

THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPERMORALISM IN THE BHAGVADGĪTĀ

SHIVNARAYAN JOSHI

The supermoralism of the Gītā rests on three assumptions viz., (i) *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi* (going beyond the sense of doership or *Kartṛtva bhāva*), (ii) *Nistraigunyatā* (transcending from the effects of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*) and finally (iii) surrender to God¹. A person who has attained *Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi* and *Nistraigunyatā* and takes refuge in god, goes beyond good and evil². Before analyzing these assumptions we ponder some thought on moralism. Morality or *Dharma*, as it may rightly be called in the context of Indian philosophy, is concerned with *Samsāra*. We the worldly men have deep attachment for the objects of senses. We desire to achieve certain things we like and have aversion for such things which we dislike. *Iṣṭa* is desired object and *Dviṣṭa* is that which is shunned or avoided³. If our action performed to achieve *Iṣṭa* causes harm to others then it is wrong action or *Aśubha Karma* but if it is beneficial to others, it is right action or *Śubha Karma*. *Dharma* or morality is concerned with the obligation to others. Since we have deep attachment for objects of senses the observance of *Dharma* is not an easy sailing for us in our life. We are constantly facing contrary pulls between *Preyas* or desired object and *Śreyas* or obligation for duty. Our natural tendency is to run after the objects of our choice. We find constraint, may it be internal, in doing acts which are in accordance with *Dharma*. We have to sacrifice choices of our interest or liking in favour of duty or obligation. When our *Iṣṭa* is not in consonance with *Dharma* or there is a demand of choosing some higher value we are obliged to drop the *Iṣṭa* or desired object. So *Dharma* or morality needs readiness to sacrifice the *Preyas* in favour of *Śreyas*. *Samsāra* is a constant war between two opposite forces of *Preyas* and *Śreyas* in which sometimes

we win and at other times we lose.

Śaṅkara describes *Samsāra* as characterized by doership and enjoyership⁴. We perform actions and enjoy their fruits. Since we are combination of unconscious body and conscious spirit the qualities of both apparently get superimposed. That is why we are both rational and irrational, selfish and not-selfish. Man led by reason cares for others but when he is under the influence of senses he seeks self-interest. But there is an inherent urge to go beyond *Samsāra* in every person, may it be dormant in some and awakened, in others, which motivates them to pursue *Śreyas* or higher values in life. We have thus three stages from lower to higher in our pursuit of values viz., (i) to live competitively (ii) to live co-operatively and (iii) to live sacrificially⁵. Persons living at the first stage act mostly for their own interest without paying attention to benefit of others. They act for the benefit of others only when it is in their self-interest. At the second stage while seeking interest of ourselves we do help others also for their betterment. Interests of both ours as well of others are protected at this stage. Finally, the aim of our life becomes to live for others. We sacrifice our own interests in favour of others. To live for others seems to be an impossible task to a man engrossed in *Samsāra*. But it is the firm belief of the *Gītā* that one can control one's lower passions by doing constant effort or *Abhyāsa* and detachment or *Vairāgya*⁶ and can live sacrificially for others. At this stage a man acts under the guidance of reason but still it is not an effortless moral life. He is not out of *Samsāra*. We make distinction between the world of objects and *Samsāra*. *Samsāra* is an interaction between man and objective world. Man living in *Samsāra*, though he leads a moral and rational life, is not *Dvandvātita* or beyond the duals of life. The battle between *Preyas* (desires) and *Śreyas* has not yet ceased to be though by exerting rigorous effort he always wins it and lives sacrificially. There remains always a possibility of losing the battle in this moral realm. Since a moral man is not completely detached from *Samsāra*, he is under the influence of pleasure and pain. Kant has beautifully presented the dilemma of struggling moral man in these words - "There is always deceit, violence and envy around and about him, even though he is honest, peaceable and kindly. He sees righteous man who deserves happiness fall victim to the evils of want, sickness and untimely death as animals do..... This right

minded person may, therefore, feel impelled to give up the impossible purpose which caused him to obey the moral law”⁷.

In contrast with moralism, the realm of supermoralism is an effortless journey to achieve Śreyas or the highest good. While a moral man lives under the constant stress of obligation, a man of super-moralism is free from the constraint of ‘ought’. Because a man of super-moralism has attained Naiṣkarmya- Siddhi he is mentally detached from the objects of desires. *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi* is not the state of actionlessness. It is not possible for man to remain without doing actions⁸. Naiṣkarmya is a non-attachment to the ego-centric perspective or absence of doership which is followed by the non-attachment to fruits of actions. A person who has realized that the spirit is different from body also realizes that spirit is, by its very nature, non-doer or Akartā. The Akartṛtva-bhāva, is a necessary condition for the attitude of non-attachment to the fruits of the actions. The attitude of non-attachment though very difficult, can be cultivated by a person who has controlled body by controlling senses, has controlled senses by controlling mind, has controlled mind by controlling intellect and finally has controlled intellect by controlling spirit⁹. The spirit being conscious is the highest of all these elements. The objects of senses are not significant in themselves but our ideas or values assigned to them make so. A thing which was most significant for a person before the dawn of knowledge may become totally insignificant after self-realization. Akartṛtva bhāva developed in a self controlled person transforms the action done into inaction. This is to see Karma or action as Akarma or inaction.¹⁰ The transformation of action into inaction is the real meaning of Naiṣkarmya-siddhi. Naiṣkarmya-siddhi is not renunciation of actions but renunciation in action. The awakened person while performing his Dharma or duty skillfully remains totally detached from the result thereof. The Kartṛtva-bhāva or attitude of doership attaches the person to fruits of actions and contrarily the Akartṛtva-bhāva or the attitude of non-doership detaches him from the fruits of actions. The awakened man knows that it is the body animated by the contact of spirit is real doer and enjoyer and not the spirit.¹¹ It is not the ‘action’ that binds the person but his attitude towards the action is responsible for the feeling of pleasure and pain. It is said very rightly in the Gīta that the awakened person abandons both ‘good’ or Sukṛta and ‘evil’

or Duṣkṛta¹². The true self knower (Atmajñānī) acts and reacts without any emotional disturbance on his part. The person attaining Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi also attains Samatva or equanimity which is of two kinds viz., (i) Psychological and (ii) Social. There are two most powerful opposite mental forces known as Rāga or like and Dveṣa or dislike which motivate persons to perform actions¹³. Impelled by these forces men are attracted to the objects of their liking and are averted from the objects of disliking. Both Rāga and Dveṣa produce pleasure and pain in the agent. The person who has attained Akartṛtva-bhāva is not mentally attached to the objects, hence he rises above pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat. His stable mind rests in tranquility and peace. He becomes Nirdvandva or devoid of opposites. This is the psychological equanimity which paves the way for social equanimity. A man who has risen above the opposites of Rāga or attachment and Dveṣa or hatred, performs his duty without making any discrimination of gender, wealthy or poor, lower, or higher. He gives due respect to the every member of society impartially.

Nistraigunyatā is another foundational feature of supermoralism. It means to go beyond to the effect of triplet viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. It is to be noted that *Nistraigunyatā* is not new achievement. It is already there. The spirit in essence is devoid of Triguna or triplet. One has to realize the true nature of self as distinct from the Trigunātmaka body. According to the Bhagavadgītā the Prakṛti, the unconscious element is Trigunātmaka. All the products of Prakṛti including body are also endowed with Triguna. The real doer of action is not spirit but the Prakṛti or body possessed with triplet which after coming in contact with spirit becomes conscious.¹⁴ The spirit- wrongly identified with body, misunderstands itself as an agent of action. Consequently the spirit enjoys Sukha (pleasure), Duhkha (pain), Moha (delusion). Attaining the state of *Nistraigunyatā* is to get rid of the effects of Triguna. After self realization the person understands properly the true nature of both body and spirit. Now he knows that Kartṛtva or doership belongs to body endowed with Triguna or three qualities.¹⁵

Though Naiṣkarmya and *Nistraigunyatā* go side by side and are interdependent, the former may be said to be logically prior to the later. Naiṣkarmya is absence of doership and *Nistraigunyatā* is the absence of

enjoyership. Kartṛtva or doership is followed by Bhoktṛtva or enjoyership. So long as there is Kartṛtva - bhāva there remains Bhoktṛtva-bhāva also. As soon as the spirit realizes that it is not an agent of any action whatsoever it also ceases to be Bhoktā or enjoyer of pleasure (the product of Sattva), Pain (the product of Rajas) and delusion (the product of Tamas). On realizing Nistraiguṇyatā one is happy within himself, enjoys within himself the delight of self.¹⁶ This is because the spirit, by its very nature is bliss or Ānanda.¹⁷ The pleasure arising from Sattva in the objective world is momentary whereas inner happiness is everlasting. The surest way of transcending of Trigūṇa is the constant devotion (Avyabhicāriṇī Bhakti) of God.¹⁸ It is the one pointed and unswerving devotion to god which takes a devotee beyond Trigūṇa.

The person who has attained the state of Naiṣkarmya and Nistraiguṇyatā enters into the realms of supermoralism where he is freed from both good as well as bad deeds.¹⁹ The distinction of good and bad remains significant within the limit of Samsāra. Dharma or morality is also significant only within Samsāra. On transcending Samsāra one goes beyond good and bad and also morality. Prof. R. D. Ranade has asked a very significant question. "The question, however, arises, whether there is any 'ought' after god realization."²⁰ 'Ought' is related to obligation which is the heart of morality. The man of self knowledge has outgrown the mere do's (good) and don'ts (evil). He acts from no moral compulsion or obligation to do good or to abstain from evil, but acts or abstains naturally and spontaneously so that he does not feel the goodness of his acts (Nistraiguṇyatā). The goodness comes to him unsought and unannounced wherefore he feels no effort at all in doing it and, therefore no pride nor a longing for reward (Akartṛtva bhāva).²¹ So long as we are conscious of the ethical distinctions so that we feel something to be 'good' and something to be 'bad', we have not abandoned our desires and so have to do rigorous efforts for acquiring and then maintaining virtue and avoiding vice.²² At the realm of morality we are supposed to be constant vigilant against our desires which may detract us from our duty easily. On the contrary the awakened man, attaining the state of super moralism rejoices the practice of moral life effortlessly. Just as for Socrates 'knowledge is virtue' in the similar way 'the self knowledge is the sole virtue' for the awakened person.

One who has achieved self-realization never indulges in immoral acts. Super-moralism is not immoralism as some thinkers have misinterpreted its spirit,²³ but it is perfect morality in the sense that it (moral behaviour) becomes routine of spiritual or awakened person. Prof. R. D. Ranade has very rightly called this state of super moralism as a state of moral Jivanmukti.²⁴ Just as a person having reached metaphysical Jivanmukti goes beyond all sorts of sufferings in this very life similarly a moral Jivanmukta person is above to 'resist the rush of desires and anger even here before he gives up his body.'²⁵ In short for a man of super-moralism the morality is a spontaneous flow of virtues where as a moral man is engaged in a constant war against desires. The awakened person, though living in world, goes beyond Samsāra.

In connection with the possibility of super moralism one may raise the question: is it possible for a man to give up all desires? Is it possible to act without any purpose or motive? Even if it is possible, is the purposeless life a worth living? The Gītā gives the most practical solution to the problem which makes spiritual life more significant and worth living. Though an awakened man does not have any selfish purpose to fulfill his actions are not purposeless. His actions are aimed at for the benefit of all living beings.²⁶ Though the Gita accepts both personal and impersonal forms of God it gives more importance to personal form or immanence of God because it is readily accessible.²⁷ Serving other beings is to serve God directly. God loves a person who sees God as immanent in all things and all things as present in God. The yogin who worships God as residing in all beings, resides himself in God no matter what he does.²⁸ In fact he will not do any immoral act but seek only well being of others. A spiritual man diverts his attachment from the objects of senses to God as present in all beings. "Āsakti (attachment) to God means Anāsakti (non-attachment) to all other things whatsoever"²⁹ In this way the life of a man of super-moralism realm is not dry and aimless but purposive and full of happiness. He devotes his whole life for social welfare or Lokasaṅgraha and thus remains inwardly calm while being outwardly active. He is full of joy. The super-moralism of the Gītā culminates in surrendering all his Dharmas or duties to God.³⁰ This again is not abandoning of duties but to take all his duties as the service of God. All his worldly duties like Varṇadharmā, Āshramadharmā,

Sādhāraṇadharmā etc., find their terminal in one Dharma and that is service to God which is nothing but the service of all living beings. The spiritual man remains most dutiful till he breaths his last.

Scholars are of opinion that the spirituality cannot be a justification for morality. According to them the pursuit of Mokṣa or God cannot be a satisfactory answer to the question- 'Why should I be moral? Prof. Rajendra Prasad says'. "In whatever way the Mokṣa is described, it remains a factual or ontological state and therefore to that extent Mokṣa is a descriptive term"³¹ For him it is wrong to derive ethics from metaphysics. It may be agreed that both morality and spirituality are distinct phenomena at the level of Samsāra and therefore spirituality cannot justify morality. But what we are trying to explain here is that for an enlightened person who, by way of Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi and Nistraiguṇyatā, has transcended the Samsāra there remains no distinction of morality and spirituality. The every action of a spiritual man is aimed at in the pursuit of God. The distinction of ethics and metaphysics is reconciled in God who is immanent in all things. For him no ought or obligation whatsoever is left behind. This does not mean at all that he is a immoral person. On the contrary he eats morality, drinks morality, breaths morality and lives with morality.

Thus the supermoralism is neither immoralism nor anti moralism but the culmination of moralism.

NOTES

1. Prof. R. D. Ranade, "*The Bhagavadgītā, As a Philosophy of God Realization*. Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, 1982, P. 190-191.
2. "Buddhiyukto Jahātiha Ubhe Sukṛtaduṣkṛte" *Gīta* II 50
3. M. Hiriyanna, "*Indian Conception of Values*" Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore P. 2
4. "Kartṛtva-bhotṛtvādi lakṣṇam Samsārtivam," *Vivekacudomani* 10
5. Jayantilal S. Jariwalla, '*Gītā: The Science of Living*' Motilal Banarasidas 1984, p. 47.
6. *Gītā* VI-35, XV- 3
7. '*An Emmanuel Kant Reader*' Ed & Trans by Raymond B. Blankey, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1960 P. 276.

8. "Na hi kaṣcitkṣaṇamapi Jātu tiṣṭhatyakarmakṛt" *Gñā* III-5
9. *Gñā*III - 42-43
10. *Gñā*IX - 18
11. *Gñā*III-27 V 8-9
12. *Gñā*II - 50
13. *Gñā*II 64, III 34, V 3, 20
14. *Gñā*III 27.
15. *Gñā*XIV 19, 23
16. *Gñā*V - 24
17. "Anyontara ātmānadamayāh' Ānanda ātmā" *Taittirīya Up.* II- 5
18. *Gñā* XIV 26.
19. *Gñā* II- 50
20. 'The Bhagavadgñā: As a philosophy of God Realization : Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan 1982, P. 183
21. Jayantilal S. Jariwalla, "Gñā: The science of living" Motilal Banarasidas, 1984, P. 50
22. *Ibid*, 50
23. Dayakrishna, "Three Myths about Indian Philosophy-A counter perspective" P. 7
24. "He who is able to bear the ferocious onslaught of Kama and Krodha before he bids good bye to his body may be called a moral Jivan Mukta" *The Bhagavadgñā As a Philosophy of God Realization* P. 221
25. S. Radhakrishnan "The Bhagavadgñā (V-23) George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1960. P. 183.
26. "Sarvabhūtahite ratah" *Gñā*V - 25, XII - 4
27. *Gñā* XI 3-6
28. *Gñā* VI - 31
29. Prof. R. D. Ranade, "The Bhagavadgñā, As a Philosophy of God Realization. P. 189
30. 'Sarvadharmānparityajya Māmekam śaraṇam vraja" *Gñā*XVIII 66
31. *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality*, ICPR & Munshiram Manoharlal, 1989 P. 318.

B O O K R E V I E W S

I

Acharya, Kala : *Buddhanusmrti* (A Glossary of Buddhist Terms); Somaiyya Publications Pvt. Ltd.; Mumbai; 2002; Rs. 425/- (HB)

The book under review, as the sub-title indicates, is a glossary of Buddhist terms, basically meant to be an introduction to a novice and to common readers. Taking into consideration diversity of concepts, notions, ideas, expressions and terms used for explanation of Buddhistic beliefs on various themes, compiler has chosen to be selective, although quite arbitrarily. The work, it is claimed in the preface, hopes to shape lives of people using the Buddhistic faith, though one feels that no glossary of such a kind would be ever able to accomplish such an expected result anywhere to any extent. The exercise is accomplished with the assistance of many scholars and institutions. Though the work does not, on the whole, involve any major *Apasiddhānta* (basic misunderstanding) there is hardly anything striking and novel methodologically, philosophically, indologically or even lexicologically. In what follows, the present reviewer, in all humility, wishes to draw attention to some points which seem worthy of consideration.

In the glossary section, head entries are said to be either in Sanskrit or Pali. But, then, one is unable to make sense of such entries as 'Buddha, the' : Epithets of the Buddha (pp.133-35) or Buddha-ten powers of the Buddha (pp.135-36). If there is entry on Buddha-Gayā (p.136), there is no reason why there should be none on Rājagraha, Sāranātha, or Śravasti. Or again, if there is entry on *Vaibhāṣika* (p.209), there is no reason why there should be no mention of *Mādhyamika*, *Yogacāra* or *Sautrantika*. The book is replete with such arbitrariness and it is needless to multiply instances.

As per the sub-title, the work claims to be a glossary of Buddhist terms. However, on careful consideration one finds, unfortunately, that it is fraught with recurrent confusion as to whether the entries are appropriate and befitting for a glossary or a dictionary or a lexicon or an encyclopedia. This seems to be the case mainly because the compiler appears to be unaware of the methodological and systematic grounds on which to demarcate such entries. For example, consider such entries as *Śūnya* and

Śūnyatā (pp. 200-201), *Vipaśyanā* (pp. 212-213), *Ālaya-Vijñāna* (pp.93-94), *Anātman* (pp. 95-96), etc. They are more appropriate as entries in a lexicon, dealing with historical changes in meanings of words, though even in that context they would require refinement and editing. Entries like *Buddha* (p. 132), *Bodhimanda* (.119), *Mala* (p. 158), *Avabhāsa* (p.111), *Īrya-Patha* (p.149) etc. on the contrary, are fit to be incorporated into a dictionary, dealing with etymological meanings, definitions, uses and contextual applications, where again such entries would require improvements and precision to purge them of their present crudity. Such entries as *Akuśala-dharmaḥ* (pp. 91-93), *Āryasatyāni* (pp. 101-109), *Bhikṣu* (pp. 115-17), *Bodhisattvabhūmī* (pp. 121-25), *Bodhyangāni* (pp.125-30), *Karma* (pp. 151-54), *Pāramitā* (pp. 163-69), *Pratītya-Samutpāda* (172-80) etc. are more apt to be included in an encyclopedia of Buddhism, but only after a good deal of revision and emendation. There are hardly any entries strictly glossorial in character dealing with explanations or words or expressions that are obscure, unusual, technical but frequently used. Those entries like *Acintya* (pp. 89-90), *Anusmṛti* (pp. 97-98), *Brahmacarya* (p. 130), *Dhātu* (pp. 144-145), *Kuśalamūla* (p. 157), *Posadha* (p. 171), *Triratna* (pp. 207-08) etc. which seem to be glossorial in character, do not turn out to be so on critical perusal. Some entries like *Indriya* (pp. 147-48), *Navānga-Śāsana* (pp. 159-60), *Kaśāya* (p. 154), etc. are purely enumerative in nature, offering no analysis or explanation of any kind. In some others like *Brahma-Vihāra* (pp. 130-131), *Ārya* (pp. 100-01) etc. the main concerns of Buddhist understanding of the terms like *Brahma*, *Arya*, etc. seem to be completely ignored. Some entries such as *Pāramitā* (pp. 163-69), *Sanḅha* (pp. 186-90), *Vimukti* (pp. 210-13), *Yāna* (pp. 213-18), etc. are disproportionately lengthy, while others like *Anitya* (p. 97), *Kalyāṇa-mitra* (p. 151), *Dharmacakra* (p. 144), *Bodhi* (p. 118), *Yoga* (p. 218), etc. are too sketchy and short. The entire exercise, in short, seems to lack any coherent and balanced systematic conceptual framework. Arbitrariness and confusion, instead, are often found throughout the book.

Preceding the glossary section proper, running over for three pages, there is a small collection of excerpts and quotations from various Buddhist, Pali and Sanskrit texts bringing out the sense in which certain term/

expression is used in the given text. One is unable to understand the purpose, if any, of citing such quotations in a glossary. More importantly, however, without proper and accurate reference, such entries as *Samyuttanikāya*, *Ariyasaccāni*, *Dighanikāya*, *Tanhā*, *Majjhimanikāya*, *Akuśaladhammā* (p. 86) are extremely difficult to be located and verified in the respective voluminous works and hence are as good as unprofitable.

As per the announced intention, the compiler wishes to restrict mainly to entries originating from Pali and Sanskrit works on Buddhism. But if so, one is unable to make sense of the utter lack of any reference to such decisively important works such as Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* and *Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi*, Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika*, Ratnakīrti's or Jñānaśrī Mitra's *Nibandhāvaliḥ* etc. Similarly, it is very difficult to understand significance of the sort of appendices which are added at the end of the glossary. For, all of them are basically enumerative or indicative in character, explaining or clarifying no term or expression - obscure or technical - in the process and, thus, do not seem to fit into a glossary properly understood.

Lastly, turning to the introduction, which claims to provide a bird's eye-view of Buddhism, a survey of Buddhist literature and a background for the entries in the glossary (p. 1), one normally expects a statement from the compiler regarding the general directives that guided selection of entries in the glossary and the reasons behind them. Unfortunately, no attempt of this sort is made because no such methodologically tenable perspective has found favour with the compiler. One would also have expected, howsoever brief, a statement concerning distinctive contribution of Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy. One is disappointed on this count as well. In fact there is hardly any systematic but brief account of the Buddhist contributions to the field of logic and epistemology. Accordingly, one also notices that important terms and expressions from these areas of investigation are conspicuously absent. And along the same line, in the survey of Buddhist literature that is claimed to have been provided, there is not even a mention, leave apart account, of such decisively important works as *Pramāṇa-Samuccaya* and *Ālambana-Parīkṣā* of Dinnaga, *Pramāṇa-Vārtika*, *Hetubindu*, *Sambandha-Parīkṣā* etc. of Dharmakīrti, *Jñānaśrīnibandhāvaliḥ*, *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvaliḥ* etc. each of which has

a profound catalytic value. Each of them has exerted vivid impact on posterity. In the introduction, there also occasionally occurs mis-statement of facts. We cite two examples by way of samples. It is claimed that *Abhidharmakosābhāṣya* is an auto-commentary on *Abhidharmakośa* by Vasubandhu himself. There is a celebrated commentary called as *Sphuṭārtha* on the former, which is by Yasomitra and not by Vasumitra. Further, it is claimed that Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* is not available in Sanskrit (p. 80). As a matter of fact it has been published and gone through couple of editions and reprints. It is needless to multiply such instances.

In sum, the work reflects an overall balance of points of weakness and liability over those of strength and assets and, therefore, it is doubtful whether and to what extent if at all, it would realise its intended goal.

MANGALA R. CHINCHORE

II

Nayak, G. C.; *Mādhyamika Śūnyatā: A Reappraisal*; Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 2001, pp. xi + 93; Rs. 250/- (HB)

The present booklet bears a sub-title : A Reappraisal of Madhyamika Philosophical Enterprise with Special Reference to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. It is an outcome of a Senior Fellowship awarded by the I.C.P.R. to the author for a period of two years. The project rightly seeks to contest the traditional characterization of the Mādhyamika philosophical enterprise in general and of Nāgārjuna's philosophy in particular, to be nihilistic, absolutistic or transcendentalistic in character. It is pointed out that such improper characterization has emerged basically out of miscomprehension of the concept of 'Śūnyatā', despite their protests to the contrary, and of *Śūnyavāda*, whose advocacy they are illicitly accused of. The work also seeks to highlight some important tenets of the basic framework of the philosophy of Nāgārjuna, as one of the pioneering Mādhyamikas. In this part, the author is neither original nor uniquely singular. Unfortunately, he has ignored quite a few but important books and journal-articles previously published by Indian and foreign scholars.

As is clear from the title itself, the author seeks to re-examine the Mādhyamika concept of 'Śūnyatā', by undertaking a critical and careful study of Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamakāśāstra*, also known as *Mulamādhyamikākarikā* and Candrakīrti's celebrated commentary on it called *Prasannapadā*. This is well-taken as far as it goes. But, then, why should author ignore other commentators such as Buddhapalita and Bhāvaviveka (or Bhavya) etc.? Is it because they were not Mādhyamikas or they did not comment upon the said work of Nāgārjuna or their works are un-extant as once upon a time was the case? Nothing of the kind seems to be justifiable, and their neglect seems indefensible on any valid ground. In his attempt to study Nāgārjuna's concept of *Śūnyatā*, the author hardly seems to draw upon Nagarjuna's other relevant treatises like *Śūnyatā-saptati*, *Vigrahavyāvartani* etc. in any systematic and major way, except referring to them perfunctorily, marginally and sporadically. In fact, both the works are available and importantly relevant in this context. Further, the author attempts to undertake re-appraisal of the *Mādhyamika* Philosophical enterprise with special reference to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti through their concept of *Śūnyatā*, as mentioned above. But as Nāgārjuna repeatedly points out and is at pains to frequently emphasise, in his framework the concepts of *Śūnyatā*, *Pratītya-Samutpāda*, and *Nirvāṇa* together with those of *Mādhyamā-Pratipad* along with *Dve-satya* (two truths) form an integral whole in a way that none of them can be studied in isolation from the others. Without attaining penetrating insight into the basic teachings of Buddha, preference of categories involved in them and the rationale of such a preference, one can hardly develop a legitimate comprehension of Nāgārjuna's thoughts on *Śūnyatā*. In the present sketchy work no major attempt seems to have been made in this direction. What one finds, unfortunately, is a patch-work of many points, without any major thread systematically and consistently running through them.

It would be pertinent to draw attention to one more point that deserves serious consideration. The author basically wishes to limit himself to a specific work of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti's commentary on it. Both the works do not mention in any major way, leave aside elaborate discussion, the concept of or ideal of *Bodhisattva*. Nor do they make any reference to Advaita Vedānta. The author is, however, unable to resist the traditional

temptation of somehow comparing *Mādhyaṃika* philosophy of *Śūnyatā* with that of *Advaita Vedānta*, and the Buddhist ideal of *Bodhisattva* with that of *Jīvanamukta of Advaita Vedānta*. For this, he draws upon Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* from the Buddhist side along with Prajñākaramati's commentary (viz. *Pañjikā*) on it, and upon fifteen century work called *Pancadaśī* of Vidyāraṇya from *Advaita* side. The author is oblivious as to whether this fits into his proclaimed principal objective of writing his treatise. One finds it extremely hard to understand the significance and role of such excursions and connect them inarticulately with the main aim of the author. This is all the more so especially when neither Śāntideva's work under consideration is a commentary on Nāgārjuna's treatise, nor does it draw upon or make any reference to Advaita system. Similarly, Vidyāraṇya's *Pancadaśī* does not in any way concentrate on or even make reference to Buddhism.

All the same, the work needs to be studied by beginners and sophomores of Buddhist philosophy in general and of Nāgārjuna's philosophy in particular to know that they have been misunderstood and that a determined attempt needs to be made to understand them properly. It would have been better if bibliography were added for the benefit of students and researchers. Further, it would have been also profitable if instead of merely citing excerpts and quotations from various texts appropriate and exact references were provided in the notes and references. Likewise, care should have been taken to provide precise and exact references in place of ambiguous and inexact ones. Lastly, it would have been helpful if author were to provide an appendix of his own previously published papers to enable readers to pursue author's ideas in a meaningful way.

MANGALA R. CHINCHORE

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

VOL XXIX

NUMBER 1 - JANUARY 2002

S. PANNEERSELVAM	: Habermas on Presuppositions of Communicative Rationality	1
SUDIPTA DUTTA ROY	: Reason or Revelation? Locke on the Ground of Religion	17
KANTILAL DAS	: Quantificational Parity and Vernacular Disparity	29
MUHAMMAD KAMAL	: Heidegger and the Transition to Postmodernity	43
GAUTAM SINHA	: Can Moral Reasoning be Purely Deductive?	57
RADHEY SHYAM KAUSHAL	: The Conscious Pendulum : A Physicist's Approach	65
MAUSHUMI GUHA	: Free Will and Value	79
SHYAMALI SANYAL	: Dignāga's Interpretation of The Perceptual Universe	97
ALOK TANDON	: Anekāntavāda and Ahimsā : A Framework For Inter-Religious Dialogue	105

NUMBER 2 & 3 APRIL - JULY 2002

D. D. VADEKAR	: The Indian Traditional Values & Their Indications For Education In India In The Modern Age of Science & Technology	117
---------------	--	-----

ASHOK R. KELKAR	: Interrogating Knowledge Globalization	133
ALPANA CHAKRABORTY	: Does Aristotle Believe In Liberation?	177
KOYELI CHAKRAVARTI & Apurbo Roy	: Interpersonal Relationships & Human Dignity	191
ABHA SINGH	: A Peep Into Ethics and Metaethics	202
NANDITA BAGCHI	: Metaphors & Morality	229
RAJNI SRIVASTAVA	: Mill's Classical Theory of Democracy	237
S. A. SHAI DA	: Kierkegaard's Ontology Of Faith	253
JAGAT PAL	: Some Reflections On the Concept of Rationality	265
Ramakant Sinari	: The Real & The Constructed : Śaṅkara & Husserl	277
D. N. TIWARI	: Analysis of How & What We Know By A Word	291
N. SREEKUMAR	: Language & The Evolution of The Self	319
SANGEETHA MENON	: Structure Of Mind & Structured Mind	335
N. G. KULKARNI	: Putnam's Proposal For Logical Reform	345
S. V. BOKIL	: What Is Aristotelian Syllogism ?	351
GOPAL SAHU	: Induction In the 'Grue'-some World	361
R. SUGATHAN	: Polylectics	379

NUMBER 4 OCTOBER 2002

SUDESHNA MITRA	: The Problem of Reference	397
NAYEEMA HAQUE	: The Language of Human Rights and Rights-talk in society	405
BHUPENDRA C. DAS	: The Mīmāṃsakas on Yogaja Pratyakṣa : A Critique	419
SHAKUNTALA BORA	: Belief in Immortality	435
HAROON RASHID	: Making Sense of Marxian Concept of Justice	445
ARUNDHATI SARDESAI	: Popular Art : New Angle	471
MANJIRI CHAKRABARTY	: Technological Knowledge	483
ABEY KOSHY	: Heidegger's Interrogation of Modernity	495
G. VEDAPARAYANA	: Krishnamurti's Philosophy of Education	505
JYOTISH CH. BASAK	: Cloning : Social or Scientific Priority	517
SHIVNARAYAN JOSHI	: The Possibility of Supermoralism In The Bhagvadgītā	529

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY**Individual Life Membership**

390. Ramdas Sirkar
Department of Philosophy and Life World
Vidyasagar University
Midnapore 721 102 (W.B)
391. Mrs. Kalpana Chaudhary
Department of Philosophy
Thiu College,
Thiu 781 371
Dist. Nalbari, Assam
392. Smt. Sibani Chaudhary
Jogesh Pally
Bankura 722 101 (W.B)
393. Dr. Sarita Vyas
5, Jhalamand House
High Court Colony
Nr. Senapati Bhavan
Jodhpur 342 011
394. Prof. Surendra Gaydhane
Philosophy Department
Post Graduate Teaching Unit
Nagpur University Campus
Amravati Road,
Nagapur 440 009
395. Urbana Rodrigues
Pilar Niketan
Mohannager, Kamptee Road
Nagpur 440 001
396. Dr. A. Joseph Dorairaj
Reader in English
Gandhigram Rural University
Gandhigram 624 302
Dindigul DT (TN)

B O O K S R E C E I V E D

1. Acharya, Kala : *Buddhānusmṛti* (A Glossary of Buddhist Terms), Mumbai-400 014, India, Somaiya Publications, Pvt. Ltd., 2002, pp. xvi+281, Price Rs. 425/-
2. Balsubramanian, R. (ed) : *Advaita Vedānta*, vol. II Part 2 of *History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization* (Gen. Editor Prof. D. P. Chattopadhyaya), New Delhi, Centre for Studies in Civilizations (distributed by Motilal Banarasidass, New Delhi, 110 007, 2000, pp. li+696, Price Rs. 1200/-
3. Banerjee, Dr. Nikhilesh : *Perception in Art*, Kolkata-6, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 38, Bidhan Sarani, Kolkata 700 006, 2000, pp. vi+127, Price 100/-
4. Hanson V., Stewart R. and Nicholson S. (Eds) : *Karma : Rhythmic Return to Harmony*, Delhi, Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, Pvt. Ltd., 2001, pp. xix+249.
5. Jhingram, Saral : *Ethical Relativism and Universalism* Delhi, Motilal Banarasidass Publishers, Pvt. Ltd., 2001, pp. xiv+385.
6. Lathief, Dr. Abdul : *Philosophical Reflections*, Kozhikode, 673 001, Mulberry Publications, 2002. pp. 164 Price Rs. 75/-
7. Mercier Jean L. : *From the Upnishads To Aurobindo : A Critical History of the Key-Concepts of Indian Philosophy*, Bangalore- 84 Asian Trading Corporation, India, 2002, pp 134.
8. Nayak, G. C. : *Mādhyamika Śūnyatā, A Reappraisal*, New Delhi -62, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2001, pp. xi+93, Rs. 250/-
9. Ouseparampil, Dr. J. : *Religion Revisited*, Pune-411 032 Published by author himself; Copies available at Indian Institute of Indology, Pune, 411 032, pp.viii+146, Price Rs. 200/-
10. Roodurum, Pulasth Soobah : *Bhāmati and Vivaraṇa Schools of Advaita Vedānta : A Critical Approach*, Delhi, Motilal Banarasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2002 pp, xv+297.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives**, Rs. 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone**. Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls**, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (ed) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization**, Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection**, Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya**, Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism**, Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change**, Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed.) **A. Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I**, Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding**. Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units**. Rs. 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Sharad Deshpande (ed.) **Author & Subject Index of Indian Philosophical Quarterly, I-XXV, (1973-1998)** Rs. 100+25 (postage)

Contact : The Editor,
Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007