DISCUSSION II

ARE DRAVID'S MĀHAVĀKYAS FREGEAN MAHĀVĀKYAS?

Apropos to Professor Dravid's rejoinder to my comments in this Journal, I offer the following proof, which will clear much of the confusion, taking the cue from Dravid's own final re-statement of the problem. Dravid's main thrust here is to explain how Fregean Mahāvākyas and Mahāvākyas per se (Dravid's Mahāvākyas) are diametrically opposed. Does he succeed to show that they are? Once he is proved that he is not, then he should agree that his Mahavakyas are no different from Fregean Mahāvākyas. Consider,

- Pure Consciousness = Pure Consciousness
 Is an identity vākya, for the precise reason that they have pure referents.
 The onus is on Dravid to explain the 'pure' referents. That is, Dravid can agree that:
- Pure referend = Pure referend
 But he will classify this as Fregean Mahāvākyas. For Dravid, this is diametrically opposed to,
- Tvam = Tat
 which is Dravid's Mahāvākyas.
 Now, Dravid states the precise reason why Fregean Mahāvākyas are to
 be treated as opposed to his variety. That is because,
- 4. Empirical consciousness = Universal consciousness which is *ex hypothese* non-identical. This is what that needs explanation especially after the 'shed'-ing of the clause. Now,
- Tvam = Tat

Indian Philosophical Quarterly XXVIII No 1 January 2001 is not paraphrasable into,

- Empirical Consciousness is the same as Universal Consciousness.
 This is just like,
- Morning star = Evening Star and the latter corresponds to,
- 8. 'Morning Star' is the same as 'Evening star'.

The above sentences are not equivalent because they do not pass Church's test, for the specific reason that the former is use and the latter is mention of the sentence.

This is quite agreeable from Church's point of view (Kenneth Taylor 1998). Is this also equally agreeable to Dravid? But for Dravid, unfortunately this should be enough to show that Fregean identity $v\bar{a}kyas$ are tautologies. They are not identical from Dravid's own point of view, especially when they are mentioned. So, it transpires that identityvakya for Dravid is only a tautology of the form A=A. When A=B, they are not tautologies, but they are neither identities according to Dravid. This is exactly what is not acceptable to Kenneth Taylor and to me as well as to Professor Bokil (Kanthamani)

Now, the exact move Frege employs is to add sense so as to see that,

- 9. Meaning (reference plus sense 1) = Meaning (reference plus sense 2) which is just equivalent to the (7) above.
 - But for Dravid, (6) should be understood only with reference to suggestive mode of meaning (SM), which comes to,
- 10. SM (reference minus sense 1) = SM (reference minus sense 2)
 The question is whether this Dravidväkya is an identityväkya or not.
 When the 'shed'-ing 'sense' clause that Dravid recommends, the common denominator should be explained as (11):
- Sm (pure referent) = SM (pure referent)this is according to him is just equivalent to 12):
- 12. SM (pure referend) = SM (pure referend) = Pure Consciousness

But this is exactly what Frege says in,

13. Morning Star = Evening Star = Venus

Venus as the pure referend is Venus irrespective of plus or minus. This is only a difference between Tweedledom and Tweedledee. In what other way Dravid wants to distinguish, he should tell us. May be that he will say that,

- 14. Empirical Consciousness = Pure Consciousness
- is not an identityvakya in which case, it will be impossible to get the plus or minus but he will get not the denial of identity, but only a case for indeterminacy, that is, we will get only that (14) is not translatable into (15):
- (15) Empirical Consciousness is not identical with Pure consciousness.

 But this is not what is recommended in his *plus-minus* strategy. That is, to say Dravid may get only (16):
- 16. 'Tvam=Tat' is not translatable into that 'Tvam is the same as Tat'.

 To do so amounts only to distinguish between use and mention. This is different from the Dravid' strategy of *plus* and *minus* discussed in the above. Voila, Dravidvakyas are that much different from Fregean ones!

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