

STRAWSON ON PRESUPPOSITION

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I

P.F.Strawson develops his theory of Presupposition mainly, in two places namely in the paper 'On Referring, published in 1950 and in the book '*Introduction to Logical Theory*' published in 1952. In 'On Referring' Strawson gives a general characterisation of the theory of presupposition by analysing his 'Use Theory of meaning', But in *Introduction to Logical Theory* Strawson defines and explains his notion of presupposition and contrasts it with the notion of entailment. In 'On Referring' Strawson's, objective was to criticise Russell's Theory of Description'. In fact, Russell's philosophical ideas have been the main target of attack amongst Oxford logicians who see in those ideas the source of Germanic American formalization which they deeply mistrust. The locus classicus is Strawson's 'On Referring', an attack on the sacred doctrine of formalists. But in *Introduction to Logical Theory* Strawson's objective was simply to defend the laws of traditional logic from the clutches of self-contradiction they involve.

In 1950 Strawson's theory of presupposition emerges from the criticism of Russell's Theory of Description and so it is convenient to begin with Russell. Russell made, inter alia, the following claims in [1] that:

- (1) 'The present king of France is bald' is logically analysable into three propositions, namely :
 - a) at least one person is the king of France;
 - b) at most one person is the king of France; and
 - c) whoever is the king of France is bald.

- (2) The relation between 'The King of France is bald' and 'There is a King of France' is one of entailment, and
- (3) When the entailed proposition is false, the entailing proposition is false
In his 'On Referring' Strawson introduces the following distinctions:
 - A1) A sentence
 - A2) A use of a sentence.
 - A3) An utterance of a sentence

Similarly he distinguishes :

- B1) An expression
- B2) A use of an expression
- B3) An utterance of an expression.

On the basis of the above distinction Strawson concludes that (1) 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes that there is a king of France and asserts that he is bald, (2) the relation between the statements 'The present king of France is bald' and 'there is a king of France' is the relation of presupposition and not of entailment as Russell thought and (3) if there is no king of France to refer to, the statement 'The king of France is bald' is neither true nor false and not false as Russell thought. Thus, presupposition is opposed to entailment. The reason behind Strawson's conclusion lies, in his view. "The same expression can have different mentioning use, as the same sentence can be used to make statements with different truth values. 'Mentioning' or 'referring' is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can use an expression to do. 'Mentioning', or 'referring to', something is a characteristic of a use an expression just as 'being about' something, and truth or falsity, are characteristics of a use of a sentence". (Strawson[2]). Viewed in the light of the above remarks of Strawson we may say that the problem which gave rise to Russell-Strawson controversy is as old as the history of philosophy. How can we refer to or talk about that which does not exist? This question is raised in the past when

philosophers had tried to explain and analyse the difference between the significance of a term and what it stands for. In other words, "is the meaning or significance of a term always the thing or person referred to by means of it?" If the answer to this question is in affirmative, then meaning is reference and hence 'I met a unicorn' which is meaningful must refer to something. For example, Meinong argued in the following way: let the sentence 'The king of France is bald' be called S.

- 1) The king of France is the subject of S
- 2) To say 1) is to say that S is about the king of France.
- 3) If S is about the king of France then it is true only if the king of France is bald and it is false only if the king of France is not bald.
- 4) But 2) and 3) could not be true unless there were a king of France.
- 5) Therefore, if S is significant there must be an object named the king of France. Russell's theory of description is an attempt to show how S can be significant even though its referring expression does not refer to anything, that is, even though there is not now a king of France.

We should note that neither Strawson nor Russell is prepared to say that S is not significant. Russell wants to say that S is significant because it really states a proposition that is quite different from the proposition that it appears to state. When we unpack such a sentence, we find that it really is a series of conjoined propositions that are being asserted and that this series of conjoined propositions is meaningful even though it is often seen to be false. On the other hand according to Strawson while the sentence itself has meaning, only use of it can be said to mention or to refer and to be true or false. Where the context of utterance justifies its use, the question of its reference or its truth arises but where the context of utterance does not justify its use, those questions do not arise at all. Russell holds that sentences are either true or false, or meaningless. But Strawson holds that sentences by themselves are either meaningful or meaningless. They need however, to be used by someone to say what is true or false. It is not sentences but statements uttered in a context which are true or false.

To Russell, a meaningful sentence is either true or false, whereas to Strawson it is not so. Strawson holds that a sentence could be meaningful even though a particular use of it is neither true nor false. Meaning, according to Strawson, is the function of an expression of Mentioning, referring and truth or falsity are the functions of the use of an expression of a sentence. To give the meaning of a sentence is to give general direction for its use which follows "the rules, habit and conventions" of the language. Thus Strawson is careful to say that it is not his view that S is meaningless. Rather his idea is that the use of a sentence in an act of asserting presupposes the success of another act i.e. referring which we perform in order to go on to assert. That is, in order to assert that a predicate applies to the subject of a sentence we must first refer to the subject. If the subject term lacks a referent this presupposed act of referring fails, and as a result the attempt to assert cannot succeed. This is the case with the presumed use of S as an attempt at asserting. Since there is no king of France now, the attempt to assert now that the present king of France has any predicate e.g. is bald, is neither true nor false since the presupposed act of referring fails.

II

In [3] Strawson develops his doctrine of presupposition from a different angle. Here he tries to defend the traditional logic. In traditional logic general propositions both universal and particular, that is A,E,I and O propositions are considered as categorical. A categorical proposition is that which involves unconditional assertion, that which is amenable to a subject-predicate analysis and in which a certain predicate is unconditionally ascribed to a certain subject. Thus a categorical proposition is contrasted with a conditional or hypothetical proposition which involves a conditional predicate.

The view of the traditional logicians that all general propositions are categorical enabled them to set up a relationship between four kinds of general propositions in their theory of opposition of proposition. Again an important feature of a categorical proposition is that it has existential import with respect to its subject term which means existence of the object denoted by the subject term is a necessary condition for the truth of the proposition.

So in traditional logic all forms of general propositions have existential import.

Thus in traditional logic both the theory of existential import of propositions and the theory of opposition of propositions are accepted. But it is very easy to see that both the theories cannot be maintained together. If the A proposition: 'All angels are beautiful', the E proposition: 'No angels are beautiful', the I proposition: 'Some angels are beautiful' and the O proposition: 'Some angels are not beautiful' all have existential import which means existence of the object denoted by the subject terms is the necessary condition for the truth of the proposition, all of them become false because the class of angels is an empty class. Under such circumstances, A and O, and E and I cease to be contradictories and I and O cease to be subcontraries. Here we find the self contradictory character of the traditional logic.

In modern standard predicate logic A and E propositions are interpreted as hypothetical and carry no existential commitment, but I and O propositions are interpreted as categorical and carry existential commitment. Thus modern logician differs from the traditional only in respect of A and E propositions but hold the same opinion with the traditional logicians in respect of I and O proposition. In modern standard predicate logic A proposition is treated as hypothetical and so it can be true when both the antecedent and the consequent are true or when the antecedent is false. " $(x)(\theta x \supset \psi x)$ " this form of A proposition is true when the x which are (θ) are also (ψ) when no x is (θ) . If there is at least one x which is (θ) but not (ψ) then " $(X)(\theta x \supset \psi x)$ " this form of A proposition is false. In other words, if " $(\exists x)(\theta x \ \& \ \sim \psi x)$ " is true, then A proposition is false. This is why the precise form of A proposition in modern standard predicate logic is $\sim(\exists x)(\theta x \ \& \ \sim \psi x)$. Similarly " $(X)(\theta x \supset \sim \psi x)$ " this form of E proposition is true when the x which are θ are also not ψ or when no x is θ . If there is at least one x which is θ and also ψ then " $(X)(\theta x \supset \sim \psi x)$ " this form of proposition is false. In other words, if " $(\exists x)(\theta x \ \& \ \psi x)$ " is true, then E proposition is false. This is why the precise form of E proposition in modern standard predicate logic is $\sim(\exists x)(\theta x \ \& \ \psi x)$.

Modern logicians as we have told earlier hold the same opinion with traditional logicians in respect of I and O propositions. So the form of I and O propositions in modern predicate logic is " $(\exists x) (\theta x \ \& \ \psi x)$ " and " $(\exists x) (\theta x \ \& \ \sim \ \psi x)$ " respectively. Modern logicians' interpretation of A, E, I, O proposition saves contradictory opposition between A and O, and E and I but at the cost of contrary, subcontrary and subalternation. We have seen above the precise form of A and E propositions as " $\sim(\exists x) (\theta x \ \& \ \sim \ \psi x)$ ", and " $\sim(\exists x) (\theta x \ \& \ \psi x)$ " respectively which are contradictory to " $(\exists x) (\theta x \ \& \ \sim \ \psi x)$ " and " $(\exists x) (\theta x \ \& \ \psi x)$ ", that is O and I form of proposition respectively. Thus contradictory relation is maintained in Modern standard predicate logic. Let us see why contrary, subcontrary and subalternation relation cannot be maintained in modern standard predicate logic. In modern standard predicate logic both the propositions, 'All angels are beautiful' and 'No angels are beautiful' are true because angel is an empty class and in the case of hypothetical or conditional proposition which has no existential commitment if the subject term is empty, the proposition would be true. And if both the above propositions are true, they are not contrary. Again both the propositions 'Some angels are beautiful' and 'Some angels are not beautiful' are false because angel is an empty class and in the case of categorical proposition which carries existential commitment if the subject term is empty, the proposition would be false. And if both the above propositions are false, they are not subcontrary. Since 'All angels are beautiful' has no existential commitment (it rather denies existence) but 'Some angels are beautiful' does have it (as it asserts the same), A proposition does not entail the I proposition and the same is true in the case of E and O. Hence subalternation does not hold. With the rejection of subalternation, conversion by limitation and the strengthened syllogisms viz; DARAPTI, FELAPTON, BRAMANTIP and FESAPO become invalid.

Now we are in a dilemma. Strawson puts it in this way : "Either the A and E forms have existential import or they do not. If they do, one set of laws has to be sacrificed as invalid, if they do not, another set has to go" (Strawson [3] page 165). Strawson's line of thinking is that the laws of traditional logic are rooted in the ordinary use of human language and so

these laws are to be saved. Interpretation of existential import in traditional logic annihilates, as we have seen, contradictory and sub-contrary relations. Again, interpretation of existential import in modern standard predicate logic annihilates, we have seen, contrary sub-contrary and subalternation relation but only saves, contradictory relation. According to Strawson interpretation of existential import of categorical proposition is to be given in such a way that all the laws of traditional logic can be preserved and for this purpose he offered two solutions, a formalistic solution, an ad hoc patching up, as he calls it and a realistic solution (Strawson [3])

Strawson felt that the existential interpretation of all the four forms of A,E,I,O propositions given in traditional logic could save more laws of traditional logic than the modern interpretation could do. So he decided to save the laws of traditional logic by improving upon the former. The main shortcoming of existential interpretation was that it failed to maintain contradictory relation between A and O, and E and I and also subcontrary relation between I and O.

In order to make A and O, E and I contradictories Strawson suggested a mere formal interpretation of I and O. He argues : contradictory of $\sim P \ \& \ Q$ is $P \vee \sim Q$. So the contradictory of A proposition which can be expressed in existential interpretation as $\sim (\exists x) (fx \ \& \ \sim gx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (fx)$ must be $(\exists x) (fx \ \& \ \sim gx) \vee \sim (\exists x) (fx)$. Similarly, the contradictory of E proposition which can be expressed in existential interpretation as $\sim (\exists x) (fx \ \& \ gx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (fx)$ must be $(\exists x) (fx \ \& \ gx) \vee \sim (\exists x) (fx)$. Now, when translated, the four forms of A,E,I, O stands thus :

f A g : $\sim (\exists x) (fx \ \& \ \sim gx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (fx)$ [It is not the case that there is at least one thing which is f but not g though something is f]

f E g : $\sim (\exists x) (fx \ \& \ gx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (fx)$ [It is not the case that there is at least one thing which is both f and g though something is f]

f I g : $(\exists x) (fx \ \& \ gx) \vee \sim (\exists x) (fx)$ [Either there is at least one thing which is both f and g or nothing is f]

f O g : $(\exists x) (fx \ \& \ \sim gx) \vee \sim (\exists x) (fx)$ [Either there is at least one thing

which is f but not g or nothing is f |

This manoeuvre, according to Strawson, not only saves the contradictory relation but also the law that I and O are subcontraries without sacrificing any law of the square of opposition in traditional logic. Strawson, however, points out that this new formulations fail to work in simple conversion of E and I propositions. Let us see why. In new formulation E reads as: $\sim (\exists x) (fx \ \& \ gx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (fx)$ which leaves open the possibility of 'g' being an empty class i.e, the denial of existence of 'x' belonging to 'g' or $\sim (\exists x) (gx)$ is consistent with this interpretation of f E g but not with its simple converse g E f i. e, $\sim (\exists x) (gx \ \& \ fx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (fx)$. Similarly, $(\exists x) (gx) \ \& \ \sim (\exists x) (fx)$ is consistent with f I g i. e, $(\exists x) (fx \ \& \ gx) \ \vee \ \sim (\exists x) (fx)$ but not with its converse g I f i.e, $(\exists x) (gx \ \& \ fx) \ \vee \ \sim (\exists x) (gx)$. Thus, according to Strawson, the reason for the break down of the new formulation in the few cases is their lack of symmetry. So he proposes his formalistic interpretation as follows in which term-symmetry is added to all the A,E,I,O Propositions:

f A g $\sim (\exists x) (fx \ \& \ \sim gx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (fx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (\sim gx)$

f E g $\sim (\exists x) (fx \ \& \ gx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (fx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (gx)$

f I g $(\exists x) (fx \ \& \ gx) \ \vee \ \sim (\exists x) (fx) \ \vee \ \sim (\exists x) (gx)$

f O g $(\exists x) (fx \ \& \ \sim gx) \ \vee \ \sim (\exists x) (fx) \ \vee \ \sim (\exists x) (\sim gx)$

For this interpretation Strawson claims all the laws of traditional logic hold good together and this he regards as the formalistic solution to the problem of the square of opposition which over-throws the orthodox criticism of traditional logic by modern standard predicate logic. An important characteristic of this interpretation is that I and O are no more existential propositions. They no more categorically claim the existence of members in the class denoted by their subject term 'f'. Both I and O propositions being formulated disjunctively, become true if their second disjunct $\sim (\exists x) (fx)$ is true. In other words, they are true even if 'f' is a null class i.e, there exists no member in the 'f' class. Thus while modern standard predicate logic gives a non-existential interpretation of A and E forms and preserve the existential meaning of I and O forms with traditional logic, Strawson gives an existential

interpretation of A and E forms and non-existential interpretation of I and O forms. In respect of A and E he opposes modern standard predicate logic and in respect of I and O he opposes both modern standard predicate logic and traditional logic.

Though Strawson claims that all the laws of traditional logic hold good together in his formalistic interpretation, he fails to see that the law of Identity is hostile to his interpretation. An expression of the law of Identity, 'All barren women's sons are barren women's sons' can be symbolised in Strawson's formalistic interpretation as $\sim (\exists x) (Bx \ \& \ \sim Bx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (Bx) \ \& \ (\exists x) (\sim Bx)$. Here the second disjunct $(\exists x) (Bx)$ which means there is at least one thing which is barren women's son is certainly false and so is the entire proposition. But the proposition all barren women's sons are barren women's son expresses law of Identity which can not be false.

Secondly instead of proving that the meaning of A and E are respectively contradictory to the meaning of O and I Strawson tries to find out the formulations which would be contradictory to A and E and calls them translation of O and I.

Thirdly, Strawson proposes to save the laws of traditional logic by his formalistic interpretation because these laws are rooted in common human language and based on ordinary speech of common man. But that his formalistic interpretation does not entertain the ordinary speech of common man can be shown by considering translation of E proposition. According to Strawson, the E proposition 'No figure is a square circle' is translated as $\sim (\exists x) (fx \ \& \ sx) \ \& \ (\exists x) fx \ \& \ (\exists x) sx$ which reads as 'there is no thing which is both a figure and a square circle though there is at least one thing which is a square circle'. But when we say 'No figure is a square circle' we never assert in ordinary speech that there are certain things which are square as well as circle.

To preserve the laws of traditional logic Strawson's realistic solution came in the wake of his formalistic. Solution is based upon the belief that interpretation of A,E,I,O forms need not be in explicitly existential terms. In developing his realistic solution Strawson holds that one cannot normally or

different bodily gestures performed in a stretch. But where is the pain? It is like Ryle's "where is the university?". If we put them, i.e. "pain" and "yelling" in the same footing or category, we commit the fallacy of *Category mistake*. Yelling is not pain, nor closing the eyes, nor writhing. Idea of pain is derived out of this "yelling", "closing of eyes" and "writhing". I quote Sartre for clarification:

In the first place the appearance of the Other in my experience is manifested by the presence of organized forms such as gestures and expression, acts and conducts.

These organized forms refer to an organizing unity which on principle is located outside of our experience. The Other's anger, in so far as it appears to his inner sense and is by nature refused to my apperception, gives the meaning and is perhaps the cause of the series of phenomena which I apprehend in my experience under the name of expression or gestures.⁴

It is the commonality of behaviour and gestures, and unification of these impressions through consciousness that we know what we call as the feeling of the other. We come to know the other's state of mind since all of us have common forms of life. I see the gestures of my friend as similar to mine when I am in pain. I compare our gestures; his yelling, closing of eyes, writhing and holding of feet, etc. to my own when faced a similar situation. Through analogy we infer other's inner existence. "Organized forms" as stated above by Sartre, is precisely this comparison of collective experiences. But form is not experience, it is merely an idea. Experience is a *vehicle* to arrive at the state of "form".

Negation is also seen by Sartre as one of the foundation for the distinction between I and the other. ".....there is a fundamental presupposition; others are the other, that is the self which is not myself. Therefore we grasp here a negation as the constitutive structure of the *being-of-others*."⁵ I cannot be the other and the other cannot be me. It is a case of complete exteriority between the two. There is no relationship⁶ between the two, the two exist in a completely different spatial frameworks. If there is any relationship

This table shows that both the modern and the Strawsonian formalistic views revise traditional view in mutually opposite ways. But the difference between Strawson's realistic view and the three others is more basic. According to the three other views, the non-existence of members in the subject class does not deprive a general proposition of its truth value but according to Strawson's realistic view, it does. If there is no members in the subject class, A,E,I,O forms of proposition lose their truth value and become pointless in realistic view since according to it the existence of members in the subject class is a necessary precondition for any statement to be either true or false. This view sympathetically revises the traditional view. While according to the traditional view all propositions entail the existence of such members according to Strawson's realistic view, they only presuppose their existence. To quote Strawson "...If a statement S presuppose a statement S' in the sense that the truth of S' is a precondition of the truth or falsity of S, then of course there will be a kind of logical absurdity in conjoining S with the denial of S'....But we must distinguish this kind of logical absurdity from straight forward self-contradiction. It is self contradictory to conjoin S with the denial of S' if is a necessary condition of truth simply of S. It is a different kind of logical absurdity to cojoin S with the denial of S' if s' is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of S. The relation between S and S' in the first case is that S entails S'. We need a different name for the relation between S and S' in the second case, let us say, as above, S presupposes S' " (Strawson [3] page 175)

III

Thus according to Strawson entailment is a relation between sentences such that the truth of the entailed sentence necessarily follows from the truth of the entailing sentence. A sentence S will entail a sentence S' If when S is true, S' must also be true. It is, therefore, not possible to assert the truth of S and deny the truth of S'. This relation of entailment can be formulated differently as the truth of S' is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the truth of S ; whereas the truth of S is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the truth of S'. For example, the statement made by uttering 'this is a mango' (S) entails the statement made by uttering 'this is a fruit' (S') since if

S is true S' must be (demonstrating the sufficiency of the truth of S for the truth of S'): On the other hand, S' is to be, though this does not itself guarantee the truth of S demonstrating the necessity of the truth of S' for the truth of S. It follows from this defining conditions that if S' is false then S must also be false. However, if S is false S' can be either true or false.

Presupposition differs from entailment in two ways: the consequence of S being false and the consequence of S' being false. For S to presuppose S', the truth of S' must follow from the truth of S but if S' is false then S will have no truth value at all. It follows from this that if S is false S' must be true. Like entailment then, for a presupposition relation to hold between two statements the truth of S' must be a necessary condition of the truth of S and conversely the truth of S must be a sufficient condition of the truth of S'. But in addition, the truth of S' must also be a necessary condition of the falsity of S, and conversely, the falsity of S must be sufficient condition for the truth of S'. 'All John's children are asleep' is said to presuppose John has children since, as Strawson argues, one determines the truth or falsity of this statement by assuming the existence of John's children and by assuming on the basis of this assumption whether or not they are asleep. If John has no children, then the statement 'All John's children are asleep' is neither true nor false. It follows from this that John's children are not asleep (which asserts the falsity of 'All John's children are asleep') is also said to be either true or false only if John has children. If John has no children it is said to be just as odd to say John's children are not asleep as it is to say 'All John's children are asleep'. As Strawson said the question of whether these statements are true or false does not arise if John has no children. The difference between entailment and presupposition is summarised as follows:

<i>Entailment</i>	<i>Presupposition</i>
S S'	S S'
T \longrightarrow T	T \longrightarrow T
F \longleftarrow F	$\sim(T \vee F) \longleftarrow F$
F \longrightarrow T \vee F	F \longrightarrow T

Why Strawson had introduced the notion of presupposition is an obvious question in the reflective mind. One of the general theses of Strawson is that in a realistic study of the logic of ordinary speech we have to "Think in many more dimensions than that of entailment and contradiction, and use many more tools of analysis besides those which belong to formal logic. (Strawson [3] P 213). The notion of presupposition, according to Strawson, is to be one of the additional concepts required. Hence Strawson's notion of presupposition can be viewed as an attempt to establish that by formal logic alone, we cannot see realistically the logical relation between statements like 'All John's children are asleep' and 'John has children'. Suppose, Strawson argues, by applying the apparatus of formal logic we try to describe the logical relation between these two statements. The statement 'All John's children are asleep' can be interpreted in two ways: as an instance of the statement form: (1) $(X) (Fx \supset Gx)$ or as an instance of (2) $(X) (Fx \supset Gx) \ \& \ (\exists x) Fx$. While the statement 'John has children' is an instance of $(\exists x) Fx$. If we take the first interpretation, then the falsity of the statement 'John has children' is the sufficient condition of the truth of 'All John children are asleep'. If we take the second interpretation then the falsity of the statement 'John has children' is the sufficient condition of the falsity of 'All John's children are asleep'. Thus the use of formal logic "forces us to conclude that the non-existence of any children of John's is sufficient to determine the truth or falsity of the general statement", whereas "the more realistic view seems to be that the existence of children of John's is a necessary precondition not merely of the truth of what is said but of its being either true or false". (Strawson [3] P. 174). By saying it is more realistic view, Strawson means that it conforms more closely to what "we normally should say" in such a case, namely, that "since John has no children, the question does not arise". (Strawson [3] P 174)

The above argument appeals to what we 'normally should say' in order to show that a realistic logic will use the notion of presupposition. In later contexts, Strawson argues that using only the apparatus of formal logic, a logician finds himself committing a kind of linguistic outrage. Thus he objects as follows to the first interpretation according to which, for example

someone who says 'There is not a single book in his room which is not by an English author' has made a true statement, in case there are no books, at all in the room.

"So it is that if someone, with a solemn face, says 'There is not a single foreign book in his room' and then later reveals that there are no books in the room at all, we have the sense, not of having been lied to, but of having been made the victim of a sort of linguistic outrage. Of Course he did not say there were any books in the room, so he has not said anything false. Yet what he said gave us the right to assume that there were, so he has misled us." (Strawson [3]P 178)

Strawson made a similar charge against the second interpretation where, for example, the statement 'He will die in the course of the next two months' would be considered to include the statement 'He is now living' and hence false in case he is not now living. Thus if someone says, 'He will die in the course of the next two months' it is linguistically outrageous to reply 'No, he won't and then give as one's reason 'He is dead already'. If the event has already taken place, the question whether it will take place within the next two months or not is a question which does not arise. 'He is dead already' disputes the presupposition that his death lies in the future, that he is not dead already. But it does not contradict the original statement since to do this would be to admit its presupposition; and hence does not contradict anything entailed by the original statement." (Strawson [3] P 213)

Thus Strawson argues, either the first interpretation or the second leads us to commit outrages when we are dealing with ordinary statements. In the case of original example we would be forced to say either 'you are right in saying that all John's children are asleep, because he has no children' or 'you are wrong in saying that all John's children are asleep because he has no children'. To avoid this, Strawson concludes we should enrich our logical vocabulary by bringing in the notion of presupposition.

An important outcome of Strawson's theory of presupposition is the recognition of the logic with value gaps. In Strawson's opinion if the statement John has children (S') is false i.e, if John has no children, then the

statement 'All John's children are asleep' (S) is neither true nor false or the question of its truth or falsity, as Strawson phrases it, does not arise at all. Strawson, Quine says, 'exploits this idea in a detailed defense of the traditional syllogistic logic apropos of the famous question, raised by Leibnitz and others, of existential import'. (W.V.Quine [4]). Strawson's method is to construe the categorical forms of propositions, of traditional logic, in such a way that where a term is empty of extension the question of the truth of the containing categorical statement does not arise. He argues that this view does justice to ordinary language.

A substantial off shoot of Strawson's notion of truth value gaps is a theory expounded earlier in (Strawson [2]) in which he made a distinction between the referential role and the predicative role of a singular term. Normally, if the role of a singular term in a given statement is referential, the question of truth or falsity of the statement does not arise in case the purported object of the term is non-existent. Since modern formal logic closes all such truth value gaps, there is nothing in that logic to correspond to the referential role of terms.

NOTES

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| (1) | B. Russell - | On Denoting, <i>Mind</i> , 1905, |
| (2) | P.F.Strawson - | On Referring, <i>Mind</i> Vol-59, 1905 |
| (3) | P. F. Strawson - | <i>Introduction to Logical Theory</i> . (Methuen & Com. London, 1952.) |
| (4) | W.V.Quine - | Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory, <i>Mind</i> , Oct. 1953. |

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3. B. Russell- *My Philosophical Development* (New York : Simon & Schuster, 1959).
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