BOOK REVIEW I

a) *Ātmatattvaviveka of Udayanācārya* with Translation, Explanation and Analytical - Critical Survey by N.S.Dravid, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1995, x + 587, Rs. 900


N.S. Dravid, a Veteran scholar of Indian Philosophy, has translated two major works of Udayanācārya, a stalwart of the Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika School. Both these books have been translated in Indian languages by competent scholars. Thus, *Ātmatattvavivena* has been translated into Bengali along with elaborate notes by Pandit Dinanatha Tripathi, and a Hindi translation of this book prepared by Pandit Kedarnath Tripathi is also available. A Bengali translation of *Nyāyakusumānjali* has been prepared by Pandit Srimohan Tarkatirtha, and a Hindi translation of the same has been done by Pandit Durgadhar Jha. Through the commendable efforts of these scholars, these abstruse texts of Udayanācārya have now become accessible to readers who cannot, by themselves, cope with the terse writing of Udayanācārya. It is gratifying to note that a scholar like N.S. Dravid has undertaken the difficult job of translating *Ātmatattvavike* and *Nyāyakusumānjali* into English. Thanks to his efforts, these two masterpieces of Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika School are now accessible to a larger number of readers who are interested in Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika Philosophy.

Dravid has printed the Sanskrit texts along with the English translation,
and he has also split up the Sanskrit words in the original text in such a manner that people who have some knowledge of Sanskrit can match the Sanskrit text with the English translation with ease. (He has not, however, mentioned which of the editions of these two texts have been adopted by him. There is also no evidence of preparing any critical editions of the texts concerned.) At the end of the translation of Sanskrit passages, there are explanatory notes where some different issues have been discussed. Many years ago, an English translation of the verse - portion (Kārikā-s) of Nyāyakusumānjali along with the commentary of Haridasa Bhattacharya was prepared by E.B. Cowell, and a few years ago, an Indian reprint of this work has been published. That translation is not, however, of much help to uninitiated readers. The translations prepared by Prof. Dravid are much more lucid, and accordingly, of much more help to interested readers. Prof. Dravid belongs to a very famous family of Pandits known for their Scholarship in Indian Philosophy, and one wishes there were more persons like him, who could translate such difficult works in Sanskrit into readable English.

These two books of Udayana are of two different types - Ātmatatttvaviveka, which aims at defending the Nyāya theory of self against the criticisms of Buddhists, who are supporters of nairatmyavada, is overtly polemical in character. From a close study of the commentary Ātmatatttvavivekakalpalata by Śankara Misra, one can easily see that here, the principal opponents for Udayana were Jñānasrimitra and Ratnakirti, two famous Buddhist philosophers who belonged to the famous monastery at Vikramasila. This can be corroborated further if we compare relevant portions of Ātmatatttvaviveka with related portions of Jñānasrinibandhvali and Ratnakirtinibandhvali, photo-copies of which were brought to India by Mahapandita Rahula Sānkṛityayana, and which have been since published from K.P. Jaiswal Institute, Patna. For the Naiyāyikas, self is a permanent substance that can be characterised by qualities like cognition, desire, effort, pleasure, pain etc. which may be an object of internal perceptions like "I am happy", "I am knowing" etc. Udayanacarya has anticipated four possible objections that may be raised by the Buddhist against this doctrine by opposing each of the separate claims made by the Naiyāyikas. Thus, the
Buddhists might claim that since all existent entities are momentary, there can be nothing that can be permanent; and hence, the claim that the self is a permanent entity cannot be admitted. Again, the Buddhists may claim that cognition alone is real, and as such, there can be no self that can be a substratum of cognition. Further, the Buddhists may maintain that there is no substance over and above the qualities that are supposed to belong to such a substance, and hence, the claim that the self is a distinct type of substance different from earth, water, etc., is not tenable. Finally, the Buddhists may claim that while we may be aware of internal states like cognition, pleasure, pain etc., we do not perceive any self apart from such states. These four possible objections have been discussed thoroughly, and then rejected by Udayanacarya in the four sections of Atmatattvaviveka that are known as

(a) Ksanabhanga\&dhya\&a,  (b) Bhyarthabhanga\&dhya\&a,  
(c) Gun\&guni\bhedabhanga\&dhya\&a and (d) Anupalambha\&dhya\&a.  
Atmatattvaviveka seems to be the first work of Udayanacarya, and in his youthful, vigour, he has adopted a very aggressive style while answering his opponents. The sarcastic expressions of J\&nasrimitra have been met with equally sarcastic answers. But, the style of Udayanacarya's writing is very terse, and it is often difficult to follow the chain of his reasoning without the help of commentaries that often provide us with the necessary hints for reconstructing his argument, or for connecting portions of his writing with earlier or latter portions of the same. The style adopted in Ny\&yakusuman\&jali is comparatively more serene, though the terseness of his writing has perhaps increased; and here, Udayanacarya attempts at proving the existence of God against the anti-theistic arguments that were advanced by the opponents of the Ny\&ya - Vai\&\e{s\&\i}s\&\i}ka school. Here, too, Udayana begins his book by stating five basic objections that may be raised against the Ny\&ya - Vai\&\e{s\&\i}s\&\i}ka view that there is a Creator God, who is responsible for the creation, maintenance and destruction of the universe; whose commands regarding what we should do and what we should not do are enshrined in the Vedas, who is merciful and according to whose desire, words mean what they stand for. These five basic objections have been discussed and refuted in five chapters that constitute Ny\&yakusuman\&jali. In both these works, Udayanacarya has discussed
a number of epistemological and ontological doctrines that are central to the
tenet of the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika school, and no scholar, who wants to gain some
expertise in Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika Philosophy can afford to ignore these two
important, but extremely difficult works of Udayanācārya. It may now be
hoped that with the aid of the translations prepared by N.S. Dravid, studies in
Nyaya - Vaiṣeṣika philosophy will receive a new impetus.

These two translations would have been more helpful to readers if the
Introductions had contained some more material about the other works of
Udayanācārya, and also about his contribution to Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika Philosophy
as a whole. A careful comparison of Udayana's works with Tattvacintāmāni
of Gangeśa' Upādhyāya, who is usually considered to be the father of Navya-
Nyāya, clearly shows the extent to which Ganges'a was influenced by
Udayana. A few lines about the commentaries on these works that are
available would also have enhanced the usefulness of these translations.
Dravid has promised to bring out another volume on Nyāyakusumāṅjali and
we ardently hope that he will kindly enlighten his readers on these issues.

There are some minor blemishes in these two translations that are, on
the whole, both faithful and readable. We mention some of them with the
hope that they will be corrected when further editions of these works will be
called for.

1) There are some misprints in the Sanskrit texts. Thus, in the Sanskrit text
printed on p.20 of Ātmātattvaviveka, avilamba has been printed as ahvilamba.
Again on p. 72 of the same book, avastuna has been printed as anvastunah,
sutasya has become suvasya, vaktva has become vaktutva, pramanam has
become pramanat, vidyamānatvāt has become vidhmanatvān, asmāt has
become anmiat and ucatye has become ucmate. Again the same explanatory
passage has been inadvertently printed on pp. 241-242 of Ātmātattvaviveka.
In the case of Nyāyakusumāṅjali too, na Vidhantarasaṃbhavah has been
printed on p. 105 as na vicāra-antara-sambhavah. Such misprints are a sort
of eye-sore in such prestigious publications, and it seems that the proofs were
not properly corrected when these translations were being printed.

2) In some cases, the Sanskrit expressions have been split up in an improper
manner. Thus, on page 208 of Ātmatattvaviveka, Ksiram Vihaya ruchirarocakagrastasya sauvire should be split up as: Ksiram vihaya rucih arocaka - grastasya sauvire. Instead of this, it has been split up as ... rucira - rocaka - grastasya .... which is extremely misleading, because the word rucih stands for taste, while rucira means beautiful! This is just one example. We refrain from citing other cases for keeping this review within the prescribed limits.

3) In some cases, transliteration of Sanskrit words has not been done properly. Thus, in place of correct transliteration as "Jñānaśrī" one reads "Ghanasri" on pp.211,214,215,228 and 388 of Ātmatattvaviveka.

4) In some cases, the translation has been careless. Take for example, the sentence: "Nāṇā Sāśnādimādyaktivat svarga-locana-bāṇa-ambu-kulisādisu api gosabdasanketagrahavasānāvasāt tathāvidhāpratīyayanyugamaprasanat" on page 181 of Ātmatattvaviveka, which has been translated as follows:

"Just as the word 'cow' is used for different individuals endowed with dewlap, so by different conventions the same word 'cow' is used for heaven, eyes, arrows, water, thunder, etc., and so as a result of the urge for the knowledge of the conventions of this word, all these different entities denoted by the word 'cow' should be comprehended as endowed with a common character."

Here, Dravid has certainly overlooked the fact that while the Sanskrit word 'go' is used in that language in various senses, the same is not true of the English word 'cow'. The translation here would certainly astonish readers who are ignorant of Sanskrit.

Let us take another example from p.6 of Nyāyakusumānjali.

Here, the sentence "Sattve api tasyapramāṇatvat" has been translated as "that even if God's existence is envisaged on the basis of some proof, the latter is not valid." This runs totally counter to the opening sentence of the "Fourth bunch of flowers" on p. 333 which is directly linked to the sentence quoted above. Here, Udayana says - "nanu sadāpisvarajñanam pramanānām tallaksanayogāt", which has been duly translated on p.33, by Dravid as
follows:

"Isn't it a fact that although God is all-knowing this knowledge is not valid, as it does not fulfill the definition of validity"?

The first sentence of the fourth Stavana merely amplifies the objections anticipated on p.6, and it should now be clear that the translation of "Sattve api tasyapramanatvai" as provided by Dravid, is not tenable.

5) On p. 248 of Ätmataativaviveka, the sentence tasya pratijñarupatayā Kulirasyeva svaprasutasya vyāpatyenaiva pratiḥatatavā has been translated by Dravid as follows:

"Thus like the mongoose being killed by its own progeny, reflection will be eliminated by the very consequences which it entailed".

Here, it is obvious that for Dravid, the word Kulir stands for a mongoose. Similarly, on p.427 of the same work, we come across the sentence caitya-cīvaradi partipadakānam tu svasthirmamasanśaya darsanatarṣṭhitidvēṣah has been translated as follows:

"The basis of the doctrines prescribing obeisance to the sacred pillars and the discarding of clothes which entrench themselves on their own presuppositions, is their aversion to opposed points to view."

Once again, it is clear that for Dravid, the word caitya stands for a sacred pillar, while the word cīvara stands for discarding of clothes. We beg to differ from Dravid in all these three cases. First, as far as we know, the word Kulir stands for a crab, and not for a mongoose. It is not a well-known fact that a mongoose is killed by its own progeny. On the other hand, there is a widespread belief that when the offsprings of the mother-crab are hatched from the eggs, they feed upon their mother as they grow, and when they come out of the mother-crab's body, she dies as a result of this process. Compare, for example, the following sentence in Arthaśastra of Kautilya - karkatakasadharmano hi janakagaksah rajaputra. Again, caitya is a structure that contains the mortal remains of some venerable saint of the Buddhist order and cīvara stands for the outer robe worn by a Buddhist monk. One of the principal rituals of Buddhist laity is known as kathinacīvaradāna, where
robes are offered to Buddhist monks. Besides, Buddhists specifically prohibit nudity on the part of monks. Thus, *civara* can never mean "discarding of robes".

In like manner, on P.192 of *Nyāyakusumānjali*, we come across the sentences.

(i)  
\[ \text{tathā hi - bhuyastra karmalāghavamityalasah} \]

and

(ii)  
\[ \text{saptaghatikabhojanadisiddherjivikā ityayogyah}. \]

These sentences which seek to show that persons who are unacceptable to the society faithful to vedic practices are welcome to join the Buddhist order, have been translated by Dravid on p.201 as follows:

(i)  
"Since in the Buddhist fold none is required to work hard, even lethargic persons can thrive by espousing Buddhism.

(ii)  
"There are again those incomplete people who for the mess of pottage are drawn towards Buddhism which allows free board at all hours of day and night".

Here too, we are unable to agree with Dravid. The first sentence quoted above should be understood in the context of an earlier sentence, viz. *na hyatralaśyadinimittam, duhkhhamaya karmapradhānatvāt* where Udayanācarya claims that no one joins the vaidika fold due to lethargy, because many rituals that are strenuous have to be performed by its members. Thus, *karma* in the sentence mentioned above stands from rituals which entail hardships like fasting, gifting of dakṣinā etc., and not just for any activity whatsoever. Again, Buddhist monks are specifically prohibited from taking any meal after midday - in fact, a major split in the Buddhist Sangha took place when it was found that some monks from Vaisali were taking food even when the shadow indicating mid-day had increased by a length of two fingers and they were excommunicated by more orthodox monks. Thus, free board at all hours of day and night were not available to Buddhist monks, and Udayana being sufficiently knowledgable about Buddhist practices,
he could not have brought baseless charges against them. It is however, a fact that the food collected by Buddhist monks through begging was usually brought to the monastery and shared by all - thus, all members could have some food within mid-day.

Take for example yet another, sentence that occurs on p.192 of Nyāyakusumānjali "Ubhayorantaram jñātva kasya śaucam vidhiyate iti sravanāt avyagrātābhimaninah. This has been translated on p.201 as follows:

"There are also those persons who following the precept contained in the well-known remark that if the body is filthy and the soul surrounded by the body is absolutely pure. then realising their radical difference, one cannot decide which of these two is to be purified; do not bother about piety, Straightaway adopt Buddhism."

Here, Dravid has kindly supplied the translation of the first half of the verse, the second half of which was quoted by Udayana. The full verse reads as follows:

Atyantamalino dehah dehi cātyantanirmalah |
Ubhayorantaram jñatva Kasya śaucam vidhiyate||

But while this translation contains something important for understanding Udayana's intention, the sentence quoted above still remains grammatically incomplete.Perhaps some portion of it has been left out due to the printer's inadvertence.

(6) On P. 425 of Atmatattvaiveka, one comes across the line traivanikabahiskartairanadadhikāribhirananyagatikavat, Kirtiprajñākāradivat. This related to the reasons, for which some people, in the opinion of Udayana, join the Buddhist order, Dravid translates this sentence as follows:

"Also some persons who are ostracised by the people of the three main castes, and are not sufficiently qualified have upheld there gospels because they have no other go. Such are the scholars called Kirti and Prajñākara.

Here, 'Kirti' is an abbreviation for 'Dharmakirti', the name of the
author of the famous Buddhist works like Pramāṇavārttika, Nyayabindu, Hetubindu etc. 'Prajñakara' is the short form of Prajñakaragupta, who composed a Bhāsya on Pramāṇavārttika and was also the main founder of Sakaravijnānavada, as can be known from the works of Jñanasrimitra. Such information would have been enlightening to the readers.

On p.433 of Atmatalhvariveka, the following sentence is found - 'alabhe mattakasinyah drsta tiryakāsu kāmīta ityudāharaṇādīti. This has also been properly translated by Dravid as follows:

"As the saying goes, if a ravishing beauty is not available for sexual gratification of a young man, he runs after even an animal to satisfy his lust".

The half verse quoted by Udayana has been taken from Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmañāti.

7) On p. 433 of Atmatatttvaviveka, the word samsāramocaka has been translated as Buddha'. This is a case of serious mistake. Samsāramocaka happens to be the name of a heretic sect who believed that animals should be killed out of mercy, as it would free them from a life full of suffering. Nyāyamanjari and Agamadambara of Jayanta Bhatta mention this sect, which was prevalent at that time, in Kashmir, and whose adherents were asked to leave the country by Sankaravarman, the king of Kashmir, whom Jayanta served as a minister. The evil practices of this sect are described by Jayanta as follows :

samsāramocakāh pāpāh prānihimsāparāyanah

Jayanta also clearly distinguishes between Buddhists and Samsāramocakas in the following verse :

Samsāramocakam sprśtyā śistah snāti savasasah
Baudhārīrapī sahitasam vyavahāre na kaścana

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