RULE AND RULE-FOLLOWING SKEPTICISM

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I

Rule is a set of directions arbitrarily designed to guide, explain and justify our varied day-to-day activities. Rule, once accepted, becomes universal and acts as a norm over its unlimited and infinite applications. Rule as a norm has to satisfy two conditions: On the one hand, it guides us to select the appropriate action among the available options, on the other hand, it provides the justification for such selection. This is apparently an impossible job on the part of follower to determine the infinite applications of the rule considering his cognitive limitations. There is a contrived tension in bridging the gap between the rule and its applications. It is argued that any rule can be extrapolated in an infinite ways and equivalently, any set of behaviours can be held to fit a single rule. The indeterminacy of the applications of rule can give rise to a paradox: the same rule being interpreted in contradictory ways or the follower may not be following the rule, which he was following previously to account for the same act. This is the problem of the rule-following skepticism.[1] The rule-following skepticism puts grave question mark to the rule-based explanations of human actions and behaviours having broad implications for all areas of philosophy.

I argue, following Wittgenstein, that the rule-following skepticism arises because of the misunderstanding of the concept "rule" and "rule-following" and a conceptual analysis of these expressions will resolve the misunderstanding. The conceptual analysis is a grammatical investigation, in which philosophical problems are resolved and confusions are eliminated by describing the use of the words, clarifying the grammar of the

expressions and tabulating the rules for the use of words. This is an investigation into the posibility and actuality of conditions of rule follow-ing. The conceptual analysis is undertaken in the frame-work of philo-sophical grammar provided by Wittgenstein.

II

It is an obvious fact and apparently unproblematic to state that our day-to-day activities are rule-governed. We teach ourselves by reference to rules; we guide and explain activities by citing the rules that govern them. Rules can appear in the form of plain orders, commands, theories and mathematical formulas and are associated with human activities in the form of meaningful criticism, encouragement and correction etc. Conspicuous cases of such rules are rules of games, legal rules, the traffic codes, rules of etiquette etc. These rules regulate our movement on the road, explain the possibility of meaningful interpersonal communication, teach us how to do a mathematical calculation, provide reason to why we did what we did, govern the meaningful movements of chess pieces in the game of chess, so on and so forth. The behaviors and actions that are explained on the basis of some rules are the applications of the rules. So my stopping at the red signal is an application of the traffic rule "do not cross the road when there is red signal". The applications of a given rule are the extensions of the rule and can be called as an action-type.[2] The action-type is an open-ended class having infinite members. For example, the applications of the rule "+2", such as 1002, 1004, 1006 etc. are unlimited and unbounded.

Rule acts as a constraint over an indefinite number of cases, therefore, it is relevant for an indefinitely large number of action-types. The employment of the rule presupposes the independent identifiction of its infinite applications or laying down the conditions of its application in advance. This characterization of rule makes it a normative issue. The normativity of rule puts certain constraints on usage over an indefinite variety of cases and determines the meaning independently of any particu-lar use. Hence, rule is a "normative- regularity" or "normative-con-

straint"[3], which regulates òur actions and behjaviors by providing *the necessary* and *sufficient* condition to fit a particular action as the extension of the given rule.   Rule, like the ethical norm, is normative in nature for rule is *prescriptive and prohibitive* in nature; prescribes to act positively in accordance with the given rule and prohibits the unwarranted extension of the given rule.   The normativity of rule puts evaluation constraints on having unjustified applications and thereby regulates our behaviors.   Other features of a normative rule are that it discourages deviant behaviors (e.g. do not kick the football in specific position and place, otherwise your party will be penalized), encourages the desired interpretation of rule (e.g. follow the rule of syntax to produce the meaningful sentences) and it helps us to decide our actions in the case of confusions (e.g. in the case of confusion regarding the meaning of a word, we check the dictionary/rule to decide the meaning), helps us to control and predict the event(e.g. if there is black cloud, (it means rain) keep an umbrella with you) or in resolving conflict (e.g. the rule "plus" decides when there is indecision in addition of two numbers).   Thus, Baker and Hacker[4] have rightly pointed out five characteristics of normative rules, such as, the definitory aspect, the explanatory aspect, the justificatory aspect, the evaluative aspect and the instructional aspect.

Rule as a normative regularity to govern and explain our actions has to satisfy two conditions: First, rule should help us to pick up the appropriate and correct action among the available set of behaviors. This condition can be called the *correctness* condition of rule. The explanation of certain action-type by subsuming it under a rule is dependent on the successful identification of the action-type. The correct identification naturally helps us to eliminate the incorrect and inappropriate applications of a rule. Thus for example, the rule "plus" instructs the users not only to select the action-type "2 plus 2 equals to 4", but also it eliminates the action-type "2+2 equals to 5". The correctness condition of rules also signifies that the rules are universal in character having open-ended applications. If one follows a given rule, then one always does the same thing when the appropriate occasion arises. However, the correct and

successful identification or determination of the applications of rule is not enough. This itself does not provide the reason that whatever is correct is also reasonable or warranted. This is the reason the appropriate and correct chess-move made by the computer cannot provide the adequate explanation as to why it moves the chess piece as it made.

Secondly, rule should provide justification for the action-type so selected. This condition can be called the *adequate*[5] condition of the rule. The adequate criterion of rule not only helps us to choose the correct action-type, but also it provides the reason as to why a particular action-type is the correct one or is the only one in accordance with the given rule. The adequate condition predetermines in some unique way the application of a rule. Rule does not help us to simply identify objects fall under its scope, but it also compels us to adhere to the norms set by it for our future use. The algebraic formula "plus" should "determine my answer for indefinably many new sums that I have never previously considered...my past intention use determines a unique answer for indefinably many new cases on the future"[6]. The adequate condition helps one to justify and defend oneself at the time of conflict and criticism and helps one to remove confusion and inconsistency. This condition also explains the necessary change and meaningul deviation of rule whenever required.

At this point, it is very pertinent to discuss the distinction between following a rule and conforming a rule. The distinction is very crucial for the presentation and understanding of the rule-following skepticism. Following a rule is more general than conforming a rule. Though all cases of following a rule are also cases of conforming the specified rule, it is not other way. One may conform a rule without following it. For example, an idiot and a monkey may conform the rule of chess and can make correct and appropriate movement of chess pieces, but it cannot be said to follow the rule of the game of chess. The conformation of a rule is different from the conscious and deliberate action of following a rule. It may so happen that we are acting in accordance with a rule perfectly under the influence of some drug or under the compulsion of some external force. So, we are conforming a rule without being aware of its

conditions. This is certainly different from following a rule, where one can explain and defend oneself against the possible criticism.

The difference between conforming a rule and following a rule can be compared to the epistemic distinction between "true belief" and "true justified belief". Though all justified beliefs are also true beliefs, it may not be the case that all true beliefs are also justified beliefs. One may have a belief and the belief may be true incidental to the luck of the knower, however the belief will not be considered as an instance of knowledge, unless the reason for its truthfulness is provided. The belief to be considered as knowledge must be justified and the agent must be able to explain how it can be justified.

The normativity of rule is more related to the issue of following rather than conformation of a rule. For the issues of prohibition and prescription make sense only when it specifies when and how a rule can be followed and when the conditions of the rule are deliberately laid down. The issue of following a rule is invariably related to the issues of intention, capacity and willingness of the follower and the conditions under which the rule can be followed. To follow a rule is to obey the conditions of the rule intentionally and with a purpose to achieve an end. If the agent is following a rule he is aware that he is conforming the rule. Thus, rule-following is a self-conscious and an intentional act.

III

Some philosophers have raised serious doubt whether a follower can really follow the rule considering the requirement of its following. They challenge that the follower cannot identify a rule that can satisfy the normative constraint with his limited cognitive capabilities. The object of infinite requirement does not affect our senses as a physicl object and we are not causally related to its infinite applications in the ordinary way.[7] In following a rule we always go beyond the given. The past experiences, though successful and correct, are always finite and do not provide the license to go beyond. We are not omniscient to identify the unlimited applications which are yet to take place. If our accumulated practice of

the rule-following is not enough to keep track of the future applications of the rule, and if we do not have control over the future operation of the rule, it is quite possible that we may not be following the same rule which we used to follow in earlier cases to justify the same action. This possibility will give rise to the problem of multiple interpretations of the rule. On the one hand, there may be more than one contradictory action-types fitting to a given rule and on the other hand, the same action-type can be accounted for by two contradictory rules. Rule-following then seems to be an irrational act.

To understand the problem, let us discuss the thought-experiment designed by Kripke. He asks us to imagine a person who has applied the plus-rule successfully and correctly involving numbers up to 57. Now we can say that, since the person has fulfilled the correctness criterion, he has grasped the plus-rule and can employ it in infinite cases. Thus, for example, if he is asked to operate the plus-rule between the numbers 57 and 68, he will come with the number 125, though he has never applied the plus-rule to the number 68 before. At this juncture, Kripke introduces the concept of "quus-rule" which, according to him, is identical to plus-rule if the numbers involved are less than 57, otherwise it is 5.[8] That means, the function "68+57=125" is correct according to plus-rule and at the same time the function "68+57=5" is also correct as per quus-rule. The skeptic is asking "how do we know that 68 plus 57 as we meant "plus" in the past should denote 125 and not "5"? We cannot know whether the person is following plus-rule or quus-rule since both the rules will hold valid, though, we know that the person who used to following the plus-rule in the past, the answer he indents of 68+57, should be 125 rather than 5.

Kripke argues that the person cannot provide the reason to choose between plus-rule and quus-rule. Kripke argues that the quus rule is incorrect and we do not misinterpret plus-rule with quus-rule, but it does not seem to be *a priori* impossible. This is possible because his calculation by hypothesis does not go beyond the numbers involving 57 and thus by

the same hypothesis he does not explicitly instruct that 125 is that result. The hypothesis is true, for the infinitely large number of the cases of plus rule are not in the follower's mind. The applications so far made are always limited. Thus, Kripke argues that there is no way one can say whether plus or quus rule is being followed. It is possible that by plus I always mean quus, I should misinterpret all my past uses of the plus rule. The skeptic argues that there are equally compelling reasons for both plus and quus functions having been applied in this case.

What is skeptical about here is that, as Kripke says, "we follow the rules as we do without reason or justification."[9]. "Plus" as we understand it forces us to say that "68+57" equals to "125", but the rule of plus function has nothing in it to identify the plus-rule as distinct from quus-rule. Skepticism doubts two things: First that, there is any "fact about past history-nothing that was ever in my mind, or in my external behavior-establishes what I mean by a word."[10] Second, even if we have meaning, we are not justified in having it. There is no logical justification that a particular word would necessarily mean this and not any thing else, for, "there is no justification for one response rather than others."[11]

The rule-following skepticism seems to pose a dilemma questioning the possibility of meaning, understanding, prediction, projection etc. If this is the level of skepticism, then it is obvious that we cannot with surety speak of the rule-governed behavior of other person. Thus, social building of knowledge system is impossible, and not only that the day-to-day working knowledge of the language and other transactions are made impossible. There would not be any reason to choose one set of options as justified against the available set of options. It is not possible to choose the right and correct theory among competing theories. Contrary to the fact that rule makes communication and clarification possible, it plunges us into such a situation that we are not able to justify our behaviors and actions. Worst still, if rule-following skepticism is allowed to have its sway, even the individual who framed the rule cannot know when he follows the rule whether he has followed the same rule which he had formulated in the past.

No wonder the problem posed by Kripke has been felt by many contemporary philosophers and the problem has surfaced in various forms. Two such contemporary problems which can be shown to be similar to the problem of rule-following are the problem of *new riddle of induction* and the problem of *underdeterminacy of theories* proposed by Goodman and Quine respectively. The new riddle of induction is a problem related to the inductive rule and its applications in the form of projection of the predicates and the adaptation of the hypotheses. The problem in projection from the given or going beyond the evidence can be interpreted to be a problem similar to the problem of rule and the identification of its examples in advance. Similarly, theory in science can be compared to the characteristics of rule. A theory in science is also a set of guide-lines and acts as a normative constraint in predicting, explaining and controlling the nature. A theory is built from the given data, but it always transcends the data. Therefore, as Quine will argue, the theory is always underdeterminate from the given data. There would not be much problem to argue that underdeterminacy of theory is nothing but the problem of rule-following skepticism, albeit in different context.[12] Even the Gettier's paradox[13] can be interpreted to be a form of rule-following skepticism.

Kripke argues that there is no possibility of attempting, what he calls a "straight solution" to skeptical paradox. We cannot offer a definite solution to skepticism by producing a mental fact or a disposition the description of which would answer skepticism once and for all. However, he has offered a solution to the skeptical paradox which he calls "the skeptical solution to skepticism". The skeptical solution begins by "conceding that the skeptic's negative assertation are unanswerable. Nevertheless our ordinary practice or belief is justified because...it need not require the justification the skeptic has shown to be untenable."[14] The solution offered is called a skeptical one because, it is not an answer to the problem *per se,* rather it is an attempt to explain away the problem. Kripke has offered an Humean solution to the problem in admitting that we do not require to offer a solution to the problem and following Hume he says that human instinct is enough to get rid of the problem.

The skeptical-problem as well as skeptical solutions is the result of the mistaken assumption that rule is different from its applications and we require some intermediary to fix the applications under the most appropriate rule. On this assumption, rule is treated as a mysterious explanatory mechanism, transecending all its applications, yet is involved in the explanation. The hidden nature of rule supposes that the user has a tacit and implicit knowledge of the rule while following. Following Wittgenstein, I argue that the problem arises out of misunderstanding of what he would call the grammar of rule. Wittgenstein seems to argue that the puzzle in the following a rule arises due to the mystification of rule. The grammar of rule helps us to demystify uses of rule and provides the necessity to the act of rule-following.

IV

Let us discuss the notion of "philosophical grammar" which is very basic in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. According to Wittgenstein, philosophical grammar is a linguistic tool to demarcate the meaningful expression from nonsense expression in a system of language by describing its structure and conceptual scheme. Grammar aims at explanation, clarification and correction of different linguistic expressions, thus grammar is a set of rules used for the construction of significant utterances whose violation yields nonsense.. The meaningfulness of an expression is decided within the language game in which it is embedded and not by verifying its truthfulness or falsity. The clarification is done not by describing the nature of the reality or the structure of the mind or the "laws of thought", but by use of analogy, comparison, illumination, example, model etc. Thus, philosophical grammar is an investigation in which philosophical problems are resolved and misunderstandings are eliminated by describing our use of words, clarifying the grammar of expressions and tabulating rules.

Philosophical grammar is a free floating set of rules for meaningful use of the language. The grammar is an internal relation and it consists of autonomous rules to establish the relationship among constituents in the

language.   There is no such thing as correct use of grammar and there is no such thing as justifying the grammar by reference to reality, grammar is antecedent to truth. Thus Wittgenstein claims that the meaning of an expression is not an object in the reality but the totality of the rules which determines its uses within the language.[15] The philosophical grammar produces no conclusion or thesis in philosophy and it does not assert or deny any fact about the world. The denial of the grammar does not result in denying some fact about the world. It is not concerned with the truth-value of the expression. Thus rules are not answerable to the reality in the currency of truth, rather it is answerable to the usage prevalent among the users of the rules. Wittgenstein considers that grammar consists of only two things: rules and symbols. Thus, philosophical grammar as a tool of clarification is concerned with language only, our explanation and under-standing are confined within the limit of language without any factual or theoretical commitment.

In this sense, the philosophical grammar is no different from that of the ordinary grammar. The traditional grammar concerns itself with the grammatically correct use of the part of speech (such as nouns, verbs, adjectives etc.), teaches the use of tenses and so on. Thus, like the philosophical grammar, it also teaches not to violate grammatical rule to commit grammatically nonsense expressions. It tells us which combina-tion of words is permissible and which is not. One may say that a sentence is meaningful if the sentence follows the existing rules of syntax and semantic. The grammatically sound or unsound sentences are also the sentences which are meaningful or meaningless. An ungrammatical sentence in the philosophical sense is a sentence quite similar to the ordinary wrong sentence. An ungrammatical sentence in both ordinary and philosophical sense results from the same cause; i.e., not following the proper rules of grammar. For like the rule of syntax, the philosophical grammar also determines the bound of sense, the difference from sense from nonsense but not truth from falsity. Neither kind of rule furnishes empirical knowledge about the world. Thus, they do not presuppose the

metaphysical entity unlike the depth rules of logical syntax. Ordinary grammar books and disctionaries also provide the explanation, clarifications and corrections of different linguistic expressions.

However, the domain of philosophical grammar is wider than the rules of logical syntax. The philosophical grammar includes all forms of meaning, not merely epistemological definitions, but ostensive definitions, explanation by examples, paraphrases, gestures etc. The philosophical grammar is a heterogeneous rule for the use of symbol that we take to inform the activity of speaking the language. Thus, the use of analogy, similes, comparison and many other tools which are not generally part of the traditional grammar is a part of philosophical grammar. It includes all kinds of speeches as a part of the web of human life interwoven with multitude of acts, activities, reactions and responses. Where the grammarian classifies parts of speech into nouns, adjectives, adverbs etc. the philosophers do conceptual classification, e.g. the sensation words into words for feeling, emotion, attitude etc. The perceptual word can be classified into memory, introspection, tactual etc., which are generally not dealt with in the ordinary grammar. The second difference is that the ordinary grammar is concerned with the rules involving a particular language at a particular time, characteristic of a particular form of representation. But philosophical grammar consists of the rules for the use of the symbol, of all languages both natural and artifical. However this characteristic of the philosophical grammar should not give the impression that it is a form of the universal grammar seeking the universal and unquestionable element or structure common to all languages: the deep structure grammar. Moreover, all philosophical nonsenses are not necessarily grammatical nonsenses. For example, "green idea sleeps furiously" is philosophically a nonsense sentence, but grammatically it is a meaningful sentence.

Beside, the philosophical grammar is purposive in the sense that it is concerned with solving the problems arising out of the misusing the grammar of the language. The philosophical grammar uses the grammar

to resolve the philosophical problems involving grammar. That is why it is called the philosophical grammar. Wittgenstein equates the conceptual relations with "grammatical notes" and argues that logical questions are really "grammatical" in nature.[16] Philosophical grammar is the analysis of the necessity, possibility. conceivability of a given expression in a given context.

<div align="center">V</div>

Wittgenstein believes that the investigation into what is expressed by a rule and following it is an investigation into the grammar of the word "rule" and mastering the technique of how to follow a rule. The grammar of rule is an investigation to clarify the grammar of the expressions or rule, i.e. what is it to act in accord with a rule? how is it possible for a rule to have an open range of applications? What is it to understand a rule, and how does such understanding manifest itself? This is to say what expressions of rule make sense and those which do not. Wittgenstein has used a number of analogies and examples as a part of philosophical grammar to make clear the use of the expression of rule and what it is to call an action as a consequence of the rule. He compares the act of following a rule with playing a game in accordance with a definite rule and fulfillment of an expectation and having an expectation.

The philosophical analysis of rule points two things: first, it does not make sense to presuppose any metaphysical intermediary between rule and its applications, for the grammar of the rule is not grounded in the reality. The relationship between rule and its applications is immanent and internal, yet transparent, for we have to acknowledge the use of the rule for using it and we should be willing to cleave to it, other wise rule cannot act as reason for what one is doing. If a chasm between the rule and its application is created, there is little chance to close the gap by the help of something which operates between the rule and its applications, but is neither. The question of bridging the gap is unwaranted for the gap is an artificial one and is the result of the misconception of following a rule. Thus Wittgenstein comments: "in our failure to understand the use

of a word we take it as the expression of a queer process. (as we think of time as a queer medium, of the mind as queer kind of being.)"[17] The whole process of answering the skeptic is centered around finding out some immutable characteristic in the rule or unquestionable mental process. As we do not encounter such characteristic in a given rule which guides us beyond, we tend to think that rules are metaphysical entities found in the world of forms. Wittgenstein comments, "we do not command a clear view of the use of our words,...hence the importance of finding and investigating intermediate cases".[18] As a result of which there are attempts to determine the scope of rule by positing different mythological explanations, i.e. causal determination, the mental and logical determination of rules.

Second, rule is very much contained in its rule. On this account, there is no place of hidden rule; nothing would be counted as a rule independently of being used as a rule. There is nothing as our following a rule without our being able to explain or justify our actions by reference to them, for the calculus of rule is nothing but the uses of the rule. Wittgenstein comments, "every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?- in use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? - Or is the use its life."[19] Furhter he says,"one cannot guess how a word functions, one has to look at its use and learn from that."[20] For example, "the signpost is an order- if, under normal circumstances, it fulfills its purpose"[21] The grammar of the expression involving rule will render a rule senseless which we cannot use or in principle it is impossible to violate, for "what is hidden to us is of no interest to us."[22] Thus Wittgenstein says, "obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one is obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it."[23]

The practice and custom are essential for the understanding of a rule and how to follow it. Wittgenstein validly argues that "a person goes by the sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-post, a custom"[24] The mastering of the technique is possible because we have a

common language and some uniform practices. The other frameworks within which the successful following of the rule is dependent are that, the world is substantially an unchanging and uniform in nature, there is harmony between language and reality and human beings have their own limitations. This commonality or frame-work is what Wittgenstein says the "forms of life". However, the forms of life don't define or constitute rule-following, it provides the minimum requirement to conduct our rule-governed activity smoothly. The forms of life provide the frame-work through which we operate our grammar and achieve the necessary agreement. However, this is "not an agreement in opinions but in the forms of life."[25]

How does the rule which is so much depended on the form of life can provide the necessity to its following, since form of life is conventional and relativistic in nature. A rule heavily dependent on the conventional practice of the members of the community is whimsical, subjective and is subject to change at will, therefore, it is natural to wonder how such relativistic framework can provide the ground for the justification for meaning and communication. However, rules formulated within this framework provide the necessity for two reasons:

First, rules are stipulated for certain purposes, approved and followed in the community by its members after deliberation. Therefore rules are very much objective and collective in nature and there should be no problem of inter-subjective communication. Though the community view of justification is arbitrary and fallible, it does not force us to embrace relativism, a very common charge leveled against any theory based on convention. This is because, once we invoke a rule, we are committed to follow it; are supposed to be faithful to it. Thus, Wittgenstein would say though rules are arbitrary, their applications are not.[26] The application of a rule becomes a social necessity. The community view of rule, and faith to honor it acts as a *normative constraint.* Systematic and consistent use of rule along with commitment to rule gives us the required parameters to judge the epistemic behavior of other members in the community. Rule, thus is predictable, it tells us in advance which

behavior would fit which rule. In this sense, a rule determines its extension. On the strength of the knowledge of the rule used in the communities, one member understands the behavior of the others in the society. The commitment to rule is essential part of our very institution of language and is best exemplified by the fact that one has no freedom to question the truth of a statement expressing a definition. Having defined a week consisting of seven days, I cannot further ask the question why should a week consist of seven days. This is the implication of Wittgensteinian thesis that rules canot be justified further though we justify our actions and judgments in terms of rules.[27]

However, we do not deny the possibility that there can be a rule for instance a time-table, totally designed and followed by an individual isolated from the society. But this fact does not make such a rule mysterious. What we object, following Wittgenstein, is that we cannot follow a rule privately. This is because rule is not a mental fact and it is not the case that an individual who possesses this mental state alone is privileged to follow it. The agent can disobey a rule or even can stipulate contradictory rule for there is no right or wrong rule, only convenient or inconvenient to follow, but it makes sense only when it is followed publicly or at least the conditions of the rule should be clear enough for somebody who is willing to follow. Therefore, though rule is merely conventional, that does not license the user to change the agreement unless and ohterwise there is a case for either giving up the convention or introduce a new convention which is in some way opposed to the present one, ohterwise we do not change the existing conventions as they are already part of our way of life. There is force of a promise attached to every rule because we have committed to the rule and, thus if we are violating it, which we can very much do, it amounts to cheating the society in a subtle manner by not keeping our promise; and the result would be a conceptual confusion.

Secondly, why rule is not whimsical and private is that it is meant to be followed by cognitively finite and fallible human beings. There is no point in prescribing rule which the agent cannot follow and is not

within the cognitive reach of the finite human beings like us. For example, rules are to be formulated keeping fact in the mind that followers have limited information processing ability, finite memory storage capacity, are vulnerable to error in sense and reasoning.[28] Therefore, though we can very much stipulate a very arbitrary traffic rule like "jump over the road when there is a red light", we do not formulate such an impractical rule, because we know that this is not possible on the part of the human beings to follow. For an ideal rule violates the principle of "ought" implies "can". It must be possible to follow and violate the rule. Rule which cannot in principle be followed or violated is a pseudo-rule. For example, the rule "you should remember all the results or applications of the algebraic rule '+2' " is such a rule which cannot be followed nor can be violated in principle. The requirement that rule ought to be followable makes the rules determinable in advance. It should be determinable or identifiable by a finite follower independently of any particular application-condition under which a particular rule is first used. The condition to conform the rule also incorporates fallible nature of rule. Rule is not absolute, so the possibility of committing a mistake is unavoidable no matter what and how much precaution we take in advance, for rule is "directly readable and falliably readable."[29]

How it is possible that we grasp the whole application of a rule in flash, in an instance which requires laying hold of something which must somehow contain the entire use of the expression in advance of our applying it. The unlimited applications of rule are buried in the use of the rules. Thus the question of the grasping all applications of the rule appears not to be impossible, though we simply cannot see or experience all the applications of the rule before using it. When you master the technique as how to use a rule, you have known all the steps in advance because you know the condition of the application of the rule is pre-decided. Rules are hypothetical-imperatives: follow a rule this way, its consequences will be like this. Thus, if somebody understands the rule "+2", there should be no problem for him to go the next step, e.g. 1002 after the numeral 1000. It is not the special education or training or some

mathematical acumen which guides us to go to the next step in the process of adding 2. The rule and how to use it contains all steps in the rule of adding 2. Thus all the steps are predecided even though the chain of the calculation is indefinite and each step is a new step in the chain. There occurs mistake and miscalculation in the process of following the rule of "add2", but that does not mean that the rule is not followable or we cannot keep track of all its applications well in advances. Thus when you master the technique of rules, your mind flew ahead and took all steps before you physically arrived this or that one.[30] When "you know what the word stands for, you understood it, you know its whole truth", comments Wittgenstein.[31] How do we determine what would constitute the violation of the rule? There is nothing above and over the application to describe the violation of a rule. Somebody understands a rule means he is aware of the conditions under which the rule can be followed and under what condition it can possibly be violated. For "the understanding itself is a state which is the source of the correct use".[32]

But the mastering the technique of how to use the rule is not merely be able to apply the rule by examples. Understanding a rule by citing its examples is always a limited affair and it does not carry any logical guarantee about the future uses. We cannot say that because I have calculated the series correctly and follow the series of odd number till a point, I have understood the rule and can go further. Rule-following involves mastering the technique or a know-how to use it which does not demand repetition. The technique is a capacity and ability to do certain things under certain conditions. When I know how to ride a bicycle, it means I am capable of riding it or probably in a position to teach the method of riding to somebody. Thus, We cannot define rule and order in terms of meaning of "regular", "uniform", "same" etc. or in terms of example and practice. For the application always goes beyond all examples, and education and training to understand the algebraic formulas are always limited up to a particular time.[33] The mastering of the technique of the use of the rule does not involve the mastering of some logical acumen to logically see all the inferences or applications of the rule at once. This

is not possible, for we are not omniscient.

Following a rule is like obeying an order to react or to choosing in a particular way and unique way. Rule, like an order, loses its grammar and meaning if one person reacts the order in one way and the second person in a different way.[34] The "quus" rule designed by Kripke to show how the arithmetical rule of "plus" can be manipulated is a case of violating the rule of the expression "plus". Even though, we have not performed the function of "plus" beyond the number involving 57, the addition of two numbers beyond 57 will not be 5, as Kripke's skeptic holds, so long as we are following the "plus" rule. We do not have to look into our habit of addition to give certainty to the rule of plus, rather it is the definition of the rule "plus" and the .commitment to follow it, that determines the meaning of the expression "plus". Therefore, there is no scope for any confusion in the multiple interpretations of rules and its following.

NOTES

1. Kripke (Kripke, S.A., *Wittgenstein: On Rule and Private Language* (henceforth *WRPL*), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982) is the first philosopher to have propounded the rule-following skepticism though he attributes skepticism to Wittgenstein. This is a debatable issue. I do not want to enter into the debate nor want to discuss Kripekean variety of rule-following skepticism. Here my concern is to discuss the skeptical problem *per se,* though I will be referring to both Kripke and Wittgenstein regularly in the course of the discussion. However, readers who want to go into the debate, they can benefit from: Baker, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S., *Skepticism, Rule and Language,* Basil Blackwell, 1984,pp. 1-50. McGinn, Marie, "Kripke on Wittgenstein's Skeptical Problem", *Ratio,* 1984, pp. 19-32 and Malcolm, Norman, *Wittgenstein: Nothing Is Hidden,* Basil Blackwell, 1986,pp. 154-181 and Byrne, Alex, "On Misunderstanding Kripke's Wittgenstein", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* 1996, pp. 339-343.

2. See Pettit, p., "*The Reality of Rule-Following*", *Mind* Vol. 99, 1990,p.2.

3.   See Pettit, p., *op cit.,* p.4.

4.   See Baker, G.P. and Hacker,P.M.S., *Wittgenstein :Rules, Grammar and Necessity,* Vol.2, Basil Blackwcll, London, 1985,pp.45-49.

5.   See Boghossian, P.A., "The Rule-Following Consideration", *Mind,* Vol. 98, 1989, p. 508ff.

6.   *WRPL,* p. 11.

7.   See Prttit, p., *op. cit.,* pp. 7-8.

8.   See *WRPL,*p.9.

9.   *WRPL.,*p.viii.

10.   *WRPL.,* p.13.

11.   *WRPL,*p.21.

12.   For a comparative study of these problems see, Sahu, Gopal, *Rule-Following Skepticism:Kripe, Goodman, Quine and Wittgenstein,* unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, submitted to Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, 1997.

13.   See Gettier,E.: "Is Justified True Belief Knoweldge?", *Analysis,* Vol.23, 1963,pp.121-123.

14.   *WRPI,*p.66.

15.   Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophical Grammar* (ed.), R. Rhees, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974. See sections 59,63,87.

16.   Wittgenstein,L., *Zettle* (ed.), G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxfprd, 1974 590.

17.   Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophical Investigations* (henceforth PI) (ed.), G.E.M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1963, Sec. 196.

18.   *PI,* 122.

19.   *PI,* 432.

20.   *PI,* 340.

21.   *PI*, 87.

22.   *PI*, 126.

23.   *PI*, 202.

24.   *PI*, 198.

25.   *PI*, 241.

26.   See *PI*, 241.

27.   See *PI*, 219.

28.   See, Goldman, A.I.: "Epistemic : The Regulative Theory of Cognition" in Kornblith, H. (ed.): *Naturalizing Epistemology*, 1985, pp. 217-230.

29.   See Pettit, P., *op.cit.*, p 4.

30.   See *PI*, 188.

31.   *PI*, 264.

32.   *PI*, 164.

33.   See *PI*, 189.

34.   See *PI*, 206.