

DISCUSSION - I

MUSINGS ON THE CONCEPT OF AHIMSĀ (NON-VIOLENCE)

On 'Reflections on Ahimsā : A Practical Approach'

by Prabhat Misra, *I. P. Q.* Vol. XXV No. 2

Non-Violence as an Ideal

Translated, the word 'Ahimsā' becomes blatantly negative: it is no longer associated with ideas like *Āsteya*, *Maitrī*, *Karuṇā* etc. One tends to forget that it belongs to an ideological cluster.

Ahimsā Paramo Dharmah (Non-violence is the supreme religion) is a valued Indian precept. So long as Ahimsā remains a religious or ethical ideal, no one can question its worth. Even before the religions extolling Ahimsā (Jainism, Buddhism), the ancient religion of Zoroasterianism or Judaism exhibited a non-violent character in succumbing to the victimisation of Powers ready to use violence and thus being ousted from the lands of their origin. The wandering Jews remained non-violent, often treated by the Christian world with contempt as 'cowards' till a confederation of Christian Nations gave them a country, Israel and weaponised them to the teeth. Interestingly, even Christianity, as a religion, upholds the ideal of non-violence in asking a true Christian to offer the other cheek if one is slapped. Jesus Christ, on the Cross, asking his Heavenly Father to forgive the perpetrators of violence on him, remains an epitome for all times, of Ahimsā as an ideal.

Two religions that preach the tempering of Ahimsā, the supreme ideal, with a judicious use of violence, are Hinduism and Islam. Islam is widely known as a militant religion. However, Prophet Mohammed never advocated unrestrained violence, as can be seen from the following quotes:-

1. "Defend yourself against your enemies, but attack them not first; God hateth the aggressor". Sura II, 190.
2. "God loveth not the transgressors;if they attack you, slay them;.....but

if they desist, let there be no hostility, except against the ungodly''. Sura II, 186.

3. ''Let there be no compulsions in religion.....Invite all to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching, and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious; for thy Lord knoweth best, who have strayed from his path, and who receive guidance''. Sura XVI, 125.

Undoubtedly, Hinduism, in spite of its Upaniṣadic paeans favouring Ahimsā, is also a militant religion in its own way. I shall support this statement throughout in this paper by means of a variety of arguments. Initially, it will be sufficient to point out that the revered epics, Rāmāyana and Mahābhārata, centre around the subjugation by means of violent warfare, of such enemies who are perceived as evil or unrighteous. In fact, the word ''Dharmayuddha'' coined in India, has a wider and deeper meaning than the later word, ''Crusade'', about which more analysis comes later.

Non-violence as a Myth

It has been very aptly pointed out by Prabhat Misra in his article, that the very term 'Ahimsā' has a negative character. Yet, Misra states very casually that ''Ultimately this (he means love as a positive constituent of Ahimsā) may materialise in love or a tradition of love-force''.

However, Indian History prior to the advent of Buddhism, did not have any such tradition of love-force or conquest by love and Ahimsā. The historical reality of India is that of 'Digvijaya' (conquest of other kings in warfare) taken to be the greatest achievement for a king. The word 'Dharmavijaya' echoing 'Digvijaya' was a departure from traditional Hindu religion which did not believe in religious conversion.

Non-violence wedded to a political program is never the Ahimsā of religious ideology. It cannot, without violating the essence of it, become a practical agenda; in Indian History, a transmutation of negative non-violence to positive love-force was attempted, much later, by Mahatma Gandhi. The original attempt in 'Dharmavijaya' was the substitution of one religion by another. In reality, religions of a benign, tolerant and love-professing type, e.g. Jainism and Buddhism rose as a protest against the older tradition of violence. One cannot

write Indian History by referring to its brief spells of non-violence. It must not be forgotten that before embracing Buddhism, King Ashoka had earned the epithet 'Chandāshoka' by transgressing the permitted limits of violence.

From the time of the epics till the present century, Indian History has mainly been a history of violence, of conquests and valiant resistances, and the resultant amalgam of invaders who stayed on and the original inhabitants who judiciously co-operated and accepted these outsiders like the Huns, the Pathans and the Moghuls. To blend this amalgam into a loving community, thinkers like Tagore had written, in his poem, 'Bhārat-Tīrtha' --

'Those who came in a trail of war and blood,
singing the notes of victory
Are no longer aliens. In my blood reverberates
their multi-hued music.'

A man like Mahatma Gandhi, an unusual human being, through his life, acts, character, and also his spoken and written words effected this blending and almost achieved the equation of Ahimsā with love yet, as an ethico-political strategy, the role of Non-violence in Indian History has to be critically re-assessed.

Non-violence as Reality

In reality, non-violence used as a strategy of resistance, loses its character. Every resistance, active as well as passive, is some sort of pressure-tactics, some assault on the mind-set of another person or group.

In reality, any transmutation of non-violence into a 'positive love-force' is possible only through dialogue and personal meeting. 'Dialogue' includes the writings of persons, and personal meetings can be supplemented with conferences and committees, but group-discussions can never take the place of person-to person(s) communication. Gandhi's appeal to his followers was based on all these and also on the charisma of a person embodying courage, love, selflessness.

The reality is that it will be absurd to hope that the violence from an opponent can be neutralised by stating 'I oppose you with non-violence' unless

this statement originates from a Buddha or a Gandhi, whose lives and teachings serve as their protective armour. The reality is that even an exemplary super-person like Jesus Christ failed to conquer violence by non-violence (and Gandhi fell victim to the violent assassin's bullet), because a ruthless aggressor or a merciless enemy may not respond to the the human endeavour symbolised by Ahimsā. It is questionable whether the Gandhian strategy of passive resistance or civil disobedience would have any success unless the British as a nation had some up-right, just and human values. Both in South Africa and in India, Gandhian non-violence operated in the framework of:-

- (a) The opponent not being barbaric and ruthless
- (b) The actions of resistance interspersed with dialogue and exchange of views
- (c) Resistance coupled with acts of voluntary co-operation and help, proving the good will of the non-violent resistor

In reality, non-violence in the Indian scene had an extremely limited success. Indians, whether Hindus or Muslims, are core- believers in the power of fighting violence with judicious violence, after negotiations fail. After the offer of peace in exchange of just 'five villages' failed, the Pāndavas of Mahābhārata obtained inner sanction for 'Dharmayuddha'. 'Dharma', in Indian philosophical terminology, does not stand for a particular religion, but for 'righteousness'; and the war fought in Mahābhārata was that of defending righteousness. It was not 'Crusade' for a cause, religious or personal.

In reality, though the lifting of 'Ahimsā' from the religious text-books to the battlefield of Indian politics of the 20th century was a stunning move by Gandhi and had an instant magical effect, the theory that Indian Independence has been achieved through non-violence, must be given up. To glorify Gandhi as "the Sant of Sabarmati who gave us Āzādi without using sword or shield" (the popular Hindi Cinema - song) is to forget the heroses and heroines of the Sepoy Mutiny, that first War of Indian Independence: to forget the thousands of martyrs in Punjab and Bengal contributing their constant effort to keep the desire for freedom burning in Indian hearts, to forget the revolutionary Veer Savarkar and Lokmanya Tilak who gave the first clarion call for swaraj, to forget Chittagong Armoury Raid which set up Independence for a second spell after

the Sepoy Mutiny; to forget the Azad Hind Army and Netaji Subhash; to forget the historical fact that almost every time Gandhi gave a call for Satyāgraha along with the non-violent, the violent activists courted arrest, torture and death.

In reality, non-violence can never end violence by challenging it. Baring your breast before the bullet is not a language of love, but that of defiance. It may even incite the enemy towards further violence. Such suicidal actions, including the strategy of fasting-until death are violence towards self, and cannot be categorised as non-violent. Vincent Shean, one of Gandhi's biographers, contends that Fasting for Gandhi was not a Pressure tactics, but a matter of personal conviction that through fasting one could attain self-purification or self-chastisement. However, fasting as a threat in the hands of any and every Politician is not even remotely positive. As Vincent Shean states, about (Socrates, Buddha, Jesus) "All of them believed that other men could do what they did. They were wrong, and so was Gandhi".

Non-violence, the Legacy of Gandhi

Perhaps till Martin Luther King, the legacy continued to convince the world. Nelson Mandela escaped the fate of King, though stories of how plots of poisoning him were hatched are now going around. The resistance to Apartheid often took violent form, though there was conscious effort to restrain violence; what finally worked was dialogue.

Dalai Lama, the modern apostle of non-violence, remains an ineffective figure, allowing more and more compromises in his initial demand. There is also the Palestinian Centre for the study of non-violence, founded by Mubarak Aead, called the Gandhi of Palestine, That he had very small success is quite clear. A few more centres and preachers of non-violence are struggling to perpetuate the legacy, among whom is Desmond Tutu. The Gandhian principles are basically not different from Buddhist or Christian principles; the question is:- how far are we observing and respecting these indubitably high and humanitarian truths in today's materialistic and pragmatic world, where violence is a more recognised charter for righting a wrong?

RAJLUKSHMEE DEBEE BHATTACHARYA

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DISCUSSION - II

A Note on

'Is "Tat Tvam Asi" the same type of Identity statement As "The Morning star Is the Evening star"?

In his paper¹ under the above caption Dayakrishna has raised and discussed in a rambling manner an interesting and important issue namely, whether the imports of the Upanisadic statement "Tat Tvam Asi"- (meaning "That Thou Art") which is known as "Mahāvākya", and the wellknown Fregean statement "The morning star is the evening star" are similar or not and if they are similar what they are. In the course of the discussion of this issue several other issues quite irrelevant to the discussion have been brought up by Dayakrishna and rather questionable solutions to these issues have been suggested by him. In fact almost every paragraph in the paper contains some questionable statements which call for critical examination. So a paragraph-by-paragraph examination of the paper is first attempted in this note. This is followed by an independent discussion of the above semantic issue in the light of traditional Advaitic doctrine of the import of the Mahāvākyas.

First, Dayakrishna says that the Upaniṣadic and the Fregean statements share the same problematic. This assertion is totally incorrect. In the Upaniṣadic statement the referends as well as the senses of the demonstrative terms "That" and "Thou" are different from each other (although the coordinate use of the terms creates the impression that at least the referends of the terms are the same). This is not the case with the Fregean statement as the coordinate terms "the morning star" and "the evening star" occurring in it may have identical referends (the morning star can be an evening star too). Further the Upaniṣadic statement is not presented and discussed to explain the distinction between the sense and the reference of a word which is the main purpose for which the Fregean statement is discussed. Besides the proper understanding of the meaning of the Upaniṣadic statement does not consist (as it does in the case of the Fregean statement) in the apprehension of the identity of the referends of the

1. IPQ, Jan. 98, pp. 1-13.

demonstratives. The full grasp of the significance of the statement requires (as Dayakrishna rightly says towards the end of the paper) the existential - or more precisely the spiritual realisation of the identity of one's individual self with the universal self. Even the solutions of the semantic issues pertaining to the two statements are not similar. As will be explained in the sequel the right meaning of the Upaniṣadic statement is sought to be explained by taking recourse to a special type of the suggestive mode of meaning.

Next Dayakrishna goes on to make another equally questionable assertion that the referends in both the foregoing statements are experienced as both different and identical. In view of this he asks why the identity of the referends be supposed to override their difference? This is not a proper question to ask in this context but having asked it Dayakrishna has not answered it. However the above assertion itself is incorrect. It is not true that both identity and difference of the referends in the statements are experienced. Is the form of the statements such as to give rise to the experience of the difference of the referends? The words used for the referends are coordinate with each other both being in the nominative case. According to grammar two coordinate terms cannot give rise to the meaning of difference between their denotations (even if these were actually different from each other). So there is no question here of identity overruling difference. If the referends were different from each other then the statement would be false but not cease to be significant.

In the next paragraph Dayakrishna says-on the basis of what he has said earlier, - that with regard to the said statements there are two problems to be considered namely, the problem of interpreting the statements and the problem as to why the identity -- interpretation (if adopted) be treated as fundamental. As a matter of fact there is no occasion for the second problem to arise with regard to the statements. The statements express the identity of referends which appear to be different. This identity needs to be justified if it is real. This is precisely what the interpreters have sought to do. The difference in the sense-meanings of the subject terms engenders doubt about the identity of the referends. This doubt is removed by adopting the suggestive mode of meaning in one case and distinguishing sense-meaning from reference-meaning in the other case.

In the following paragraph Dayakrishna has made some mutually

inconsistent statements. These are as follows : “There is the basic problem of coming to know that two things which are considered identical are really different.....”The objection is raised to this that unless two things are regarded as two their identity cannot be considered at all. This means that even only numerically different entities cannot be considered to be identical. If this were true then in the given expression identity-interpretation cannot be made as the difference of sense and reference in the meanings of the expressions obtains.’

It is not clear from these few sentences what exactly Dayakrishna wants to say about what he refers to as “the basic problem of coming to know things considered to be identical as really different. If he intends to say that it is a problem to know that things commonly treated as identical are really different then this statement implies that knowledge of identity is not dependent upon the knowledge of difference. This implication however is inconsistent with what Dayakrishna mentions as the objection to this in the next statement to the effect that “unless two things are regarded as two their identity cannot be considered at all”. This means that the knowledge of (some kind of) difference of two things is essential for the knowledge of their identity. The inconsistency of the above two statements is quite obvious. Now let us move to the next statement..... “even only numerically different entities cannot be considered to be identical”, If knowledge of the difference of two entities is essential for the knowledge of their identity then the knowledge even of the numerical difference of two entities must not be opposed to the knowledge of their identity. What Dayakrishna fumblingly seeks to convey through all these sentences is the simple fact that things considered to be identical must be known to be different from each other in some respect. Absolutely different things known as such cannot be regarded as identical with each other.

Having stated what he considers to be the problems relating to the two statements Dayakrishna refers to two solutions-which he calls “traditional” - of the problems. One solution is the view that all proper names are denotative not connotative. The other solution is the view that all common nouns are purely connotative, so they have no denotation. From the verbal cognition of the property connoted by a word it cannot be known if there is anything characterised by the connoted property.’ How these views are called traditional solutions of the semantic problem by Dayakrishna is an enigma. Neither any Indian nor any western philosophical school has advocated either of these views as a solution

of the problem. Besides they are totally irrelevant to the problem. Neither in the Upaniṣadic nor in the Fregean statement there occurs any proper name as, "That" and "Thou" in the Upaniṣadic statement and "Morning star" and "Evening star" in the Fregean statement are, not names at all. The first pair of words are demonstratives and the second pair significant adjectives. Even if, for arguments sake the demonstratives are treated as proper names how can this help resolve the problem? "That" and "thou" denote different entities. "That" means "that which is not present before the speaker" and "Thou" means "the person who is being addressed by the speaker". It is because these denotations cannot be treated as identical with each other that the Advaitins adopt the suggestive mode of meaning for interpreting the Upaniṣadic statement.

As regards the Fregean sentence, even if the adjectival terms are regarded as names and thereby the identity of the denotends of the names is established, the main purpose of discussing the sentence would have been defeated. Frege presented the sentence to highlight the distinction between sense-meaning and reference-meaning. If there is no sense-meaning at all to the terms what will be the use of considering the sentence? It may also be noted in this connection that the Upaniṣadic statement is called "Mahāvākya" or a most important statement in the whole Upaniṣadic literature mainly because it embodies most important spiritual truth which only a competent teacher can impart to a well-groomed disciple. If it were just the identity of the denotations of two names that the statement was supposed to convey, then it would have to be regarded as a very trivial statement. It is extremely surprising how Dayakrishna could think of the denotative view of proper names as a possible solution of the above semantic problems.

So far as the proposed second solution is concerned it is not clear which traditional school Dayakrishna has in mind while referring to the view as traditional. Mīmāṃsā does of course advocate the view that a common noun or word stands for the generic universal common to all the individual specimens of a class commonly supposed to be denoted by the word. But the manner in which the connotative view is presented by Dayakrishna does not at all agree with the Mīmāṃsīst account of the view. Mīmāṃsā says that although it is the generic universal that alone is meant by a common word like "Pot" or "Tree" yet the concerned individual or individuals characterised by the universal enter the final verbal cognition produced by the sentence containing the word

by way of implication. For example, if I say to someone, "Bring the book" the word book does mean "bookness" only, yet since bookness cannot be connected with any action, the hearer of the sentence connects bookness with the action of bringing through the book asked for. Thus bookness is indirectly connected with the action indicated by the verb. This sense of the sentence is called on this account the subsequently concocted sense (in Sanskrit, Pārshthika sense). In view of this explanation of the Mīmāṃsā view what Dayakrishna says about the second solution does not seem to square with any traditional view. According to him, if a common word is purely connotative then the individuals characterised by the universal connoted by the word and commonly supposed to be referred to by it remain unknown. If this is so then how does the individual form part of the verbal cognition?

But what is most puzzling about the presentation of this so-called solution is how Dayakrishna could think of it as a solution of the semantic problem. Neither in the case of the Upaniṣadic statement nor in that of the Fregean statement the semantic difficulty is resolved by the "solution". If the properties connoted by the demonstratives in one instance and by the adjectives in another instance are all different from one another how are the identities in the two instances going to be justified?

Leaving these objections aside if we turn to what Dayakrishna says against these so-called "traditional solutions" we find that it is highly objectionable. Against the view that proper names are denotative-not connotative he says that names do connote properties, they are not purely denotative, that the same name can be applied to different individuals, that even in an ideal language names assigned to things do not always remain denotative and that names come to be associated with different properties by frequent use (in different contexts). None of these views pertaining to names as stated by Dayakrishna is advocated by any Indian or western thinker. They do not also bear critical scrutiny. First, it is true that some names like say, Kalidas, in the sentence "Shakespeare is the Kalidas of the west" connote the property of "being a great playwright". But as used in the sentence even the name "Kalidas" is transformed into a common noun. Second, it is not correct to say that the same name can be applied to different individuals. The word "John" for example used for naming a person is also denotative of a lavatory but no thinker treats the word to be the same in both of its uses although it appears to

be the same. Third, if names used in an ideal language come to be associated by careless use, with things for which they are not coined then they are replaced by other names. In no case the specificity of the use of names in the ideal language is ever sacrificed. Thus both the proposed solution and its criticisms suggested by Dayakrishna are simply unacceptable.

Dayakrishna goes on to add that the identity-problem can arise even in respect of names as the same individual can be called by different names or even described by means of different descriptive properties. Yes, this is so. There is no problem in this. If names are supposed to be denotative or they simply name things, in either case one and the same thing may quite well be denoted or named by different names or even described by different descriptions.

Coming back from this diversion to the main theme of the paper Dayakrishna makes the rather queer remark that both Brahman and Ātman (the respective references of "That" and "thou") are theoretically postulated entities and that, it is their identity that is exhorted in the Upaniṣadic statement. Here it may be conceded that Brahman is a theoretically - postulated entity but this cannot be said about the Ātman or the empirical self. Śaṅkara, the founder of the Ādvaita says explicitly in his Bhāṣya (commentary) that it is not at all true that Atman is not experienced (Nāyamekāntenāviṣayah asmatpratayayaviṣayatvāt). Everyone always experiences his or her self and expresses the experience by words like "I" "We" etc. If both Brahman and Ātman were only theoretically-postulated entities then the Upaniṣadic statement under consideration would not be a subject-predicate statement. In such statements the subject is always the given or previously-known. It is only the predicate that is novel (or ungiven).

In this connection Dayakrishna trots out a view of his own concerning the basic philosophical standpoints of Advaita and Sāṅkhya for which there is neither textual nor rational support. The view concerns the fundamental (according to Dayakrishna) distinction between the standpoints of these schools. As per the view, according to Advaita the difference between Brahman and Ātman or the whole realm of empirical reality is false and this falsehood can be got rid of by the spiritual realisation of the identity of everything with Brahman. According to Sāṅkhya on the other hand it is the identity of the pure self with Prakṛti and its evolutes that is false and it is the realisation of the

distinction of the self from the latter that destroys the false identity. Dayakrishna has presented here his own version of the standpoint of Advaita which almost contradicts the version given by Śaṅkara, the very founder of the school. So far as Dayakrishna's reading of Sāṅkhyan viewpoint is concerned it may be broadly accepted. Sāṅkhya treats Puruṣa's awareness of identity with Prakṛti as the cause of this bondage. It is by the dissipation of this awareness through the knowledge of his distinctive nature that Puruṣa attains release according to this school. Regarding Advaitic standpoint Dayakrishna's view is that the distinction of Brahman and the world including the Ātman is false and that this falsehood engendered by avidyā or māyā is dissipated by the realisation of the unity or identity of Brahman and the world. The grounds of such an unorthodox view of Advaita - (some of which are stated at length elsewhere by Dayakrishna) are as follows. First the distinction between the Sāṅkhyan and Advaitic standpoints can be maintained only if these are regarded as upholding mutually-opposed views concerning falsehood (or Adhyāsa) and ultimate truth. Otherwise, both treating distinction as absolute truth and falsehood as identity (of the world and pure self) the two standpoints would merge into each other. Second, Śaṅkara, the founder of Advaita starts his Bhāṣya (commentary) on the Brahmasūtra by rebutting the possibility of mistaking the not-self for the self and thereafter defending this possibility, thereby leading (perhaps inadvertently according to Dayakrishna) to the conclusion that the identity of the Brahman and Ātman is the ultimate truth according to Upaniṣadic (if not according to Śaṅkara). Third, the Mahāvākya under consideration also points towards this conclusion as it asserts the identity of "that" and "thou" which refer to Brahman and Ātman respectively. Fourth, the Vedantic ideal of Jīvanmukhti also appears to lend support to the above view. The multifarious empirical reality of the world including the self is not dissolved and reduced to nought (as the Śaṅkarite Advaitins think) when the self is released from bondage even when it carries on its embodied existence. The world is only absorbed into the all-comprehensive reality of Brahman after the self's release, whether it takes place in the empirical or the nonempirical state. Fifth, if ultimate truth did not have a place for empirical reality then the infinite diversity of things in the world would remain unexplained in the Advaita philosophy. These are the main reasons why Advaita or the Upaniṣadic Vedānta is diametrically opposed to Śaṅkara's reading.

Before considering and rebutting these reasons we may concede the point

that the Advaitic and Śāṅkhyan stāndpoints do differ from each other in regard **to** what is false and what is the ultimate truth. Śāṅkhya-as explained above-regards the distinction of the pure self and Prakṛti as the ultimate truth and the identification of these as the falsehood to be got rid of. Advaita-on the other hand,treats the absolute Brahman as the ultimate truth and like Śāṅkhya-the mutual superimposition of the self and not- self as the falsehood (or empiricity) to be got over. The difference between the two standpoints consists in the fact that the world does not cease to exist after the release from bondage of the self in the Śāṅkhyan view while in the Advaitic view the world is totally dissipated when the self is released. Dayakrishna misunderstands this difference of views by treating Advaita as the upholder of the view of the unity or identity of the self and the not-self. The misunderstanding seems to be caused-as stated above-by the misreading of the introductory passage of Samkara's Bhasya. In this passage Śāṅkara introduces the subject of inquiry by first raising the question whether the inquiry is necessary at all when the distinction between the self and the not-self is universally known. Nobody ever mistakes oneself for anybody or anything other than oneself. This question is answered by Śāṅkara by adducing examples of the widely prevalent confusion of self and not-self with each other in common life. This confusion which Dayakrishna regards as the unity of self and notself is not the ultimate truth according to Advaita nor is the superficial empirical distinction between the self and the notself the falsehood or Adhyāsa which needs to be dissipated for attaining realse. Advaita is not at all a doctrine of unity. It is as the very etymology of the word explicitly indicates and as all the great Advaitins like Madhusudana, Saraswati, Sriharsha etc. have explained with convincing arguments-the doctrine of nondualism. Brahman is the sole reality, all else is the projection of avidyā or the cosmic ignorance, the Mahāvākya whose grammatical construction appears to lead to the verbal cognition of the identity of Brahman and Ātman is interpreted-for certain reasons as yielding the meaning of nondifference between the two entities. Dayakrishna's version of Advaita is in fact a distorted version of Viśiṣṭadvāita in which God as qualified by the self and the not-self is supposed to be the ultimate reality.

The plea that the concept of Jivanmukti is consistent with Advaita only as it is understood by Dayakrishna is simply otiose. According to Advaita Jivanmukti is not the summum bonum; it needs to be transcended in the highest

state of complete liberation in which not only empirical consciousness but even empirical existence is reduced to nothingness. Of course this is not to be construed as an event taking place after the occurrence of the event of liberation. Neither of these is an event. The self is eternally liberated, it is only the illusion of bondage or empiricity that needs to be sublated. Even this sublation is not an occurrence. It is the very nature and being of self.

Much of the above discussion is not quite relevant to the solution of the central problem of the paper but it had to be presented here in order to remove the misunderstanding about Advaita and Sāṃkhya created by Dayakrishna's statements about them. Now we turn to the so-called solutions of the semantic problem relating to the two statements suggested by Dayakrishna. The other and more important problem of the methodology of understanding the significance of the statements—specially the Upaniṣadic one will be discussed in our own independent consideration of these problems. Dayakrishna does not say much on this second problem except that it is by means of the existential or spiritual realisation that the identity of the Brahman and Ātman exhorted by the Upaniṣadic statement is known while in the Fregean statement the identity of the morning star and the evening star is known just by means of simple observation.

As to the solution of the semantical problem what Dayakrishna says regarding it is summed up in his following remarks :-

“The problem of the assertion of identity in the context of an illusory difference that was previously apprehended as real, has to be differentiated depending upon the types of objects between which identity is being asserted.....

The identity for example of five plus three and four plus four is an identity of a different kind that the one between “the morning star and the evening star”.

Both these statements are highly questionable if not totally wrong. First, the equality-statements in mathematical equations are radically different from the identity-statements under consideration. Equality is not the identity that is being considered here. To say that $x + y = 2$ is not to say that $x + y$ is the same as 2. Even if for arguments sake equality is regarded as identical with

identity how does an interpretation of the above equation similar to that of the identity-statements fail to yield the mathematically-correct meaning of the equation? What is wrong in saying that the figures on the right and the left sides of the equality-sign refer to the same entity although under different forms or characteristics (as the same number is viewed first as the sum of two other numbers and then as the resulting total of these numbers)? In this interpretation the difference of sense and reference is quite evident. There is therefore no need whatsoever to make any differentiation among the problems relating to identity-judgments concerning different types of objects whatever may be the type of objects referred to in the statement. If it is the identity-statement, then the identity of the referends is bound to be signified by the statement. Even if the identity signified in one statement is supposed to be of a different type than what is signified by another statement the main problem of the identity-statement is not solved. The core of the problem is "How can there be a significant identity-statement at all? If the statement, "The morning star is the morning star" is not significant how can the statement, "The morning star is the evening star" be significant? This problem can be partly tackled by distinguishing between the sense and the reference of the words "the morning star" and "the evening star".

Having thus disposed of Dayakrishna's misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the problem of the Upaniṣadic and Fregean sentences and his wrong solutions of the problems we now try to present the problem (or problems) and the solutions in the right perspective. First it needs to be noted that even the semantic problems of the two sentences are not similar. Nor are their solutions similar. As pointed out earlier the etymological referends of the words "That" and "Thou" in the Upaniṣadic sentence are different but those of the words "The morning star" and "The evening star" are not and need not be different. So the problem of identity in the case of the Fregean sentence is not as acute as it is in the case of the Upaniṣadic sentence. The solution of the problem is not as simple as it is likely to be thought. The Fregean sentence has been trotted out to highlight the need to distinguish between the sense and reference of words. The senses of the words "Morning star" and "Evening star" are respectively the properties of morning-starness and evening-starness which being different from each other the sentence is saved from being reduced to a tautology. This is broadly the solution suggested to the identity-problem. It

may here be asked, "Granting that the two properties are different how do they help the sentence-meaning to make the assertion of identity significant"? The sentence-meaning refers only to the planet that appears on the horizon both in the morning and in the evening. The properties of morning-starness and evening-starness do not figure at all in the sentence-meaning. The planet is endowed with many other properties like these two but none of these enters into the sentence-meaning. What is then the use of having the sense-meaning over and above the reference-meaning for a word? This is perhaps the core of the above semantic problem. It can be tackled only by the Navya Nyāya method of analysing the meaning of sentences. According to this method every sentence produces a determinate verbal cognition of a determinate predicate ascribed to a subject characterised by a definite property delimiting the subjecthood of the subject. In the instant case the subject is the planet as characterised by the property "morning starness" which therefore is the limitor of the subjecthood of the planet (Venus). Another property "evening starness" is the predicate ascribed to the planet as characterised by "morning starness". So both the properties invariably enter into the final meaning of the sentence. It may here be noted that the identity of the planet as one that is characterised by morning starness as well as evening starness is realised only after the full verbal (predicative) cognition has taken place. Thus sense-difference does not jeopardise the identity of the referends in the sentence.

As a matter of fact Frege need not have bothered to invent the above special sentence to illustrate and justify the distinction of sense and reference of a word. Even a common sentence like, "The pot is a material substance" would have served the purpose. When fully analysed this simple sentence means that "the pot as endowed by potness" is the same entity that is characterised by the property "material substanceness". Thus the identity of the pot as characterised by the two properties happens to be stated (or implied) by the sentences. It is immaterial (logically though not grammatically) that the word "pot" stands for a substantive entity and the word "material substance" for a property. According to the Nyāya way of interpreting a subject-predicate sentence it is the identity with that which has the property of "being a material substance" that is attributed to the pot endowed with potness.

Now we turn to the semantic problem posed by the Upaniṣadic sentence. As stated above this problem is of a different type than that pertaining to the

Fregean sentence. In the sentence "That thou art" we are presented with the identity of apparently disparate entities. The disparity appears to be intrinsic to the things referred to. "That" cannot be "Thou". Such obviously is not the case with the "morning star" and the "evening star". The possibility of the morning star being the (same as the) evening star can be envisaged even by a person who has not observed the star (or planet) at all. After all it is only a question of a single thing possessing two different but not opposed properties. In the case of "That" and "Thou" however such a possibility can never be conceived. So the etymologically expressed identity of "That and Thou" gets jeopardised by the descriptive properties connoted by the demonstrative terms which are not only different but mutually opposed. If they were totally opposed to each other the statement of identity would simply be falsified. Since this is not the case, recourse needs to be had to the suggestive mode of meaning called "laxaṇā" in Sanskrit. This is a quite usual practice in the interpretation of sentences in which words with incompatible meaning occur, as for example in the sentence "My house is on the Ganges itself". The incompatibility of the meanings of the words "house" and "Ganges" causes the word "Ganges" to suggest the meaning "the bank of the Ganges" through the proximity of the bank to the Ganges. In the present case however the suggestive mode of meaning cannot be applied to the words directly. Neither the emaning of the word "That" is related to that of "Thou" nor the meaning of "Thou" is related to that of "That", so that by means of such relationship the two meanings could be made compatible. So what is known as 'suggestion by dropping only a part of its meaning' (in Sanskrit "Bhāgatyāgalaxaṇā") is employed here to the words to derive a consistent meaning from the sentence. The process involved in the application of this suggestive mode is as follows: The word "Thou" in the context (of the sentence) stands for the empirical self or consciousness (of the disciple). The other word "That" stands for the absolute self or consciousness. Part of the meaning of the first word is the property of "empiricity" and part of the meaning of the other word "That" is absoluteness. Both these part-meanings being dropped the two words come to refer to or mean the same entity namely pure consciousness. The "thatness" and "thouness" characterising respectively the two meant entities in the sentence are gone. That is to say the sense-meanings or connotations of the words get totally excluded and only the referential meanings retained.

From this explanation it will be obvious that the import of the Fregean sentence is not similar to what we find in the Upaniṣadic sentence. Even the process of interpreting the sentences is not the same or similar. As we saw above the Fregean sentence is quite amenable to the normal mode of interpretation but to interpret the Upaniṣadic sentence the peculiar suggestive mode needs to be adopted. So the cognition resulting from the sentence despite being verbal is of a peculiar type. No school of philosophy other than Advaita has admitted the possibility of the occurrence of such a cognition which is absolutely indeterminate (in the sense that the pure underdetermined object is apprehended in it) and also quite vivid (introspectively). Advaitins regard this verbal cognition unlike other verbal cognitions - as immediate like any perceptual cognition which is generated by sense - object contact. The wellknown theory known as Śabdaparokṣavāda is propounded by Advaita to explain the immediacy of this verbal cognition. The existential realisation that Dayakrishna speaks of while explaining the distinction between the identity-cognitions arising from the two sentences is the immediate introspective realisation of the self's nondistinction from Brahman (as pure underdetermined consciousness). But the consciousness arising from the Fregean sentence is not "objective" (as Dayakrishna describes it). The consciousness being verbal it only refers to its objects but it is not objective as perceptual consciousness is. This is not the case with the consciousness generated by the Mahāvākya the reason being that the Mahāvākya is the direct exhortation of a competent spiritual teacher to a spiritually-groomed disciple. Only because of the effectiveness of the exhortative sentence in engendering the immediate introspective experience or realisation of the non-difference of self from Brahman, the Upaniṣadic sentence is called "Mahāvākya". Since this realisation is not producible except through the exhortation of the master, the words attain in this case the status of an absolutely independent means of knowledge. Neither perception nor inference can ever produce such knowledge. Moreover the knowledge produced by Mahāvākya is direct unlike the knowledge that any other combination of words produces.

This naturally provokes the query, "How can the Mahāvākya by itself produce the said realisation if verbal cognition is by nature indirect?" This query is sought to be answered by Advaitins with the help of the wellknown parable of Ten fools'. This parable highlights the important point that the non-difference of the self and Brahman is not a fact quite unknown to anybody. Everybody

knows it but only implicitly. This knowledge needs to be evoked by mobilising the process of introspective self-analysis in the mind of the disciple by the authoritative exhortation of the master. The catharsis needed for starting this self-analysis process is brought about by the masterful assertion of the master that the disciple (or his self) is no other than the universal self. The semantical exclusion of the distinctive (but unreal) properties of the self like its embodiedness, is paralleled by the psycho-spiritual process of the dissipation of the awareness of its distinctive nature by the self. A sort of spiritual inferiority complex remains entrenched in the mind of the disciple. This is gradually rooted out by means of deep introspection induced by the emphatic exhortation of the master.

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