

ROLE OF PSYCHOSIS (VṚTTI) IN ADVAITA PSYCHOLOGY OF PERCEPTION

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I

The Advaitins maintain that for the production of perceptual cognition, *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* or psychosis plays the central role. In such cognition, what happens is that *antaḥkaraṇa* or the mind goes out to the object of cognition and assumes its form. The *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* states with the help of a beautiful illustration : When the water of a tank (*taḍāga*) goes out through leakage and enters a tub (*kedāra*) through a channel in the form of that (channel), it assumes the form of that tub, a quadrangular or the like, in the same manner, the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*), being the nature of light (*taijasa*) goes out through the sense of sight etc., and reaches the location of the contents like jar, and is modified in the form of those like jar. This modification of the internal organ is called *vṛtti*¹. To explain. When the water remains in the tank, it remains there in the form of that (tank), when the water enters a tub through some channel, it assumes the form of that (tub). The water is modified into the form of the tub. In like manner, when the light-product *antaḥkaraṇa* remains in the body, it has the form of the (body), but when any part of the *antaḥkaraṇa* goes to the location of the contents, like jar, in the form of long rays through the sense-gates, then that part of the internal organ of the body gets the form of the contents, like jar, as some piece of the metal used to melt gets the shape of the pot for melting (*muṣā*). This transformation of the internal organ or *antaḥkaraṇa* into the shape of the object in concern is the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti*.

Now perceptual cognition, the immediate apprehension is of two types - external and internal. In the cases of internal perception like the cognition of pleasure, suffering etc. *antaḥkaraṇa* or the mind need not go out, but has to assume the form of the particular case of pleasure or pain. In the external perception, like the cognition of a jar, the mind must go out and assume the form of the object in concern. This is based on the Advaita principle of one undivided consciousness. Cognition, according to the Advaita, is nothing but the one and undivided pure consciousness. For the sake of cognition, the *pramāṇa-caitanya* (consciousness limited by the adjunct of *vṛtti*) and *viśaya-caitanya* (consciousness limited by the adjunct of object-content) must be localised in the *pramāṇī-caitanya* (consciousness limited by the adjunct of mind). In the case of internal cognition, this localisation (localisation in the same place) i.e., the localisation of both the *vṛtti-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya* in the *pramāṇī-caitanya*, is a simple and natural case. But in the case of external perception, this localisation is made possible through the mind's going out to the object and assuming its form. When there arises the relation between the *vṛtti-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya*, then both of them are found to be localised in the *pramāṇī-caitanya* or the *antaḥkaraṇa* that limits the Pure Consciousness to make possible the existence of individual self (*jīva*).

In the case of internal cognition, like 'I am happy' or 'I am unhappy', happiness or unhappiness, the limiting adjuncts of consciousness (*viśaya-caitanya*) and the mental modification of such happiness or unhappiness, which is also the limiting adjunct of the same (consciousness) occur simultaneously and remain always in the same *antaḥkaraṇa*. As the limiting adjuncts (*Upādhi*) are always in the same location, there would always arise the non-difference (*abheda*) of the consciousness limited by both the types of adjuncts. As the consciousness distinguished (*avacchinna*) by the *vṛtti* of the form of happiness and the consciousness distinguished by the happiness or unhappiness in concern, are always non-different, so one's own happiness or unhappiness, the internal objects and their cognitions will simply and always directly be cognised. These cognitions are designated as *sāksibhāṣya* revealed by the eternal witnessing-self, not *jīvabhāṣya*, not revealed by the *jīva*, the consciousness limited either by the *antaḥkaraṇa* (view of the Bhāmatī School) or by the *avidyā* (view of

the Vivaraṇa School.) We cannot say, however, about the internal objects that they are sometimes cognised directly, sometimes indirectly, as we say about the external objects.

Thus we find that there does not arise any problem of the mind's outgoing to the object, although it does take the form of that in the case of internal cognition which is always immediate. In the case of mediate cognition, like inference also this problem does not arise. But in respect of the immediate cognition of the external objects, the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) must have to go out to the objects in concern and assume their shape. In such cases, the role of *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* is centered in two specific points, viz., the mind's going out to the object and its assuming the form of the same.

In the Advaita texts, sometimes it is said that the *antaḥkaraṇa* or its part goes out to assume the form of the object of cognition and sometimes it is said that the *vṛtti* does so. This implies the question : Where does the *vṛtti* or modification of *antaḥkaraṇa* arise? Does it arise in the mind, or in the external world of objects? This question is not a problem to the Advaita, who is in favour of one undivided principle of Consciousness (*caitanya*). One principle of Consciousness reigns in the knowledge-situation consisting of the three factors- *pramāṇa-caitanya* (*vṛtyavacchinna caitanya*), *pramāṇa-caitanya* (*antaḥkaraṇavacchinna caitanya*) and *viśaya-caitanya* (*viśayavacchinna caitanya*). Of the two types of perceptual cognition-*jñānagata pratyakṣa* (perceptuality as present in the cognition) and *viśayagata pratyakṣa* (perceptuality as present in the object-content), the first one is the non-difference between the *pramāṇa-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya*² and the second is the non-difference between the *pramāṇa-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya*³. One non-different consciousness is the substratum of *antaḥkaraṇa* (*pramāṇa*), *vṛtti* (*pramāṇa*) and the content (*viśaya*). This Consciousness becomes limited by the three substrata in their cases. The point is that these are metaphysically so close that whether the *antaḥkaraṇa* or the *vṛtti* does go out to assume the object-form and where does the modification arise - whether in the mind or in the locus of the object are no questions at all. For a pointed understanding, it may be thought that in the case of a perceptual cognition, the part of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is divided by the object of cognition, this part

is the state of mind, modified by the shape of the object. This modified state (*vṛtti*) removes the veil of ignorance from the object in concern. And in this way, the part of *antaḥkaraṇa*, not the whole, or the *vṛtti* comes out to be related with the object and becomes as it (the object) is.

Another type of question has been raised by some critic.⁴ That the Vedantic doctrine of perception seems to fit in well only with the perception of a particular kind i.e., visual ones. In fact, in all the texts, it has been stated that *antaḥkaraṇa* goes out through the eye-channel only. But Madhusudana, the author of *Advaitasiddhi* strictly observes that 'there is no restriction that antahkarana should come out only through the eye and not through the other organs - *sarvatra tat-tad-indriyādisthānasyaivadvārata-rata-sambhāṭ* (*Advaitasiddhi*). In the case of pleasure, pain etc. there is no question of *antaḥkaraṇa* going out, because in their case there is no veil to be lifted and the locus is the same'.⁵

II

Now let us try to explain the problem of mind's going out first and secondly, its assuming the form of the object of cognition.

Mind, the *antaḥkaraṇa*, according to the Advaita, has parts and is the product of matter. This does not imply the so-called materialism. Rather, it resembles to the view of some New Realists like Russell, according to whom, matter and mind are different arrangements of some same neutral stuff. Both matter and mind may be said to be produced out of the same neutral stuff, where the characteristics of both of these are not present - i.e, which is neither mind nor matter. Russell, in his '*Analysis of mind*' is not interested in enquiring any metaphysical reality as the material ground of the world of mind and matter, because to him, we cannot reach at the neutral stuff as existent. He has tried to explain this world from the point of view of this neutral stuff with the help of his epistemological theory of atomic facts. **But in the Advaita**, the source (*adhithāna*) of both the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and matter (*viśaya*) is Brahman- the principle of one non-different pure Consciousness. And in this sense, mind is the product of matter. This is the **metaphysical** standpoint of the Advaita. In its theory

of creation, *antaḥkaraṇa* has been said to be produced out of the five material elements (*pancabhūta*) in all of which the *Sattva-guṇa* predominates.

However, there is really no difference between mind and matter in reality or as it is the product of matter, its movement or going out in space has been granted in the Advaita. Mind or *antaḥkaraṇa* goes out to the object, like a jar of the external world. In the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, it is said that when the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* in the form of a content like the jar goes out to be related to the object, jar, then *pramāṭṛ-caitanya*, the *pramāṇa-caitanya* and the *viśaya-caitanya* become one and non-different. The difference of the consciousness is destroyed, because of the fact that the limiting adjuncts (*antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* and object content) are placed in the same locus. In this way, when the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya*, and the *viśaya-caitanya* (consciousness limited by the object-content, jar) become one, then the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya (antaḥkaraṇa)* stands as the substratum of the object, jar, like the consciousness limited by the jar (*ghatadyavacchinnacaitanya*). At that time, there remains no other reality of the jar than the reality of the *pramātā* viz., the consciousness limited by the *antaḥkaraṇa* and the jar becomes an object of immediate cognition.⁶

Thinkers like T.M.P. Mahadevan, P. K. Sundaram and D.M. Datta opine that the outgoing of *antaḥkaraṇa* as the *vṛtti* is actual, not metaphorical. These thinkers, perhaps, have gained the support from the author of *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*. The *Paribhāṣākāra* clearly states that '*tathā cayam ghata ityadi-pratyakṣasthale ghatādestadākāra-vṛtteśca vahirekatra deśe samā-vadhanat*' etc.⁷ The word 'vahirekatra' is to be noted here. But K. C. Bhattacharya says in his '*Studies in Vedantism*', "Ultimately no doubt, Vedānta will hold that the body is phenomenal, this space is also phenomenal, and this 'going out' of the mind is also only illusory"⁸

These two view-points in regard to the mind's going out, in fact, based on the Advaita distinction between the empirical reality (*vyāvahārika sattvā*) and the Absolute Reality (*pārmāthika sattā*). the *pārmāthika* point of view, all these viz., *antaḥkaraṇa*, *vṛtti* and object-content are illusory. So we may understand that the mind actually moves towards the object of cognition existing in the external world.

But, then, where does the *vṛtti* remain? In reply to the question, we may quote the words of D. M. Datta : "When we perceive an external object, our attention is directed not to the physiological changes caused by the object within the organism, but to the object itself, outside in space. And in fixing attention on an object mind comes into direct contact with it" Here we may emphasise on the word 'attention'. Attention, it may be thought, is what the Advaitin calls *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*, function of the mind. This attention, in fact, goes out through the sense-organ to its object in the production of the cognition of that. This attention as the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* is nothing but a relation between the mind and the object - the relation, which is made possible through the one undivided principle of consciousness. This consciousness pervades the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*), its modification (*vṛtti*) and the object-content (*viśaya*). So the question, in connection with the *vṛtti* remaining either in the locus of *antaḥkaraṇa* or in that of the object may be ignored.

The Advaita shows its peculiarity by declaring the activity of mind's going out. It does not hold the accepted view that the objects of external world, first, stimulate the senseorgans, then the mind receives the impression of the objects through these organs. The Advaitins grant the sense-object contact in perception, but according to them, neither the senses nor the objects have any distinguished role. The role completely belongs to the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. This is taken as the general view of the Advaita system. But if we look into the view of Sureśvara, the direct disciple of Śaṅkara, in this connection, we find that the Advaita Vedānta seems not to disregard the accepted view of perception. To quote from an analysis of the theory of perception according to Sureśvara as made by V. P. Upadhyāya in his '*Lights on Vedānta*' : "It is not certain whether the outgoing of the mind to the object (which is admitted by the Vivaraṇa School in clear words) is approved by Sureśvara as well. In accordance with his one verse (*Bṛhadaranyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika*-Pune Publication, pp. 1827-28), if literally interpreted, it will have to be concluded that he is in favour of object transmitting its mould and it is this transmission of a distinct mould through the sense-organ by an object and consequent establishment of a direct contact between the mind and a particular object, which accounts for the immediacy of the perception as distinguishable from other kinds of

indirect cognitions".¹⁰ Thus Sureśvara thinks that the object transmits its mould or form through the senses to the mind, and then the mind has a contact with the form of the object and as such becomes modified into the said form (vṛtti).

In the light of the above exposition, we may understand the notion of 'the going out' of mind or its vṛtti in this way. It is obviously said in the Advaita texts that the vṛtti, a modified part of the *antaḥkaraṇa* goes out, not the whole of mind-apparatus. Then by 'the going out', it is better to understand, is the formation of a part of mind through modification in the shape of the object of cognition. Mind or the *antaḥkaraṇa* is *taijasa*, produced of lightmaterial also it is predominated by the *sattva-guṇa* and so transparent (*svaccha*). But this is not all of vṛttijñāna. Behind it there is *Sāksī-caitanya* (Jīvasākṣī) and behind this *Sāksī-caitanya* there is the Cosmic Consciousness (Īsvara-Sākṣī). This Cosmic Consciousness is Brahman, the Absolute Reality-Consciousness and to the Advaita Vedānta School of thought, the energy-source of the Jīva-Sākṣī. "The vṛttijñāna.", as Prof. Hiriyanna puts, "draws its breath and substance from it, and the whole complex of empirical or finite knowledge would be no-where without the light of this Absolute or Infinite Consciousness".¹¹ The three entities (Īsvara-sākṣī), Jīva-sākṣī and *antaḥkaraṇa* are very close to each other. The Jīvasākṣī may be compared with a tank of consciousness, by which, according to the Advaita, objects of the world as a whole, known or unknown, are manifested. In the case of the immediate cognition of an object, when the appearance of it creates attention, the *antaḥkaraṇa* is modified into the so-called vṛtti by the Witnessing-self (*Sāksī-caitanya*), which is the store of all objects - cognised or non-cognised and at that very moment, the arisen vṛtti coincides with the approaching object through the respective sense-organ. This coincidence, though thought to be the result of the going out of mind, may itself be designated as the said 'going out'. It may so be designated only to make distinction of a particular vṛtti of the *antaḥkaraṇa* and nothing more. And all this is happened instantly. So 'the going out' is just the coincidence between the vṛtti and the object-content. As the sense-object contact is indispensable in the case of immediate cognition like perception, so the going out of the mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti*) has been recognised. In fact, whatever stimuli would come from the

object to the sense, without the attentive state of mind, the sense-object contact would not be possible. Again if there arises any sense-contact with the object without the participation of mind, the contact would certainly be fruitless. The active participation of mind, like its going out in perception, distinguishes it (perception) from the mediate cognitions, like inference, memory etc. and also from immediate internal cognitions. The sense-organs conjoined with the *antaḥkaraṇa* are in contact with the objects, so the *vṛtti* has to go out, or we may say, it thus coincides with the form of the object. In that case, the consciousness limited by the object (*viśayāvachinna caitanya*) becomes one and the same. And as all this consciousness is that one consciousness, by which energised the witnessing-self (Sāksī) is existent in us, we have the immediate cognition of the something.

III

Let us now come to the other issue. In the Advaita texts, it is said that the *antaḥkaraṇa* or its *vṛtti* not only goes out to the object, but also assumes its form. The Paribhāṣakāra has put, we may remember, as the water of a tank assumes the form a tub after passing through a channel, so also the *antaḥkaraṇa*, going out through the sense-channel, assumes the form of the object of cognition.

The form-assuming of *antaḥkaraṇa* is not a figment of imagination. It is capable of being recognised from our own experience. Suppose, I perceive a jar before me with the visual organ. In course of the perceiving, I may close up my eyes and so far my attention continues, I may have an image in the form of the jar in my mental world. Or if the object be left out of the scene any way at that time, still I may be possessed with an image of that object particularly in the mental state. This image may be regarded as the *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* that possesses the form of the object in concern and this image is nothing but the impression left by the total form of the object. Here we are certainly reminded of the philosophical principle that *saṃskāra* (impression) produces *vṛtti* (mode) and vice versa. Now when either for the closure of eyes or for anyhow removal of the object from the vicinity of the sense, we have the image of the object, then that image is of the past object as it is no more in the sense-contact. The question is : How

can we possess the image of a past object?

There must be some inner principle to record the form of the object, when it was presented to the sense-organ. D.M. Datta observes, "Antaḥkaraṇa would then be identical with this principle. From all this it will appear that the Vedāntic theory that in the perception of an object the antaḥkaraṇa takes the form of the object, is not at all unreasonable."¹²

Secondly, according to the Advaita, the form of an object necessarily includes its primary qualities like size, shape etc. and also the secondary qualities like colour, taste, smell etc. There is no absolute difference of these qualities from the object - substance. The forms of the qualities are the forms of their substrata. So like the form of an object, the form of a quality or of an action may also arise in case of exclusively their (of quality or action) perception. The Advaita strictly upholds that the cognition of quality etc. (*dharma*) is not possible without the cognition of the substance (*dharmi*). To ascertain the immediacy in perceptuality the Advaitins do not recognise that the qualities are only sensed by the organs, not the substance, like some western realists; or they do not believe in the Humean conception that there is no substance over and above the qualities. According to the Advaita thinkers, the object as a total form is assumed by the mind through the sense-organ. It resembles to the view of common-sense realism of the West. Infact, the Advaita view of perception may be called to be solely based on the experience of common people. The point is that the form-assuming principle of the Advaita theory of cognition dissolves the complex problem of immediate cognition in regard to the question, whether the object of perception is immediately given, or given through the medium of its sensed qualities.

Thirdly, we may refer to the *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Sṛuti* in which it has been said that antaḥkaraṇa may assume the form of the object-substance and quality. The *bhāṣya* speaks of the form of quality assumed by the mind.¹³ But it factually implies the form of substance also. It tells the fact of our images or impressions, in this connection, as we have explained. The portion in our concern may be stated from the translation by Svami Nikhilānanda : "The mind transformed into colour. The idea is that since one remembers colours which lie in the form of impression -

through the mind for their support.”¹⁴

Thus the mind's assuming the object-form is not at all baseless.

IV

Another important issue in connection with the role of *vṛtti* may be noted. When I have the perceptual cognition of a jar, I have it through a *vṛtti*. I have also such apprehension as ‘I perceive the jar? This is, of course, a latter cognition. The question is : is this latter cognition due to another *vṛtti*? The Naiyayikas speak of two cognitions - *Vyāvasāya* (primary cognition) and *anuvyavasaya* (after-cognition). But the Advaitins do not recognise a fresh *vṛtti* like this after-cognition. Because of the fact that if we admit a new *vṛtti* for the cognition of primary one, then for cognition of that new *vṛtti* (say, second *vṛtti*), another *vṛtti* (say, a third *vṛtti*) would be demanded, and this another *vṛtti* would require of another *vṛtti* (say, a fourth). Thus it would lead to infinite regress. So the *vṛtti* is not an object of another *vṛtti*. According to the Advaita, the *vṛtti*, as initially being a mode of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is itself all for its objecthood. It is by nature an object of itself.¹⁵ Of course, the capacity of the self-uses (*svavyavahara-jnanayogyatva*) of the *vṛtti* does not imply its objecthood (*karmatva*). Since in that case, the same *vṛtti* would both be the functioning (*kriyā*) and the object (*karma*) leading to contradiction. When there arises the *vṛtti* in the form of an object in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, then that *vṛtti* will have that for its object-content. In this way, the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* would be limited by the *vṛtti* having itself for its content and when that limited consciousness (*vṛtityupahita-caitanya*) be the locus of the *vṛtti* then the reality of that *vṛtti* and that of the *pramāṭṛ-caitanya* would be non-different. Thus the *vṛtti* as cognition may have itself too for its content. There is no necessity of another new *vṛtti* after-cognition or *antaḥkaraṇa*. In fact, the *antaḥkaraṇa* of the Naiyayika also has itself for its object-content (*svaviśayaka*), it does not require of a latter cognition, although as S.S. Suryanarayana Śāstrī points out, “When they (the Naiyayikas) infer that all cognition is a quality, that inferential cognition is taken to apply to itself (*anu-vyāvasaya*) as well.”¹⁵ The point is : if *anuvyāvasaya* be a quality, it would also need a substratum of which it is the object. But the Naiyayikas stop at the *anu-vyāvasaya*. The Advaitin has not recognised the another

vṛtti like anuvyāvasaya, for the revelation of the initial vṛtti because it has explained its theory of cognition on the principle of non-difference (*abheda*) between the subject (*pramāṭṛcaitanya*) and the object (*viśaya-caitanya*).

V

Philosophers like the Naiyāyika and others do not recognise the necessity of *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* in knowledge situation. Only in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Advaita Vedānta, the necessity of vṛtti has been realised. Thinkers of these systems maintain that the sense-object contact is a necessary condition for direct cognition, but it is not all for this. Function of mind or the psychosis (vṛtti) is an essential factor not only in the case of direct cognition, but also in the case of indirect cognitions like *anumiti*, *upamiti* etc. In the direct cognition of external objects, the vṛtti goes forth to the object. In cognition of internal objects and in indirect cognitions it does not go out, because of the fact that there is no possibility of its outgoing in these cases. The outgoing of vṛtti the Advaitins hold, is necessary for the realisation of distinctness of perceptual objects, removal of the concealment of the objects, and finally for the manifestation of identity between the subject consciousness and the object-consciousness.

Although, like the Naiyāyikas, a section of the champions of extreme Advaitism contends that there is no necessity of vṛtti for the manifestation of identity between the subject and the object, since there is naturally a direct relation between them as both are consciousness,¹⁶ the general view of the Advaita is in favour of accepting the necessity of vṛtti in the cognition of objects. Broadly speaking, there are found three views in connection with the necessity of vṛtti: (1) The vṛtti is necessary for the removal of the veil of ignorance (*āvaraṇābhavārthā*); (2) it is necessary for the establishment of relation between the subject-consciousness (*Jñācaitanya*) and the object (*Sambadhārthā*); (3) it is necessary for the manifestation of identity (*abhedābhivyaktārthā*) between the two appearances of one Consciousness i.e. between the subject and the object.

The difference of the views is not so clear-cut as each may be ascribed to a particular school of Advaita Vedānta or to a particular Advaita thinker. In the Advaita works like *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, *Vedānta-Siddhāntasūktimañjarī* etc., none of the views has been stated as clearly

associated with any school of Vedānta or any Vedāntin. The author of the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* seems to hold that the first two views are of the Vivaraṇa school, since according to this school of thought, the Jīva is consciousness reflected through or limited by *avidyā* and the third one is of the Bhāmatī school, since according to this school, the Jīva is consciousness limited by *antaḥkaraṇa*.¹⁷ The author of the *Vedānta-Siddhānta sūktimañjarī* has taken great pains to analyse each of the views from different points of view including those of the Vivaraṇa and the Bhāmatī.¹⁸ V. P. Upadhyāya in his doctoral dissertation, '*Lights on Vedānta*' mentions that the first view is connected with the Bhāmatī School, the second, with the Vivaraṇa and the third, with the school of Śureśvara.¹⁹ In spite of this controversy it appears from the different Advaita treatises that the function of *vṛtti* to remove the veil of ignorance has commonly been accepted by all the Advaitins. An attempt will be intended here to dive deep into and to appraise of these theories of the necessity of *vṛtti*.

VI

The first theory is this : *Vṛtti* is necessary for the removal of veil (*āvaraṇābhibhavārthā*); or it may be said that it is necessary for breaking the concealing power of *avidyā* (ignorance). But if it does mean the destruction of the concealing power (*āvaraṇa-śakti*) of ignorance, then in the case of cognition even of a pot the power would be destroyed and the cogniser in concern would be emancipated from the bondage of ignorance.

So according to some Advaitins, the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* destroys the ignorance spreading over the consciousness by part - it removes that part of ignorance which conceals only the object in relation to which some *vṛtti* has been formed. It is stated that as a part of darkness is removed by a glow-worm, or as a part of mat is seen to be rolled up, or as a cowardly soldier suddenly retreats, so a certain part of ignorance is destroyed by the *vṛtti* or cognition relating to an object. But such comparison is not sound. A part of darkness being removed may again come into existence, whereas ignorance, once destroyed completely cannot come back again. The object, then, once brought out of the veil would continue to be known for ever. It is not also something corporeal that may be rolled up; it is not a substance with moving power, so that it would retreat.

To demolish this barrage, some Advaitins argue that the removal of the veil of ignorance is possible partially only with reference to some particular object-defined consciousness (*viṣayā-vacchhinna caitanya*) which becomes connected with some particular *vṛtti*. Vimuktātman, the author of *Iṣṭasiddhi* opines that the primal ignorance (*mulāvidyā*) is not set aside by the *vṛtti* but its off-shoots—some homogeneous individual ignorances (*tulāvidyā*) about each object are removed by it. These individual ignorances envelope the common object-defined consciousness and they are individually destroyed by each of the different *vṛtti* in respect of that object each time. For this reason when the veil or obscuration of an individual ignorance is once removed by a *vṛtti* the object again would be enveloped by other homogeneous individual ignorance in respect of the same object. The difficulty of the objects' ever-cognising would not arise.

But is it possible that the first perception of the pot e.g., will destroy only a single individual ignorance without dispelling all the individual ignorances obscuring the consciousness in respect of the pot? *vṛtti* or cognition has no such a restrictive feature as it would dispel only one ignorance, not others. Moreover, how can we perceive the object, until and unless all the ignorances are totally destroyed?

In this position, some Advaitins think that one ignorance veils the object-defined consciousness, others are kept in abeyance. The *vṛtti* or psychosis is in a position to remove the veil of that only one ignorance. As soon as the *vṛtti* ceases to exist, another ignorance creeps in and encroaches the object defined consciousness.

Dissatisfied with this explanation some hold that ignorances cannot remain in abeyance, by nature each of them must be present in the location of the object. "So they maintain that only one is dispelled at a time and others are simply scared away for the time being. Just as in a place, where many people are assembled together, the thunder, perchance suddenly falling down on someone, scatters away the rest of them, or the medicine, specifically curative of the complex disease, called '*sannipāta*', while chiefly affecting and remedying only one prominent trouble or complaint (constituent of the disease) cures or drives away all other accompanying troubles or complaints as well, similarly the psychosis (or the so-called

cognition by virtue of being the reflections of consciousness) while casting off or dispelling once for ever only one ignorance, scares away and thus over-powers the remaining homogeneous individual ignorances also so long as it lingers. Thus when there is an absolute removal of one ignorance only through psychosis, there is dispersion and subjugation or neutralisation of other accompanying homogenous ignorance as well by the same."²⁰

Now, although the advaitins do not recognise the difference of psychosis or cognition in a continuous stream of cognition of single object (*dhārāvāhika-jñāna*),²¹ as there is neither cause, nor necessity, nor even cognition of the origin and cessation of different psychosis or cognitions in respect of a single object, yet they think that the cognition arising at each moment of the *dhārāvāhika-jñāna* is *pramā* or right cognition. So if the removal of only one ignorance and the neutralisation of other accompanying ignorances through the psychosis are held simultaneously, then as Dr. V.P. Upādhyāya observes in the case of *dhārāvāhika-jñāna* the second and other subsequent *vṛttis* or cognitions would stand futile, because the entire obscuration from the object-defined consciousness has been set a side. "So some Advaitins maintain that just as when one light goes out, the darkness subjugated by it, sets in again, similarly at the time of juncture, when the first psychosis will go out and the subsequent one will step in, the ignorance, only subjugated by the first psychosis and let loose by its obscuration upon the object-defines consciousness."²²

In this connection, we may refer to the view of Ānandapurṇa Vidyāsāgara, the author of the *Nyāyachandrikā*. He strictly maintains that the removal of a particular ignorance and neutralisation of other veiling ignorances do not occur simultaneously. When one psychosis arises, it removes the ignorance acting at that point of time and brings about the manifestation of the object. It does not neutralise other ignorances expected to appear and envelope the object at subsequent points of time.²³ Ignorances are the modes of the primary ignorance and so possessed of temporary or momentary obscuring capacities. This can explain that the *vṛttijñāna* of all the moments of a continuous stream of cognition of one and the same object is not futile.

According to some, the ignorance, destroyed by the first *vṛtti* merely

obscures the pure existence (sattā) of the object, say, pot, other ignorances which are removed by the second, third and the subsequent vṛttis, obscure the pot as conditioned by time, space etc.²⁴

However, if the necessity of psychosis lies in the fact of dispelling the obscuration of ignorance, then one question may be raised : With which the ignorance (avidyā) is really connected? Is it connected with the object (*viṣaya*) or with the subject (*jīva*)? According to a section of the Vivaraṇa School, the ignorance with reference to the object is presented in two ways-one is connected with object, another is, with the subject. Ignorance lying in the object causes the projection of new external objects through psychosis, ignorance abiding in the subject is proved from our experience - "I do not know this". The followers of Bhāmatī hold that the ignorance does not exist in the object, it abides only in the subject and naturally obscures the object. It is associated with the subject like a veil. The psychosis removes the veil and makes the projection of external objects possible.

Some followers of the Vivaraṇa maintain that the ignorance does really be in the object - it, like a piece of cloth veils the object. While interpreting very intelligibly the necessity of dispelling obscuration of ignorance by vṛtti (*āvaraṇābhībhavārthā*), the author of the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* has favoured this view.²⁵ He asserts that the *jīva* is all pervading consciousness qualified per accidens by avidyā. According to this theory of self, both the *jīva* and avidyā are pervasive. So the avidyā or ignorance also lies in the objects, e.g., the jar etc. like the *jīva*-consciousness. As there is no locational difference between the consciousness defined by jar etc. and avidyā the qualifying adjunct of *jīva*-consciousness, so the consciousness defined by jar etc. and the *jīva*-consciousness have become one and identical. If both of the consciousness be thus one and non-different, then like the consciousness defined by jar etc. the *jīva*-consciousness would also be connected with the jar etc. And then these objects would be manifested constantly. But the jar etc. are not ever manifesting. So some recognise a conditional ignorance (*avasthā-ajñāna*) that obscures the consciousness as defined by jar etc. and is dependent on the primal ignorance (*mūlāvidyā*). This conditional ignorance is a dependent mode of the primal ignorance and is called *avasthā*.²⁶ On account of this, there would not be constant manifestation of the jar etc., since only the unveiled consciousness

makes such manifestation possible. And if the consciousness defined by jar etc. would be veiled by the primary ignorance, there would never be the manifestation of jar etc. in the worldly life of bondage. Again, if the obscuration made by the mode of ignorance were permanent, there would never be the manifestation of jar etc. possible, instead of the sense contact with them. So its removal is to be granted. The removal is not caused by the Witnessing Consciousness (*Sākṣī-caitanya*) since this consciousness manifests the modal ignorance (*avasthā-ajñāna*), product of the primal ignorance (*mūlāvidyā* or *mulājñāna*) and so cannot remove it. The *Sākṣī-caitanya* cannot remove the obscuration, in as much as such a removal would happen even in a case of mediate cognition. This removal is actually caused by *vṛtti* or the psychosis. The author of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has nicely established this Advaita position that the *vṛtti* removes the veil of modal ignorance lying in the object-defined consciousness.

VII

The second theory is this : The *vṛtti* or psychosis is necessary for the establishment of relation between the subject consciousness and the object-consciousness (*sambandhārthā*). Those who maintain that the *jīva* is all-pervading consciousness reflected on or associated with *avidyā*, hold that this relation is a conjunction produced by another conjunction (*saṃyogaja-saṃyoga*). As the relation between a tree and river is established by the relation between the wave and the river, so the relation between the *jīva* (subject) and object requires of a relation between the object and the *vṛtti* and between the *vṛtti* and the *jīva*.²⁷

A very comprehensive and argumentative explanation of this theory has been given in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. Dharmarāja in his *Paribhāṣā* interpretes this theory on the line of those, according to whom *jīva* is conditioned by *avidyā* and all pervasive. Although this all-pervasive *jīva* is related to all the objects of cognition like jar etc. even in the absence of the *vṛtti* yet, the jar etc. are not always manifested. Since it is the *vṛtti* with the respective form that makes a relation between subject-consciousness and object-consciousness. And this particular type of relation is the relation of manifested and manifestor (*vyāṅgyavyañjakabhāva*); it is a temporary relation and is always conditioned by the *vṛtti* with the form of an object in

concern. The all-pervasive relation of *jñā* to the objects is not of the nature of manifested and manifestor. As Pandit P. Bhattāchārya Śāstri has explained,²⁸ the all pervasive *jñā* has relation to the whole of a village, but the movement of the *jñā* in the village gives rise to a particular type of relation to the village, in like manner, the *jñā* comes to be related to the objects in the relation of manifested-manifestor through *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* the act of knowing.

Antaḥkaraṇa is the product of the five great elements (*pañcabhūta*) in which light is the pre-dominating factor. So it is called luminous (*taijasamantaḥ-karaṇam*). It is a pure substance (*svaccha*) and by nature capable of manifesting the *jñā* consciousness. But the jar etc. are impure substances; they cannot manifest the consciousness underlying themselves. At the rise of the *vṛtti* with the forms of the respective objects like the jar etc., the inertness of these (jar etc.) are overpowered by them (the *vṛttis*) and the capacity to manifest consciousness is being generated in those contents of cognition. *Antaḥkaraṇa*, the internal organ, thus, manifests consciousness immediately after the rise of *vṛtti*.²⁹ Experience reveals that even an impure substance in conjunction with a pure substance acquires the capacity to take on a reflection. For example, the wall etc. obtain the capacity of taking on the reflection of face, when these are in conjunction with water etc.³⁰ That really is meant by the manifesting capacity of the impure substances, like jar etc. is the taking reflection of that consciousness (*pratibimbatvam*). The *vṛtti* goes out in the case of immediate cognition of *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* with the fire etc. in the case of mediate cognition (e.g. the reference of fire from the perception of smoke), there is no such manifestation of consciousness and there is never found the character of immediacy. The immediate cognition of objects is, thus, based on their manifesting capacity, and this capacity is generated by the *vṛtti* established relation between the subject and the object.

We may mention in this connection that some Advaita thinkers who explain *jñā* as consciousness limited by the internal organ, hold that "as the individual soul is not all pervading, the relation consists in the establishment of an identity between the *jñā* consciousness connected with the functions (*vṛtti*) and the Brahma-consciousness as the basis of

the objects".³¹

VIII

The third theory of the necessity of *vṛtti* is that it makes the manifestation of nondifference (*abhedābhi vyaktyā*) between the *jñā* consciousness and the Brahma consciousness conditioned in the cognition-situation. The advocates of this theory hold that the *jñā* or mind-defined consciousness cannot cognise the jar etc. Without the proper manifestation of non-difference between the *jñā* consciousness and the consciousness defined by the jar etc., since no relation does either exist between the manifestable jar etc. and the *jñā* consciousness or between the *jñā* consciousness and the Brahma-consciousness, the substrate of jar etc. The point is that in the absence of an identity between the comprehender and the comprehensible the comprehension does not ensue. So the author of *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* rightly points out that in order to give plain indication of the non-difference between the *jñā* and Brahma-consciousness, the substrate of jar etc., the theory of *antaḥkāraṇavṛtti* with the form of content of cognition has been introduced in the Advaita scheme of Śaṅkara.³² Though the limiting adjuncts of the *pramāṅga-caitanya* (*jñā*-consciousness) and the *viśaya-caitanya* (consciousness defined by the objects like jar etc.) are different—the former has the internal organ and the latter, the jar, no difficulty does arise in establishing the non-difference between *pramāṅga-caitanya* and *viśaya-caitanya*, in as much as both the limiting adjuncts—the internal organ and the object in concern rest on the same locus.³³

Sureśvara, a protagonist of this theory of the manifestation of non-difference makes an attempt to define *jñā* as an appearance of Pure Consciousness in *buddhi* (internal organ), the modification of *avidyā*. Following the foot-prints of the Great Sureśvara, Dr. V.P. Upādhyāya has given a precise expression of this view. "In any case," Dr. Upādhyāya writes, "the psychosis is held to be indispensably necessary for establishing and manifesting an identity between the *jñā* the Incidence or Appearance of Consciousness, cast and settled into the internal organ and the Incidence or Appearance of Consciousness, permeating the object as its inmost reality".³⁴

Thus it appears from our rapid survey that the theories of the

necessity of *vṛtti* chiefly differ in regard to the treatment of the advaita concepts of the *jīva*. According to some, the *jīva* is all-pervasive and unveiled, they maintain that the *vṛtti* is necessary for the removal of obscuration of the object. To some, the *jīva* is all pervasive and veiled, for them the utility of *vṛtti* lies in the establishment of the relation between the subject and the object. Those, who think that the *jīva* is limited, hold that *vṛtti* brings about the manifestation of non-difference of the subject and the object. Keeping aside this subtle difference, we may unhesitatingly point out that in the case of immediate cognition, the *vṛtti* is essential in the Advaita Scheme for all the three purposes. It removes the obscuration of ignorance on the object-defined consciousness, links up the *jīva* with the object and consequently results the manifestation of non-difference of the object-defined consciousness and the *jīva* consciousness. Though Śaṅkara in his commentary to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad³⁵ does not recognise the necessity of psychosis (*vṛtti*) in the case of direct cognition, subsequently, the exponents of Śaṅkara's School, however, have taken up the issue more seriously and expended substantial energy in introducing the concept of *vṛtti* in the process of all cognitions and placing thereby the Advaita psychology of cognition on a solid foundation.

NOTES

1. tatra yatha tadāgodakam cchidrānirgatya kulyātmanā kedārān praviśya tadvadeva catuṣkoṇādyakaram bhavati. Tathā taijasamantahkaraṇamapi caksurādi dvārā nirgatya ghatadi viśaya-deśam gatva ghatadi-visayakarena parinamated sa eva parinamo vṛttyuccate. - *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, ed. by Panchanana Bhattacharya, pp 30-31
2. Pramāṇa - caitanyasya viśayavacchinna-caitanyabheda- *ibid.* P. 28
3. ghatādervisayasya pratyakṣam tu pramatrabhinnatvam *ibid.* p. 48
4. D. G. Londhe in Proceedings of the third Indian Philosophical Congress, 1927, P. 157 mentioned in the foot-notes, *Advaita Epistemology*, P. K. Sundaram, P. 33
5. *ibid.*, pp 33-34
6. viśaya-caitanyanca purvokta-prakarena pramāṭṛ caitanyanameveti pramāṭṛ

- caitanyasyaiva ghatadya-dhistanataya pramāṭṛ sattaiva ghatadi-satta nanyeti siddham ghatāderaparokṣatvam-*Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, P. 50
7. *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Pp. 32-33.
 8. K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. I, P. 72
 9. D. M. Datta, *The Six Ways of Knowing*, P. 65.
 10. *Lights on Vedānta*, Pp. 166-167
 11. M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, P. 360
 12. S. M. Sutta : *The Six Ways of Knowing*, P.71
 13. rupakaren hi hrdayani parinatam, Yasmat hrdayena hi rupāni sarvo loko janati, *Bṛhadaranyakopaniṣd- Śāṅkarabhāṣya* - 3, 9, 20
 14. *The Upaniṣads*, A Third Selection, P. 243
 15. anavasthabhiya vṛtti-gocara-vṛtṭyanangī-karcna tatra svākāra-vṛtṭyupahitvatva-ghatitokta-lakṣaṇa bhāvabāditiced, na, anavasthābhiyā vṛtṭer-vṛtṭyantara-visayatveopisvarisayatvābhyupagamena svavisaya-vṛtṭyupahita-pramāṭṛcaitanya-bhinna sattvakatvasya tatrāpi sambhavāt.-*Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, Pp 55-56
 16. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, Notes, Pp. 178-179
 17. naiyāyikatkecidviśayatvamsvabhāvataḥ-*Vedānta-Siddhānta-sūktimañjarī*, by Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī-Verse 65
 18. I. avidyopahita caitanyasya jīvatvapakṣe-*Vedānta-Paribhāṣā*, P. 301
I. tatrāpi avidyopadhikoaparichinno jīvaḥ-*ibid*, P. 303.
III. antaḥkaraṇopādhika jīvaḥ-*ibid*, P 307
 19. See introduction to Gaṅgādharendra's *Vedānta-Siddhānta-sūktimañjarī*, by N. C. Vedāntatīrtha.
 20. *Lights on Vedānta* - P. 12
 21. *Lights on Vedānta* Pp. 151-152
 22. Kiñca dhārvāḥjīkabuddhisthale na jñānabhedah - *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, edited by Panchanan Bhattacharya, P. 12.
 23. *Lights on Vedānta* P.152
 24. Paryāyena vṛtṭirnyāyacaṅdrikākṛd bhiriyitā/arthisya mohairbodhane

- svakālāvaranākṣathih. *Vedānta-Siddhānta-sūktimañjarī*, verse 82
25. Kecidāhur ghatājñānam ādyajñānena hanyate/dvītiyadaistu kālādiviśīṣṭajñānabodhanam. *ibid* verse 83
26. tasyacāvaranasya sadātanatve kadācidapi ghatādibhānam nasāyd-
Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, edited by Pañchānana Bhattācārya, P. 302
27. ghatādyā vacchīna-cai tanyāvarakājñānam mulāvidyā-paratantrama
vasthāvocyamabhyapagantavyam *ibid*. Pp. 301-302
28. taraṅgatarusamsparaśān nadisparśam tarāviva / viṣaye vṛttisamsargāj-
jivasaṅgam pare viduḥ- *Vedānta-Siddhānta-sūktimañjarī*, verse 66
29. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, edited by Pañchānana Bhattācārya, Vivṛti, P. 304
30. taduktamvivarāṇe “antaḥkaraṇam hi svasmīniva
svasamsarginyāpighatādaucāitany ābhi-vyaktiyogyatamāpādayati”-
Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, edited by Pañchānana Bhattācārya, P. 305
31. dṛṣtamcāsvacchadravasyāpīsvacchasambadha-daśāyām pratibimba-
grāhitvam, yatha kuḍyader Jalādi samyoga-daśāyām mukhadi-
pratibimbagrahita *ibid*. P. 305
32. See introduction to *Vedānta-Siddhānta-sūktimañjarī*, edited by N. C.
Vedāntatīrtha-explanation of verse 67
33. tathāca jīvasyā ghatādyadhi ṣṭhāna-brahmacāitanyā bhedaṁ antareṇa
ghatādyā vabhāśāsambhave prāpte tade vabhāśā ya ghatādyadhi ṣṭhāna-
brahmacāitanyā bheda- siddhyartham ghatādyākara vṛttir iṣyate -
Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, edited by Pañchānana Bhattācārya, P. 307.
34. vṛttir bahirdeś anirgamaṅgī-kāreṇa vṛttyantaḥ - karaṇavi ṣayāṅam
ekadeśas tha tvenopadheya - bhedaḥbhavasyo - ktatvāt-*ibid*, Pp. 307-308
35. V. P. Upadyaya; *Lights on Vedānta*, P. 167

Also,.... “Simultaneously with the rise of a psychosis in respect of a particular object, there ensues through that psychosis, connected with the subject or the *jīva*, on the one hand and with the object, on the other and an identification of the two appearances of consciousness, pervading the subject and the object of knowledge. Thus all the three-subject-Appearance of Consciousness, the object-Appearance of Consciousness and the Appearance of Consciousness pervading the particular process-constitute one unit (ekalolobhāvāpanna) for the time being and the

cognition arising under these conditions is called perception."- *Lights on Vedānta*, P. 168

36. Vijñānasya vyatiriktagrāhyate karaṇāntarā-peṅṣāyāmana-vastheti cenna. niyamabhāvāt... yatra vastvantareṇatṛhyate vastvantaram tatra grāhaka-vyatiriktaṃ karaṇāntaram syāditi naikāntena niyantum śakyate.- Śāṃkarabhāṣya on Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 4.3.7

N. K. Devarāja exposes this position : "That the mediation of the *vṛtti* is essential for direct knowledge is not accepted by Śāṃkara. According to him, the *vṛtti* Jñāna itself is illumined or apprehended by pure cit without the intervention of another *vṛtti* or some other instrumental cause". - *An Introduction to Śāṃkara's Theory of Knowledge*, Pp. 106-107.