

IS CONFIGURATION (ĀKṚTI) DENOTED BY A WORD ?

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The Present paper gives a critical account of the theory of configuration denoted by a word (*Ākṛtivāda*) with a special reference to Śabara. Śabara has opined that *ākṛti* or configuration of an object is denoted by a word while Kumarila accepts that a word denotes universal which is equivalent to Configuration (*ākṛti*). The systems of Indian philosophy express their difference of opinion on the view whether a word denotes universal (*Jāti*), individual (*vyakti*) or form (*ākṛti*). An effort has been made in this paper to throw some light on the theory which propounds that the configuration (*ākṛti*) is denoted by a word according to the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas in general and Śabara in particular. Incidentally the Mīmāṃsā position on the eternality (*nityatva*) of a word, its meaning and their relation that are very much connected with this *ākṛtivāda* has been highlighted and defended, which is followed by some critical and evaluative remarks.

It has been argued by the opponents that a word and its meaning are not naturally related on account of the fact that both of them remain in two different domains. Word remains in the mouth by virtue of being manifested there while meaning exists in the external world i.e., outside the mouth. Moreover, a word is understood as such but not as meaning while meaning is understood as such but not as word. When someone utters the word 'Cow', it merely indicates an animal endowed with the characteristic features like dewlap etc. The importance of such deliberation lies on the fact that the word 'Cow' exists in speaker's mouth and the meaning referred to by this remains in the characteristics of the cow. As the domain of a word (*Śabda*) and its meaning (*Artha*) is completely different, there cannot be a natural relation between them as claimed by the Mīmāṃsakas.¹

In response to the above-mentioned view, Śabara has left no stone

untuned to substantiate the fact that there is a necessary relation between a word and its meaning. To him, a word always denotes configuration (*ākṛti*) which alone constitutes the meaning of a word. The meaning of the term 'cow' is an animal characterised by a dewlap etc. (*Sāsnādiviśiṣṭa ākṛtiritibrumaḥ*). The configuration (*ākṛti*) cannot be said to be identical with universal (*jāti*) or individual (*vyakti*). It is also to be borne in mind that without *ākṛti* one cannot have the idea of universal and individual. As one always remembers the form or *ākṛti* through the utterance of a word, this, being the meaning of the same, is permanently related (*nitya*) to the word.² From this it follows that a word is invariably associated with the configuration (*ākṛti*) which is actually perceived. The object which is already perceived is always taken as being established, and hence there is no necessity of forwarding some arguments in favour of its existence (*na pratyakṣa satī sādhyā bhavitum arhati*).³ Śābara has described *ākṛti* as a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and hence, a qualified object (*viśiṣṭa*) is known in terms of its qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). In other words, the knowledge of a qualified object (*viśiṣṭa*) presupposes the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). Without the knowledge of a qualifier i.e. *ākṛti* the objects like cow etc. cannot be known. One can understand the meaning of the term 'cow' which is taken as *viśiṣṭa* in terms of its configuration (*ākṛti*) which is qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) here (*Na hyapratīte viśeṣaṇe viśiṣṭam kecana pratyeturmarhanti*).⁴ The main function of a qualifier is to eliminate something from others (*itaravyāvartaka*). In the present case the characteristics (*ākṛti*) of a 'cow' like dewlap etc. serve the function of distinguishing 'cow' from non-cow. Hence, *ākṛti* of an object distinguishes it from the rest (*itarabhedaka*) by a way of pointing out its characteristic feature. As a word is the cause of the awareness of the form of an object (*ākṛtipratyayasya nimittam*),⁵ it is called *viśiṣṭa* and the *ākṛti* which is known through this is called eliminating or distinguishing factor.

The *ākṛti* functions in two ways—first, it gives rise to the knowledge of an individual (*vyakti*) and secondly, it can show the inherent similarity among the individuals by way of integrating them. That a particular cow (*govyakti*) is not different from other cows is known only through its *ākṛti*. That is why, *ākṛti* serves the function of a universal. In this way, the Mīmāṃsakas have tried to show that *ākṛti* is the key-factor which ultimately points to both individual (*vyakti*) and universal (*jāti*)⁶. The view of the Naiyāyikas that a word refers to universal, individual and configuration (*vyaktyākṛtijātayastu padārthah*)⁷ can be

refused by the Mīmāṃsakas in the above-mentioned manner. In fact, if *ākṛti* is accepted as meaning of a word, it will adhere to the law of parsimony (*Lāghava*). There is no strong reason behind accepting the three (*jāti* etc) as the meaning, because the *ākṛti* of an object itself can refer to both individual and universal.

The *ākṛti*, Śabara observes, is permanently related to an individual. As a relation is called *dvistha* i.e. existing in two relata, the knowledge of one of the relata i.e. *ākṛti* gives rise to the knowledge of the another i.e. *vyakti*.⁸ It is a self-evident fact that as soon as a word is uttered, an individual (*vyakti*) is understood through it. It is very difficult to differentiate whether this awareness of an individual arises from the word or from the *ākṛti* denoted by the word. Which one is more important in this context is to be understood with the help of methods of agreement and difference (*anvayavyatireka*).⁹ When the *ākṛti* of an object is known, the individual is also known simultaneously as it serves as a differentiating element of a particular individual from others. On the other hand, when a word is uttered and corresponding *ākṛti* is not remembered due to some mental indisposition, it cannot give rise to the knowledge of *vyakti*.¹⁰ From this Śabara intends to say that it is *ākṛti* alone which constitutes the meaning of a word.

Now Śabara is trying to justify how *ākṛti* of an object is known. The characteristic features of an object are known through the repeated use of the term and its corresponding experience. Through the utterance of the word 'Cow' (*go*) one can understand its *ākṛti* if there is repeated use of the term to refer to this particular *ākṛti*. The configuration of an object is known through a word if we are familiar with the constant use of the term.

Though Śabara has accepted the importance of repeated use of the word to understand the *ākṛti* of an object, it should be clearly borne in mind that word and its denotation (*ākṛti*) do not depend on the conventional usage of the word. To him a word is used to indicate a new-born calf which is not seen before. On the other hand, a word 'Cow' has not been applied previously to a new-born calf.¹¹ On account of this the term 'Cow' indicating an individual does not depend on the actual usage of the term. In other words, it can be said that the meaning of the term does not depend on the conventional usage. If the meaning of a word depends on the experience, it would be regarded as conventional, which is purely undesirable to the Mīmāṃsakas.¹² It may be recalled in this

connection that between a word and its meaning there is a constant or permanent relation which indicates the non-conventional character of the same.¹³

Śabara thinks that *ākṛti* is the meaning of a word. This *ākṛti* is neither opposed to meaning (*artha*) nor subordinate to meaning (*artha*), but *artha* or meaning itself. The words by which some objects having *ākṛti* are expressed remain in the visible world. But there are many words or sentences which cannot express things having *ākṛti* as meaning. The injunctions like *Svargakāmo yajeta* cannot express the meaning in the form of *ākṛti* as these words do not bear any visible character. The term '*Vidhāna* i.e. injunction is derived from '*vidhiyate anena iti*' i.e., that by which something is enjoined. This injunctive sentence cannot be taken as capable of referring to *ākṛti* or to *vyakti*.¹⁴ When Śabara says that a word indicates *ākṛti* of an object, it is applicable to only visible dimension of reality. But so far as the non-visible (*Adṛṣṭa*) dimension of reality is concerned, this thesis propounded by Śabara is not applicable there. For, the words indicating the invisible (*adṛṣṭa*) dimension like *devatā*, *Svarga* etc. do not have any visible *ākṛti* at all. As to the supersensuous entities like deity, heaven etc., one cannot assign a proper name (*saṁjñā*) to them. One can name the objects having particular features and one can do so keeping the particular features in view. If there is an entity having supersensuous character, any outward feature of the same is not found through which they can be described in terms of language. After considering this dimension of reality the Mīmāṃsakas have accepted the relation between a word (*śabda*) and its meaning (*artha*) as *apauruṣeya* (i.e., not caused by any person). The imperceptible objects like diety etc. cannot be described by name etc. because proper names are generally used to inform the particular feature of an object. If these particular features are not known at all due to their imperceptible character, the ascription of name is not possible. That is why, the relation between a word and its meaning is described as *apauruṣeya* (i.e. not caused by any person).¹⁵

One can utter a word many times in different occasion and one can understand the same word permanently due to its unifying significance. That is why, Śabara has accepted the eternal character of a word due to the reference to its *ākṛti*. If uttered, it produces a particular *ākṛti* without any fail. Here the term '*nitya*' is to be taken as conveying the sense of permanence, consistency and continuity.

If a word is pronounced eight times, it is known as the same by everybody. This cognition of perceptual form gives the certainty of *nityatva* of word. If a word 'Cow' is uttered in many times, the same set of phonemes (*g,am* etc.) is realised in each case of perception, as they are not different from a word.¹⁶

It may be argued that a word uttered yesterday and that uttered today is completely different. So how the sameness or *nityatva* of a word is established. In reply, Śābara rejoins that a word uttered yesterday is not destroyed and hence it is capable of being perceived today. The understanding of the previously uttered word today is a kind of recognition which comes under perception. Had it been perished the other day when it was uttered, there would not have been the possibility of recognising it. It is evident from our day to day behaviour that we can recognise our father, mother etc. for the second time, which leads us to assume the sameness or *nityatva* of the object. This notion of *nityatva* or sameness of an object leads them to accept that *ākṛti* is denoted by a word. For this reason the Mīmāṃsaka⁸ have taken the word '*nitya*' in a completely different sense. To them *nityatva* of an object is capable of being perceived. Due to its perceptible character it can neither be taken as beginning-lessly eternal (*anadinitya*) nor unchangeably eternal (*kuṭasthanitya*). For this reason *nityava* cannot be taken in a metaphysical sense, but in the sense permanent and consistent which is capable of being perceived. In other words, a word is called *nitya* on the strength of our experience of its continuous and consistent use. The *nityatva* does not refer to the temporarility, but it refers to the consistency between a word and its meaning i.e. *ākāra*. The *ākāra* which is signified by a word has got unity (*aikarūpya*) and without parts (*niravayatva*), which are the marks of *nityatva*.¹⁷ *Śabda* being *niravayava* (having no parts does not have any cause of production and destruction. As a word (*śabda*) is characterised by unity etc, it is *nitya* in character. In order to substantiate this *nityatva* of a *śabda* the Mīmāṃsakas have accepted the unity of *ākāra* signified by it.

The aphorism of Jaimini - *Ākṛtistu Kriyārthatvāt*¹⁸ is formulated primarily for the refutation of the theory called *Vyaktivāda* and Substantiating *ākṛtivāda*. One point is to be kept in mind that the term *ākṛti* is not taken as combination of the parts (*avayavaśāsthāna*) as accepted by the Naiyāyikas. *Ākṛti* which is denoted (*vācavya*) by a word is nothing but *Jāti* according to Kumarila. To him, the wise persons describe *jāti* as *ākṛti* because it is *jāti* alone through

which *vyakti* is determined (*ākṛti*). The object i.e. *jāti* through which a *vyakti* is ascertained (*vyaktirākriyate yayā*) is called *ākṛti*.¹⁹ If *ākṛti* is taken in the sense of *jāti*, then alone the *niravayavatva* of a word and its denotation can be proved, which indicates the *nityatva* of a *śabda*. If *ākṛti* is taken in the sense of the combination of the parts, it will lose its *nitya*-character. According to the Mimāṃsakas, both *Vācya* i.e. signified object and *Vācaka* i.e. the signifier are taken to be *nitya*. Though each and every individual case of 'cow' is different from each other, there are common features among all the cows through which a cow is differentiated from a horse. These common features described as *ākṛti* are perceptual and hence, no argument against this position is tenable. The truth realised universally through perception cannot be challenged, as it will go against perceptual awareness (*anubhava*). Hence, i.e. *Vācya* (i.e. *ākṛti*), *Vācaka* (a word) and their relation are *nitya*.²⁰

For another reason a word is described as *nitya*. In the *sūtra* '*sarvatra yaugapadyāt*'²¹ it has been said that due to simultaneity of knowledge of all individuals a word has to be accepted as *nitya*. When the term 'go' (cow) is uttered, it can provide us the knowledge of all cows and hence, it can be accepted as *nitya*. If *ākṛti* in the sense of *jāti* is accepted as the meaning of a word, it cannot be taken for granted that it has relation with a word which is temporary in nature. For, when an individual knowing relation points to a particular cow as the meaning of the term 'cow', the knower does not understand this particular cow as the meaning of the term, but all the cows. Otherwise, there would not have been the verbal comprehension of another cow. If a word is taken as temporary (*anitya*), the relation or the knowledge of the relation between a word and its *ākṛti* would not be possible at all. For, it is very difficult to ascertain the meaning of all words if they are admitted as temporary. If a word is accepted as external, it being in past and present can be apprehended by the knower through the method of agreement and difference (*anvayavyatireka*) after observing their relation in many times. Hence, a word and *ākṛti* is *nitya*.²²

Jaimini and Śabara have forwarded another reason in favour of *nityatva* of a word. If it is said that ten persons are fed, it indicates the difference of individuals (*vyaktibheda*). On the other hand, the statement - 'The person has been fed ten times' indicates the non-difference of the individuals (*vyaktyabheda*) as well as difference of action (*kriyābheda*). If someone utters the word 'cow' ten times, it indicates the difference of the action of utterance and non-difference

of the individual cow.²³

Though the sun is seen in the east in the morning, in middle in midday and in the west in the afternoon, the same sun is perceived by all. From the movement of the sun one cannot assume the multiplicity of the sun. In the like manner, the word perceived by various persons in various places cannot be said to be many.²⁴

It may be argued again that the Mīmāṃsakas accept the word, meaning and their relation as eternal. If it is so, the change of meaning of a particular word in a difference place and time cannot be explained. The meaning of a particular word which prevailed in ancient society may be changed in present social context. As the present meaning is new to us or produced, the word, meaning and their relation is not eternal.

In reply, it may be said that though the word, different meaning of it and their relation exist near our auditory sense organ, it is not always related to us. As a word is all-pervasive, the nature of it is covered with non-agitated air. When the air of the mouth of the speaker hits this non-agitated air, the air becomes divided leading to the manifestation of sound. So, the sound is not always manifested though eternal in character. Following the same line of argument it may be said that from the non-manifestation of a particular meaning it does not follow that this meaning was not associated with the particular word. Different meaning of a word may exist in non-manifested condition and afterwards it may be manifested. Hence, there is no origination of the meaning of the particular word. Keeping this manifestation in view, perhaps Śābara has used the term '*Aupattika*' (having a beginning) as an adjunct of word, meaning and their relation. It should also be kept in view that once a particular meaning is attached to a particular word, it will go in future conventionally. Hence, the term '*Aupattika*' or '*Nitya*' is to be taken in a technical sense mentioned above,

It has been stated earlier that the term *nitya* is not used in the sense of absolute eternity, but it has been accepted as a permanent and consistent entity. The view is substantiated again through the coinage of the term '*aupattika*; in the sense of *nitya* which means the coexistence of the sound with its meaning in an 'inborn' relation. As the Vedas are not made by any individual (*apauruṣeya*), the sound, its meaning and their relation are not produced, which again leads us to accept the *nityatva* of it.

It has been stated earlier that Śabara accepts *ākṛti* as the meaning of a word and this *ākṛti* is neither *jāti* (universal) nor *Vyakti* (individual). But Kumarila differs from Śabara and accepts *ākṛti* in the sense of *jāti*. Let us consider which view is logically tenable. So far as my understanding goes, *ākṛti* in the sense of universal as observed by Kumarila is not logically sound. If *ākṛti* were taken in the sense of *jāti*, why the Pūrva-mīmāṃsakas had not introduced the term '*jāti*' instead of *ākṛti*. It is true that universals like cowness etc. cannot be grasped if there were no '*ākṛti*' at all. In spite of this '*ākṛti*' should not be taken in the sense of *jāti* because the domain of the former is different from that of the latter. It may be argued that if *ākṛti* is not taken in the sense of *jāti*, the *nityatva* of it cannot be justified. It is also not true, because the term '*nitya*' has been used in this context as permanent and consistent as told earlier. This type of *nityatva* remains in the *ākṛti* also. Moreover, the universal 'cowness' etc. though accepted as '*nitya*' and inhered in many individuals, seem to be a vague property. If someone enquires what cowness is, it is very difficult to reply without referring to the external and internal characteristics of a cow. Hence, the generic property 'cowness' for example, presupposes the extrinsic and intrinsic features of the cow, which is called '*ākṛti*'. But for *ākṛti jāti* is not capable of being understood. The derivative meaning of the term '*akṛti*' (*vyaktiḥ ākṛiyate yayā*) is more applicable to the characteristic features (*ākṛti*) of a cow, but not to cowness. In fact, *ākṛti* of an object is basic through which both universal and individual are comprehended. For this reason perhaps the Naiyāyikas have given emphasis on the three - universal, *ākṛti* and individual as the meaning of the term, which proves that they have realised the importance of '*akṛti*' also. An object does not realise or see that *ākṛti* of that object. Hence, *ākṛti* is the direct thing which is directly related to the word. Through this *ākṛti* the universal and individual are apprehended indirectly. The directly apprehended thing i.e. '*ākṛti*' should have to be taken as the meaning of a word, but not others. Hence, Śabara, I think, is more consistent in his analysis than Kumarila.

Śabara has argued that a word, its meaning i.e. '*ākṛti*' and their relation is *nitya* and hence he does not admit the conventional usage as the cause of the meaning. This view, I think, is not totally acceptable. It has already been discussed that the Mīmāṃsakas have interpreted the term *nitya* as permanent and consistent. But one should ascertain whether there is consistency between a word and its meaning. For this purpose we have to depend on convention or

our earlier experience regarding the use of the same. D.S. Ruegg has drawn our attention to the another interpretation of the term *nitya* in the following way- "..... that the linguistic theory comparable with *nitya* will be comprehended more easily, if one translates the term *nitya* by invariable (and *nityava* by 'invariability') instead of 'permanent'.²⁵ Even if this meaning of the term *nitya* is taken for granted, the problem arises how the invariability of a word and its meaning can be determined without looking into past experience. I think conventional use has got a prominent role in determining this *nityatva* in the sense of invariability. This notion of 'invariability' in the sense of *nityatva* may be substantiated with the following reason. A word and its meaning is comprehended in each case, because this comprehension depends on the comprehension of the relation of concomitance between a word and its meaning.

The Mīmāṃsā-positon against the conventional use may somehow be defended in the following way. The notion of *nityatva* in the sense of consistency or invariability is mainly dependent on the phenomenon of *aikarūpya* i.e. unity of forms. If a word 'cow' or 'jar' is pronounced many times, each and every time it will provide us with the same *ākṛti* of a cow i.e. *Sāsnādimattva* or that of a jar i.e. *Kambuḡrīvādimattva*. Due to this unity of forms which are the meaning of the word, it is assumed that there is *nityatva* between a word and its meaning. To verify that there is such unity of experience or conventional usage may be essential. From this it does not follow that the meaning of a word is determined conventionally. How can the unity of forms be known if we do not have repeated observation of the occurrence of the word and its *ākṛti* or meaning? In order to know this aspect convention is essential no doubt, but the relation between them is already established due to their '*nitya*' or consistent or invariable character. The *nityatva* is already there, but conventional usage is to know it as such. In this connection an effort has been made to refute the view that the meaning of a word is created through convention among men following the line of Kumarila. According to Kumarila, such convention could act in three ways. First, a convention is established for the benefit of each man. Each person can know that this would be the meaning of this. Or secondly, convention is established each time when a word is uttered. Or, thirdly, the convention is established by God at the time of initial creation. The first alternative is not acceptable, because if the relationship fixed by such convention is one and the same, it would be considered as artificial and diversity of experience could not

be explained. The second alternative is also not tenable, because a single utterance of a word cannot establish convention. If somehow convention is accepted, it cannot justify the usage of the same eternally. The third alternative is also not acceptable, because there is no place for God (in Pūrvamīmamsā) who can be accepted as the cause of setting up convention. Hence, the meaning of a word is not created through convention.²⁶

Moreover, if a word, its meaning and their relation is accepted as conventional but not *nitya*, the initial verbal usage to denote an object at the time of first creation cannot be explained. An animal having dewlap etc. is denoted by the term 'cow' at the time of initial creation after dissolution. As at this stage, there is no convention, how is such usage possible? In reply, it can be said that between these there is a *nityasambandha*. Between the word 'cow' and *ākṛti* denoted by it there is consistency or invariability. That is why, the word gives rise to its *ākṛti invariably*. For, this relation is otherwise described by the Mīmāṃsakas as *aupattika* i.e. inborn, which implies that as soon as a word is originated, it inheres the capability of indicating a particular *ākṛti*. Even if it is accepted that there had been in existence before that and hence the said relation between them could have no beginning in time.

It has been said earlier that proper name or *saṃjñā* cannot be assigned to the real objects that are *adr̥ṣṭa* in character. The words like heaven, *devata* etc. have no comprehensible external character or *ākṛti* which can be denoted by the terms. If it is so, the problem arises how can the meaning of these words be known? If *ākṛti* constitutes the meaning of a word, these words would have been meaningless due to the absence of *ākṛti* capable of being seen. In reply, the Mīmāṃsakas could say that *ākṛti* is common in both *dr̥ṣṭa* and *adr̥ṣṭa* dimension of reality. The *ākṛti* existing in the invisible object is not capable of being discussed, as it is not in the specific form. Dr. Gachter observes : "Moreover, he (Śabara) sees no reason to explain the *ākṛti* of *devatā* in any concrete way, simply because there is no complete information available apart from their presence in and through *śabda*. *Śabda* has its support in the invisible as is known from inference based on perception in the visible dimension of reality... In fact he does not and cannot deny *ākṛti* for the *adr̥ṣṭa* dimension without restricting *śabda* only to the *dr̥ṣṭa* dimension... However, it is evident for him that one cannot describe the invisible, the *ākṛti* of the invisible dimension is not at our disposal in which sense it is ineffable".²⁷ In fact, *ākṛti* is to be

accepted as of two types-*vyakta* (manifested) and *avyakta* (non-manifested). The invisible objects like *svarga*, *devatā* etc. must have some 'ākṛti' which is not capable of being expressed. Had it been not there, there would not have been corresponding concept with the utterance of the terms. It cannot be said that these are meaningless words and hence these words give rise to meaning which is nothing but 'ākṛti' of them. Though these ākṛtis cannot be expressed due to the absence of any external concrete form, some ākṛtis in the forms of ideas have to be accepted there. Hence, Śābara's view that ākṛti is denoted by a word is very much consistent.

NOTES

1. "Svabhāvato hvasambaddhāvetau śabdārthau. Mukhe hi śabdaṁ upalabhāmahe, bhūmāvartham. Śabdo'yamna tvarthah, arthoyamna śabdaḥ iti ca vyapadiṣanti. Rūpabhedo'pi bhayati. Gauriti imaṁ śabdaṁ uccārayanti. sāsādīmantam artham avabudhyante". *Śābarabhāṣya* on 1. 1. 5.
2. "Gośabda uccarite sarvagaviṣu yugapatpratyavo bhavati. Ata akṛtivacanoraṁ. Na cākṛtya śabdasya sambandhaḥ śakyate kartuṁ. Nirdiśya hvākṛtiṁ kartā sambadhniyātNitye tu satī gośabde vahukṛtva uccaritaḥ śrutapūrvaścānyasu govyaktiṣvanvayavyatirekābhyaṁ akṛtivacanam avagamaiṣyati tasmādapi nityaḥ". *Ibid*, on 1. 1. 19
3. *Śābarabhāṣya* on 1. 1. 5.
4. *Ibid*. on 1. 3. 33.
5. *Ibid*.
6. Othmar Gachter : *Hermeneutics and Language in Pūrvamīmāṃsā*, Motilal, 1983, pp. 49-50.
7. *Nyāyasūtra*, 2/2/66/195.
8. "Ākṛtīrhi vyaktyā nityasambaddhā, Sambandhinyāṁ ca tasyāmavagatāyāṁ sambandhyantaramavagamyate". *Śābarabhāṣya* on 1/3/33.
9. "Tadetadātmapratyakṣaṁ, Yacchabda uccarite vyaktiḥ pratiyate iti. Kim śabdāduta ākṛteriti, vibhāgo na pratyakṣaḥ, so'nvaya-vyatirekābhvāmavagamvate. " *Ibid*.
10. "Antareṇāpi śabdaṁ vā akṛtimavabudhyeta avabudhyetaivāsau vvakṛtiṁ.Yastūccarite'pi śabde manasādapacārāt kadā-cidākṛtiṁ nopalabheta na jātucidasāvīmāṁ vyaktimavagaccheta". *Ibid*.

11. "Tasmāttatra na vartīsyate yadi yatra prayogo dr̥ṣṭastatra vṛtīḥ. ādya jātāyām gavi prathamaprayogo na prāpnoti tatrādr̥ṣṭatvāt". *Ibid.*
12. "Tasmānā prayogāpekṣo gośabdo vyaktivacana iti śakyata āsrāyitum". *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.* on 1. 1. 19.
14. "Vidhīyate" neneṭi vidhānaṁ śabdaḥ ...Na tasyākṛtivacanā nyāyā na vyaktivacanateti". *Ibid.* on 1. 3. 16.
15. "Anupalabdhe ca devatādāvarthe ' narthakaṁ saṁjñākāraṇaṁ aśakyaṁ ca. Viśeṣān pratīpattum hi saṁjñāḥ kriyante viśeṣāṁścoddīṣya. Tad viśeṣavajñāyamaṅeṣu ubhayamapya-navakṛptaṁ Tasmāt apauruṣeyaḥ śabdasya arthena sambandhaḥ". *Ibid.* 1. 1. 5.
16. "Aṣṭakṛtvo gośabda uccarita iti vadanti nāṣṭau gośabda iti kimato vadyevaṁ. Anena vacanenāvagamyate pratyabhijñāntīti". *Ibid.* 1. 1. 20.
17. "Niravayavo hi śabdaḥ avayavabhedānavagamānniravayavatvācca mahatvānupapattiḥ". *Ibid.* on 1.1.17
18. *Ibid.* 1. 3. 30.
19. "Jātimevākṛtīm prāhurvyaktirākriyate yayā/sāmānyāṁ tacca piṇḍānāmekabuddhinivandhanaṁ."¹¹ *Ślokavārtika, Ākṛtivada* - 3.
20. *Bhāṣyabhāvārtha* on sūtra - 1. 3. 33. Edited by Bhutanath Saptatirtha, vol. I, pp. 187-190. Basumati.
21. *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* - 1. 1. 19.
22. *Śabarabhāṣya* on 1. 1. 19.
23. "Śaṁkhyābhāvāt" - *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* - 1. 1. 20. and *Śabarabhāṣya* on the same.
24. Sukhamay Bhattacharyya : *Pūrvamīmāṁsā darśana* p. 26,
W. B. B. B., 1983. "Ādityavad Yaugapadyām". *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* 1. 1. 15.
25. Ruegg D. S. *Contributions a l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne*. Paris, 1959, p.56.
26. *Ślokavārtika* (Sambandhākṣepaparihāra).
27. Othmar Gächter : *Hermeneutics and Language in Pūrvamīmāṁsā*, Motilal, 1983, p. 53.