ANALYSIS OF HOW AND WHAT WE KNOW BY A WORD
(IN THE CONTEXT OF BHARTṚHARI)

D. N. TIWARI

Karl Potter is right in observing that verbal-cogition is, logically, prior to the theory of knowledge by inference in so far as whether or not a judgement or expression is true or false cannot be very well decided until we know what the expression expresses.[1] Bhartṛhari is, perhaps, the first-thinker, in the history of philosophy, who made a thorough interpretation of verbal-cognition as the main objcetive of his *magnum opus* namely *Vākyapadīya*. He bases his analysis of verbal cognition, whether it is by a word or by a sentence, on cognition as revealed in the mind by those units. According to his analysis and interpretation verbal-cognition is the cognitive ground or foundation to all epistemological justifications and other sorts of reasoning. Knowledge, for his philosophy, is the knowledge shot through and through by language[2]. The language-cognition unlike perception and inference, is not a passive but active mode of knowing. It is an active mode of knowing because language, in every cognition, reveals itself first before it reveals meaning and the meaning is revealed by it non-differently[3]. Language and meaning are cognitive reals or philosophical beings. Our cognition, communication and philosophical reflexions are not only based on but are confined only to the beings revealed in the mind by the language.

Congnitive analysis of language

Bhartṛhari is not a linguist but a philosopher of language and grammar. He observes language by analysing it, separately, as -

1- language-tokens (*Dhvaniyān/lipiyān*) differing from community to community. They are marks and are taken, by proxy, as reference and designation of the things and thoughts. Bhartṛhari has accepted two kinds

of dhvaniyān. *Dhvani* produced through the vibration of verbal-organs is *prākṛta* and it when replicated and tripleted is *vaikṛta-dhvani*. He, however, takes *dhvani*, as a whole, only as instrumental in the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. It is remarkable here to note that Bhartṛhari has, basically, mentioned the *dhvani* aspect of the tokens only but it can be said well that his view of *dhvaniyān* is not different from that of *lipiyān*. Both of them are included in tokens (noises/utterences, written-tokens, symbols, signs, gestures etc;)

2- language as expressor (*sphoṭa*) which is real-language. It is the illuminator and the illuminated (*grāhaka-grāhya*) for the manifestation of which the function of the former is confind to its being instrumental only.

Real- language (*sphoṭa*)[4], in the holistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari, is the maeaning-revealing language. It is not confined to language-token that is verbal utterances/noises, signs, symbols and gestures which are only instruments helping manifestation of the former. Language is a flash of awareness given ubiquitously in the mind as indivisible unit (*sphoṭa*) which when manifested by language-token reveals itself first and, then, its meaning non-differently. It is by grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*) that the indivisible sphoṭa that is inner, indivisible sentence is, artificially, divided into different words which are also considered real from the point of view of practical purposes. Because of the association of *dhvaniyān/lipiyān* it is, syntactically, divided.

Grammatical analysis of language :

The indivisible sphoṭa, by proxy is divided into syntāctical units for helping the beginners understanding it in components. An account of them[5] is given as follows :

1- *Nāma* :- nominal-words comprising nouns, pronouns and adjectives denoting meanings of an accomplished character. In the scheme of analysis they are explained as a unity of the crude form of the word and of the case terminations. They are expressive of the meanings of an accomplished character.

2- *Ākhyāta* :- verbs are made by the roots by adding suffix "tiṅ". They are expressive of meanings of non-accomplished character. The meaning of a verb is considered as the central and by that reason it is

taken as the central word in   sentence. Its primacy in a sentence is such that nominal-words are cal :d by the term nāma as they qualify or are subordinated to verbs.

3. *Upasaraga* :- prefixes are added with roots or verbs prior to the uses formed by adding verb-endings for a specified meaning. Their expressiveness is not seen independently of the verbs.

4. *Nipātas* :- particles are not qualifiers of anything, they have no qualificandum. They are not used independently as a separate word and that case terminations conveying number and gender are ñot applied with them. They are suggestive of copulative-assemblage and aggregate of two or many

5. *Karmapravacanīya* :- post-positions are related with   actions. However, they are neither expressive of nor suggestive of an action. They only specify the sort of relation between past actions and the accessories if prefixed with the verbs.

These words are further divided into their stems/roots and their respective suffixes and accordingly their meanings are divided in the scheme of analysis sometimes as expressive and other times as suggestive. Grammatical analysis is a means by which the indivisible is made understandable to those who can understand it only through piecemeal and, thus, it is only instrumental in knowing the indivisible. In the holistic philosophy of Bhartṛhari the sentence, as such, is not actually divided by grammatical analysis, though, it helps the beginners to understand it which they cannot understand otherwise. The units derived by grammatical analysis are outcome of an artificial division of the indivisible yet they are taken as real on the basis of functions they perform in grammar and practice[6]. Bhartṛhari analyses the meaning of these analysed units on the basis of analysis of congition (*pratibhā*) revealed in the mind by them.

Cognition by a word

Western and Indian philosphical systems except *Vaiyākaraṇas* involve themselves in the discussion on verbal-cognition, specially, on the occasion of interpreting sentential-meaning which, for them, is an association of the meaning of words. If the same line of interpretation is applied in the context of cognition by a word, quite opposite consequeces may come out.

Of the association of what other meanings the meaning of a word would be cognised so? Letters, as their constituents, are not meaningful units. If it is taken that, though the letters are the eternal units, they are not meaningful and the word, constituted by them, is a meaningful unit then, in the absence of other meanings the cognition by a word will not be a cognition by relating meanings. If it is accepted that the words convey universals without the act of relating, as Kumārila Mīmānsakas say, then it must be accepted as a unitwhole and not as a synthetic unit the letters of which die the moment uttered. If otherwise, the cognition by the word will not be explained in the absence of it as a revealing unit. It is, perhaps, the problem for solving which Kumārila Mīmānsakas accept saṅskāra, as a unity which, for them, is an outcome of the resurrection of the moments died, from which its meaning is conveyed. Naiyāyikas accept word as a conventional unit conveying meaning conventionally fixed but it is difficult for a conventionalists to deny the existence of letters uttered in a fixed sequence of the word in their atomistic spirit even so when there is no possibillity of simultaneous utterance of all the letters of a word. Moreover, they accept aggregate as the meaning of a word without accepting meaningfulness of the letters and, thus, their interpretation is concerned less with the meaning of words and more with the sentential meaning which they try to explain without accepting the existence of sentence even as a collection of words. To explain meaning of a word on the basis of *śakti* (power) is a good initiation but to interpret it as convention leads to an under-estimation of its natural character of being illuminator and the illuminated by the virtue of which *vaiyākaraṇas* interpret both the word and the meaning as revealed units and the cognition by it as the identical-cognition revealed by the word itself.

Unlike *Naiyāyikas* and *rhetorics* of *India*, Bhartṛhari does not accept powers (*abhidhā*, Lakṣnā and *vyañjanā*) for explaining the cognition by a word. A word, for him, is expressive by nature, it expresses itself and its meaning is expressed non-differently by it[7]. In cases where the word is used for meanings other than the expressive meaning, he explains them 1- as *gauṇārtha* (intended meaning) known by the imposition of the expressive or primary meaning of the word by factors like similarity, etc. and 2- *nantarīyakārtha* (non-intended - meaning) known by the nearness or

closeness of the primary meaning of the word. In all the cases of cognition by a word he accepts primacy of the expressive meaning and on the basis of this logic he succeeds in explaining that all meanings are always the meanings of a word and not of inference, memory or other powers. Meanings are revealed units and are not relations known by inference or by other powers (*śakti*). Bhartṛhari, unlike them, does not accept separate theories for explaining the verbal cognition by words and that of by sentences. The theory of revelation of meaning non-differently by the language is equally applied, by him, in the context of verbal-cognition by words and by the sentences, and thus, there is brevity (*laghutā*) and uniformity (*ekarūpatā*) in his theory of verbal-congnition.

What does Bhartṛhari mean by knowing the word itself first? In a verbal cognition knowing a word does not mean only uttering and hearing but identical cognition of a word and its meaning as well. It comprises following cognitions.[8]

1- *Śabda-jāti* (word-uiniversal)-Manifested by hearing of verbal-noises the word-universal reveals itself by which we know that what is heard is not a series of sheer sounds like ringing, roaring, chirping, etc. but that which belongs to the class of words.

2- *Śabda-vyakti* (specific word-universal) - After the cognition of word-universal the specific word-universal is revealed by which we know the specific unit in use. For example, hearing the utterances POT, first of all we know that it is verbal and not sheer sound of a non-verbal class, secondly, we know that the unit is 'POT', as it is revealed in the mind, and not others like horse, cot, etc;

3- *Artha-jāti* (Meaning-universal)- The word-universal reveals meaning universal on the basis of which we know that the unit revealed in the mind belongs to a class of meaning and is different from that of non-meaning.

4- *Atrha-vyakti* (specifice meaning-universal):- The specific meaning-universal revealed by specific word-universal that is 'potness' by the word POT is distinctly known.

In brief pot-token, pot-word, potness and so on so forth are all separate and distinct sphoṭas and they reveal their distinct meanings

determinately known so as they are intertwined with their distinct *spho ṭas* manifested by their separate tokens. As all of them are universals inhered by the pot-word-universal or are revelations of it and as 'universals in universal' is acceped, by Bhartṛhari, there is no fear of infinite regress.

The cognition of the universal of the word in use and that of universal of meaning revealed by that word are given importance as the cognition of svajāti and arthajāti respectively. The cognition of *svājāti* is the clear revelation of sphoṭa in the mind and that of *arthajāti* is the clear apprehesion of meaning (*pratibhā*) revealed non-differently by the former. B. K. Matilal[9] and Radhika Harzberger[10] have translated the term *arthajāti* for thing-universal and consider that word-universal is superimposed upon thing-universal i.e., universal of external thing. Matilal, in order to justify his stand of non-difference of word-universal and thing-universal, accepts an intrusion of a metaphysical entity on the ground that latter is simply a transformation (*vivarta*) of the former. His interpretation is in accordance with *Helārāja*[11] who takes this verse of Bhartṛhari for the explanation of relation between word-universal and meaning-universal by supper-imposition of the former on the latter.

While dealing with cognition by a word Bhartṛhari confines himself only to what is revealed or figured in the mind by the word. The word, according to him, reveals itself and its meaning non-differently. They are only being revealed in character in which the former is word universal and the latter is meaning-universal and the two are non-different as the former is revealed non-differently. It is not proper to translate the term *aṛthajāti* as thing-universal as it is a revealed being. Meaning-universal (*arthajāti*) is imposed on individuals as the ontological apposition of the universal revealed by words in the mind. This interpretation is in accordance with what *Bhartṛhari and Helārāja* actually meant. If *arthajāti* is taken as thing-universal the word, then, will not be expressor and the *arthajāti* will not be the meaning proper of the word and in such a situation the relation of them cannot be explained without imposition of the word-universal on thing-universal.

Imposition of meaning universal is interpreted in three ways.

1- The word when manifested by word-tokens, reveals itself (*svājāti*)

which, from the point of view of cognition of hearers and the speakers, is primary (*antaranga-Tatrāntarangatvādhāraṇatvācca svarūpam mukhyam abhidheyam, HR. on 3/3/2*) because it is understood even if others are not known and this *svājāti* is imposed on other universals and individuals which by imposition are also taken as the meaning of the word.

2- When the primary meaning of a word revealed in the mind is not intended in a use it, due to some simlarity, is imposed on other meanings, for example, cowness (*gauḥ*) is imposed on other meanings like cowherd (*gauravāhīka*).

3- The words reveal meaning i.e; universal which, for practical purposes, is imposed on individual. For example, cowness is imposed on 'individual cow'

It is, generally, an accepted view of Bhartṛhari and his commentators that the word reveals universal. The word, as it reveals first itself, is also universal and the meaning universal is revealed non-differently by it and it is on the basis of non-difference of word and meaning-universal that identical cognition is revealed by the words.

As I have already referred in the earlier paragraphs, that though both of them are units of awareness and, hence the long and short in shape, size, tone, etc., are not applicable in their context, there is difference between the universal expressed by a word and that of by a sentence and their respective meanings. In a very general-sense it can be said that-

1- The word-sphoṭa is manifested by a set of letters conventionally fixed while a sentence-*sphoṭa* is manifested by a set of word-tokens conventionally fixed in linguistic communities.

2- The word-universal, from the point of view of cognition, is an incopmlete while sentence-universal is a complete unit retiring further expectancy for the completion of a unit meaning.

3- A specific cognition by a word is revealed if a verb to be is implied with it. In such a case the universal revealed by that is fully specified and complete in the sense that it extincts the desire of a unit meaning and, hence, not different from universal expressed by a sentence.

Bhartṛhari is an indivisibilist/holist for he accepts the revelation of

cognition indivisibly as a flash and not as one added with the others. He gives importance to theories, popularily known after Kumārila and Prabhākara's controversy as Abhihitānvaya and Anvitābhidhāna, but only as different interpretations of the verbal-cognition which in his philosophy is indivisible *pratibhā* revealed non-differently by the *sphota*. *Pratibhā* is a complete unit, a sentential-meaning extincting further expectancy for the completion of a unit meaning. It is *pratibhā* which, in a scheme of analysis, is taken as divided into word-meanings and interpreted as the association of them.

According to Bhartṛhari's theory of universal all-roots/stems, suffixes, words/sentences are separate and distinct concepts and as all those concepts are manifested by their separate tokens in their several occurences and instances, they are universals. It is their separate universals on the basis of which they are distinctly known and so are their meanings which are revealed non-differently by them.

Bhartṛhari, from the hearer's and the speaker's point of view, analyses verbal-cognition in the following manner-

From the hearer's point of view-

1- Verbal noises are heard first.

2- Manifested by verbal noises the form of the word (*svājāti*) or the word-*sphota* is revealed.

3- The meaning of the word is revealed non-differently by the *sphota*.

4- The meaning revealed thus is imposed on the intention, sometimes on speaker's and other times on the intention of the hearer's himself, due to which the meaning of the word varies in those cases.

From the speaker's point of view-

1- Perceptual entities are acquired by senses including *Mana,* the power of imagination.

2- The revelation of the form of the word (*svājāti*) or the *sphota* manifested by perceptual entities.

3- The revelation of its meaning, non-differently, in the mind of the speaker.

4- Articulation of the meaning revealed thus through *dhvaniyān/ lipiyān*.

Out of all these activities involved in verbal-cognition, of both of the speaker and of the hearer, the revelation of *sphoṭa* is given primacy by Bhartṛhari. Revelation of *sphoṭa* is so central to a verbal-cognition that it, for, him, serves as incentive to other activities involved in a verbal-cognition.

Analysis of meanings of a word expressive of an accomplished character-

All words, in the system of *Vyākaraṇa* are taken to convey all meanings (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*) out of which universal/individual, gender, number and accessories are, primarily, taken as the meaning conveyed by nominal words and universal/individual action, time, number, person and moods, in general, are taken as the meanings known by verbs[12]. An account of meanings conveyed by a nominal word is given as follows,[13]-

1- *UNIVERSAL (JĀTI)* - In the philosophy of Bhartṛhari all words and the meanings they express are universal. It is universal on the basis of which identical cognition by a word, in its several occurrences and instances, is accomplished. The meaning of a word is distinctly known by a word because of its distinct universal. The universal is expressed by both-the nominal words and the verbs. Bhāṭṭa Mīmānsakas also accept universal as the meaning of all words. The word 'dog', in its several instances and occurrences, is known as the same word only because of its universal and identical-cognition by it is revealed. For example, the nominal word '*Rāmaḥ*' denotes universal similarly the verb '*pacati*' also denotes universal manifested by different individual actions like cleaning the pot, burning the fire, putting the pot on the fire and so on. It is universal on the basis of which the word 'pacati' is used in its several instances and occurrences and identical cognition is revealed. All words, for Bhartṛhari, express universal, even the word 'individual' expresses universal on the basis of which identical-cognition by it in its several occurrences and instances is revealed. So far the meaning of proper names is concerned we will discuss it after a few steps.

2. *INDIVIDUAL (VYAKTI)*- Individual is the meaning known by implication as the ontological substratum of the universal which is revealed

directly by the word. It is the substratum of gender, number, etc. It is known as having a specific universal, number, gender etc, constituting it, for example, the norminal word '*Rāmaḥ*' denotes universal (*Rāmatva*) and the individual or particular Rāma is know by implication as the ontological substratum of 'Rāmatva' and, then, its gender, number and instrument (nominative, accusative, etc,) are known as associated with individuals. The words used for nominal are divided in two group 1- *Ajanta*-having a vowel in the end and 2- *Halanta*-having a consonant. As an action cannot be perfomed without an agent and as only by universal no action can take place. Individual is presumed as the agent of the action denoted by the verbs. In case of individual words serve not as expressive but as references to individuals referred.

3. *GENDER (Linga)* - Gender is also conveyed by a word. As individual is distinguised from others by gender and number marked by the suffixes applied with the word. Three genders are accepted in Sanskrit:

> **1. *Masculine*** : The word which indicates the male animate.
>
> **2. *Feminine*** : The word which indicates the female animates.
>
> **3. *Neuter*** : Neither male nor female animates but inanimates.

Generally the gender is distincly known by the suffixes used with the word. It is difficult to decide gender in Sanskrit because even inanimates are presented as male or as female and synonyms are used in different genders. For example, the word *Bhāryā* is in feminine but *Dara* is in masculine and *Kalatra* is in neuter. *Vāri, payas, nira*, are neuter while *āpa* is feminine. It is on the basis of convention that the genders are decided by the word and the suffixes used as fixed for feminine and masculine help us to know the gender by the word. For example, masculine gender is known by the suffix ah in *Rāmaḥ* as it is *akārānta* Top in *Rāma, lekhikā, ajā,* is *ākārānta* which helps us to know the feminine.

4. *NUMBER* - Number is also conveyed by a word. Whether the word is used for one or dual or many individuals is decided by number (*Vacana*). It, in Sanskrt is divided chiefly into three kinds.

i. SINGULAR - One individual, number, person, place, thing or action is known, for example, singular number of an indivdual is known by uses like *Rāmaḥ, tvam, saḥ, pradeśaḥ, pustakam, paṭhati,* etc.

ii. DUAL NUMBER - If the words are used for two individuals, for example, *Rāmau yuvām, tau, desau, pustake, paṭhataḥ*, etc.

iii. PLURAL NUMBER - If the words indicate more than two individuals, for example, *Rāmāḥ, yūyam,te, vayam, pustakāni, desāḥ*, etc.

The word indicative of many or several in Sanskṛt is always used in dual number and not in singular or plural (*dampatī, aświn, dvi*). The words *Dārāḥ, Asavaḥ, prāṇāḥ, Varṣāḥ, sikatāḥ, āpaḥ, sumānasaḥ, apsarasaḥ*, are always used in plural.

Trayaḥ, catvāraḥ, pañca, etc; expressing number are plural. The number 'one' is used in singular but when used in the sense of 'some' plural is taken.

5. SĀDHANA (means), - It is also a meaning conveyed by the words. An individual has several powers. What sort of power of an individual is in operation of an action is known by the word and is indicated by the use of case terminal suffixes, *Rāmaḥ, Rāmam, Rāmeṇa* etc.; conveys that relation for example the nominative case is known by the word *Rāmaḥ*, accusative by Rāmam and, instrumental by *Rāmeṇa* and thus, we know that the individual denoted by the word *Rāmaḥ* is an agent (*kartā*) and not other and similar is the case with other kārakas.

An account of meanings conveyed by verbs is given as follows:

1- Kriyā (action), - Action is expressed, primarily, by verbs. As *vaiyākaraṇas* accept sentence as a complete unit expressive of a complete sense with a primary emphasis on action, it is also taken as one among several meanings of a nominal word. A nominal, according to Bhartṛhari, if implied with verb to be is also a sentence[14]. In this view action in general consists of any of the six actions (*jāyate, asti, vipariṇamate, vardhate, apakṣīyate, vinaśyate*) by implication of any of which the nominal word conveys the meaning action in general[15]. The nominal word *Rāmaḥ* expresses action by implication of taken-birth, exists, etc, But it is the primary meaning of a verb and is indicated by the use of verb-ending suffixes, for example, ti=paṭhati, anti= paṭhanti, in third person of present tense, si, ṭhah ṭha, in second person and mi, vaḥ, maḥ, in first person in sugnular, dual and plural number respectively. Similar is the case with suffixes used in other tenses. Similarly in all forms of roots they are divided

into ten groups namely bhvādi, adādi, juhotyādi, divādi, svādi, tudādi, rudhādi, tanādi, krayādi, curādigaṇa. By suffixes (tiṅ) we know that the word is a verb indicative of an action.

2- Kāraka- The means when employed with an action is known as kārakas. For example, see the sentence, 'The king Harṣa distributed the alms to thousands of Brāhmaṇas by his own hands in Prayāga. Prayāga where alm giving (action) was performed, Harṣa the person who gave alms, hands by which alms were given the gold which was distibuted, the Brāhmaṇas to whom alm was given are instrumental in the act of almgiving. Nominative, accusative, instrumental, dative, ablative and locative these six are recognised as six *kārakas* which are known by the case-terminal suffixes applied with the word. For example, the case terminal suffix ah with the *Rāma = Rāmaḥ* indicates the nominal case.

3- Kāla (Time). The roots, when added with suffixes, fifteen in number, form verbs expressive of action. The forms of verb are formed in ten tenses and moods out of which five-present, future, past, imperfect tense, imperative and potential moods are chief. These tenses are known by the verb-ending suffixes applied with the root, for example, *ti* of the verb *paṭhati*, indicates present tense and with prefix *a* of the verb *apaṭhat*, *syati* of the verb *paṭhiṣyati* indicate past and future respectively. Similarily, *atu* of *paṭhatu*, *eta* of the *paṭhet* indicate the imparative and potential moods respectively.

4- Saṅkhyā (Number)- Verb- endings applied with verbs indicate singular if the action is performed by one person, dual if it is performed by two persons and plural if it is performed by more than two person. Thus, singular by the verb *paṭhati*, dual by *paṭhataḥ* and plural by *paṭhanti in* third person are known by the suffixes applied with verbs and similar is the case with second and third persons.

5- Puruṣa (Person) - Whether the doer of the action expressed by the verb belongs to third, second or first person is also known by the verb. For example, the use of suffixes *ti, taḥ, anti,* with the verb indicates the third person, *si, thaḥ, tha,* second and *mi, vaḥ, maḥ,* first person in present tense and similarly other suffixes used in different tenses convey the speaker himself, first person, if for listener or reader second person and third person

in rest of the cases applied with it, for example, the verb *'pathati'* conveys third person.

6. Upagraha (Mood) - It is also a meaning converyed by verb. *Parasmai pada* and *ātmane pada* of the verb are marked by the verb-ending suffixes, for example, in present tense *ti, tah, anti* (third person) *si, thah, tha,* (second person) and *mi, vah, mah,* (first person) are the suffixes by which we know that the verb belongs to *parasmai pada* that is we know that the fruit of the action goes to others not to the agent and similarly *te, āte, ante, se, āthe, dhve, e, āvahe, āmahe,* are suffixes which mark *ātmane - pada* by which we know that the fruit of the action goes to agent himself.

Measures by which the meanings are known in sequence - As we have seen, in the paragraphs mentioned above, universal, individual, gender, number and means are chiefly known by the nominal words (comprising nouns, pronouns) and action, means, time number person and mood are known by verbs. According to *vaiyākaraṇas* meanings known by a nominal word can be known by verbs and vice versa (*sarve sarvārtha vācakāḥ*). However, universal, individual, number, means, action in general are known by both sort of the words. The sequence in which the meanings of a word, in the scheme of analysis, have been placed should not be construed as an outcome of a fixed rule. It is just a proceedence followed in grammar and there is no instrument in the word for serving as assisting force in causing the cognition of all those meanings step by step in a sequence. In fact the meaning is a unit which is interpreted as a composite analysed as universal individual, etc; for the cause of making it understandable to learners. Bhartṛhari has tried to clarify the issue by the analogy of a painter[16]. Just as a figure (the original model) is grasped by the painter as a single awareness and is painted upon the canvas as an other complete unitary figure, language or linguistic unit (*śabda*) has, like wise, all these three steps. The painter paints the unitary idea or figure in a sequence of parts similarly the unitary cognition, by analysis, is made understandable as a synthesis of several meanings like indvidual, number, gender, means, etc. For explaining the sequence of conseqential cognition of different meanings conveyed by a word Bhartṛhari in his *vṛtti* has given five measures.

An account of the measures, for deciding cognition of meanings in sequence, is given as follows[17] :-

1- Contiguity (*Pratyāsatti*). In a scheme of analysis a word expresses a composite meaning i.e., Universal, individual, gender, number and means, etc; in case of word conveying meaning of accomplished character out of which a hearer first of all grasps that one which is very poximate to his expectancy. According to Bhartṛhari universal is known as revealed by the word first. As communication is not possible only on the basis of universal and as it, without individual, is not manifested in ordinary communatiation, individual is known second by implication as the ontological apposition of the universal. Similar is the case with gender, number and means as they are associated with the individual which can not be known distinctly without them. As a gender does not require to be distinguished by anything other than the individual and opposite to it number and means required to be distinguished by others gender is known prior to the cognition of number and means. Number and means are dependent on others to be distinguished in a similar way but, as the number requires the individuals of same class, it is closer than means to individual and hence, known before means and as the means are dependent on individuals of different class, it is known in the last.

2- Great-concern (*Mahāviṣayatva*)- As universal is ubiquitous in all individuals, number, etc, of which they are wholes. It is more pervasive than individual and hence it is of a great concern (object) in a verbal-cognition. As individual is common to all genders and the gender is excluded by another gender that is where there is masculine there will not be faminine, individual is a great concern in comparison to gender which is of a small concern in relation to individual of which the former is a part. The gender, in comparison to number, is of a great concern as it pervades all numbers. A number as it requires other number in order to be distinguished, is more comprehensive than means. The number is associated with nominal words including means and verbs while means are associated only with nominal words, it is more comprehensive than means and, hence, known prior to means which is known in the last.

3- Degree of excellence (*Abhivyaktemimittopavyañjanaprakarṣa*) - According to derivation '*abjivyaktemimittam yadupavyañjanam*

tasya prakarṣo bhūyastā', the manifestor which is the cause of the manifestation is called so. Out of meanings conveyed by a word that whose manifestors have excellence in number is determined first. As universal is manifested by several manifesting individuals, genders, numbers, etc; it is known first. As individual is manifested only through its constituents that is gender, number, etc; it is known second but prior to number, etc. A gender is determinately known as it is manifested by each individual and a number requires a number of individuals in order to be distinguished, gender is known first and number afterwards. As means are known on the basis of objects belonging to others it is the minimum in excellence of manifestors and, hence, known in the last.

4- Expectancy or desire to grasp (*Upalipsā*): Among many meanings of a word that which is much expected to be known frist is called *upalipsā*. It is on the basis of degrees-acute or remote, of expectancy for meanings that we know different meanings conveyed by a word in a sequence.

5- *Bijavṛttilābhānuguṇya*- It is on the basis of favourable incentive by the cognition of the meaning cognised first that we know the next meaning by the fovour conferred by that. The idea or universal serves as the basis of implication of individual. The cogntion of universal confers favours as the basis of cognition of individual as its substratum and it on the basis of individual by which gender, number and means which are constituents of, it, are known consequently in the sequence. Gender is incentive in the cognition of number and number confers favour in the cognition of means depending on external force in action.

According to *Vyāḍi*, as *Vṛṣabha* quotes,[18] we interprete the same being as comprising universal, individual, etc; on the basis of analysis and describe them separately as it is universal, it is individual and so on. Vyāḍi's interpretation seems right because in the system of grammar meaning is a flash of understanding, indivisible in nature, and is known thus in communication but for the understanding of learners it is interpreted through analysis as qualified by many meaning universal, etc; in which universal is taken as revealed directly by the word and individuals, are known by implication made on the basis of universal as its ontological substratum and

gender, etc; as constituents of individual and similar is the case with the word expressive of non-accopmlised character.

Controversy over the meaning of Proper-names :-

Now coming to the controversy over the interpretation of Kātyāyana's aphorism regarding the meaning of proper names according to which names are given to spatio-temporal-things on the basis of qualities which belongs to them.[19] In order to observe the contrast Radhika Harzberger[20] quotes Bhartṛhari's and Dignāga's statements. According to Bhartṛhari[21] names are given to individuals indirectly on the basis of a universal which belongs in word (śabda-jāti). Dignāga, opposite to Bhartṛhari, observes that a name conveys its object (spatio-temporal) on the basis of the quality which does not exceed over its objects[22]. According to her observation Bhartṛhari has rejected the spirit of Kātyāyana's aphorism and Dignāga has rejected Bhartṛhari in favour of Kātyāyana. B. K. Matilal[23] has tried to reconcile the two uncompromising stands of Bhartṛhari and Kātyāyana by providing an interpretation based on an intimate connection (generic) established between word-universal and thing-universal which is, metaphysically, not different from the former being its trasnformation (vivarta), Matilal's interpretation is supported by Helārāja's[24] commentary which considers all is one being the vivarta of Śabda but this may not be accepted as a cognitive solution to the problem of cognition of meaning non-differently revealed by the word. It simply says that the word-universal by super-imposition is taken as related with thing-universal. This is what Bhartṛhari wants to say by the verse. Radhika Harzberger has frequently quoted the verse for interpreting Bhartṛhari's theory of naming. If she is correct then Bhartṛhari's stands will not be different from Buddhist's theory of naming but this may go against Bhartṛhari's theory according to which the word reveals universal which is imposed on individual or person as an ontological substratum of the universal.

It is true that Bhartṛhari, like Dignāga, accepts that names are given to individual on the basis of quality but unlike Dignāga the quality, for him, belongs to the word. In other words when the words are used to refer to a thing, the universal in that mode of use of words is the quality which belongs to that word and not to the thing and which when imposed on external

things serves as identical cognition of that thing. So far the cognition by personal proper names is concerned, it, firstly, reveals universal which by imposition, on external thing names, serves as the the cause of identical cognition of him by that name. In such a mode of use words, which are expressive by nature, serve by proxy as a mark of the thing. One is so habitual in stereo-typed use of the names as marks of things that the expressive meaning that is universal of them is almost overlooked. But only by that overlooking universal as the import of name-words cann't be denied because in that case indentical cognition by the word will not be possoible. The issue of identical cognition will be discussed later on after a few steps.

Jonardon Ganeri in his paper entitled '*Vyādi* and the realist theory of meaning' remarks "the criterion of identity for every personal proper name is that of a person but in order to understand any one personal proper name I must also know to which it refers. And while it is, of course true that the knowledge of *ḍittha-hood* will be sufficient to distinguish *ḍittha* from all other objects, Bhartṛhari's proposal fails to display what the proper name *ḍittha* and *yaiḍttha* have in common namely that they are both names of persons[25].

Ganeri is right in thinking that a referent must be associated with the identical cognition by a personal proper name as the criterion of the former. What he cofuses is the cause of identical-cognition. Bhartṛhari makes a difference between the word as expression and the word as designation. In the former mode of word universal is revealed which serves as the basis of identical cognition and in case of latter individual is indicated but this indication of the individual, for Bhartṛhari is not direct because the word reveals only universal and the individual is known as as ontological apposition of the universal and it is presumed that the word is used in the case of personal proper names as indicative to the person named. Identical cognition, unlike what Ganeri observes,[26] is not like child's disability of recognition but always a distinct knowledge revealed by the word in all its occurrences and instances. In the knowledge by proper name we must analyse what is revealed and what is presumed because without the knowledge of their distinction one cannot understand Bhartṛhari's theory of cognition by personal proper names in particular. The person who serves

as the criterion of identity of personal proper name in Ganeri's view, is not revealed by the name as what is revealed by the name is universal; the person is presumed by the imposition of the universal on the individual-person. In such a case the name by proxy is taken as a mark of the person named. But confining to presumed part only we can not explain the proper names lacking referent or non-existent and the identical-cognition of person by proper-names because even presumption/imposition requires a cognitive base in the absence of universal revealed by the word there is no possibility of imposition, inference, etc.

It is true that words express universal and individuals are not revealed but imposed-meanings. In such a situation it is justified to take that word reveals universal and the individual is known by imposition, presumption or inference made on the basis of universal as its ontological substratum[27]. Similar is the case with personal proper names in which individual as qualified with number, gender, etc, is taken as the meaning of names.

Clarifying the position on proper-names we can say that Bhartrhari, like Mahābhāṣyakāra Patañjalī, is always conscious of showing that philosophy of language is not concerned with the things in themselves but with meanings as figured in the mind by words. Even the proper names as they are applied and are applicable to many individuals, denote universal. The universal denoted by proper names like *Deodatta* is explained by him on the basis of the indentical cognition of *Deodatta* through all changing stages of his childhood, youth and oldage. The universal, on the basis of which identical cogntion of *Deodatta* as *Deodatta* is accomplished, is the denotation of the proper name '*Deodatta*'. Universal is the idea, the concept revealed by words and is not a quality of individual which is known only by presumption as ontological apposition of universal. Helārāja writes '*Itham oa sanjñā śabdānāmapi jātivādimate jātiśabdatvamityekaiva śabdānam pravṛttiḥ*[28]. This passage is suffice ot tell that he, very like Bhartrhari, accepts that a name is used for a named on the basis of universal which is non-different from the word. He does not accept intrusion of any metaphysical entity for the explanation of meaning of all sorts of words. The words are expressive of universals by natural-fitness realtion and not of things whether imposed or real. Even the words *Jāti* and *artha* are known so distinctly by the universal they reveal[29]. What is revealed by

words is the real being of a philosophical concern. Helārāja writes[30] *śabda pramānakānām hi yacchabdāh tat paramārtha rūpam.* Conclusively, words do not express things or thier qualities. If it is accepted that they express things on the basis of qualities, an unsolvable problem of relation between a linguistic unit and an external thing may arise and this will go against Kātyāyana's aphorism[31] '*Na vā śabdapūrvako hyarthe sampratyayastasmādartha nivrttih* (*vārtika* on Pānini1/1/67). Bhartrhari's and Helārāja's interpretations do not reject Kātyāyana's view that names are used for the individual named on the basis of quality of that individual because these explanations also accept that the words reveal universal but so far individual is concerned it is known by implication as the ontological substratum of the universal and, thus, the quality of a word i.e, meaning by imposition is attached to the quality of things which serves as the basis of naming. Dharmakīrti's and Kamalaśīla's interpretation of names are also in the same line of thinking. Dignāga differs from them in so far as his interpreters accept the quality of things as the basis of use of names. But this explanation of names goes against their own theory of verbal-cognition which, for them, is confind to conceptual constructs hypostatized as external things. In case they aceept the former view they contradict themselves and in case of latter they go in favour of Bhartrhari.

On the cause of Identical-cognition-

Nominalists and realists reject universal as the import of words on the ground that identical cognition, as they think, is accomplished by group (*samūha*), resemblance (*sādrśya*) and the natural power (*śakti*) of individuals which are not different from individuals. Bhartrhari has minutely analysed their difference from universal which, for him, is the cause of identical-cognition.

An account of Bhartrhari's observations is given as follows :-

1. *Samūha* (Group)- Unlike Naiyāyikas, cognition of group, according to Bhartrhari's theory of verbal-cognition, is the cognition of aggregate without an accumulation or option (avikalpa samuccaya)[32]. For example, the word forest does not denote the cognition of different trees constituting forest nor as one added to another but expresses the whole without a reference of plurality. Objecting to the theory of group, Bhartrhari remarks'

In the cognition of group difference is basic[33]. The word forest in case of group, should reveal the aggregate of different kinds of trees similarly the word *Brāhmana* should denote the aggretgate of qualities like austerity, birth and learning and not the identity of forest and Brāhmin respectively. Even the identical-cognition by the word group as group can not be explained if group is taken as the denotation of words[34].

2- *Sādṛśya* (Resemblance) - Cognition by sādṛśya is different from that of group and of identity. According to it there are countless pots and all are different but because of similarity of them we call all of them by the word 'Pot'[35]. Bhartṛhari and his commentator Helārāja elucidates if that similarity is a common idea of which there are countless instances it is not different from universal. If it is not so it will be an addition to the heap of individuals and will not serve as the cause of identical cognition. Helārāja[36], rejecting Buddhists, observes that similarity is the cognition of identity cum difference. Two things are cognised similar only when they are cognised first as different and, then, found to share certain common features. To be similar is not just the same as to be identical and the causes of both of them are different. Bhartṛhari further adds any thing can not be the cause of anything except a capable power. He gives the example[37] of *daṇḍī* (dweller with stick) and says that it is not merely by having a desire to hold the stick but holding of stick which is the basis of designating *daṇḍī*. The desire to hold the stick is the cause of being desirous of holding the stick but not of daṇḍī. The general properties of an individual say, dew, heap, horn, tail, etc. of a cow and those of other cows are the cause of similarity of those properties but can not be the cause of identical cognition 'cow'.

If it is said, by Buddhists, who consider that universals are not perceived that identical cognition is ignorance and that there is nothing identical in momentary instants, Helaraja refutes them by saying that to accept identical cognition as illusory can not be known so without identical cognition caused by that statement (of illusory)[38]. He further argues universal can not be said imperceptible without accepting it as the cause of identical cognition. He counter retorts what is wrong there in accepting universals as perceptible if Bauddhas accept *nīla* (blue) as perceptible. The universal deserves the same claim as that of *nīla*[39].

Universals are perceptible beings and are denoted separately from individuals, for example[40], though perceptionin the expression '*jale mukham paśyami* (I perceive my face in water) is not perception of face but its reflection in water yet the denotation of the expression is face and not the water (medium), similarly universal is denoted independently of individuals through which it is manifested only.

3. *Sāmarthya* (capable power) - Refuting *sāmarthya* as the cause of identical cognition Bhartṛhari argues[41] that mere being of *sāmarthya* is not sufficient for identical cognition as it needs to be cognised as power and the cognition of power as power is not merely a fact of being of power but the identical cognition of it as power. Conclusively, *samūha, sādrśya* and *sāmarthya* if they function for identical cognition are not different from universals[42].

Word-Meaning Relation and the Identical cognition-

The word, in philosophy of Bhartṛhari, is a revealed unit and, hence, a cognitive being. The meaning revealed non-differently by it is also a cognitive being. They are revealed beings and, hence, are of awareners in chacacter. In between these beings the former is eternally fit to express the latter and this fitness of the former, for him, is natural fitness relation (*Yogyatā-sambandha*). But of relation as *yogyatā* no verbal knowledge is possible. The word is naturally expressive and it is its expressiveness that it expresses its meaning non-differently without the act of relating them by memory and inference. This relation is neither a relata nor changed into a relata and hence, it is not known independently of the expressor and the expressed. As it is natural fitness of the language, it is eternally dependent-relation. It is by this fitness of the language that cognition by language, independently of our physiological, psychological and ontological things or our allegiances to them is accomplished in communication.

As a word is both the illuminator and the illuminated the natural-fitness relation, only from the point of view of this context, is called *Vācaka-vācya-sambandha*[43]. It is by the logic of the word as the illuminator and the illuminated that he propounds the active theory of cognition in which a word is conveyed/revealed first and, hence a *vācya* which, from the point of view of meaning it reveals non-differently afterwards, is taken as *vācaka*.

Cognitive-beings are universal i.e, concepts; they are capable of being analysed by mind in several universals and as Bhartṛhari, unike Naiyāyikas, accepts 'universals in universal' there is no case of infinite regress[44]. It is the universal on the basis of which identical cognition is accomplished by words.

Difference between Knowledge and the Object of Knowledge-

Bhartṛhari makes a remarkable difference between the knowledge and the object of knowledge. In a knowledge, the object of knowledge i.e; universal, is known but it is not the knowledge itself. There is difference between the cognition and the object of cognition because the cognition is the cognition of the objects i.e. self-awareness of the object (object-awareness). It is not another in a cognition. Otherness is the character of objects but not of the knowledge itself[45]. As in cognition so in memory and recognition the object of cognition is not cognition but of the object figuring in that cognition. The word 'Jñāna' (knowledge) expresses universal but the knowledge, of the universal, is not of object, that is, the knowledge is the knowledge of some object but it is not an object itself. It is the self-consciousness of the object of knowledge[46]. Individuals are also the object of knowledge but by implication of the universal expressed by the word.

Between Knowledge and No-knowledge-

Bhartṛhari's explanation of cognition as determinate and discriminate knowledge and his theory of verity of cognition are unique contribution in the history ofphilosophy. To take the former first we can say that he, on the basis of his theory of language infuses cognition and no cognition is possible if it is not revealed non-differently by language (śabdānuviddhatā), succeeds in explaining that cognition as such is discriminative by nature. Discrimination is not possible without language. It is generally taken that in Indian Philosophy knowledge is divided, basically in 1-determinate (savikalpaka) and 2- indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and as Naiyāyikas say, none of them is infused by language. The two, according to them, may not be differentiated if taken infused by language[47]. *In Bhartṛhari, we do not find the division of knowledge in determinate and indeterminate. He considers knowledge in terms of cognition and no cognition. If it is a case of cognition it is a determinate cognition.* Cognition ceases to be

so isolately from language. How can the sense-datum of 'pot' be distinguished from that of 'cot' if cognition of them is not taken as shot through and through language? Even the sense datum of 'pot' if separated from the language can not be the object of cognition if it is not revealed by language 'pot'. Abstracted from language no cognition either by perception or by inference, which are only instrumental in the manifestation of the language (sphota, is possible). Cognition by language is always a discriminate knowledge. No knowledge is possible isolately from language and to knowledge is knowledge if it is not discriminative and determinate. Even the indeterminate knowledge, say the knowledge of newly born babies, is also intertwined with language as *bhāvanā*. If not so no activity, crying, tittering smiling, etc; in them, is possible.

Now one may ask a question as to how the universal, a word reveals, can be said as determinate object. If meaning is a determinate-object, it must be individual and not universal. It is true that universals, as Bhartṛhari[48] accepts, are expressed by the words/sentences and that language infuses cognition and, thus, cognition, for him, is always a determinate and destinguished cognition. Everything and, hence, every meaning according to him is distinguished by thier universals. Universals, in his philosophy, are not abstracted-abstractd by several instances and ocurrences of the individual but are self restrained-being of awareness in cahracter. They are given units and are manifested only by the tokens which are individuals. Manifested thus, the word universal reveals itself and, hence, a self-restrained-being. These units are concepts and are called universal only because they are manifested by individuals and not because they are abstracted from several instances. They are distinctly and separately revealed because of their distinct individuals by which they are manifested. Even the individuals are also known distinctly by the words/sentences because of their distinct universal.

Between Verity and valldlty of knowledge-

Now coming to the issue of verity of cognition, it can be said that cognition by language, in the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, is a clear, distinct and a complete indivisible unit, it is a flash of understanding (*pratibhā*). As the knowledge in communications is distinctly revealed directly by the language without instrumentality of perception, inference, etc, and

verification, confirmation, etc. based on them, it taken as a veridical-cognition. All cognition, for Bhartṛhari, is revealed by language and hence veridical. This verity is the nature of verbal-cognition. Even the cause of the cognition of non-verity as thus, is the veridical cognition revealed by the term non-verity[49]. What we count in communication is not the validity of verification by logical justifications and evidences, given importance by logicians for convincing others about the verity of cognition revealed directly by the language, but the verity which can not be denied without a veridical cognition revealed by the language "denial".

Conclusion

Generally, the words express universal and individual is known by implication as the ontological substratum of universal as having a gender, a number and means which qulify it. Individual as it is a qualified being, whether by imposition or by itself, can not be the meaning of the word isolately from the sentence. The use of a word for an individual needs to be qualified and, then, as qualified of a qualifier, it must be the meaning of a sentence and not of an isolated word. Universal does not require imposition of qualities to be qualified, it is directly revealied by words, and hence it is conveyed by all words independently of a sentence. if universal is also presented as a quality, then, it qualifies substance but such a presentation is possible only in case of the word in a sentence; isolately from sentence and even in sentence, all words express universal. Universal is not an abstracted being-abstracted from several occurrences and instances, but a self-restrained-being of awareness in character. It is by them that identical-cognition by the words is accomplished and by the imposition of which we know the individuals qualified by gender, etc. Verbal-cognition, whether by a word or by a sentence, is revealed directly and is shot through and through by those units, it is determinate and as it is a revealed being revealed by the word itself, independently of our allegiances to things, thoughts, theory-impregnation and their justification by inference, etc. it is self-veridical[50]. The self-veridical verbal-cognition is the cognitive base for logical and epistemological justifications.

NOTES

1. It is a version of Potter's statement, see, *Enyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies,* vol. 2, p. 147, 1978.

2. Na so sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte. Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate. *Vp. 1/123.*

3. See, *Vp. 1/56-57*

4. A detailed account of the Bhartṛhari's theory of *sphoṭa* is presented by the same outhor in a paper entitled 'Regarding *Sphoṭa*' sent for publication in *JICPR,* New Delhi.

5. Dvidhā kaiścit padam bhinnam caturdhā pañcadhāpi vā. Apoddhṛtyaivo vākyebhyaḥ prakṛti pratyayādivat. *Vp. 3/1/1.*

6. Upāyāḥ śikṣamāṇānām bālānāmpalāpanāḥ. Asatye vartamani sthitvā tataḥ satyam samīhate. *Vp. 2/238.*

7. Svajātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvairevābhidhīyate. Tato'rtha jātirūpeṣu tadadhyā ropakalpanā. *Vp. 3/1/6.*

8. This account of the analysis of language is based on Helārāja's observations on *Vp. 3/1/7-12.*

9. B. K. Matilal, *The Word and the World,* Oxford University press, 1990. p 36

10. *Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists,* Radhika Harzberger, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Holland, p. 78, 1938.

11. Helārāja on 3/1/6.

12. *Ibid.* on 3/1/1.

13. Bhartṛhari has devoted part III of his *Vākyapadīya* for separate chapters on the different meanings, of accomplished and non-accomplished characters, conveyed by defferent kinds of words. A very general and brief account of the meaning of accomplished and non-accomplished characters, conveyed by words, on the basis of those chapters, is given, herewith, as they are the objects of verbal cognition.

14. Vākyam tadapi manyante yatpadam caritakriyam. *Vp. 2/326.*

15. Janmādayo vikārāḥ ṣaḍ bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ. *Vp.1/3* A detailed description of these six is given by Bhartṛhari in *jāti-samuddesaḥ.*

16.   Yathaika buddhiviṣayā mūrtirakṛyate pate. Mūrtyantarasya tritayamevam
        śabde pi dṛśyate. *Vp.* 1/52.

17.   Tasyapi pratyāsattyā mahṣayatvenābhivyakti nimittopavyanjana prakarṣen
        opalipsayā bījjavṛttilābhānuguṇyena vā grāhyāsu mātrāsvaniyamena
        buddhikramo vyavatiṣṭhate. Harivṛtti on *Vp.* 1/24-26

18.   Harivṛtti and Vārṣabha quotes two verses from Sangraha of Vyāḍi which
        present a holistic view of language, see, Vṛtti and Vārṣabha on *Vp.1/*24-26.

19.   Siddham tu yasyaguṇasya bhāvād dravye śabdaniveśasyābhidhāne
        tvatalau. Kātyāyana's *Vārtika on A ṣṭādhyāyī* 5/1/119.

20.   *Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists,* pp. 1938.

21.   *VP.* 3/1/6.

22.   *Pramāṇa samuccaya,* 1/3, 5/13.

23.   *The Word and the World,* p 36

24.   Helārāja on *Vp.* 3/1/6.

25.   Jonardan Ganeri *Vyāḍi* and the realist theory of meaning *Journal of Indian
        Philosophy,* p. 419, vol. 23, No. 4, Dec. 1995.

26.   *Journal of Indian Philosophy,* p. 419, Vol. 23, No. 4, Dec. 1995

27.   Sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu. Jātirityucyate tasyām sarve
        śabdā vyavasthitāḥ. *Vp.* 3/1/33

28.   Helārāja on *Vp.* 3/1/12.

29.   *Ibid.* 3/1/12.

30.   *Ibid.* 3/1/11.

31.   Vārtika on Aṣṭādhyi 1/1/67.

32.   Samudāyo 'bhidheyo vā' pya vikalpasamuccayaḥ. *Vp.* 2/126.

33.   *Ibid.* 3/1/11.

34.   Samūhāvagrahe hi samūhināmanāvṛttā saiva buddhiḥ sāmānyam gṛhṇāti.
        Helārāja on *Vp.* 3/1/98.

35.   Sakṛt pravṛttāvekatvamāvṛttau sādṛśātmatām. Bhinnātmikānām vyaktīnām
        bhedāpohāt prapadyate. *Vp.*3/1/98.

36.   Helārāja on *Vp.* 93-94.

37.   Daṇḍopāditsayādandaṃ yadypi pratipadyate. No tasmādeva sāmarthyāt sa

dandīti pratīyate. *Ibid.* 3/1/93.

38. Mithyārūpādisamviccaikabuddhirityapi kvacit samyak samvedanamūlatvān mithyā buddheravaśyam kācidabhedabuddhiḥ satyāpyeṣtavyetyanapahnavanīyīni pratiniyatakārya sādhanāni sāmānyanīti sthitam. Helārāja on *Vp.* 3/1/95

39. Yena nīlam pratyakṣam sāmānyamīdṛśameva pratyakṣamiti. Helārāja on *Vp.* 3/1/95

40. Yathā jalādibhirvyaktam mukhamevābhidhīyate. Tathā dravyairabhivyaktā jātirevā bhidhāyate. *Vp.* 3/1/29.

41. Necchānimittādicchāvāniti jñānam pravartate. Tasmāt satyapi sāmarthye buddhirarthāntarāśrayā. *Ibid.* 3/1/94.

42. Abhedarūpm sādṛśyamātmabhūtcāśa śaktyaḥ. Jātiparyāya vācitvameṣāma pyupavarṇyate. *Ibid,* 3/1/92.

43. See, Sambandha samuddeśaḥ. A clear account of this chapter can be seen in a paper entitled' Bhartṛhari's philosophy of relation between word and meaning, *JICPR*, Vol. XI. No. 2, pp. 43-55. 1994.

44. Helārāja on *Vp* 3/1/11.

45. Jñeeyasthameva sāmānyam jñānānāmupakārakam. No jātu jñeyavajjñānam pararūpeṇa rūpyate. *Vp.* 3/1/104.

46. Yathā jyotiḥ prakāśena nānyenābhiprakāśyate. Jñānākārastathānyena na jñānenopagṛhyate. *Ibid.* 3/1/104.

47. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa *Nyāyamañjarī*, Vol, II. p. 100.

48. Na so' sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte. Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate. *Vp.* 1/123.

49. Yathā ghaṭādīnām dīpaḥ prakāśakaḥ*svaprakāśe dīpāntaram nāpekṣate, tathārthasya prakāśakam jñānamātmaprakāśanāya prakāśantarānapekṣamiti svaprakāśakam siddham... samvedanabhāge pi sāmānyayoga iti sākārāḥ svaprakāśā niḥsāmānyā buddhyaḥ siddhāḥ.* Helārāja on *Vp* 3/1/104.

50. For a detailed account of the concept of knowledge revealed by lanagage independently of things and our allegiances to them see the paper entitled' Possibility of Disinterested Knowledge : A Bhartṛharian Approach, *JICPR*, Vol. XV. No. 3 pp. 47-69, 1998, by the same author.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives,** Rs. 10/-

S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone.** Rs. 25/-

A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls,** Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization,** Rs. 50/-

S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection,** Rs. 70/-

Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya,** Rs. 60/-

M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism,** Rs. 50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change,** Rs. 25/-

S. S. Barlingay (ed.) A. **Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I,** Rs. 50/-

R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding.** Rs. 25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units.** Rs. 30/-

Rajendra Prasad, **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language** Rs. 100/-

Contact :   The Editor,
Indian Philsophical Quarterly,
Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona,
Pune 411 007