SĀKĀ - IT'S NATURE, ROLE & STATUS IN ADVAITIC TRADITION

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The concept of Sāksī is of crucial importance in Advaitic epistemology. It is considered as the highest observer in me, the most unaffected witness of my activities. The attitude of impartial spectator or neutral seer truly depicts the real nature of witness consciousness (Sāksī Caitanya). The consciousness is considered as the very nature of self. Advaita Vedanta like Samkhya makes a distinction between the consciousness which is the nature of the self & the consciousness that is due to a mode of the mind. The self is consciousness as (Svarūpa jñāna), where as the mental mode leads to consciousness of (Vrtti jñāna). The objective knowledge requires mental mode and prototype consciousness which is also described as the witness consciousness (Sāksī Caitanya). When I say "I know this is a pot," how is the knownness of the pot known? The Nyāya Vaiśesika view is that it is known through reflective cognition (anuvyavasāya jñāna). But this will lead to infinite regress: The Advaitic position is that the knownness of an object is revealed by the witnness consiousness. It is directly manifest to the Sākṣī without being objectified. This is self manifestedness (Svaprakāśattva) of knowledge in the true sense. While cognitions manifest object, it is the witness that manifests cognitions. It is not cognitive modes alone, but also all modes of the mind such as desire, pleasure and pain etc, are directly revealed by the Sākṣī. There is one more significant instance where there is awareness because of the witness, without the instrumentation of a cognitive mode - the awareness of the absence of objects as in deep sleep. Here unknownness is also known due to the revealing principle - the witness self. It is the eternal, immutable, pure awareness (cinmātra),. It is on the basis of the self that all empirical knowledge takes place, involving the disinction

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of cognizer, means of cognition and object of cognition. Rāmānuja does not accept the Advaitic standpoint that the ātman is only onlooker (Sākṣī) while the ego (ahaiṅkara) is the real knower, doer and enjoyer. The nature of ātman is to be the I - consciousness (ahamdhi) but not mere consciousness (j̄nāna) or mere witness consciousness (Sākṣī Caitanya). The I is always the I - consciousness and as the "I", the ātman itself is the agent of all the functions. The ego as the product of prakṛti cannot be the knower, the doer, and the enjoyer, for it is unconscious like Prakṛti.

śarikarācārya establishes identity between the Brahman and the jiva and for his reason what falls within the range of the object is a superimposition on subject, is interpreted as subjective idealism. To remove this misconception, it had only to be pointed out that the subject which finds itself confronted by an object, is also a super impostion on the brahman like the object The Jīva experienced as the "I" is superimposition on the Sākṣī, Sākṣī on Iśvara and finally Iśvara superimposition on the Brahman. The author of citradīpa maintains that the Brahman is pure consciousness not limited by māyā and Iśvara is the same reflected in the impression left in māyā by the intellect of the jīvas. Sākṣī or Kūṭastha is the pure consiousness limited by the gross and subtle bodies of the jīva, while jīva is reflection of mind positied in Kūṭastha. Iśavara is conceived with reference to the jīva but Brahman is without this reference. Sākṣī is unaffected perceiver of the actions and enjoyments of the jīva of empirial individual.

Every individual is aware of himself as a doer and as an experiencer. But in his self recognition (\bar{A} tma bodha) no subject object relation is involved. The self shines of itself and is not objectified. He is aware of the empirical self; the ego, but not of the changeless luminous self ever distinct from the psycho-physical adjunct as its witness. The realization of this identy leads to the immediate apprenhension of the self as nondual, non relational consciousness that Brahman is. The whole world of phenomena is grounded on pure consciousness which is idential with pure Being (Brahman). Behind the ever changing ego Brahman shines as the immutable self (Kuṭastha.) While the individual self ($J\bar{\imath}$ va) functions as the experiencer (bhoktā) and the doer (kartā), the immutable (Kūṭastha) stays behind as the witness ($S\bar{a}k\bar{\imath}\bar{\imath}$) of all cognitions and actions. The witnessing self that transcends the ego illuminates all that is known and unknown to him!

The individual self finds expression as the ego (Aham Vṛtti or ahamkāra), a mode of mind that transmits consciousness. By introspection and an act of witharawl which can be compared with phenomenologocal method of epoche and reduction, a person can aprehend himself as witness of his mental states. Indeed a jñāna is the basic limiting adjunct of an embodied being. It forms his causal body, which is the root of the subtle and the gross body. Ajñāna rests on the Kuṭastha, the immutable self, its witness (Sākṣī) which is uncontaminated by it. One and the same indwelling self is experiencer (as reflected consciousness) and the witness (as immutable consciousness). So self is distinct from the ever changing psycho-physical constitution. Waking, dream and dreamless sleep are the primary states of the mind (antaḥkaraṇa). The luminous self as the witness under lies them all.

II

It is from the preliminary discussion of saksī that we are now in a position to reflect upon its nature. It is that which remains self indentical in all the three states (waking etc.) which resides in the two bodies gross and subtle, but without undergoing any modifications2. Avidya has two fold functions of obscuring and projecting - it obscures the Kūṭastha while projecting the jīva. Being obscured, its intrinsic characteristics like unrelatedness, blissfulness etc. remain hidden. I itself is not the nature of Kūṭastha, but is only imposed on it. Jīva or cidābhāsa is the reflection of kūtastha. Avidyā is known by the self consciousness and is directly known in itself (Svarūpa). Sākṣī is that consciousness which is reflected in avidyā vṛtti. Like an eclipsed sun, avidyā is revealed by that consciousness which it covers3. The Mundakopanisad gives a beautiful imagery of differentiation between the jīva and the Sākṣīin in the following lines - "Two birds, companions (who are) always united, cling to the self - same tree. Of these two, the one eats the sweet fruit and the other looks on without eating. So sākṣīin is one who is free from the agency etc. and as such a non-involved consciousness. It is pointed out in Vedāntakaumudi that Prajnā issāk sī, as he is deviod of cause, attributes etc. and has particular nature of God. He is the motivator of attachment and detachment of human desires but he himself, remains non-involved. The Svetāśvatara upanisad puts the nature of Sākṣī in this way - The one God hidden in all beings, all pervading, the inner self of all beings, the ordainer of all deeds, dwells in all beigns the witness,

the knower the only one devoid of all qualities. The concept of saksin is a typical notion of Advaita Vedanta which may be called the principle of objectivity. By the principle of objectivity it is Meant that it reveals an object or state as it is in non-personal way, Ācārya Samkara defines Sākṣī in this sense - it is witness of all meaning threby omniscient - Sarveşū Bhutānām Sākṣī Sarvadṛṣṭā. Sākṣī is conscious reality which is the seer or witness of the mental modification and that what we are in ourselves. Sāksī is different from I consciousness which resides in all and is considered to be one immutable and eternal. Jīvais knower, doer and enjoyer while Sākṣī is neutral seer and is self evident. Jīva has to undergo different stages of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep while Sākṣī is immutable (Kūṭastha) by nature. It is from this that we are not justified in inferring that Sākṣī is ultimate reality (Brahman). The argument of Suresvara is that in Brahman the predicate of Sāksitva is beyond human imagination because Sāksī is always in need of other to witness it. It is quite logical question to be framed at this crucial juncture that if there is neither jīva nor Brahman to be called as Sāksī then can there be the possibility of third which is fit case for being called sāksī. The reply of Sureśvarācārya is on expected line - The immutable atman limited or conditioned by ignorance is sākṣī. The real import of this statement is that the distinction of knower and object known (Jñāta & Jñeya) is index of ignorance, but sāksī is truly speaking conscious in nature.

Sarvajñātma Muni has made serious attempt to explain how sākṣī sees the world. Sākṣī or Kūṭastha sees the phenomenal world of ignorance in a unique way, as conscious in nature, passively, unaided by senses and finally as witness or non-involved conciousness.

Śamkarācārya maintains Sākṣī to be self evident or self proof which cannot be cancelled. No proof is needed at all for establishing sākṣī as it is self luminous. Swami vidyāranya in Nātak dīpprakaraṇa of Pañcdasi analyses the nature of sākṣī - That consciousness which reveals at one and the same time the agent, the action and the external objects, such conscious reality is called witness. It illumines the all like lamp placed in theatre - Bhasyate Sarva Nṛṭyasā lästha dīpvat. It is universal in spatial context while it is witnessing in reference to witness, but it is beyond speech and categories of intellect (vāg Buddhihagocara). The light in the dancing hall uniformly reveals the patron, the audience and the dancer even when they are

absent the light continues to shine¹⁰. In this illustration the patron is the ego, the various sense objects are the audience, the intellect is the dancer, the muscian playing on their instruments are the sense organs and the light illuminating them all is the witness consciousness¹¹. The witness consciousness lights up the ego, the intellect and the sense objects. Even when ego etc. are absent, it reamins self luminous as ever¹².... The unchangeable witness is ever present as self luminous consciousness; the intellect functions under its light and dances in a variety of ways. As the light reveals all the objects remaining in its own place so the witness consciousness itself ever motion less, illumine the objects within and without¹³.

Advita Vedanta in order to reach the very foundation of knowing arrives at the notion of witness self (sākṣī) which stands behind everything that is known, which reveals eternally and without the break. The sākṣī is the ground of the notion 'I' the reality to which the 'I' is ascribed. Our experience is a stream of conciousness. Knowledge is not merely a succession but also a fusion or a synthesis. To know things to be different we require an indentical knower for all the different, Which therefore must also be different from the differents. The Kantian transcendental unity of pure apperception is logical presupposition of all our knowledge and experience and in similar fahion Advaita Vedanta has to accept the concept of sākṣī as the very foundation of knowledge, but it is something substantial or ontological, not merely the frame of reference for the variety of mental states held together. It is sui generis and remains self identical amidst all change. Husserl also talks about transcendental ego or subjectivity which is decidedly ontological in nature, but the major difference between Sākṣī and transcendental ego is that in Advaitic tradition we have foundational consciousness while in phenomenology consciousness is always intentional.

Ш

According to Advaita Vedānta, in the perception of an external object the mind (manas or antaḥkaraṇa) goes out to the object through the senses (indriyas). The sense therefore act as the vehicle of the movement of the antaḥkaraṇa towards the object and on reaching the object the antaḥkaraṇa is identified with it. The modification of mind (antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti) cannot amount to knowledge on account of being unconscious and has therefore to be illumined by the ātman, the cit, which is there as the observer (sākṣīin) of all changes. It is therefore held that the activity

of the antaḥkaraṇa is case of perception consists in rending the veil of ignorance (āvaraṇābhibhāva)⁴. In all knowledge situations there is present self shining transcendental light of consiousness which imparts to the object its character of immediacy. Consciousness in this aspect is called the sākṣīin or the witness. It is so called because it is conceived as the impartial spectator which takes no part in the ever changing process of knowledge, but only lights it up or passively witness it. The sākṣīin which participates in the process of empirical activity is not taken completely as transcendent in character. But sākṣīin need not exhaust itself within the confines or the empirical individual (jīva). The common import of Sākṣīin is seen or experiencing without being agent of the act concerned (akartṛtve sati draṣṭrvam). Even as evidencing it is a unique activity - an activity that implies no agency. The said evidencing principle may prove to be the transcendental precondition of all particular instances of perceiving.

The Advaita refutes the Naiyāyika contention as to the possibility of mental perception (manaspratyakṣa) of self as qualified by mental states. The position that self as endowed with the attributes of pleasure, pain, knowledge etc. is knowable by the same self through mental perception would involve the fallacy of contradiction of subject and object (Karma-Kartṛ Virodha)¹⁵. Again to treat self under two aspect - pure and qualified -in order to avoid such contradiction would be too sophisticated an approach. Thus behind the physicomental complex commonly called Jīva there is to be traced the invariable background of consciousness subsisting essentially in unmediated evidencing¹⁶. This alone may be regarded as the inner essence of individual which evidences the series of mental states (aseṣa -Svapracara-Saksi). The constantly evidencing character of the inner self makes itself felt with immediate certitude, ever indubitable and uncancelled¹⁷.

Though Jīva and Sākṣīin are not two different entities, both being grounded in consciousness, they still indicate two perspectives in which the foundational consciousness operates in mental life. While in the case of Jīva, pure consciousness in all appearance is circumscribed by mind - antanḥkaraṇa -vacchinam-as the qualifying attributes, in the case of Sākṣīin mind can at best serve as just limiting condition - antaḥkaraṇa- upahita Caitanya. Thus while the qualifying attribute (viṣesaṇa) differentiates its subject as directly related to the function predicated of it Kāryānvayi Vartamānam Vyāvartakam, the limiting condition (Upādhi)

differentiates but is not connected with the function (apparently) predicated of it - Kāryanvayi Vartamanām Vyāvartakam. This can be regarded as an appropriate fromal syntactical translation of the phenomenological situation pertaining to Jīva and Jīva Sākṣīin. Extending this model of division to the cosmic level in total perspective of Māyā the distinction between the God (Is'vara) as qualified by his power of creation, (māyāvacchinam Caitanyam) and God (Is'vara) Sākṣī) conceived as the detached witness of his creative power - māyāpahitam Caitanyam can be made. In other words, it is an analouge of what prevails on the Jīva level-pure conciousness remaining the foundational stream in both the contexts. Jīva Sākṣī is to be distinguished from Is'vara Sākṣī which is associated with cosmic creativity (māyāpahita Caitanyam) and is one.

IV

Sākṣī is selfevident principle so to construct proof for its existence will be excercise in futility. We can at best offer philosophical justification for accepting it-

- 1. what really happens when one goes to sleep? There seem to be intermittent periods of lapsing into total unconsciousness. Had there been a break in the flow of consciousness one could not on waking resume the threads of personal identity¹⁸. On waking up one says "I slept soundly, I didn't know anything". Paradoxially this not knowing of anything is itself known. Consciousness does not remain ignorant of its own ignorance. The sleeping self is thus revealed as revealing the darkness (Ajñāna) which is a kind of loose embodiment for the self, and which is the matrix of all distinctions and differentiations of the waking life. Therefore revelation is absolute and timeless, depending in the adventitious fact of their being something to be revealed. Advaita makes a basic distinction between consciousness and knowledge. Knowledge is the revelation of objects by means of modifications (Vṛṭtis), while consciousness is the principle of revelation it self, without their being a principle of revelation the entire world would be plunged in darkness (Jagad Āndhya Prasaṅga)¹⁹.
- 2. Dreams are a unique experience in many respects. Its contents though being shown up as external, are really pulsations of the mind. The mind or rather avidyā itself as associated with the sleeping self gets directly transformed into the dream

objects. The importance of dream state lies in the fact that it is here that the nature of consciousness as selfluminous becomes most explict. Since during dream all external illumination ceases and yet perception of objects is not hindered. This light can be of none other than the self itself. The most plausible hypothesis is that it is Sākṣī consiousness on which all dream experience is based. The Sākṣī witness what are essentially its own creatures.

- 3. Illusion is a private experience; the appearance of something which should not have appeared. The illusory object being non-empirical, so it cannot be known by any pramāna. The illusory object is however never hidden, it has no unknown existence and finally its sole existence is in being perceived (Pratibhasamātra -Śarirvatva) - esse est percipi. The illusory being non empirical cannot be known by the empirical I (pramātā). Illusion is thus a highly complex affair. Its content is not real as it is sublated, nor is it unreal being identical with real ground. Advaita speaks of two Vrttis in explaining the genesis of illusion - the antahkaran Vrtti and avidyāvrtti In rope snake analogy the antahkarana pertaining to the 'this' part which is real. Avidyavritti. pertains to the ascribed part-Snake. Since the contents of the two Vrttis belong to different levels they are cognized by two different 'selves'. The 'this' is known by an empirial I (pramāta) in normal way, while snake cannot be known by empirical means and therefore really perceived by the transcendental self (Sākṣī). So the judgement 'this is snake' is both true and false, true in referring to the real this and false in referring to an unreal ascription. The real and unreal are both equally objects of Sākṣi which reveals everything.
- 4. Internal states like feelings of pleasure and pain, emotion of anger and grief and other mental states occupy a peculiar place in the economy of the ordinary experience. They are qualities modification (Upādhi) of intellect (buddhi) in which the real self is reflected. In knowing pleasure I percieve, not the self as such, but only the self as characterised by this quality. A vṛtti is still involved as consciousness has not shed its intentionality, but it is a vṛtti of a very different kind. The Sākṣī has no covering (āvaraṇa) and its knowledge does not depend on that type of Vṛtti which functions by destroying covering (āvaraṇa abhibhāva). Finally the vṛtti does not have to go out, as pleasure is in immediate contact with the Sākṣī.
- 5. Knowledge is revelation of what is already there (Vastutantra) and does not add to and distort it in any manner. The object however is inert (jada) and must be

evidenced by something else. There is no experience that is not witnessed no niḥsākṣika anubhava. The principle of illumination is consciousness (caitanava). Revelation of the object is not adding anything to it, but it is only removing the covering that obstructed knowledge. The obstruction that hides things is ignorance (Ajñāna) and what removes the obstruction or limitation is a Vṛtti. The subject or knower is consciousness, but limited by egoism (ahamkāra) having the adjunct of T' - is pramātr caitanya. The object too is essentially consciousness (visaya caitanya) again circumscribed by various limiting conditions. Here is the crucial role of vṛttis penetrating through the covering of ignorance and showing the nature of both as the same consciousness. There must be some consciousness from which avidyā cannot hide anything, and always everything is revealed to it. This is Sākṣī caitanya which is ultimate principle of revelation on which is imposed all plurality, all epistmeic distinction of knower, known and knowledge. It reveals everything without exception, whether known or unknown, it is called omniscient. (Sarvajña) How is such trancedental consciousness to be apprehended? Objects are known by paramānas, which themselves presuppose the self, and cannot prove the latter. How can the knower itself be known? It canot be known by other consciousness there cannot be knower behind the knower, without launching an infinite regress. Nor could it be known by itself; the subject cannot be its own object. The self is not the subject and object at once (Karma Kartrtva Virodha). The seer of seeing cannot be seen (Na dṛṣṭer draṣṭāram paṣyeh). The knower remains unknown (Avijñātam Vijñātr). Since who will know the knower (Vijnātarām are kena Vijāniyāt.) It can be only discovered regressively, as the presupposition of the very possibility of knowing. The self is therefore described as pratyagātman the inward or backward (pratyak) principle of knowledge. It is evident in itself, unknown yet immediate. Though unknown, its existence is however undeniable, Since denial itself is the Vindication of awareness. Advaida Vedānta makes a distinctiona between self luminosity. svayam Prakāṣa) and self consciousness (Svasamvedanā). The essence of consciousness is its unrelatedness (asanga), it is so pure that it is not even related to itself in terms of self consciousness. It is in itself (en soi) but not for itself (Pour Soi). It does not require the intervention of any vrtti or pramana to make its self luminosity evident. Finally Advaita Vedānta distinguishes empirical I (Pramātā) from the witness consciousness (Sākṣī -Caitanya). The empirical I cannot remain indifferent to what it sees. It is itself involved and cannot be neutral and therefore

will reject and illusory. But the illusory is revealed by witness consciousness and therefore witness reality and illusory with equal indifference²⁰.

V

It is now time to discuss ontological status of Sākṣīin. Some advaitins draw a distinction between the dual aspects of Sākṣīin - treascendent and immutable (Kūṭastha) on the one hand, and immanent and functional (Taṭastha) on the other²¹. According to this distinction in the immanent and functional aspect alone does the notion imply evidencing function and correspondingly the evidenced continuum (dṛṣya). In its ultimate nature as pure consciousness, however, self would involve no reference, even detached. The status of Sākṣīin iṣ defined in two fold way epistemologocal and ontological, the former pertaining to jīva and the latter to Brahman. In anticipation of the ontological, the two aspects are sought to be reconciled by Jñānaghana in Tattva suddhi - Parmārthato Brahmāt yepi Pratibhāsataḥ Sākṣinaḥ Saṃsāri antarbhāva eva.

The Sāksī is the pure nonrelated consciousness, the impartial and timeless witness of everything. But it is not proper to equate it with Brahman. Though in itself unrelated, the Sākṣī is discriminated only in a relational context. It cannot be evidenced in the absence of something to be illumined. Brahman is not the seer, since there is no other to be seen. Brahman is the utter beyond the turiya, it is not Sāksī, as even ajñāna is not there to be witnessed. The relation between the transcendental self (Sāksī) and the empirical self (pramātā or jīva) is peculiar in nature. They are not really two independent selves leading their own private and parallel lives. The subject or the seer or rather the principle of seeing is pure consciousness or the ultimate self (Sākṣī). Brahman is not the subject, since the subject object distinction is meaningles in that context. It is a seer transcendence of all duality. So far as the empirical self is concerned, Sākṣī is the real self. It cannot however be apprehended in isolation, since egoity is always super imposed on it. It is not distinguished by the empirical subject (Jīva), because ignorance hides the self and projects the ego instead. Sākṣī is the ground which underlies the Jīva illusion.

There may be disagreement regarding the number of Sākṣī which can be easily resolved through critical analysis. - The pramātā or I, is defined as

antahkaranavācchinna or anthakarana viśista, but the Sākṣī is either described as antahkaranopahita or avidyopahita. In the first case it would be individual and many. But who is to witness the different Sāksīis? The proposition is not, assertible, being self-stultifying. There can be only one Sāksī, and it is therefore avidyopahita, not antahkarano-pahita. Isvara is described as māyopahita. Though it operates within the framework of ignorance, it is not deluded by the latter. He sees thus the real and unreal at once, and nothing remains hidden from him. For Isvara there can be no unknown existence. In all these respects the concept of Isvara is comparable to that of sāksi for which knowledge is direct revelation. Here we can make distinction between Iśvara and sāksi. Iśvara is not bound and has never been in bondage. Sākṣī too may be said to be free, but it is not conscious of its freedom, and cannot even make distinction between bondage and freedom. Sākṣī is witness consciousness as it passively witness real as well as illusory and can therefore be said to be neutral. Iśvara apart from being neutral seer (Sākṣī or dṛṣṭa) is immanent inner controller (antaryāmi) of cosmic process, while the Sāksi is bare witness of the Jiva and his actions. So in the ontological framework of Advaita Vedanta apart from adhoc distinction between the Jīvas and the Brahman two other principles are recognised - Iśvara and Sākṣī in which Sākṣī comes in between Iśvara and Jī va.

NOTES

- Sarvam Vastu Jňātatayā vā Ajňatatayā vā Sākṣī Caitnayasya Viṣaya Eva 52 Pañc -Pādika - Virvarana.
- Adhişihānatayā Dehadvayā Vacchinna Cetanaḥ Kuţavan Nir Vikārena Sthitaḥ Kūţastha Uchyate - VI 22 Pañcdaśī.
- Ate Evocyate Rāhuvat Svāvṛta Citanya Prakāśyā Vidyeti page 575 Advaita Siddih.
- Dvā Suparņā Sayujā Sakhāyā Samānam Vṛṣam Pariṣasva Jāte I Tayor Anyaḥ Pippalam Svady Atty Anaśannanyo Bhicākaśiti II III 1.1 Munḍaka Upaniṣad.
- Eko Devaḥ Sarvabhūteṣu Gūḍhaḥ Sarva Vyāpi Sar-Vabhūtāntarātma I Karmādhyakṣah Sarvabhūtādhivāsas Sākṣī Cetā Kevalo Nirguṇaśca II - VI, 11 Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.

- 6. Aham Pratyaya Vişaya Kartā Vyatirekena Tat Sākṣī I. Sarvabhūṭastha Sam Ekah Kūtastha Nıtyaḥ Puruṣaḥ II 1.1.4 Brahmsūtra Śāṁkara Bhāsya.
- Tamsā Vinirmitamidam Sakalm Caturah Na Paśyanti Paraḥ Puruṣaḥ I
 Avikāri Bodhavpuradvyakaḥ Kāranervinā sakal sākṣītmyā II 2.29 Saṃkṣepa Sārīraka.
- 8. Svayam Siddhasyā Ca Sākṣino Apratyābhaye Yatvāt I 2.2.228 Brahmasūtra Śāmkara Bhāsya.
- Kartarām Kriyām Tvad Dvyā Vyāvṛtviṣayānapi Sphoraye Dekyatnena Yo Sau, Sāksyatra Ci Dvapuḥ II x - 9 Pañcadaśī.
- Nṛṭyasālā sthito Dīpaḥ Prabhum, Sabhyām Srava Nartkim I dīpyed Viseṣena Tad Abhāve Api Dīpyate II x - II Ibid.
- 11. Ahamkāraḥ Prabhuḥ Sabhyā Vişaya Nartaki Matiḥ Talādi Dhārinya Kṣāni Dīpah Sākṣya Avabhasakaḥ II x 14 *Ibid*.
- Aha mkāram Dhiyam Sākṣī Viṣyān Api Bhāsyet I Ahamkār Adyabhave Api Svayam Bhāsyaeva Pūrvavat II - x - 12 Ibid.
- Svasthān Sansthito Dīpah Sarvato Bhāsyedyathā Sthir Sthāyi Tathā Sākṣī Bahirantaḥ prakāsayet. II x-15 lbid.
- 14. Jivasya Jagad Upādānatve Āvaraņābhibhāvārtha: page 479 Sidhdhānta Vindu quoted in Advaita Siddhi.
- Mānas Pratyakṣa Vedyatve Iccādeh Karma Karṭṛvbhāvasya Bādhakatvāt -IV, page 381 f. Cit -Sukhi.
- Tam Pracāram Asesam Asangitayā Avikāritvena Ca Hanopādān Sunyaḥ Sskṣāt
 Avyavadhānam Avabhās Yati citidhatuḥ Page 35 Pañca Pādika.
- Asya Sākṣinah Sadā Asandigdha, Aviparītasya Nitya Sākṣātkāratā Anāgantuka Prakāśtave ghaṭate -II Pages 28 Bhāmatī.
- 18. The concept of Sākṣi In Advita Vendānta A.K. Chatterjee & R.R. Dravid, Page 49.
- 19. Ibid. Page 50
- 20. Ibid. Page 93

 Drastrtvaghatitam Sākṣitvam Na Svarūpam Apitu Udāsinobodhātmakameva Sākṣitvam Svarūpam, Tasya Niṣpratiyogika Svarūpatvāt: Page 441. Advaita Dīpikā.

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