

## A LOGICAL ILLUMINATION OF SYĀDVĀDA

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

Hemachandra in his *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* has forwarded some arguments in favour of justifying *Syādvāda* and *Anekāntavāda* and refuted the view of the opponents. Our effort is to give a critical exposition of the position of Hemachandra on this score.

### I

Let us concentrate on the arguments given by the opponents as put forth by Hemachandra in connection with the refutation of the tenability of *Syādvāda*. It is the contention of the Jaina-logicians that the substance and mode are somehow identical and different both, but not absolutely different and absolutely identical. The opponents are of the view that such standpoint is not at all admissible due to having the defects like contradiction etc., of the following type.

First, just as an entity cannot be both blue and not blue in the same locus, both the affirmative and negative assertion in the same object cannot coexist, as they are opposite to each other.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, if an object is both identical and different, an object becomes identical in respect of one aspect and different in another. From this, it will follow that there will be another locus of difference and another locus of identity leading to the non-integrity of the locus (i.e., as locus will not remain as one).<sup>2</sup>

Thirdly, the object is identical in some aspect and also different in some aspect. These aspects are also to be taken again as endowed with identity in some aspect and different in some aspect. Otherwise, every

thing would come under the influence of *ekāntavāda* (absolutism) but not *anekāntavāda* and there would arise the defect of *Infinite Regress* (*anavasthā*). That is, the locus of the identity and difference has to be taken as a bifurcated one due to having both identity and difference which must have another locus endowed with the same identity and difference and in this way *infinite regress*.<sup>3</sup>

Fourthly, an object is identical with reference to some aspect which is also endowed with both identity and difference. Again the object is different with reference to some aspect which is also endowed with both identity and difference. On account of having such opposite characters an object is to be taken as a mixed entity (*sankara*) not capable of being described with a particular name, definition etc. Because an object having definite shape, size etc. would be capable of being described. If something is having a mixed character, it becomes indescribable due to having no definite character,<sup>4</sup> but in our everyday life we describe and define an object.

Fifthly, the aspect which is associated with identity will have difference also and in the same way the aspect which is associated with difference must have identity also. That is, the same aspect will be associated with identity and difference. From this there would arise the possibility of exchange of functions and attributes of one with another due to having the same character, which is not possible.

Sixthly, an entity being endowed with identity and difference cannot be ascertained as having a particular character which would lead to doubt due to having two conflicting alternatives.<sup>6</sup> This doubt leads to the non-ascertainment of an entity and lastly this non-ascertainment leads us to the non-determination of the individual status of an object.<sup>7</sup> If an object is not ascertained at all, it cannot be utilised in our daily life to fulfil our purpose-oriented actions.

These are the arguments by which the opponents have proved the futility of the *Syādvāda* and *anekāntavāda*.

## II

Hemachandra came forward to refute the above-mentioned arguments and justified the Jaina-position. He argues that the problem of

contradiction as mentioned by the opponents is not at all a contradiction in the true sense of the term in an object already apprehended. An object is to be taken as opposite to another when in presence of an object the another is not known as existing. If the object is perceived clearly, how does there arise the question of contradiction? If there is the cognition of both blue and non-blue in particular locus, there is no contradiction as per the definition already cited. The Buddhists also do not accept contradiction between blue and non-blue cognised in a variegated canvas. If there is the realisation of the apparent diverse opposite characteristics like 'mobile and immobile', 'red and non-red', 'covered and non-covered' in a pot etc, there is no scope for the possibility of contradiction in the sense already mentioned.<sup>8</sup> In the light of the same reason the problem of the disintegrity of locus (*vaiyadhikaranyadoṣa*) does not arise. In other words, if an object is identical with the locus in some form and different from the locus in some other form, there would arise the disintegrity of locus due to the difference, which is not correct. As said earlier an object may have both the properties the red and non-red etc. From this it does not prove that there is contradiction, because in presence of one (i.e., redness) another property (non-redness) is perceived in the same object. In other words, when redness is found, non-redness is also found as in the case of *citra-varṇa*. Hence, there is no question of disintegrity of locus as the object is the same.<sup>9</sup>

It has been stated earlier that an object is identical in some aspect and also different in some aspect. These aspects are to be taken as endowed with identity in some aspect and difference in some aspect, which leads to the defect of *infinite regress*. This view is also not tenable because the non-absolutist believes that in a real entity there is the synthesis of substance (*dravya*) and mode (*paryāya*). Difference is not other than this substance and mode, because the term *bheda* or difference denotes these two. When it is said that something is identical with substance, it is to be known that substance itself constitutes the identity, but nothing else. If something is said to be different, it indicates both substance and mode alone, nothing else. Hence it suggests that the real is one and many.<sup>10</sup>

If an object is identical in some aspect which is endowed with both identity and difference and if an object is different from something in some aspect which is endowed with both identity and difference, it would be

taken as a mixed entity not capable of being described with name etc. This defect of *samkara* does not arise at all, because it is already pointed out that in a cognition of the multiform colour and in the synthesis of universal and particular, in all existent objects there is no confusion inspite of having manifold varieties capable of being described. If it is said that in the above-mentioned instances problem is not there as it is solved by the direct experience of the data, it would go to the Jaina's favour. Because the Jainas also agree that the perception of something gives rise to the cognition that reality is manifold.<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, no doubt can be entertained in a matter which is already ascertained. Because, doubt is a kind of cognition which touches both the conflicting alternatives (*ubhayakoṭika*). Such type of doubt is absolutely not possible in an object the cognition of which is already ascertained without any conflicting alternatives. If it is said that the knowledge of an object which is known is not possible, it will lead us to the world of contradiction. If knowledge is established, it is to be assumed that there is no lack of knowledge. Hence, the concept of reality as the synthesis of substance and mode is not inconsistent with our experience leading to the substantiation of *anekāntavāda* or *Syādvāda*.<sup>12</sup> Though an object has got different modes, it cannot be described as a dubious one (*sandigdha*.) Because it is clearly known to us having diverse modes. The cognition does not touch both the alternatives like 'either snake or rope' or 'either pillar or a trunk of a tree (*sthānurvā puruṣo vā*) etc., but it has got definite character (*nirṇaya*) of diverse nature like an object having existence, non-existence, indescribable character etc.

### III

It is rightly pointed out by the opponents that, if an object has got manifold characters, it would develop a mixed character capable of not being described. In response to this some supplementary arguments may be developed in favour of the Jaina-thinkers. If it is said that an object having fixed (but not mixed) character is capable of being known and described, it would never be described. Because, it is very difficult to know all the definite or fixed characters of an object. Rather it is not possible for us to know all the hidden definite characteristics of an object. Some

characteristics are known and some unknown or indescribable. A man is not an omniscient being and hence he has got some limitations according to which he can have limited knowledge. For this reason the fixed character which is called *ekānta* is not at all possible for the Jains as they believe that each and every object is fundamentally *anekānta* i.e., having diverse characters. Though an object is endowed with diverse characters yet it is capable of being known and described in diverse ways. When we keep looking towards an object, we become acquainted with its various aspects of it. To know an object means to know its substance and various modes, which are capable of being described. Hence, it is not true that a mixed entity cannot be described just as we can easily describe the various colours in the rainbow.

The Jaina view of *anekāntavāda* may be established through the insertion of relation according to the Nāiyayikas. It depends on the different modes (*bhāṅgī*) of looking towards a particular fact. When it is said - 'The mountain possesses fire' (*parvato vahnimān*), the existence of fire on the mountain is asserted through relation called contact (*saṁyoga*). The same fire does not exist on the mountain through relation called inherence (*samavāya*). It is the relation through which an object is apprehended as existing as well as non-existing in certain locus, which proves the essence of *syādvāda*.

Though all Aryans and non-aryans reside in India at present, they may be described as existing in England also through a particular mode of looking which is through relation called *svasamrādadhikṛtarājyatva* (i.e. the property of being a kingdom occupied by a king ruling individuals of a particular state) The individuals in India are to be taken by the term *sva*. The king of them is the former king of Indian like Edward VIIth etc. The region conquered by him is England in which the kingdom of this type remains. Hence this existence is through the indirect relation called *svasamrādadhikṛtarājyatva*.<sup>13</sup>

Someone may say that he *is* in the room and *is not* in the room simultaneously. If it is left in this way, it would be contradictory like  $p \sim p$ . But the apparent contradiction may be removed if this positive and negative factors are shown to be correct through some specific mode. One may

say that one is in the room through the relation of contact (*saṁyoga*) and not in the room through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Though a woman is unmarried, she may be described as having a son (*putravati*) through insertion of a relation called *prāgabhāvavattva* (by virtue of being a locus of the prior-absence of a son). Though she is not married and no son, it amounts to saying that there is the *prāgabhāva* (prior-absence) of a son.

As per this *syādvāda* the apparently inconsistent pairs like 'existence non-existence', 'eternal-non-eternal' etc simultaneously feature the one and the same object relative to different limitors (*avacchedakas*). An individual may exist in some place in a capacity of husband, teacher, officer, father, actor etc. The wife feels the existence as husband, but others miss him not as such. In the same way, students, employees, sons, spectators feel his existence as teacher, officer, father, actor respectively. In such case also an individual can be looked upon as different ways. A jar may remain in some place as such, but does not exist as cloth (*ghaṭatvena ghaṭaḥ asti na paṭatvena*).<sup>14</sup>

In the same way, the knowledge of 'fire' may be described perceptual, inferential and also testimonial depending on the situation. From the words of a trustworthy person an individual can know of the existence of fire in a distant place. He may go towards the locus of fire. When he goes a certain distance, he sees smoke arising from a place by which he infers the existence of fire. When he goes nearest to the fire, he perceives the same with his own eyes.<sup>15</sup>

From the above discussion it may be concluded that the *anekāntavāda* or *syādvāda* of the Jaina-logicians is grounded on sound logic. Each and every individual has liberty to describe an object according to his own feeling, impression, presupposition, culture etc. As these are determining factors of describing some entity, the description may be of diverse types. This is one side of the *anekāntavāda* or *syādvāda*. One question may be raised in this context whether the presupposition, culture, feeling etc., lead us to describe an entity in different ways or the entity itself bears diverse modes for which it is described in various ways by an individual. Hemachandra will favour the latter alternative. To him an object

is capable of being described in diverse ways as it is endowed with intrinsic diverse nature. This view may be justified from the fact that one can interpret a particular sentence or text in different ways according to one's culture, presupposition etc. if the object (sentence or text) is capable of being interpreted. Had there been no such possibility, no one could have given diverse interpretations. Hence, the entity itself bears nature of diverse types, which substantiates Hemachandra's position.

### NOTES

1. "Tatha hi - dravya-paryāyayoraikāntika-bhedābheda-parihāreṇa kathañccidbhedābhedaḥ syādvādbhirupeyate. na cāsau yukto virodhādidoṣā-vidhi-pratiśedharūpayorekatra vastunyasambhavānīlanilvat.  
*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 1.1.32, Prose portion - 130
2. "Atha kenacidrūpeṇa bhedaḥ kenacidābhedaḥ. evaṃ sati bhedaśyānyadadhikarānamābhedaśya cānyaditi vaiyadhikarānyam." *Ibid.*
3. "Yam cātmanāṃ purodhaya bhedo yaṃ caśrityābhedaśtanau bhīnāvanyathaikāntavādaprasaktistathā ca satyanavasthā." *Ibid.*
4. "Yena ca rūpeṇa bhedaśtena bhedaścabhedaśca yena cābhedaśtenāpyābhedaśca bhedaśceti samkaraḥ." *Ibid.*
5. "Yena rūpeṇa bhedaśtenābhedo yena bhedaśtena bheda iti vyatikaraḥ." *Ibid.*
6. "Bhedābhedaśtmakatve ca vastuno viviktenākāreṇa niścetumaśakteḥ samkaraḥ." *Ibid.*
7. "Tataścāpratipattiḥ iti ca viśayavyavasthā." *Ibid.*
8. "Naivam. pratiyamāne vastuni virodhasyāsambhavāt. Yatsannidhāne yo nopalabhyate sa tasya virodhīti niściyate. Upalabhamāne ca vastuni ko virodhagandhāvakaśaḥ? Nīlānīlayorapi yadyekatro-palambho' sti tadā nāsti virodhaḥ. Ekatra citrapatījñāne saugataimīlānīlayorvirodhānābhyupagamat ekasyaiva ca paṇḍeścalācalaraktāraktāvṛtādirviruddhadharmānāmupalabdheḥ prakṛte ko virodhaśamkāvakaśaḥ?" *Ibid.*
9. "Etena vaiyadhikarānyadoṣo' pyapastāḥ. tayorekādhikarānatvena praḡuktayuktidiśa pratīteḥ." *Ibid.*
10. "Yadāpyanavasthānam dūśanamupanyastam tadāpyanekāntavādimatānābhijñānaiiva. Tanmatam hi dravya-paryāyātmake vastuni dravyaprayāyēveva bhedaḥ bhedadhvanīna tayorevābhidhānat, dravyarūpeṇābhedaḥ iti dravyamevābhedaḥ ekānekātmakatvādvastunaḥ." *Ibid.*

11. "Yau ca saṃkaravyatikarau tau mecakajñānandarś anena samānya-viśeṣa-dr̥ṣṭāntena ca pariḥṛtau. Atha tatra tathā pratibhasaḥ samādhm, parasyāpi tadevāstu pratibhasasyapakṣapatitvat." *Ibid.*
12. "Nirṇite cārthe saṃśayopī na yuktaḥ tasya sakampapratipattirūpatvādakampapratipattau durghaṭvat. Pratipanne ca vastunyapratipattiriti sahasam. Upalabdhya-bhidhānādanupalambho'pi na siddhastato nabhava iti dr̥ṣṭeṣṭāvīruddham dravya-paryāyātmakam vastviti." *Ibid.*
13. "Tatha hi svasamrādadhikṛtarājyatvasambandhena bhāratavar̥ṣiyāḥ sarva eva āryā anāryāśca englaṇde santi."  
*Navyanyāyabhaṣāpradīpāḥ* (Ed. By Kalipada Tarkacharya), Sanskrit College, 1973, p. 13.
14. Tushar Sarkar : *Some Reflections on Jaina Anekāntavāda and Syādvāda*, *Jadavpur Journal of Philosophy*, Vol 4, No. 2, P. 1992, p. 19.
15. "...sarvatra viśayabhedasya darśitatvat-satyam dharmyabhiprāyeṇa samplava kathyate ... Tadudaharaṇantu ... 'agnirāptopadeśat pratyate, amutreti, pratyāsīdata dhūmadarśanenānumiyate pratyāsannatarena upalabhyate' ityadi."  
*Nyāyamañjarī*, The Oriental Research Institute, University Of Mysore, 1969, p.93.