ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

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In 'A' I give an original proof of St. Anselm'a argument for the existence of God based on a new law of deduction.[1] In 'B' I give an explanation for premiss 7 of the proof, and in 'C' I give an explanation for premiss 8. In 'D' I show the validity of the new law of deduction on which the final conclusion is based (A9). (Key:*= necessarily, #= possibly, ~ = negation, v = disjunction, & = conjunction, > = conditional) In 'E' I answer some objections that have been levelled against the proof in the past.

A :

1. The perfect being cannot have a begining or ending in time for then it would not determine what comes before it in time and what comes after it in time. (Ontological truth)

2. Since the perfect being would then exist eternally (be an eternal substance) it would neither ever come into being nor ever cease to be. (1)

3. The contradictory of the contingently existent (~*p or #p) is the contingently non-existent (~*~ p or #~p), while the contradictory of the necessarily existent (*p) is the necessarily non-existent (*~p). (Onto-logical truth)

4. Therefore neither its existence is contingent nor is its non-existence contingent. (2,3)

5. Therefore necessarily (if the perfect being exists then necessarily it exists) or necessarily (if the perfect being does not exist the necessarily

it does not exist). (4) (The conditional 'If-then' refers to the possibility of the argument not the contigency of its being or not being)

6.   Necessarily the perfect being exists or necessarily the perfect being does not exist. (*p v*~p)(5)

7.   The idea of a perfect being is self-consistent. (B)

8.   Therefore necessarily it is the case that necessarily it is not the case that necessarily there isn't the perfect being. (*[* ~*~ p])(7),(C)

9.   Therefore necessarily the perfect being exists. (*p)(6,8)

B :

Only an omnipotent power can necessarily exist. For only an omnipotent power connot lack any logically possible power, i.e. that which is not self-contradictory, including that of self-existence. (To be unable to perform the self-contradictory is no lack of power).

Now the idea of more than one omnipotent power is self-contradictory. For suppose there are two such powers. In that case since for either to be omnipotent the other must be within its power, either is subject to the power of the other and so neither is omnipotent. Therefore the idea of one omnipotent power is self consistent (not self-contradictory)[2]

The very impossibility of more than one omnipotent power proves the self-consistency of the perfect being. For it is the only one that has the power to order itself in a wholly self- consistent manner because it has the greatest powers of reasoning and of ordering attributes.

An omnipotent power is one which has the power to realize all that is logically possible i.e. that which is not self-contradictory. But possessing every logically possible power or being all-powerful means that the power to know all that it is logically possible to know (omniscience or all-knowing) and the power to love all that it is logically possible to love (omnilove or all-loving) would be two of the powers it possesses. For they are simply two out of all the powers it possesses. The latter two powers are logically derivable from the power or omnipotence. Omnipotence, omniscience and omnilove are then three necessarily individuating attributes, among possibly an infinite number, which are consistent with each other. Consequently the

idea of a perfect being is self-consistent.

Since logically there can be only one omnipotent power possessing all powers the power of greatest good and greatest evil belong to the same omnipotent power. Both are held consistently by the same power in a perfect unit since being omnipotent it has the power to unify all things in the highest degree. Consequently logically there is no problem of evil.

Note for the proof all that is required is that of all the possible conceptions of God one is self-consistent.

C :

It should also be noted that everything self-contradictory is necessarily non-existent. (Ontological truth) But idea of a perfect being being self-consistent is not self-contradictory, and so the perfect being is not necessarily non-existent.

Since either necessarily it exists or necessarily it does not exist and since the idea is not self-contradictory and this implies that it does not necessarily not exist, it necessarily exits. But then since the idea that it is not self-contradictory implies that the only alternative is that it necessarily exists, its very possibility implies its existence. The very idea of God then implies its existence. For God existence is a perfection. To conceive of God and to conceive of it as not existing, seems self-contradictory.

It should be noted that all necessary truths are not logical truths. That everything that is material has spatio-temporal properties is a necessary truth but not a logical truth. It is then not necessary to conceive of God's necessary existence as a logical truth.

D :

1. The above proof is based on the modal version of the following new law of deduction, based on the law of excluded middle, which consists in the elimination of one of the disjuncts :

$$\{(p \lor {}^{\sim}p) \ \& \ {}^{\sim\sim}P\} > P$$

$$\{({}^*p \lor {}^{*\sim}p) \ \& \ [{}^*({}^{*\sim*\sim}p)]\} > {}^*p$$

2. The truth table validity is as follows :

p	~p		$\{(p \lor {\sim} p) \ \& \ ({\sim}{\sim} p)\}$	>	p
T	F		T	T	T	T T
F	T		T	F	F	T F

3. It should be noted that *~ p and ~* p are not identical modal logical operators. The latter implies # p while the former does not, the former implies ~#p. So ~*~ p implies # p not * p while *~*~ P implies p whereas *(*~*~p)implies *p.~#~p implies #p, not *p

E :

1. The idea that a proposition is self-referingly true, confirmed when its very denial presupposes its truth by being used in the very denial, implies that its very idea implies its necessary truth. This is the ontological argument for necessary truths.

It may be applicable to the argument for the necessary existence of God. If its very idea implies its existence, its very denial may be self-refuting.

2. Kant's two famous objections can be answered.

One is that while it is not possible to think away the idea of the necessary properties of a conceived object it is possible to think away the object itself. The necessary properties of God may not be thought away in the conception of God but the object God can be thought away. First of all this ignores the distinction between universal and particular. A particular triangle may be thought away, rubbed off the blackboard as it wear, but the universal triangle which is one and not many cannot be thought away. Similarly particular gods may be thought away but the universal God cannot be thought away. Finite existents may be thought away but the universal Being of which all finite existents are instances cannot be thought away. And Kant's objection assumes that necessity cannot reign over particulars.

The other is that existence is not an attribute. But consider the following. A possible individual can be conceived in this manner. A

particular sperm and a particular ovum can be imagined to be fertilizable and the possible embryological process develop into an individual. Such an individual remains a possibility. When fertilized and developed it acquires existence. Existence then is an attribute which something may possess or not possess. The difference is that with the perfect being it is an inseparable attribute since such a being necessarily exists and can never lack the attribute, unlike contingent beings.

NOTES

1. For the Indian version of the ontological argument see S.Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, London, George, Allen and Unwin, 1940, p. 369.
2. The formulation here differs from that of A. Plantinga and R. Swinburne in that it neither argues for the self-consistency of God from the reduction ad absurdum, that more than one omnipotent power is self-contradictory. Nor do they utilize the law of deduction that I do, Infact none of the premissess formulated here are to be found in them.
   I have not used quantifiers since firstly they gloss over the distinction between the indefinite and definite article; secondly, they gloss over the distinction between properties held universally but contingently on the one hand and properties held universally and necessarily on the other, and thirdly, the point is glossed over that necessity may reign over either universals or particulars.

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