

A PEEP INTO ETHICS AND METAETHICS

ABHA SINGH

Human beings on this earth are regarded as species belonging to a bigger class 'animal'. As members of this species, human beings have some traits common with other animals. But, whereas other animals are very much limited to their sense-perception, to the perceptual world of various phenomena, human beings have a tendency to transcend the mere phenomenal world. This transcendence or the tendency to move from the perceptual to something beyond or ideal assumes different forms-one expression being that man's life is governed by some notions of 'ought'. Probably this is why, while pointing out the essential nature of man and place of ideal in his basic nature, Brand Blanshard says, "Value is so fundamental in human life that its true character can be seen only against the background of human nature".¹

Having made it clear that in man's life there is a special place for something ideal, we, at once, find that human beings have developed a philosophy for themselves, a way of life, a culture and, above all, good set of traditions in the form of a well developed code of conduct, whereby they make a distinction between 'good' or 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong', 'ethically praiseworthy' or 'ethically condemnable'. All these phenomena have given rise to a separate branch of study commonly known as moral philosophy or ethics. Giving vent to this expression Surma Dasgupta has said :

From the very remote period of human civilisation, when men had just begun to be awoken to newer problem of life, and had learnt to think in a subtle and refined way in response to the need of something higher than the mere satisfaction of biological demands, he had been, in a way or another, trying to think out a systematic account

of the mysteries of life and set before himself an ideal to be achieved.²

The branch of study known as 'moral philosophy' or 'ethics', which at first sight seems to be very simple one, curiously enough turns to be not so when we endeavour to make precise what it takes as its subject-matter and particularly when we try to pin-point some problems studied by it. Our difficulties become enlarged, particularly in view of the fact that there have been lack of unanimity among the ethicists to consider a particular set of questions as not coming to its area. Probably on account of this consideration, a great contemporary philosopher A. J. Ayer has expressed that it is not something homogeneous in nature. To put in his own words :

The ordinary system of ethics, as elaborated in the works of ethical philosophers, is very far from being a homogeneous whole. Not only is it apt to contain pieces of metaphysics, and analyses of non-ethical concepts, its actual ethical contents are themselves of very different kinds. We may divide them, indeed into four main classes. there are first of all propositions which express definitions of ethical terms, or judgements about the legitimacy or possibility of certain definitions. Secondly, there are propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience, and their causes. Thirdly, there are exhortations to moral virtue. And, lastly, there are actual ethical judgements.³

The recognition of the fact that ethics does not have a homogeneous character leads us to make a somewhat serviceable distinction between different ethical concepts (not terms), which are closely connected and are generally reckoned as constituting the different stages of ethical enquiry. It should be mentioned here that 'morals', 'morality', 'moral reflection', 'casuistry' and 'theoretical ethics' are various levels of enquiries which go to constitute, broadly speaking, the realm of ethics. To this list a new name of a subject is now-a-days added, and this is very commonly known as metaethics or meta-moral analysis. It may be contended that the distinction between them is only a relative one, but, even then, this distinction is important in view of some academic interest of man, because by making a distinction between them, one is able to understand in what respect the subject-matter of one is different from that of the other.

Human being, all of us know, is a social being and, as a member of some society, he not only functions as an agent who performs certain action but, by virtue of his capacity to reflect on what is done by him or his fellow beings, he, at once, makes various moral pronouncements. As an agent in the society, man performs various activities-some of them are deliberate or voluntary, while others are not so. There are innumerable actions performed by human being, but only some of them are brought under the purview of moral reflections, assuming the form of moral evaluation or ethical judgement. Basically there are two things in it. On the one hand, we have certain actions, motives etc. These actions or motives have certain attitudes pro or con, which are applied to the actions or the motives, and the result is that we have various ethical judgements such as 'X is good', 'Y is bad', 'A is right', 'B is wrong', 'Z is our duty', 'S ought to be performed' 'Ahimāsa is the greatest virtue'. This reflection may assume one of the innumerable forms. If an action is something physico-mental in the sense that the analysis of an action reveals certain mental stages, and when it is overtly performed, it goes through a physical stage. But moral reflection, on the other and is somewhat a purely mental thing, because in this stage a man applies his attitudes to certain actions and, if possible, tries to bring those actions to the purview of moral reflection. In relation to actions, moral reflection is something of second order nature, because first an action is performed, then comes moral reflection. May be, that the gap between the two is so negligible that they may seem to be simultaneous. In order to perform an action a man has to simply go through certain physico-mental state-be that the state of desires, conflicts, decision and performance. But the performance of an act does not require a great deal of mental maturity. Moral reflection, on the other hand, requires intellectual maturity in the sense that, unless one is not fully equipped with the set of norms to be applied to actions, one is not able to reflect on the actions and, thereby, to determine the ethical nature of that action.

Our discussions so far, have been confined to, what we call, 'moral actions' and 'moral reflections'. 'Moral reflection' is some intellectual enterprise of man in which a man expresses his reaction against certain actions through language, and the special feature of it is that, at least, one ethical term is used in it. There is a good number of terms known as ethical

terms such as 'good' or 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong', 'ought' and 'ought-not', 'duty' and 'not-duty', 'virtues' and 'vices', 'fittingness' and so on. It is a matter of simple observation that most of these terms are used ethically, as well as non-ethically, and when they have a place in moral judgements, they are used exclusively in the ethical sense. It should also be noted that when in an ethical judgement a particular ethical term is used, it is not simply mentioned. In linguistic philosophy there is tradition to make a distinction between using a term and simply mentioning a term. When we use a term to refer to something beyond it, the term is said to be used, and when we just talk about the term itself, we simply mention it. While bringing this distinction between 'using a term' and 'mentioning a term', Paul Edwards says: "when a word is employed in order to refer to something beyond itself, it is said to be used, but if something is said about a word, if the word itself is the subject matter of discussion, the word is said to be mentioned."⁴ In course of using ethical terms in ethical expressions we have innumerable ethical judgements and in fact these ethical judgements serve as bases in formulation of an ethical system. Before we actually discuss what is the realm of ethics proper, it is desirable to say that 'moral judgement' has been variously understood. When G. E. Moore says that "In the vast majority of cases, where we make statements involving any of the terms 'virtue', 'vice', 'duty', 'right', 'ought', 'good', 'bad', we are making ethical judgements..."⁵, this fact has been stressed. Similarly, laying stress on the real and formal character of ethical judgements, Paul Edwards makes an assertion to the effect that "Accordingly, I propose to mean for the time-being by the term 'moral judgement' any sentence in which an ethical predicate is used, whether it is employed in a characteristically ethical sense or not."⁶

We have hitherto seen that there is one set of ethical phenomena generally termed moral or ethical judgements. A study of ethical judgements is doubly significant because of the consideration that it is this set of judgements that provides bases for three kinds of enquiries-casuistry, ethics and metaethics, and secondly because of the considerations that ethical judgements form some kind of first-order ethical discourse in relation to not only reflection but also systematization of various ethical judgements, or even in presenting a metaethical point-of-view in regard to their meaning,

functions and analyses.

There are basically two points-of-views in studying any ethical judgement, viz. the structural point -of-view, and secondly, the nature of the content expressed by them. Structurally, there is nothing very unique in the structure of ethical judgements, save and except one thing that, at least, one ethical term is employed in it. The real controversy (we shall examine, in detail, later on) centres round the problem, what is the nature of content expressed by a moral judgement, whether it is descriptive of fact, whether it expresses feeling or a sentiment, or an emotion, or a wish, or an attitude, or a command? There have been various theses to develop one or the other point of view on this theme, giving rise to various types of metaethical discussions. Suspending our discussion on this theme for a short while, we now proceed to examine the nature of yet another somewhat general enquiry, namely 'ethics'.

As, we have seen in our previous discussions that, the character of ethics is very heterogeneous and many levels of things are included in it. It would be natural, in view of the lack of homogeneity in character of ethics, to just make a passing reference of two other allied subjects called 'casuistry' and 'morals'. Both of them take as their starting point, some 'moral actions' and 'moral judgements'. But the approach, they adopt, to these phenomena are not only different in themselves, but also is quite different in relation to ethical enquiry. Since we are trying to locate the significance and place of moral actions and judgements in casuistry, we are naturally led to a problem : What actually is casuistry? And what is its subject matter? Putting briefly a reply to these problems, W. Stark says:

The word casuistry (literally "concern with individual cases") has been used in three different, if connected meanings. In its widest sense, it has described a mentality which pays closer attention to the concrete instance than to abstract generalities. In a narrower sense, it has been, employed to characterise legal systems... In its narrowest sense, it refers to the uses of subtle definitional distinctions in the handling of ethico-legal or purely ethical problems with the aim of drawing fine dividing lines between what is permissible and what is not.⁷

The definition of casuistry reflects that it is a subject which takes as its starting point the questions, what things are good when they happen? A casuist's job mainly consists in the preparation of a list of good or bad things, virtuous actions or vices. While making a distinction between ethics and casuistry, G. E. Moore says:

We may be told that casuistry differs from ethics, in that it is much more detailed and particular Ethics much more general. But it is most important to notice that casuistry does not deal with anything that is absolutely particular - particular in the only sense in which a perfectly precise line can be drawn between it and what is general."⁸

It should be said here that most of Indian ethical philosophers had not done any ethical job, rather they had functioned like casuists. This is evident from the consideration that many renowned names in Indian ethics, such as Manu and Praśastapāda, had mainly engaged themselves in presenting a casuistry rather than ethics.⁹ Probably this is why N.K.Devaraja has levelled a charge against Indian Philosophers that there is a dearth of ethics in Indian philosophy, the reason seems to be that he had made a distinction between ethics and casuistry, because the former is a theoretical study and casuistry is applied ethics, and is not ready to take the one for the other.

Having made a very synoptic treatment of what is casuistry, we are now better placed with some facts to consider two other things, 'morals' and 'morality'. All of us know that these two terms 'morals' and 'morality' are so much common that even ordinary persons, who are not aware with any kind of philosophising, make use of these terms very frequently in their discourse. But when we actually ask: what is their actual connotation? what do they really mean? are they one and the same things?, many of us simply fail to reply to these simple questions in a precise manner. And probably this is why putting forward a point of view of holding a distinction between the two has become a matter of importance now-a-days.

Needless to say that the term 'moral' has been etymologically derived from 'mos' or 'mores', which means customs or traditions or social habits. Man, all of us know, is a social animal. The society in which he is born and

brought up has certain traditions. The family members make him aware with the various social practices and sometimes it is thought that a moral action consists in action or behaving in accordance with social tradition, practices or customs. Society plays a very important role in the acquisition of certain moral traits in an individual, may be that it is not the only factor in man's moral life. There is a possibility of man's life being spent in isolation, but this does not prove the complete independence of mankind. Daya Krishna has pointed out :

Actions outside the context of play and ritual is, however, another matter. It, in the first place, makes one dependent on others as most of the ends we want to achieve through actions can hardly be achieved by the effort of a single man alone. This dependence, makes man social in the sense that he comes, to realize more and more the essential interdependence of all men upon one another. This leads to a sense of community, the sense of belonging to a large whole, but only on the condition that other co-operate in the facilitation of what one wants to achieve.¹⁰

Having made some reference to the customary character of 'morals', we now see that 'morals' and 'morality' have not been uniformly used, and a large penumbra of uncertainty hovers their meaning.¹¹ It goes without saying that the term 'moral' itself has been used in two different senses. In its wider meaning, any action which is liable to be adjudged 'good' or 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong' etc., is termed 'moral' and in its narrow sense only those actions are regarded as 'moral actions' having some positive ethical values such as 'goodness' or 'rightness'. 'Moral', used in the wider sense, is opposed to 'non-moral' but includes 'immoral', whereas moral, used in the narrower sense, is opposed to 'immoral'. It is also noticed that from a point of view of grammatical structure of sentences, moral sometimes finds place as a common noun and at other times, as an adjective.

But 'morality' is something different and at the same time related with 'morals' in the same sense that 'morality' refers to a system of 'moral beliefs', 'moral ideals', 'moral code of conduct'. In the case of 'morals', we see that 'moral' is opposed with 'non-moral' but we do not find anything, in its customary use, as 'non-morality'. W. K. Frankena has, however, used the term immorality in his writings. Similarly the term

'morality' is sometimes used as opposed to 'immorality' as when we say that the essence of morality is love or speak of the morality of an action.¹² Yet another distinction between them is that 'moral' is regarded as adjective applied to a noun or a pronoun (in its adjectival sense) and so it cannot be qualified, by a possessive case particularly in its form of adjective e.g. we very often, say, 'moral consideration' but the expression 'my moral consideration', does not sound much. But in the case of 'morality' we see that it is always used as a noun. This character of 'morals' and 'morality' particularly in the case of 'moral consideration' not to be qualified by mine or yours reveals that 'morals' has a very important customary sense, as distinct from the 'reflective morals'. John Dewey say, "The intellectual distinction between customary and reflective morality is clearly marked. The former places the standard and rules of conduct in ancestral habit, the latter appeals to conscience, reason or to some principles which includes thought."¹³

It is also seen that the quality 'moral' has a distinct feature and on the basis of this feature it is contrasted with one set of epithets and in varying context with other sets of epithets e.g. we use 'moral duty' and 'legal duty'. 'Moral duty' is sometimes contrasted with another kind of 'duty' or 'legal duty'. But this is not the case with 'morality'. Realizing this, G. Wallance and A.D.M. Walker have maintained that 'moral duty' can be contrasted with 'legal duty'. On the other hand, 'moral consideration' may be opposed to (contrasted with) 'legal', 'prudential' or 'aesthetic consideration'.¹⁴

Our discussions, so far, have put emphasis on morals and morality, and the possible point of differences between them. Our aforesaid account of the two amply shows that, 'moral' is a point-of-view, be it a customary or reflective or critical, whereas morality is something as a system of morals. When we make a departure to study what is actually ethics or moral philosophy, this distinction helps us in the sense that ethics can be treated in its manifold perspectives.

To begin with, an ethical point-of-view and distinguishing it from other approaches, it can be just mentioned that whenever we talk in terms of 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' 'virtue' and 'vices' etc., we are

certainly entering into the ethical domain or ethical point of-view. G.E. Moore observes, "It is very easy to point out some among our every day judgements, with the truth of which Ethics is undoubtedly concerned. Whenever we say, 'so and so is a good man', 'or that fellow is a villain', whenever we ask 'what ought I to do?' or 'is it wrong for me to do like this'?, Whenever we hazard such remarks as 'Temperance is a virtue and drunkenness a vice'-it is, undoubtedly, the business of Ethics to discuss such questions and such statements..."¹⁵

The problems of ethics are no doubt of great human concern. But this does not, in any way, lessen our burden that these problems are complex in their ramification. It would be, therefore, in right earnest to consider at least the two levels of enquiries - 'the customary ethics' and 'the theoretical ethics', as system of ethical ideas and ideals. W. K. Frankena, however, adds a third kind of enquiry also under the name ethics but he prefers to call it 'metaethics' which we shall consider later on. According to him there is a descriptive, historical, empirical, psychological, sociological and anthropological side of ethics and on the other there is some kind of normative thinking presenting a system of ethical beliefs, ideas and ideals. W. K. Frankena says that "normative ethics.... deals with general questions about what is good or right and not when it tries to solve particular problems as Socrates was mainly doing in the *Crito*. In fact, we shall take ethics to be primarily concerned with providing the general outlines of normative theory to help us in answering problems about what is right or ought to be done..."¹⁶

The distinction, that we have brought, between the traditional or customary character of ethics, and this as a system of ethical ideas opens out two considerations for us, viz. ethics considered etymologically and the special factors of ethics as system of ethical beliefs, ideas and ideals.

ETHICS ETYMOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED

Though it is not a matter of much significance, yet it can be said that 'etymologically' ethics is that branch of philosophical knowledge which deals with such conduct or pattern of behaviours which have some sanctions by customs and usages. This is evident from the consideration that the two

terms 'ethics' and 'ethical' have been derived from 'ethica' and 'ethica' itself has a derivative from a German word 'ethos', which had been used to mean customs, usages, traditions etc. Similarly, a term 'moral philosophy' is also sometimes synonymously used in place of ethics. 'Moral' deriving its origin from the root-a latin term 'mores' or 'mos'. In fact ethics, in the beginning, started appearing in the form of ethos, customs or traditional pattern of behaviours. But, as the time advanced, people became prone to new way of things. Customary ethics or ethics in the form of ethos, although did not disappear but was substituted by a new mode of thinking in which some kind of reflection on the existing moral codes and traditions began. The result has been that we could get a new dimension in ethical thinking opened in the form of presenting a system of ethical ideas, ideals and beliefs.

ETHICS AS A SYSTEM

In order to have a better understanding of 'what is ethics as a system?', it would be serviceable first to mention various factors which constitute the bases for such enquiry. First, we find that this contains certain forms of judgements in which particular action of set or actions and even persons and their character are said to have various kind of moral qualities such as 'goodness' or 'badness', 'rightness' or 'wrongness', 'moral obligation' and 'responsibility' etc. Secondly, we have certain set of arguments, or reasons, or proofs to vindicate a particular stand-point. Thirdly, we have certain general principles, rules, list of ideals, virtues assuming the shape of some general rules, and these rules are made applicable with particular cases. Fourthly, we have also certain natural or acquired characteristics or patterns of feeling or attitudes which accompany these judgements. Fifthly, we have sanctions which point out what are the additional sources of motivation or obligatory forces.

Considered on the basis of above mentioned factors we, at once, see that a normative ethics is nothing but such a system of ethical ideas and ideals in which certain ethical idea (ideas) and ideal (ideals) work as fundamental ones, and rest of ethical ideas are reduced into those termed fundamental. Acceptance of some fundamental ethical notion is one of the

basic features of modern normative ethics. In these ethical systems only some ethical ideas or ideals are regarded as fundamental ones, and the rest of the ethical phenomena are deemed reducible notions, for example when J. S. Mill attempts to explain his Utilitarianism in terms of 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' the following two propositions become fundamental:

(i) "Utility, or the Greatest Happiness principle holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."¹⁷

(ii) ".....the utilitarian standard, for that standard is not the agents's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether..."¹⁸

Mills' division of Utilitarianism into its meaning, sanctions, proofs etc. is an attempt to strengthen this claim that ethics is a system of some well pronounced ethical ideas. Reasons and sanctions supporting them. When Karl Britton tries to develop Mill's ethical ideas he has particularly this consideration in his mind. And similarly when some recent attempts to bring out definition or essential features of ethical enquiry are seen, we get a reflection of this tendency in all such attempts. To mention a few :

By Moral *philosophy* is meant enquiry into the fundamental principles that underlie all the problems of ethics, especially into the meaning of those predicates, such as *right*, *wrong*, *good*, *bad*, *ought*, *ought not*, which moral judgements apply to various kinds of acts. Ethical theory, as the term is used here is virtually synonymous with moral philosophy.²⁰

Similarly when many writers on ethical philosophy make an attempt to define it as a scientific enquiry, their contention is somewhat directed to same goal. To mention just a few definitions from the text books of ethics:

"Ethics is the science that deals with conduct, in so far as this is considered as right or wrong, good or bad".²¹

And,

"We may define ethics as the normative science of the conduct of human beings living in societies-a science which judges this conduct to be right or wrong to be good or bad, or in some similar way".²²

Still another declaration by C. D. Broad that "Ethics may be described as the theoretical treatment of moral phenomena"²³, and John Hospers' point of view that "...normative ethics. is the attempt to discover some... acceptable and rationally defensible view concerning what kinds of things are good (worth aiming at) and what kinds of acts are right and why..."²⁴, are the expressions to the effect that theoretical ethics is somewhat a systematic study of ethical ideas and ideals.

TYPES OF ETHICS

Under this sub-head, it is intended to present the various types of ethical theories. In presenting the types of ethics it is of some significance to throw some light on a difficulty posed before us in the form of a question'... in what way this division is maintained?' This question relates to the problem of fundamentum divisionis i. e. the basic stand point to be adopted in order to make a division. If we confine ourselves to the question of the fundamental character of a particular set of ethical concepts, basically there are four types of ethics variously called, (i) teleological ethics, (ii) deontological ethics, (iii) ethical dualism and (iv) ethical pluralism.

Before we present the basic hypotheses of a particular type of ethical theory it is of great importance to have some acquaintance with the various ethical concepts. We know that many terms like 'good' or 'bad', 'ought' and 'ought-not', 'right' and 'wrong', 'duty', and, 'not-duty', 'evil', 'virtue' and 'vices', 'the maximum good', 'not the maximum good', 'ethically praiseworthy' and 'ethically forbidden' are used in ethical discourse. Structurally, some of them are monadic while others are dyadic. From another point-of-view, some of them are used for actions e.g. right, wrong, duty, not-duty, ought, ought-not, some others are used both for actions and persons such as good or bad, virtue or virtuous etc. while still others refer to things or state-of-affairs e.g. good, bad, the maximum good, not the maximum good.²⁵ Basically, there are two kinds of ethical concepts, the 'telic concepts'-which have some reference to end or purpose, and the 'deontic concepts' which do not have any direct reference to end or purpose of an action. They are used, sometimes, in utter disregard to what consequence or result they can produce or are liable to produce. For example the ethical concepts 'good' and 'bad' are telic concepts, whereas 'right', 'wrong', 'duty' etc. come in the category of deontic concepts.

The aforesaid classification of ethical theories into four types centres round the basic controversy whether telic concepts are fundamental and other deontic concepts are reducible to them, or whether deontic concepts are fundamental and the telic ones are reducible into them, or whether none of them is fundamental, both types of concepts have their won area of use and none can be reduced into the other or whether all the different concepts are fundamental.

THE TELEOLOGICAL ETHICS

The fundamental hypothesis of a teleological ethics is that telic concepts are fundamental, and other concepts are reducible to them. According to this type of ethical theory, the consideration of end or consequence or ideal is fundamental and an ethicist must be careful in presenting an ethical system in which the concept 'good' or its negative counterpart 'evil' or 'bad' must have a supreme place. This implies that all other concepts as 'right' or 'wrong', 'duty', 'ought' etc. should be reducible to good or bad. There are various examples of ethical philosophers maintaining this position G. E. Moore, for example, makes the assertion "I may say that I intend to use Ethics to cover more than this - a usage, for which there is, I think, quite sufficient authority. I am using it to cover an enquiry for which, at all events, there is no other word: the general enquiry into what is good."²⁶ This shows that the notion of intrinsic goodness is very fundamental in ethics. What is meant by intrinsic goodness? Whether this is something good as an end or, something good in isolation? Moore in his *Principia Ethica* is inclined to take it not only as something good as an end, but also good in isolation. In his essay on "The conception of intrinsic Value" he puts forth the view. He says, *To say that a kind of Value is intrinsic means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.*²⁷

Teleological ethics, we have seen, makes a persistent attempt to show that the term 'goodness' has a central place in ethics, and all other ethical terms like 'right', 'duty', 'ought' etc. are reducible to it. This contention of a teleologist is evidenced not only in the writing of H. Rashdall who makes the pronouncement that the attainment of the maximum amount

of intrinsic goodness is our sole motive behind all actions and, of course, he includes goodness for animals as well in the concept of maximum intrinsic goodness. He declares, "It is to my mind a perfectly clear deliverance of the moral consciousness that no action can be right, except in so far as it tends to produce a good, and that when we have to choose between goods, it is always right to choose the greater good".²⁸

G.E. Moore goes to the extent in his *Principia Ethica*, Chapter V, that even ethical terms like 'right' and 'duty' are reducible to intrinsic goodness. In his words, "Our 'duty', therefore, can only be defined as that action which will cause more good to exist in the Universe than any possible alternative. And what is right or morally permissible only differs from this, as what will not cause less good than any possible alternative".²⁹

Having made a synoptic treatment of the basic hypothesis of ethical teleologism, we are in a position to state that out of the controversialists' stand-points on the issue whether end justifies the means, the teleologists make an affirmative assertion to the effect that ethics is mainly end oriented. Although the teleologists have agreed on a basic issue regarding the fundamental character of good as a primary notion, yet they are very much divided into several camps on the issue whether goodness refers to a natural property or a supernatural property, or a non-natural property. Consequent upon this variation in teleological stand-point we have, on the one hand, a naturalistic teleologism propounded by J. S. Mill and others, a kind of super-naturalism roughly supported by Aristotle, and a non-naturalism advocated by G. E. Moore and others. There can be still many other sub-divisions on the aforesaid views such as objectivism, subjectivism and relativism or relationalism, all of them maintaining different hypotheses but agreeing on the major issue. To put it in the words of W. K. Frankena : "The final appeal, directly or indirectly, must be to the comparative amount of good produced, or rather to the comparative balance of good over evil produced".³⁰ Before we close our discussion on ethical teleologism a passing reference should, however, be made on Frankena's remark "that for a teleologist, the moral quality or value of actions, persons, or traits of character is dependent on the comparative non-moral value of what they bring about or try to bring about".³¹ Here he is inclined to restrict ethical teleologism to a type of naturalism or super-naturalism, but our recognition of some non-

naturalistic view, especially propounded by G.E. Moore and H. Rashdall as upholders of teleologism, makes us amend the position held by Frankena, and it should be said that an imposition to treat teleologism restricting to some non-value ends is not warranted.

DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS

While discussing ethical teleologism we have made it clear that the ethicists of this group have made an attempt to accept morality as end-oriented and also they have regarded good in some way or other the central concept of ethics, and have tried to reduce other ethical notion to goodness. The fundamental hypothesis behind the type of ethical theory we are going to discuss in the section under the heading of deontological ethics is, although conflicting to the hypothesis of teleologism cannot be at the same time regarded as contradicting the fundamental postulates of the former. Particularly in view of the questions whether in ethics terms denoting rules or set of rules have an independent status, whether terms like 'right', 'duty', 'moral obligation' etc. are fundamental, the deontologists try to establish that all these notions cannot be reduced to goodness, rather they enjoy somewhat an independent status either in isolation from the consideration of the end or by going side-by-side with goodness attached to actions or persons. Realizing this feature of a deontological ethics and stating its basic assumption Frankena observes, ".....a deontologist contends that it is possible for an action or rule of action to be the morally right or obligatory one even if it does not promote the greatest possible balance of good over evil for self, society, or universe".³²

The ethical deontologists, we have seen, have developed a particular kind of attitude towards the status enjoyed by the ethical terms like 'right', 'duty', obligation etc. We do not intend to enter into the details of historical aspect of this type of ethical theory, but a passing reference is needed. It should be said that deontologism in a suggestive form is as old a view as Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, for the reason there are some statements in it which show that he held this view. Making a case for interpreting Aristotle as an act deontologist W. K. Frankena has made the observation, "Such a view was held by E. F. Carritt (in *Theory of Morals*) and possibly by H. A. Prichard, and was, at least, suggested by Aristotle when he said

that in determining what the golden mean is 'the decision rests with perception'.³³

In Christian ethics some emphasis is laid on the independent character of moral rules and particularly some of the commands but we do not find a clear case for treating this ethics as belonging to deontologism, but in modern times several stories, like Cudworth, More and Clarke, have made a case for deontologism and particularly in certain classical works of Kant and Butler we find their clear inclination towards this view. Whether Kant is out-and-out a deontologist is a bit controversial matter, particularly in view of Paton's recognition of Kant as a teleologist. Paton says, particularly under the caption 'Goodness is fundamental', "Kant is so in true perspective we must remember that for him goodness is fundamental, and there is no warrant for supposing that he even entertained the conception of a duty divorced from goodness".³⁴ Of course, Paton has made a good case for treating Kant in a teleological manner, for he finds the ground in Kant's insistence on accepting Good will as the only thing in this world or even beyond it which can be said good without limitation or intrinsically good. But we should remember that, if one holds a teleological position and he also sticks to some kind of deontology, it does not amount to holding two contradictory statements. Kant has also laid emphasis on the notion of duty for duty's sake and formulated certain abstract rules which never have any reference to consequence, and this consideration leads one to conclude that although there is some element of teleology in his ethics, yet he is basically a deontologist. Probably this is why W. K. Frankena regards him as an upholder of rule deontology. In his observation, "The best example of his monistic kind of rule deontology is presented by Immanuel Kant. We may here confine our discussion to what he calls the first form of the categorical imperative, 'Act only on the maxim which you can at the same time will to be a universal law'. "In this dictum, Kant is taking a principle, very similar to those quoted from Sidgwick and Rashdall, and offering it as the necessary and sufficient criterion for determining what more concrete maxims or rules we should live by."³⁵ Besides Kant, we also find some statements in Bulter's Five Sermons suggesting some kind of deontological position especially when he says, "... any plain honest man, before he engages in any course of action, ask himself, Is this I am going about right,

or is it wrong?...I do not in the least doubt but that this question would be answered agreeably to truth and virtue by almost any fair man in almost any circumstance (without any general rule)".³⁶

In recent times deontologism, as a revolt against ethical teleologism, appeared mainly in the writings of H. A. Prichard and E. F. Carritt. Prichard, in his famous article entitled "Does Moral Philosophy rest on a Mistake?"³⁷, is inclined to give a negative reply to the aforesaid question and puts emphasis on obligation regarded as independent of consequence whatsoever. And the world could see E. F. Carritt's insistence on accepting a deontological position in his *Theory of Morals*³⁸ and *Ethical and Political Thinking*.³⁹

In the twentieth century itself there appeared W. D. Ross's *The Right and The Good* and *The Foundations of Ethics*, and a person like B. Blanshard finds Ross's view quite akin to deontology, but here, in our opinion, he is more nearer to a dualistic view than to be branded a deontologist, and therefore, we propose to discuss his view in the following section.

The ethical deontologists have shown some kind of unanimity in regard to its fundamental postulate, but they very much differ on the point as to, whether the basic judgements of obligation are, particular or general. Consequent upon this, variation in the opinions of different deontologists, W. K. Frankena prefers to bring a classification of deontological ethics as act - deontological and rule-deontological theory, the second also admitting of two forms the concrete rule deontologism and abstract rule deontologism. According to him: Act deontological theories maintain that the basic judgement of obligation are all purely particular ones like "In this situation I should do so and so", and that general ones like "We ought always to keep our promises "are unavaliable, useless, or at best derivative from particular judgements.. Rule-deontologists hold that the standard of right and wrong consists of one or more rules-either fairly concrete ones like "We ought always to tell the truth" or very abstract ones like Henry Sidgwick's Principle of Justice.⁴⁰

ETHICAL DUALISM

At the very outset it should be made clear that in discussing ethical

dualism and its fundamental hypothesis in a separate section as an independent type, we are mainly guided by the consideration that, certain telic concepts like 'good' and deontic concepts like 'duty', 'not-duty' 'right' and 'wrong' 'moral obligation' etc. on the other, are not reducible to each other. This admission is warranted particularly in view of the fact that a particular kind of theory we are going to discuss here has been mainly discussed as a deontological theory by some eminent writers like W. K. Frankena⁴¹, T. E. Hill⁴², Bland Blanshard⁴³ and others. The view in question is that propounded by W. D. Ross in his two books *The Right and The Good* and *The Foundations of Ethics*. May be that certain writers, in discussing Ross as a deontologist, have been guided by the consideration that a man can very well be a deontologist and at the same time he preserves certain elements of ethical teleologism. But we have preferred to give a separate category to the aforesaid view, the fundamental hypothesis of which is that neither certain telic concepts like 'good' or 'evil' or 'bad' are reducible to deontic concepts like 'right', 'wrong', 'duty', 'moral obligation' etc. And also, we have assumed that ethics is, no doubt, sometimes end centric but it possibility cannot be ruled out that in certain cases actions can be regarded 'right' or 'wrong', 'duty' or 'morally obligatory' even without any consideration of end.

W. D. Ross, while discussing the meaning of right makes this announcement: "The purpose of this enquiry is to examine the nature, relations, and implications of three conceptions which appear to be fundamental in ethics- those of 'right' good in general", and 'morally good'⁴⁴. Ross' recognition of three fundamental ethical concepts viz. 'right' 'good in general', and 'morally good' has led PapitaHaezrahi⁴⁵ to discuss him as a pluralist, but this fact cannot be ignored that 'good in general' and 'morally good' and 'right' seem to be fundamental. Ross has tried to show that right is an irreducible notion to goodness and there are certain prima facie 'right acts' irrespective of the result they may produce. His own assertion is :

"Any one who is satisfied that neither the subjective theories of the meaning of 'right', nor what is for the most attractive of the attempts to reduce it to simpler objective element, is correct, will

probably be prepared to agree that 'right' is an irreducible notion"⁴⁶.

And,

"That his act will produce the best possible consequences is not his reason for calling it right."⁴⁷

W. D. Ross not only recognizes 'right' as an irreducible and indefinable notion but has also taken 'good' as an irreducible and at the same time, an indefinable notion to any other term or concept. However, in certain non-ethical senses 'good' comes nearer to other notions but in its ethical sense it is wholly irreducible and indefinable notion to any other terms or concept. However, in certain non-ethical senses 'good' comes never to other notions but, in its ethical sense, it is wholly irreducible and indefinable notion which refers to a consequential attribute. We do not intend any more to make a detailed study of his view but suffice it to say that his view comes nearer to some kind of ethical dualism.

ETHICAL PLURALISM

Having given a brief account of three types of ethical theories, viz. Ethical Teleologism. Ethical deontologism and Ethical dualism, we have thrown some light on the important types of ethical theories, but there still remains one more possible view preferably termed Ethical Pluralism the fundamental hypothesis of which will be that the different ethical concepts such as 'good', 'bad', 'right', 'wrong', 'duty', 'obligation', 'ought' 'ought-not' are either fully or in their main sense not reducible notions, they have their own realm of use. We find a pluralistic account of ethics in Pepita Haezerahi's *The Price of Morality* and certain cases have been discussed therein, but since we have discussed Ross' view in the preceding section here we propose to take this as a possibility alone, and so we do not think it warranted to provide it in its historical perspective. With these observations regarding some basic problems of ethics, its nature, realm and types, we proceed to discuss yet another branch of ethical philosophy, developed as a separate subject, metaethics.

METAETHICS

The twentieth century philosophical world would find emergence of so many philosophical currents. History of Philosophy reveals that it was

in the twentieth century that the idealistic movement reached to its climax and almost side-by-side some kind of revolt in the form of realistic movement has also been evidenced. But, nevertheless, some kind of metaphysical quest remained there. But this too received a setback in the hands of logical positivists followed by the Philosophy of linguistic analysis and as a result not only a general revolt was visible in the metaphysical world but also a very persistent attempt had been made to declare metaphysical sentences as pseudo statements and metaphysical concepts as pseudo concepts, and the whole metaphysical pursuit was made sterile. This was the negative side of the philosophical picture but, at the same time, emphases were laid on the problem of meaning, criterion of truth and the result has been that linguistic analysis could occupy a central place in philosophy by becoming a very important philosophical tool. Here a distinction between 'philosophy of language' and 'linguistic philosophy' is warranted. To put the distinction in the words of J. R. Searle. "Linguistic Philosophy consists in the attempt to solve Philosophical problems by analysing the meanings of words, and by analysing logical relations between words in natural languages... The Philosophy of language consists in the attempt to analyse certain general features of language such as meaning, reference, truth, verification, speech acts, and logical necessity".¹⁸ Analysis, which had very central place in the philosophical pursuits of more than three decades, was itself not one pattern, and different trends in it have been there, those represented by realists like Moore and Russell and earlier Wittgenstein and that represented by later Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle and a third one known as the Austinian trend. Whatever basic differences be there as to the mode of analysis, one thing was clear that in all the different pursuits a study of language has been the focal point of attention, be it language of ethics or religion or mathematics or logic or epistemology or of any walk of philosophising. The result has been very obvious in the way that we could find emergence of several newer branches of enquiries such as meta-religion, meta-logic, meta-mathematics, meta-epistemology and of utmost significance metaethics.

ABOUT THE WORD 'METAETHICS' AND ITS MAIN PROBLEMS

The coinage of the word 'metaethics' cannot be traced back to a

very older period. Of course, some kind of metaethical pursuits were developing undercurrent and A. J. Ayer, who in his 'critique of Ethics and Theology' undertook this problem, never used this word in his *Language, Truth and Logic*, nor has this expression been made popular by C.L. Stevenson, although he has made a declaration in the very beginning of *Ethics and Language* that "This book deals not with the whole of ethics, but with a narrowly specialized part of it. Its first object is to clarify the meaning of the ethical terms—such terms as 'good', 'right', 'just', 'ought', and so on. Its second object is to characterize the general methods by which ethical judgements can be proved or supported."⁴⁹ So far I could come across this term first of all appeared as late as 1949 with the first publication of A. J. Ayer's "On the Analysis of Moral Judgement", where he uses this term in the sentence "neither in expounding my meta-ethical theory am I recommending the opposite."⁵⁰

In the fifties of 19th century R. M. Hare preferred to use the term 'ethics', though his contention was to mean 'metaethics'. He made a use of this term 'metaethics' along with so many other terms like the 'Logic of ethics', 'Theoretical ethics', 'Philosophical ethics'. His own words are. "The student of ethics will nevertheless have to get used to a variety of terminologies, he will find plain 'ethics' used for what we have just called 'morals' (normative ethics' is another term used for this), and he will find, for what we have just called 'ethics', the more guarded terms 'the logic of ethics', 'metaethics', 'theoretical ethics', 'philosophical ethics', and so on."⁵¹ Now this term is much in vogue in the writings on ethics.

We have not still said anything as to the meaning of 'metaethics'. The prefix "meta" used with "ethics" has a special sense. This signifies 'about' or 'after'. 'About' in a sense, we, in a metaethical discussion, talk about the language of ethics, and 'after' in the sense 'ethics' stands in relation of precedence to it. But it should be said that the prefix "meta", unlike used in metaphysics, when used with metaethics, generally stands for 'about'. Now, what is its subject-matter is clear from the previously quoted statement of C. L. Stevenson. By way of recapitulation it would be serviceable to reproduce it here along with another statement by R. M. Hare. The two statements are :

"This book deals not with the whole of ethics, but with narrowly specialized part of it. Its first object is to clarify the meaning of the ethical terms-such terms as 'good' 'right' 'just', 'ought' and so on. Its second object is to characterize the general method by which ethical judgements can be proved or supported."⁵²

And

"Ethics, as I conceive it, is the logical study of the Language of morals."⁵³

It has now become clear that metaethicists are keenly interested in the various problems pertaining to the language used in ethical discourses. But this raises an important question as to : what we mean by the language of ethics? There is no controversy on the matter that some kind of language is used in order to give vent to our ethical beliefs or attitudes, or arguments so on and so forth. If we look at the structure of ethical expressions we do not find anything of a very unique nature. Structurally we see that there are some ethical words like 'good', 'bad', 'duty', 'not-duty', 'obligation', 'right', 'wrong', 'ought' and 'ought-not' etc. There are some sentences like 'X is good', 'Y is my duty'. 'A ought to be performed', 'K is wrong', 'B' is evil'. There are also ethical paragraphs containing some ethical sentences. Besides these we have also a set of particular or general rules such as "you should not speak a lie", "You should not hit a man when he is down" and also many arguments supporting one or the other standpoint. All these constitute the language of ethics and when a metaethicist tries to study the various problems pertaining to language he takes into account ethical language as such, suggests some analysis about its meaning, functions and also examines certain problems pertaining to suitability and *modus operandi* of various types of ethical arguments. There are some important problems discussed by a metaethicist. The various problems pertaining to metaethical enquiry have been enlisted by W. K. Frankena⁵⁴ in the following manner :

- (i) Problem regarding the meaning or definition of ethical terms or concepts like 'good', 'bad', 'right', 'wrong', 'ought', 'ought-not', 'duty', and 'not duty', 'moral obligations' etc. To be precise, this assumes the form : what is the nature or meaning or function of

such terms or concepts in an ethical sentence or judgement.

(ii) We know that many terms enlisted above have a non-moral sense also and naturally a metaethicist is also one faced with the question how is one to distinguish between the moral sense of these terms and the non-moral meanings of the said terms.

(iii) The third category of problem discussed by a metaethicist relates to somewhat non-ethical problems or related terms to ethics. This relates to the analysis of certain terms or concepts like 'actions', 'conscience', 'free will', 'intention', 'promising', 'motive', 'responsibility', 'reason', 'voluntary' etc.

(iv) We have also certain problems discussed and these problems relate to the methodology of metaethics. Problems discussed here are : What kind of justification or proof be given for ethical and value judgements. To be more precise what is the nature of moral reasoning or argumentation.

Of the various problems enlisted above, basically there are two categories of metaethical problems. Those belonging to the meaning, analysis, use or functions of, to use a broader word, 'ethical expression' and secondly, those belonging to the field of ethical methodology, particularly concerned with the mode, workability and suitability of various ethical arguments and also to the question of validity, invalidity, truth and falsity which are used in common arguments, whether ethical reasoning or arguments stand on par with other modes of arguments. To these problems various point-of-view have been presented by different metaethicists and consequently we get several types of metaethical theories propounding one hypothesis, rejecting or partially accepting other hypothesis.

However, various attempts of metaethicists have been subjected to bitter attacks by those writers who expected some kind of normative ethics from them. They particularly allege that metaethics runs into some kind of moral agnosticism or scepticism and they find some kind of ethical bankruptcy in the analytical approach of the metaethicists. T. E. Hill has not only termed all these endeavours as sceptical but also makes a very sarcastic remark about the approach of metaethicist by saying : "Worst of all, their convictions about basic meanings have often been at opposite

poles, so that what each has affirmed others have denied, and what each has denied others have affirmed. Touching here and there upon the area of today's ethical thought, one has the impression of being confronted by a jungle in which trunks, branches, vines, and briars are intertwined in rich but tangled profusion quite without unifying principle or common purpose."⁵⁵

We find that metaethics and metaethicists venture to provide ethical philosophy a new dimension have been viewed by some critics with anguish. We share our feelings with those writers who find some kind of ethical bankruptcy in today's ethical writings, but we must also assess our expectations and demands. In fact, a metaethicist is engaged in presenting certain analysis of ethical language including ethical arguments, and if we allege them for not doing any normative ethical job the fault does not lie in what they are doing but in our expectation itself. Suppose if we say that a rickshaw puller is not driving his vehicle at the rate of 100 mph. or suppose we allege him of not flying his rickshaw in the sky as it is done by a pilot in the case of an aircraft, then really the fault is not of rickshaw puller. His job is something else and if we are expecting him of doing some other job and if he fails in that we accuse him of some shortcomings. This is certainly wrong. The same consideration is applicable with the allegations levelled against the metaethicists of this age.

REFERENCES

1. B. Blanshard, *Reason And Goodness*, London (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961), p. 292.
2. S. Dasgupta, *Development of Moral Philosophy in India* (Calcutta, Longmans Ltd., 1961), p. 1.
3. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1967), p. 103.
4. Paul Edwards, *The Logic of Moral Discourse* (Illinois, The Free Press, 1955), p. 43.
5. G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1903), p. 1

6. Paul Edwards, *Op Cit*, p.20.
7. W. Stark, "Casuistry", in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 1 Ed. by Philip P. Weiner (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1957), p 257.
8. G. E. Moore *Op. Cit.*, p.3
9. See, S. K. Maitra, *The Ethics of the Hindus* (Calcutta, Calcutta, University Press), pp. 7-19.
10. Daya Krishna, "Reflection on Action" in *Social Philosophy Past and Future* (Simla, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1969), p. 27.
11. G. J. Warnock, *Contemporary Moral Philosophy* (London, The Mac Millian Co. Ltd., 1967), p. 52.
12. W. K. Frankena, *Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice Hall Inc., 1963), p.5.
13. John Dewey, *Theory of the Moral Life* (New York, Halt, Richard and Winston, 1960). p. 3.
14. G. Wallace and A.D.M. Walker, "Introduction" in *Definition of Morality* (London, 1970). p. 4.
15. G. E. Moore, *Op. Cit.*, p. 1.
16. W. K. Frankena, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 4-5
17. J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism* (London, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1910), p. 6.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
19. Karl Britton, *John Stuart Mill* (London, Penguin Books, 1953), pp. 50-53.
20. Thomas English Hill, *Contemporary Ethical Theory*, (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1960). p. 1, note.
21. Arnold Isenberg. Ethics, "Introduction" of John Dewey, *Theory of the Moral Life* (New Youk, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. VIII.
22. William Lillie, *An Introduction to Ethics* (London, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1955), p. 2.
23. C. D. Broad, *Philosophy*, 1946 Reprinted in Feigl and Sellers *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, p. 547.
24. John Hospers, *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* (Bombay, Allied Publishers Private Ltd. 1971), p. 567.

25. See, B. S. Sanyal, *Ethics and Metaethics* (Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1970), pp. 2-5.
26. G. E. Moore *Op Cit.* p. 2
27. G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, "The Conception of Intrinsic Value" In *Philosophical Studies* (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1922), p. 260.
28. H. Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1907), p. 19
29. G. E. Moore, *Op. Cit.*, p. 148.
30. W. K. Frankena, *Op Cit.*, p. 13.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 15. See also Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*, Book II Eng. Tr., W. D. Ross.
34. H. J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative* (London Hutchinsons' University Library. 1946), p. 45.
35. W. K. Frankena *Op. Cit.* p. 25
36. J. Bulter, *Five Sermons*, p. 45.
37. *Mind*, New Series, Vol. XXI, 1912.
38. E. F. Carritt, *The Theory of Morals* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1923).
39. E. F. Carritt, *Ethical and Political Thinking* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1947).
40. W. K. Frankena *Op Cit.*, p. 15.
41. W. K. Frankena, *Ethics*, pp. 23-24
42. T. E. Hill, *Contemporary Ethical Theories*, Chapter, XIX.
43. Bland Blanshard, *Reason and Goodness*, Chapter, VI.
44. W. D. Ross, *The Right And the Good*, p.1
45. Pepita Haezrahi, "On the 'Good' And the 'Right', The Pluralistic View of Ethics", *The Price of Morality* (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961), pp. 68-84

46. W. D. Ross, *Op. Cit.*, p. 12
47. W. D. Ross, *Op. Cit.*, p. 17
48. J. R. Searle, "Introduction", In *The Philosophy of Language* Oxford, (Oxford University Press, 1971).
49. C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven Yale University Press, 1944), p.1
50. A. J. Ayer, "On the Analysis of Moral Judgement", *Horizen* Vol. XX. No. 117, 1949, Reappeared in *Philosophical Essays*, Citation from this book, p. 246.
51. R. M. Hare, 'Ethics', in *Easay on the Moral Concepts* (London : the Macmillan Press, Ltd. 1972). pp. 39-40.
52. C. L. Stevenson, *Op Cit.*, p. 1.
53. R. M. Hare, Preface to the *Language of Morals* (Oxford, Calredon Press, 1952). p. V.
54. cf. *Ethics*, pp. 78-79.
55. T. E. Hill, *Op Cit.*, p. 2.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives**, Rs. 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone**. Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls**, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization**, Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection**, Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya**, Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism**, Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change**, Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed.) **A. Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I**, Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding**. Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units**. Rs. 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact : The Editor,
 Indian Philosophical Quarterly,
 Department of Philosophy,
 University of Poona,
 Pune 411 007