users. Hence, Habermas draws the distinction between *understanding a text and reaching an understanding about the text*. The latter is a complex process which is unpredictable and unconditional, 'while evaluating the text vide its specific cultural background it simultaneously transcends its 'local agreement' to subversive, ever flexible 'reservoir of potential, disputable reasons.' Kantian reflective

judgment, as a linguistic term is communicative. Being the linguistic expression, Mahadevan argues that 'reflective judgment' goes beyond Kant's intention and context" with an excess of meaning." Mahasweta Devi's *Rudali* Mahadevan conjectures, employ (Kantian) reflective judgment to 'critique the limitations of socially accepted laws in modern and pre-modern India.' Mahasweta Devi's critique in its turn replaces Kant's prejudiced account of humanity by that of the under privileged, lower caste Indian women. Humanity is redefined in Devi's text as heterogeneous and 'marginalized people's attempt to undo privilege'. *Rudali*, thus transgresses Kant's colonial and patriarchal intentions. This transgression is due to the unbounded-ness of language.

In his essay, *Fine Art, Creativity and Kant: Some Philosophical Reflections*, Ranjan Ghosh addresses the question: 'What is fine art and what makes such art possible in the Kantian framework?' In the course of this investigation, the distinctions made by Kant between nature and science and art as standing out distinct from both, is made explicit. The contrast Kant draws between mechanical or industrial art on the one hand and fine art on the other is central to Kant's explication of judgment of taste. Ghosh also addresses the issue of the apparent contradiction when Kant holds both that art does not have any specific or definite end and also it is not yet a mere product of chance. In course of the essay, Ghosh discusses the theme of creativity, the notion of aesthetic satisfaction along with a critical evaluation of the notion of art as a representation of nature in the Kantian framework. Ghosh alludes to Rabindra Nath Tagore's ideas of creativity to complement Kant's notion of creativity.

Taking a lead from Kant's distinction between fine art and judgment of taste, Sanil V in his *Passing Time: Immanuel Kant goes to Cinema* takes up an interesting issue of the relationship between time and entertainment. Within the context of Kantian aesthetics, Sanil presents the issue by asking: can cinema propose itself as something new to Kant? The discourse arising out of Sanil's essay could be termed as philosophy of cinema. But unlike philosophy of science, as Sanil holds, it would not be a meta discourse, 'a philosophy about cinema' since there is no subsumption of practice (*prayoga*) under the alleged theory (*sastra*).

The issue of the relationship between Kant and cinema comes through the Kantian classification of arts. In this classification cinema would not fall within the realm of fine arts, though it might share some of the features of industrial arts or of, in Kantian terminology, 'art of

the agreeable or entertainment.' These kinds of arts, in Kantian scheme of things, have no claim on the judgment of taste since 'agreeable art gives us pleasure from mere sensations whereas in fine art pleasure accompanies the presentation of aesthetic ideas.' Given the implications of this classification, entertainment, as a kind of agreeable art, turns out to be inferior to the fine art. The inferior nature of entertainment and of arts falling under it is due to the fact that they are "attended with no further interest than that of making the time pass by unheeded." This is what entertainment means." It allows time to pass without us noticing its passage, without it affecting us'. Entertainment, thus, is not characterized in terms of taste but in relations to time. For Kant, time is the subject matter of aesthetics but not, as Sanil notes, when it is a theory of the beautiful or art. For Kant time is the subject matter of aesthetics only when it is logic of sensation as explicated in the Transcendental Aesthetics of *Critique of Pure Reason*. But the transcendental aesthetics of the first critique 'gives way' to analytics, but reappears in the third critique under the rubric 'philosophy of the beautiful.' Sanil tries to 'retrieve the sense of aesthetics in the first critique with respect to the challenge of Cinema.' Since entertainment is characterized in terms of time and not taste, to pose the question of cinema amounts to posing the question of time. This, Sanil feels, "opens up the Kantian transcendental aesthetics to the challenge of cinema.

This challenge is seen, on the one hand, in terms of the Kantian definition of entertainment and on the other, in terms of the nature of time itself. Kantian definition of entertainment has two components; time and affect. But surprisingly, entertainment, as per Kantian definition, has no object. That is to say, "entertainment does not give us pleasure in fulfilling our interest in any object." In this respect, entertainment and fine art differ. In entertainment time moves so fast that its passage skips our attention. Therefore, an entertaining activity has to be such that it is neither work, nor leisure, nor a mere "contemplation of the harmonious play of our subjective faculties" as it happens in aesthetic experience. In other words, entertainment means that time passes without the subject in fact noticing that it has passed or is passing.

But what is time? and what is the passage of time? The passage of time consists in the passage of "nows". But if this is so, then one faces a paradox as posed by Aristotle. The paradox shows that the 'nows' cannot follow one another by immediately destroying one another "for

in that case there will be no time at all." Therefore, a now can pass only by being other than itself, or in other words, it can be, only by being another. That is to say, "to pass time, the now has to be itself and another at the same time simultaneously" This is Aristotelian paradox and Kantian resolution of it consists in freeing time from the clutches of the 'movement'. This Sanil notes, is a 'revolutionary intervention' since it amounts to 'change the rules of the game or invent a new game.' Prior to Kant, philosophers have subjected time to movement making the *former* a measure of the *latter*. Kant reverses this and makes movement subordinate to time by turning time from an aporia to a-priori, making it a pure intuition and as a form of the inner sense. Time therefore, is not a thing or an attribute of a thing, rather, it is a pure form of being affected by things, i.e. "time is an empty intuition."

Time is an inner intuition, a form to which the succession of inner states is subjected. Moreover, as Kant holds, the outer experience (in space) is determined by time only as mediated, time does not allow the determination 'I think' to directly bear upon 'I am'. This Kantian denial of Cartesian drawing of 'I am' from 'I think' is based on making states of mind a locus of passing time. In other words, Kant is successful in introducing a gap between thought and being. "I encounter myself only as determined within time, as a phenomenal being and not as I am...The 'I' is assigned to me as if from outside. 'I is the other'. The consequence of the gap between thought and being is that one's subjectivity is not one's own. The gap between thought and being is interiorised and represented as the passive self. Time, thus, becomes the form of the passive self. "Time here is the internal rupture or the torison within the order of representation: Hence, time does not yield to direct representation."

As against the Kantian restriction on time, i.e. time cannot be represented directly, and given the dictum 'no time without affection' the problem Sanil is raising becomes explicit. "How can we entertain ourselves and let time pass while preventing the form of affection from affecting us?" It is against this that we "need to evaluate cinema's claim to represent time directly and to offer us entertainment without affection."

We need to distinguish between philosophers' concern for time and the claims made by the makers of cinema at this point. The makers of cinema claim, as does Tarkovsky, that time is an organizing principle,

the very foundation of cinema. Such and similar claims are not 'disguised philosophical discussions' on time. Such claims are made on the basis of the *making* of cinema. Cinema presents images and not symbols. It is the time of the image (which is not the duration of film or of the events depicted or of the span of the story) that runs through the shot. This is the 'time-thrust' or 'time-pressure' as Tarkovsky calls it. This time pressure or 'time-image' as Deluxe calls it, 'reveals the direct presentation of time in cinema'. As Sanil notes, time enters cinema as a fact, as directly observed. Referring to some great films of our times Sanil shows how does "cinema overcome the invisibility of time and make the time pressure visible." His narratives of Tarkovsky's *Ivan's childhood* and Paradjanov's *The Story of our Forgotten Ancestors* bring out how these films accomplish a direct representation of time as well as what constitutes cinematic image and what is the relationship between time and affect. For Kant as Sanil observes, time is the form of self-affection and affection is determination. Films of Tarkovsky and Paradjanov, argues Sanil, show how cinema breaks this equivocation. This break comes through in letting our affect free from ourselves. In doing so we find ourselves passive in relation to ourselves since in "releasing the affect we realize ourselves not as the owners but as the fragments we find along the trajectory of our own affections."

Kant and cinema confront each other on the issue of the passivity of self i.e. whereas Kant denies us any 'direct access to the sources of' this passive self: cinema explores into this passivity.

V

The presence of Kant and of Kantianism in the intellectual life of the West is too obvious to be mentioned. The three *Critiques* of Kant, have inaugurated a full-fledged discourse in metaphysics (transcendentalism), moral philosophy (ethics of obligation) and aesthetics (reflective judgments as autonomous). But besides these three areas of inquiry, many of Kantian intuitions are present in such diverse fields as philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of law and philosophy of history. The post-modern thinking in its various forms takes Kant more seriously than, perhaps, any other philosopher of modernity. This is partly due to the peculiar conception of human

reason and of human rationality that Kant has proposed. The post-modernist reading of Kant's conception of reason and human rationality is in terms of 'a-priorism' or 'transcendentalism'. It is in this context S. Pannierselvam and R. P. Singh discuss the post-metaphysical or the post-modern reading of Kant as evident in the works of Hegel, Heidegger, Habermas, Adorno, Foucault and Derrida. Both Pannierselvam and Singh focus, with a certain degree of overlap, on the a-priorism or the transcendentalism of Kantian reason. Singh argues that Kant's transcendental approach to human cognitive capabilities culminates into a 'theory of limit' while Pannierselvam shows how Habermas and others have felt the need to 'de-transcendentalize' Kant.

The concept of 'limit' is one of the most fertile concepts in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant uses it in two separate but related contexts. On the one hand, knowledge vis-à-vis faith has to be restricted and on the other hand, given the peculiar distinction that Kant makes between noumenon and phenomenon, it is necessary to restrict phenomenon (i.e. sensible intuition) from being extended to noumenon (i.e. thing in itself). R. P. Singh⁸, in his *Transcendental Philosophy as a Theory of Limit* brings it to our notice the Kantian employment of the concept of limit and argues that the basis for it is Kant's a-priorism. Apart from the general statements wherein Kant uses the term 'limit', the specific employment of it is in Kant's Transcendental Deduction of concepts wherein Kant is discussing the Infinite judgment under the *Quality* of the Table of Judgments. Infinite judgments, in contradistinction to affirmative and negative judgments are those in whose case the concepts of 'reality' and 'negation' can not be applied. This is illustrated in terms of such judgments like 'Hydrogen gas is not green' which means (i) Hydrogen gas has a colour other than green or (ii) it has no colour at all. Another type of judgment which exemplifies the notion of limit is disjunctive judgment like "the earth exists either through the inner necessity or through external cause or through a blind chance". These disjunctions mutually exclude each other but jointly they somehow give us complete knowledge. The modern logicians who reject many a presuppositions of the traditional Aristotelian logic will have great problems into Kant's table of judgments. But the point R. P. Singh is making is more general. Singh argues that to understand the Kantian conception of 'limit', one needs to examine Kant's separation between noumenon and phenomenon on the basis of a threefold distinction between 'reason', 'understanding', and 'sensibility'. As understanding

unifies perceptions with the categories, it requires higher unity—the unity of reason to form a connected system. This unity is supplied by the ideas of reason, namely, freedom of will, immortality of soul, and the existence of God. For Kant the ideas of reason are regulative than constitutive. Now, given the conception of knowledge as synthetic a-priori, it has a 'limit', i.e. it is limited to the phenomenal world and can not penetrate into the noumenal world, i.e. into the ideas of reason. Thus, the conception of limit as an epistemic category serves to maintain the distinction, as rigorously as possible, between the two realms, i.e. the noumenal and the phenomenal. Kant's theory is a theory of limit in this sense.

As a number of Kant scholars have argued, Kant's entire project was aimed at providing a justification to Newtonian conception of the world. Hence on the one hand, there has to be a limit to the skepticism of the empiricists and the extravagance of the rationalists on the natural employment of reason to secure the foundations for science. But on the other hand, the synthetic a-priori knowledge which provides the needed justification to science must also be subjected to a further limit in order to preserve the autonomy of the realms of morality and aesthetics. Kantian conception of 'limit', thus, has these two aspects.

In the Transcendental Dialectic, therefore, Kant enforces a 'limitation' on human reason in the form of antinomies which the human reason can neither comprehend nor reject. Realization of this fact is the ground for the self-critique of reason itself. The self-reflectivity of reason reflects upon the conditions of its own employment. But more importantly, the 'limit-riddled constitution of pure reason necessitates the emergence not only of practical reason for moral pursuits but also of judgment for aesthetic experience'. Kant's three *Critiques*, argues Singh, illustrate three instances of the theory of limit. The *First Critique* shows how pure reason can self-reflexively come to grasp the possibility, validity, and limit of synthetic a-priori judgment. The *Second Critique* shows how the practical reason can self-reflexively arrive at the autonomous free will in the maxims of universality, end-in-itself and kingdom of ends. The *Third Critique* shows how the judgment of taste can discern what is beautiful and sublime.

The limit-riddled constitution of human reason and its Kantian resolution remains an issue for the post-Kantian philosophers. Two points concerning this issue, namely, the dualism of noumenon and phenomenon

and the unknowability of the noumenon provide the basis for criticism and reconstruction of Kant's theory. For Fichte and Schelling the concept of pure-ego as self-reflectedness would overcome the problems of Kantian theory of limit. Hegel, in order to overcome the Kantian theory of limit proposes that "all reality is at least potentially and in principle accessible to cognition. No part of it is in principle unknowable forever and necessarily walled off from cognition in Kantian fashion behind the veil of appearances". Following the dialectical method Hegel argues for the dialectical unity between rationality and reality. The post-modern reactions to Kant's theory of limit, following those of Hegel and Marx have been various, both in form and content. They can all be described under the rubric 'crisis of philosophy'. The 'crisis' is symptomatic of the failure of the older models of defining, appropriating and recognizing the objects of artistic, philosophical, literary, social and scientific languages. Both Singh and Pannierselvam converge on this point.

Continuing R. P. Singh's presentation of the post-modernist critique of Kant's transcendentalism as offered by Foucault and Derrida, Pannierselvam in his *De-Transcendentalization of Kant* argues that the Kantian conception of reason turns into, (or at least provides a ground for such a turn) 'a new and powerful force of domination'. The point at issue is the failure of 'instrumental reason'. Pannierselvam discusses the points of similarity and difference between the Kantian and the Heideggerian understanding of the concept of transcendental philosophy. For Kant, transcendental philosophy is a critique of human knowledge, i.e. what human knowledge can and cannot reveal. For Heidegger, transcendental philosophy concerns the ontology of Dasein. Despite this difference, Pannierselvam also notes the Kantian influence on Heidegger in the formulation of the very problem of transcendence. For Kant it is 'how is knowledge possible?' for Heidegger it is 'How is it possible to understand entities as entities?' Kant takes the knowing subject as different from the objective world whereas Heidegger, following the hermeneutic method, unfolds the 'ontology of Dasein'. Pannierselvam's presentation of the Kantian and the Heideggerian accounts of the issue of transcendentalism makes the reader aware that why the transcendental subject, i.e. Dasein, cannot be subjected to the restriction imposed by the modernist dualism of subject and object which Kant was expounding. In the recent times, Habermas, by expounding the theory of communicative action which stresses the concept of communicative rationality has attempted a further transformation of Kantian

transcendental subject or consciousness in terms of language and intersubjectivity. A similar transformation that is introduced by Foucault is also a point of departure from Kant's transcendentalism. For Foucault the relationship between knowledge, autonomy, and political action does not presume the transcendental implications of pure reason as they are presupposed by Kant. For Foucault each person is viewed as the subject of knowledge and the self is always situated within the control of social, economic and political institutions. As Pannerselvam notes, for Foucault, possibility of enlightenment is not connected with a-priori necessity inscribed in and with practical reason. These transformations virtually amount to what Pannerselvam calls, 'de-transcendentalization' of Kantian reason with a view to make it more relevant and applicable in the post-metaphysical thinking.

VI

Kant's political philosophy is yet another area of interest for Kantian scholars. It offers a mix of different themes, e.g. Kant's conception of right, conception of punishment, and conception of freedom. William Sweet in his *Kant, Rights, and the General Will* notes that interest in Kant's political thought has recently turned more thoroughgoing and is in fact experiencing a 'renaissance'. The three chief reasons for this significant change in the studies in Kant's political philosophy are (a) the concern of contemporary political thought in 'social contract' theory, (b) that Kant's political thought offers an alternative to individualism and collectivism and (c) that Kant provides a transitional link between Rousseau and Hegel. A substantial part of the contemporary political philosophy as developed by Rawls, Nozick and others can be situated on the grounds provided by these three factors. Of the three, William Sweet takes up for discussion Kant's account of rights as formulated in his *Metaphysics of Morals*. Sweet believes that Kant's account of rights 'reflects both a robust theory of individual (human) rights and, at the same time, recognition of the importance of political community'. The specific question Sweet address is: Is a Kantian account that recognizes the fundamental importance of human freedom and the necessity of life in the state a viable liberal alternative to Locke? This question falls back upon the Lockean account of rights as natural or innate. As against this,

Kant's account of rights incorporates both the aspects that characterize rights, i.e. the legal and the moral. For Kant the source of the innate rights-in their twin aspects-is human person herself. However, there is no uniformity on the issue of the nature of personhood as such. For some, personhood is moral personhood (in the Kantian sense of autonomous moral agent operating within the limits of reason), for others, personhood consists in the power of being able to choose or exercise will which is the basis of right. Kant's supplement to the notion of the source of right is that it requires the reciprocity of exercise of will, so the source of right involves a relation to others as well.

What does Kant mean by 'will' when he considers the legitimacy of the state and law? Within the scholastic tradition it is the rational faculty of the immaterial soul. But for Kant, 'will in the context of the state and rights, is not merely one's free choice (i.e. *die Willkür*) or an individual will (i.e. *der Wille*) but also a general will'. *Die Willkür* is 'will' as it is understood in the ordinary language. It indicates the choices, decisions, etc. of the subject and it reflects subject's desire to act in a particular manner. *Der Wille* is the faculty of desire not associated with any action but in relation to the ground determining will to action. *Der Wille* is the determining ground of will to action but it itself has no determining ground. On the other hand a general will is the 'United will of the people'. This will serves as a means by which, 'each decides the same for all and all decide the same for each'. In other words, it is the legislative authority in the state. Sweet observes that this notion of will is very much Rousseauvian in its content. But for Kant the general will is essential to rights at least in three ways. These are (a) as far as an account of property and the obligation to respect it, (b) as far as the nature and legitimacy of the state that secures rights is concerned, and (c) as far as the legal and moral character of the rights is concerned. Sweet notes, that to these three ways, in which the general will is held to be necessary for the existence of rights, we should add the fourth, namely, that the general will is necessary for freedom. Sweet argues that the general will takes freedom to mean 'freedom of choice or the spontaneous self-activity of persons' and reconstitute it as a freedom that has the moral as well as legal 'weight' through a process of rational recognition and through law as a set of principles of a-priori practical reason'. The issue that might arise at the introduction of general will is whether it will not diminish freedom. But for Kant this is not so. What is historically interesting to note are the differences between Kant's

and Rousseau's accounts of general will. Kant's account of the general will does not presuppose a common good. Kant's approach 'does not entail identifying self-interest with the interest of the collective'. Similarly, Kant's conception of a general will is not to be read as the 'will of all'. It is interesting to note that Hegel, while rejecting Rousseau's account of general will, does recognize Kant's account of general will under similar terms like 'the absolute will' or 'the substantial will'.

Kant's account of the general will faces certain criticisms. For instance, there can not be a general will without there being something that the general will wills. Similarly, the role of general will in Kant's 'republican theory' leads Kant to set 'too high a standard for active participation for there to be any genuine democracy'. But despite these difficulties, Sweet concludes, that Kant's account offers 'a robust theory of human rights'. It involves a conception of practical reason and law so as to avoid the paradox of 'permitting a right to do wrong'. Kant offers a clear theory which explicates the role of law and political authority that gives a 'more plausible description of the relation of rights to the state, and how the state is both conditioned by, and yet contributes to, the existence of rights'.

As Kant's moral and political writings have been subjected to various criticisms some of his minor texts have also engaged scholars' attention on various views Kant expresses in these texts. Two such texts, i.e. *The Observations on the feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic point of view*, have been referred to by Deepti Gangavane in her *Kant on Femininity*. She presents a textual reading of these texts, though briefly, and tries to highlight the inconsistency between Kant's moral theory and his views about women as expounded in these texts. According to her, the distinction that Kant makes between women as the 'fair sex' which is known by the mark of the beautiful and men as the 'noble sex' which is known by the mark of the sublime, itself becomes questionable from the feminist perspective. Likewise, the distinction drawn by Kant between active and passive citizens, argues Gangavane, when juxtaposed with his notion of 'equality of all human beings *qua* human beings', seems problematic in terms of coherence and consistency, as Kant places women in the category of passive citizens. Gangavane highlights that if the ideal of moral autonomy at the personal level and that of the public use of reason and

a just constitution at the political level is to be retained; changes are called for in the Kantian framework to bridge the alleged gap between Kant's moral theory and his practical philosophy.

VII

Since no particular theme was assigned to the contributors, the structure of this volume that has evolved is largely a result of the varied interests and inclinations of its contributors towards Kant. We hope these essays would stimulate our readers in ways more than one. We would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance received by Mr. Carsten Voigt in making us available the photographs of Kant's bust at the former Cathedral of Königsberg, now Kaliningrad, Germany. We also appreciate Mr. Varada Rajan N. of Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur and A. Anupama from Victoria, Canada, for volunteering to supplement this volume by a comprehensive bibliography and Mr. Pravesh Jung Golay, a research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy for assisting in the editorial tasks. We acknowledge the partial financial assistance from Poona Philosophy Union towards the production of this special Number.