

## REFLECTIONS ON AHIMSĀ : A PRACTICAL APPROACH

PRABHAT MISRA

### I

The term *ahimsā* or non-violence clearly expresses its negative character. Indian ethical thinkers - the Hindus, the Jains and the Buddhists accept its negative character also. Even the ethics of the Mohammedans, which is not originally Indian, share with this character. All of these thinkers also emphasise its positive character (love). But in my opinion, love as its positive character is an ideal concept. In our practical world, the negative aspect of *ahimsā* is more real and really a matter of evaluation. Of course, ultimately this aspect may materialise love or a tradition of love-force.

In its negative aspect, *ahimsā* is the negation of *himsā* or violence. *Himsā* or violence may be of two types : physical and mental. Generally killing of man and animal is physical type of *himsā*. Anger and hatred are its mental type. In my paper I shall try to reflect my thoughts on the negative aspect of *ahimsā*. I shall not however consider the Jain view, because, in my opinion it is too much impractical and it will not be consistent with the intention expressed in this paper.

### *Mā himsāt sarvabhūtāni*

“Don’t kill the creatures of the world” is a famous vedic dictum. It has also been stated that *himsā* or killing gives rise to sin, for the remedy of which some expiratory rites (*prāyascitta*) are to be performed. Of course, so far as the Dharma-śāstras are concerned, the Hindus are not so rigid as the Buddhists are. They permit physical type of *himsā* in some cases.

In the Vedic sacrificial rites, some non-human beings - beasts like goats and even the cows - were permitted to be killed. In almost all the somayajña, goat-killing for the fat-offering was a rule-abiding practice. To quote the words

of Saral Jhingram, "Gradually the violence in these sacrifices increased. Scores and probably hundreds of animal were sacrificed in the major sacrifices. Cow, the most sacred animal of the present day Hinduism, was one of the important victims in several Vedic sacrifices. Even man was included among the list of victims of some sacrifices, such as *Sarvamedha* (sacrifice of all). An important, Vedic ritual - *agnicayana* (erection of the fire altar) included man as one of the fire victims whose heads were to be walled up in the construction of the altar. Thus, the human sacrifice was not beyond the thinking of the Aryans, though in all probability it was usually not carried out."<sup>1</sup> Secondly, According to the *Varṇadharma*, the Kṣatriya-kings were permitted to kill their enemies in war. Thirdly, they were also permitted to award physical tortures particularly to the śūdras and women as punishment, according to the regulations of the Dharma-śāstras. Fourthly, the Dharma-śāstras permitted the people to take some animal flesh, which was first dedicated to the Gods and the Goddesses. In all other cases, however, killing was treated as condemnable violence and disvalue.

In the Purāṇas, *ahimsā* did not duly mean non-killing of man or animal. The Agnipurāṇa had furnished ten types of physical violence.<sup>2</sup> These include several types of physical injury. Other than physical injuries, back-biting obstructing another's good and betrayal of trust were also included in the list of cases of physical violence. The Padmapurāṇa nicely stated the ground against the violent actions : "Don't do unto others, what you do not desire for yourself".<sup>3</sup> This ground may be compared with some statements of the Dhammapāda.

The Buddhist ethics is world-famous for its utmost emphasis on the principle of *ahimsā*. Out of the five principles of panchaśīla (the five precepts), the first is the principle of non-violence or *ahimsā*. To the Buddhists, violence is either killing, or causing killing, or even sanctioning the killing of the living beings - from insect to man. The Buddhists think that there is a close relationship among all the living beings in the world; any harm inflicted on any one will certainly harm him who does inflict harm. The Dandabhāgga of Dhammapāda upholds: "All fear death, comparing others with oneself one should neither kill nor cause to kill".<sup>4</sup> Again, "Life is dear to all, comparing others with oneself one should neither kill, nor cause to kill".<sup>5</sup> Unlike the Hindus, the Buddhists strongly disbelieved in the Vedic sacrificial rites in which animal killing was a regular practice. Instead an orthodox Buddhist used to sacrifice his own selfish

motives. The Suttapīṭaka states, “Don’t kill a living being. You shouldn’t kill nor condone killing by others. Having abandoned the use of violence you should not use the force either against the strong or the feeble.”<sup>6</sup> The Buddhists are, indeed, in favour of a figid type of non-violence in its negative aspect. In the fourth part of Vinayapīṭaka, there are many statements made by the Buddha, in which the Buddhist monks have been advised not to dig the ground, not to cut the trees and not to misuse the water of pond, because there are breathing things - living beings in these places.<sup>7</sup> Such statements certainly remind us of the Jaina view in this connection. But the Jaina view seems to be too much impractical, when it maintains that one should cover his nose with a piece of cloth, because his breathing process may kill some insect.

However, to-day any study of Indian ethics must take into account particularly the teaching of the Quran in this regard. The Mohammedans have been living side by side of the Hindus, the Buddhists, the Sikhs and others for a longer period in India. Even history has informed that a section of Mohammedans living in India were originally Hindus. That is to say, they or their ancestors were original inhabitants of India. Changing their religion they have been trying to abide by the rules of the Mohammedan ethics. Here I shall mention some points on the Mohammedan view of non-violence on the basis of the ethical teachings of the Quran as furnished in *A History of Muslim Philosophy* Vol.I, edited by M. M. Sharif.<sup>8</sup> Sharif has made use of the English translation of the Quran, by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. The quotations from the Quran here are from this translation as found in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*. Emphasizing the value of life, the Quran regards violence as a disvalue. It states, “Opposed to the value of life is weakness of man to make mischief on the earth and shed blood.”<sup>9</sup> “All life is sacred. It is forbidden to commit suicide or to kill anybody without a just cause.”<sup>10</sup> The Quran discards the killing of a person as it is tantamount to slaying the human race. “Fight for the cause of righteousness is permitted only because tumult and oppression, which necessitate resort to armed resistance, are worse than killing”<sup>11</sup> This sanction may encourage an active Marxist, who believes in violent social revolution. The Quran also approves physical tortures, which even may lead to death in awarding punishment to the criminals. To punish some performer of misdeed, the Quran advices, “The thief, male or female, cut off his or her hands.”<sup>12</sup> Again “Those who devour the property of orphans unjustly, devour fire in their bellies, and

will soon endure a blazing fire.”<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, in some rituals, the Mohammedan ethics permits massive cow-killing and camel-killing for the grand feast of the devotees. Thus beside just war for the protection of number of good and valuable lives, for the punishment of evil doers and for eating purposes only violence or killing is permitted. In no other cases violence is sanctioned in the Mohammedan ethics.

## II

One may think that the principle of non-violence envisaged in the ethics of the Hindus and the Mohammedans is inconsistent. Both the ethical systems, though accept this principle as an important virtue or value for human being, in some cases, they permit man to violate this principle. In the Vedic sacrificial rites and just war cases like the case of Kurukshetra battle violence is permitted. Again severe physical torturing has been permitted by the Hindus to those who violate the socio-ethical rules and regulations prescribed by the Dharmaśāstras. It is the duty of the king as Kṣatriya to award such punishments to the evil doers, particularly the *Śūdras*. Thus it was prescribed that, if a *Śūdra* used offensive words to a Brahman, his tongue was to be cut off or pierced with a red-hot iron nail or his mouth or ears were to be filled with burning oil.<sup>14</sup> The Mohammedan ethics, as found in the Quran, also is in favour of violence in just war. The rulers of the Mohammedan society were also permitted to do physical tortures to the evil doers. Ancient Hindus, the so-called Aryans were ruthlessly meat-eaters. In the fifth chapter of his *samhitā*, Manu has prescribed many regulations for the eating of meat. He approves, “If anybody eats an animal, which may be eaten, there is no sin. As God has created some animals as eatable and some as eater.”<sup>15</sup> Perhaps to justify their habit of meat-eating, they used to offer first the killed animal in some sacrificial rites. Then they took the same. And that meat was granted as just meat (*Vaidha Māṁsa*). “It seems”, says Dr. Saral Jhingram, “to be fairly certain that the value of non-violence was introduced into Hinduism as a result of the direct influence of the heterodox sects of Buddhism and Jainism. At first the value of non-violence was only conditionally accepted as a virtue which characterises a certain class of persons, viz. the renunciants. Gradually, non-violence came to be accepted as a guiding principle of life or the supreme universal virtue - (*ahimsā paramo dharma*). The acceptance of non-violence resulted in the rejection of vedic sacrifices involving

violence”<sup>16</sup>

### III

The case of violence in just war, however, deserves special discussion. In this connection, one may find out a kind of affinity of the principle of non-violence with the so-called pacifism.

Prof. Richard Norman asserts, “I define ‘pacifism’ as the view that it is always wrong to go to war. As such it is addressed to Governments, and to political movements, specially those which aspire to be Governments, since there are the bodies which, by definition, are capable of waging wars and therefore have to decide whether or not to do so. Violence or killing engaged in by individuals solely as individuals would not be war, whatever else it might be. However, as individually we can, to a greater or lesser extent, influence governments, and we can either support or oppose the decisions of Governments and political movements to resort to war. Pacifism, therefore, would require us as individuals to oppose any resort to war.”<sup>17</sup>

According to Prof. Richard Norman, killing of human life in just or unjust war destroys respect for human life and autonomy which is no less valuable in civilization. Secondly, even in a just war of defence the loser nation or community does not lose its intellectual, moral, religious, political and artistic movements. Thirdly, if a community is destroyed in the face of violent aggression, individuals retain the ability to speak the language and engage in their traditional practices. In fact, in war the irreplaceable individual life is lost and the loss is total. Tragic though the destruction of a community may be, the destruction of individual lives is of a different order again. Fourthly consequentialist’s consideration about killing in any war may not also be justified. A consequentialist may say that killing in some war is justified if some greater good is achieved after the war. Taking the case of the second world war, Prof. Norman thinks that this war was surely a justified war against the terror of Nazism. This war achieves its result at an immense cost, involving million of deaths and appalling suffering. By such means it brought about the overthrow of Nazism. But Nazism has not been really destroyed. It as a political system or as an ideology is still there in the world in some other form.<sup>18</sup> Prof. Norman states, “It is very difficult to tell whether fighting a war will achieve anything positive, and what its long term consequences will be. We do not know however,

with very much greater certainty, that it will involve immense suffering and great loss of life. Therefore, weighing the certainty of suffering and death against the mere possibility of long term good term consequences, we may well conclude that war is never worth to risk.

Now Scepticism about the positive achievements of war does not by itself entail pacifism. Nor does scepticism about 'just war' theory. Nor does respect for human life. What I have been claiming is that that respect for human life sets up a very strong presumption against the justifiability of killing in war. Doubts about 'Just war' theory and doubts about the positive achievements of war, make it very difficult to see how that presumption could be overridden. That is the case for pacifism, and it is a very strong case."<sup>19</sup> Prof. Norman finally advises that "by building up a tradition of non-violent resistance to aggression and oppression, we can bring it about that people do have a choice and are not faced with an impossible ethical dilemma. It might then be possible to be unhesitatingly a pacifist."<sup>20</sup>

Pacifism, which is ultimately the principle of passive resistance is not same as the principle of *ahimsā*, particularly advocated by our Mahatma Gandhi, the last and most significant figure of India in this regard. In his autobiography Gandhi says that passive resistance may be a weapon of the weak, it may admit of inner hatred. This inner hatred may ultimately lead to violence.<sup>21</sup> So passive resistance is not all for the principle of *ahimsā*.

Whatever may be the case -- be it pacifism or the principle of non-violence, it is very difficult to say whether a war is just or unjust. War for attack or aggression is generally designated as unjust. The defensive war against aggression is just war. But attack or aggression for the greater good of a nation or community has been regarded sometimes as just war. The civil war in the Bolshevik revolution led by Lenin, or the long march in the Chinese revolution led by Mao - Tse - Tung may practically be regarded as just war. The aggression of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha in India may be granted by some as just war. So we are to come to a definite position in regard to the question what is a just war?

In my opinion, the ethics of the Hindus and the Mohammedans and even that of the Buddhists may enlighten us to find out the real distinction between just war and unjust war. Anger, pride, hatred, selfish consideration and bad

intention have been definitely described by these ethicists as the disvalues of man. Any war based upon these disvalues is unjust. Whereas any war not influenced by these disvalues, but initiated by love to greater humanity and good intention of establishing justice and peace in human society - in a nation or in a community is just war. Unless the tradition of non-violence is nationally and emotionally established in human society, violence in such just war would not be overcome. Mahatma Gandhi, the practical pioneer of the principle on non-violence in India had shown that even the principle of *ahimsā*, led the oppressed to Satyāgraha movement. Of the different actions of this movement in different parts of our country, he was particularly in favour of disobedience, non-co-operation, direct action and fasting. But the last two actions, though essentially non-violent cannot be regarded as purely so. Direct action gave rise to violent activities in different places. And fasting which may lead to kill oneself by himself is also violence in a sense. The call of 'Quit India' given by Gandhi in 1942 was a kind of direct action of the Satyāgraha movement. It was not purely non-violent in different corners of our country. And fasting, which was to Gandhi, the last resort to conquer the enemy by awakening rationality and love in his heart, is certainly, a going towards suicide. Suicide is a type of killing - self-killing. So each and every killing or violence cannot be discarded in our practical world. Limited violence may necessarily be permitted in the case of just war. In reality, we have seen violence has been predominating over non-violence. Gandhi's violent death may be symbol of the victory of violence over non-violence. The same may be said in some restricted sense, about the murders of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi.

From these considerations, I am unanimous with Prof. Norman's view that unless a tradition of non-violence grows in the rationality of mankind, violence cannot be wiped out. Also in any just war -- war for the establishment of justice and righteousness in society, I disagree with him, violence may not be avoided.

#### IV

There is another case of violence permitted by the Hindu and Mohammadan ethicists - the case of physical tortures to award punishment to the evildoers. Although the inhuman punishment prescribed in the Hindu

Dharmaśāstras and in the Quran are not in vogue to-day, yet we find torture and killing of human beings who are identified as witches out of superstition in tribal Hindu societies. Above all, till now the legal authorities award the death penalty as a type of cruel killing is, no doubt, an act of violence. The question is : How can the principle of non-violence appear before us as consistent with the death penalty? Or, in other words, is this type of violent penalty morally justifiable particularly in the light of the principle of non-violence? The controversy before the retentionists and abolitionists in connection with the death penalty has not yet come to a compromise. Both groups have sound arguments. Killing somebody for awarding punishment may in some cases be permissible. But it is a very serious matter. It should not be permitted in the absence of weighty overriding reasons. That is to say, in the case, where the question of death penalty comes, the principle of non-violence may not keep itself rigid. "Most heinous offences", as Prof. Leiser contends, "against the state and against individual (such as crimes against the peace, security and integrity of the state) seem to deserve the death penalty. Because of the fact that if the claim that life is sacred has any meaning at all, it must be that no man may deliberately cause another to lose his life without some compelling justification."<sup>22</sup> But if it is possible any day, I repeat, to establish a tradition of non-violence in the world, then no such major crimes like unjustified terrorism and murder will take place and consequently the question of death penalty will not arise at all.

## V

The Buddhist principle of non-violence is different from the Hindu-Mohammedan principle. Killing of man or animal for any purpose (for sacrificial rules, just or unjust wars, eating or awarding punishment) is strictly prohibited in Buddhist ethics. Rather the Buddhists in their religious practices revolted against the Hindu view of animal killing in sacrificial rites. Killing in war and awarding physical tortures or the death penalty as punishment is also out of question in non-violence principle of the Buddhist ethics. In the Dandabhāgga of Dhammapada, I repeat, it has been stated : "All tremble at punishment. All fear death, comparing others with oneself, one should neither kill nor cause to kill."<sup>23</sup> In regard to the method of non-violence which may be adopted by a king one may go through the Dighanīthaya (I. 134-42). I would like to quote the relevant text in the words of Hammalawa Saddhatissa. "In the



Kutadanta sutta ... .. we have the story of a king of a distant date by name Mahavijita, who finding himself possessed of great wealth, his treasure-houses and store-houses full, felt that he should perform a great sacrifice to show his gratitude. He consulted with his religious adviser who said, "Sir, it is remarked that the king's territory is oppressed with murderous attacks, seeking of villages, market towns and cities with ambush and robbery,' ... .. It may be that the esteemed king feels : "I should put an end to that robbery - trouble by punishment, imprisonment, fire, fine or by making an example of somebody, or by exile," but it is not by that means that violence is slightly exterminated. Those who survive cause fresh difficulties. But by adopting this method (method of non- violence), the robbery trouble is rightly exterminated. In this case, to those in the king's territory, who work on the land, cultivating and farming, let him distribute food and seeds; those who are traders, let him make a grant; to those who are in service let him consider food and wages. These men, attached to their own work, will not make trouble; they will help in the raising of revenue and the country will be free from oppression ... ..'"<sup>24</sup> In fact, historically speaking, the kingdoms ruled by the Buddhist Kings accepting the principle of rigid non-violence were peaceful for a long long time. Fahsien writes, "Of all the countries of Central India this (i.e. Magadha in the Buddhist period) has the largest cities and towns. Its people are rich and emulate one another in practising charity of heart and to one's neighbour."<sup>25</sup> The Kingdom of the Buddhist Ashoka was a golden Kingdom in all respects, so far the historians certify.

## VI

Now the Question is : What type of non-violence is acceptable to- day - the Buddhist type or the Hindu - Mahammedan type? At this stage of human civilization, the answer may be very simple. The Buddhist type may be ideal; but may seem to be impractical; but the Hindu -Mohammedan type is realistic and acceptable. Although a group of thinkers, nowadays, are in favour of Vegetarianism, one cannot even imagine now that animal killing for eating purpose will be stopped any day. Secondly, many inventions in medical science require of the torture and killing of animals, killing of man particularly in just war cases, though debatable, cannot be avoided even on human ground. The death penalty, particularly in some justified cases, may be required for the sake

of greater good of human society. Besides these cases of violence, which may roughly be called just, violence may be avoided, if we may rationalise the situation giving rise to violence.

But inspite of this, it may be emphasised that the principle of non-violence advocated by the Buddhists must be the highest end of humanity as a whole.

If reason be the guiding force of human civilization, then why shall we aim at violence? Reason may justify violence also. As Kant, the celebrated rationalist philosopher is found to be an advocate of violent retributive theory of punishment. But the reason, which is needed to establish a non-violent tradition in human society is the reason blended with human emotion viz. love or loving kindness. Love is the positive and more fruitful counterpart of non-violence. This love or loving kindness may be acquired by extensive efforts of educated people of the society. In different Buddhist Texts, the methods of the acquisition of love have been furnished. This love-centric non-violence theory is greater than western pacifism which implies inaction.

However, while emphasising the Buddhist position we cannot underestimate the Hindu-Mohammadan contribution. "The Hindu Thinkers", says Saral Jhingram, "could not always succeed in deriving a morality of love and kindness to all from their grand vision of the identity of all selves with the universal self; but they were always conscious that this vision becomes meaningful only when one habitually sees all in the images of one's self and acts accordingly. This vision and its related moral virtues (daya sarvabhuteṣu, anasūyā, Kṣamā, akrodha, dāna etc.) have very well compensated for certain soul-centric tendencies of Hindu moral philosophy. Any future reconstruction of a Hindu philosophy of morals must first of all try to develop the Vedantic vision at a philosophical level, and thus make it the basis of a positive morality or universal love and compassion."<sup>26</sup> In the ethical teachings of Quran also it is upheld that love as a human ideal demands that man should love God as the complete embodiment of all moral selves above everything else. It is the love-force, with the help of which the human beings are compassionate and loving to one another, they walk on the earth in humility and hold to forgiveness. They are friends to others, and forgive and overlook their faults even though they are in anger"<sup>27</sup>.

It may be added that Gandhiji, while expressing the positive counter-part

of *ahimsā* has established that it is nothing but Love -- a kind of feeling of oneness. Due to this love or loving kindness, one can be non-violent. But such realisation of non-violence is not something passive. It is a dynamic process of mind that involves continuous and persistent deliberations, efforts, strains and actions. By these active efforts one can make one's mind free from the disvalues recognised by the moral philosophy of the Buddhists, the Hindus and the Mohammedans. Anger, malice, hatred, will to take revenge, jealousy etc. are such disvalues, which ultimately give rise to violence in society.

Though the principles of non-violence and loving - kindness have been preached by almost all the ancient ethicicians of the world, violence and hatred have not disappeared. Communal riots, cast-conflicts, regional and racial conflicts, terrorism, aggression and violent attacks are usual events of different parts of the world and India. Particularly as Indians we are sometimes proud of carrying a long tradition of spiritualistic moral philosophy. But violence is still ruler of different parts of India. A Marxist would opine that the tradition of spiritualist moral philosophy is not sufficient for the abolition of violence. When historically proved class-struggle will come to an end, only then a non-violent and peaceful world-community will emerge. But to achieve this end he would necessarily grant violence to uproot the class-division of human society. This is a time-taking process. The fall of the socialism of U.S.S.R. and the countries of East Eurpoe is not failure of Marxist philosophy. We may also accept the Marxist position, if it is realised that violence in the form of blood-shed revolution to build up a classless society is morally justified, if it is really a just war. Violence in just war, we have seen, has been permitted in Hindu-Mohammadan ethics. We have also defined just war. Briefly speaking a just war is that type of violence which arises out of sincerest love to the major portion of the people and for the sake of preservation and upliftment of humanity and human values. Without loving kindness to the most of the people violence will never cease and it will act only for the benefit of a few power-loving pseudo patriots. "The history of all hitherto is the history of class-struggles". This proposition of the Manifesto of the Communist Party is true. But Marx and Engels aimed at the ultimate end of the class-war originated from this class- struggle -- ultimate end of the underlying violence in human society. In reality, a non-violent tradition may be

manifested only in a classless society. But unless we make us prepared to build up this tradition, unless we heartily believe in the morality of non-violence and realise the distinction between just and unjust violence, the world will never be a kingdom of classless human society. Let us try to arrange a meeting between Gandhi and Marx and hope for a better future of human civilization.

### NOTES

1. Saral Jhingram, *Aspects of Hindu Morality* MLBD, Delhi 1989, p. 47.  
See also *The Cultural Heritage of India*, R.K. Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta, 1975 Vol I, P 253, Vol.II P. 1247.
2. *Agnipurāṇa*, C C C LXXII.
3. atmanal pratikutani parasam na samacaret - *Padmapurāṇa*, I. 56.33
4. *Dhammapada*, X. 129.
5. *Ibid* X. 130
6. *Sūttapīṭaka*, 194, ed. by D. Anderson, Helmer Smith, 1948.
7. A. K. Coomarswamy and I. B. Horner, *Gotama, the Buddha*, Cassel and Company. Ltd. London, 1948, P. 137.
8. M. M. Sharif ed., *A History of Muslim Philosophy* Vol. I, Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi, 1989.
9. *Quran*, II, 30
10. *Ibid*, VI, 130, 140.
11. *Ibid*, II, 191.
12. *Ibid*, V, 41.
13. *Ibid*, IV, 10.
14. *Manusamhitā*, VIII, 270 - 272,  
*Apastamba Dharmasūtra*, II, 10.27.8-9,  
*Gautama Dhammasūtra*, XII, 2-3.
15. *Manusamhitā*, V, 56.

16. S. Jhingram, *Aspects of Hindu Morality*, MLBD, Delhi, 1989, P. 190.
17. Richard Norman, 'The Case of Pacifism, in *Applied Philosophy* ed. By Brenda Almond and Donald Hill, Routledge, London & New York, 1991 pp. 166. 167.
18. *Ibid*, pp. 173 - 176.
19. *Ibid*, p. 177.
20. *Ibid*, p. 178.
21. M. K. Gandhi, *An Autobiography, Part IV, Chapt. 26, Navajiban Publishing House, 1948.*
22. Burton M. Leiser, 'Retribution and Capital Punishment' in *Social Ethics* ed. by T.A. Mappes and J.S. Zambatty, M.C. Graw-Hill Book Company, 1982, p. 101.
23. *Dhammapada*, X, 129.
24. Hammalawa Saddhatissa, *Buddhist Ethics*, Wisdom Publication, London, 1987 p. 146.
25. *The Travels of Fa - hsien or Record of the Buddhist Kingdoms*, tr by H.A. Gills, Routledge and Kegan Poul, 1956.
26. Saral Jhingram, *Aspects of Hindu Morality*, MLBD, Delhi, 1989,P. 195.
27. M. M. Sharif ed. *A History of Muslim Philosophy Vol. I*, Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, p. 163.

## INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

- Daya Krishna and A. M. Ghose (eds) **Contemporary Philosophical Problems : Some Classical Indian Perspectives**, Rs. 10/-
- S. V. Bokil (Tran) **Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone**. Rs. 25/-
- A. P. Rao, **Three Lectures on John Rawls**, Rs. 10/-
- Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) **Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization**, Rs. 50/-
- S. S. Barlingay, **Beliefs, Reasons and Reflection**, Rs. 70/-
- Daya Krishna, A. M. Ghose and P. K. Srivastav (eds) **The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya**, Rs. 60/-
- M. P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale (eds) **Studies in Jainism**, Rs. 50/-
- R. Sundara Rajan, **Innovative Competence and Social Change**, Rs. 25/-
- S. S. Barlingay (ed), **A. Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian University (upto 1980), Part I**, Rs. 50/-
- R. K. Gupta, **Exercises in Conceptual Understanding**, Rs. 25/-
- Vidyut Aklujkar, **Primacy of Linguistic Units**. Rs. 30/-
- Rajendra Prasad. **Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language**  
Rs. 100/-

*Contact :* The Editor,  
Indian Philosophical quarterly,  
Department of Philosophy,  
University of Poona,  
Pune 411 007.