

THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IN SARTRE AND ŚAṄKARA

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In his Introduction to Sartre's *Existentialism and Humanism*, Philip Mairet points out, "To him (Sartre) freedom is the value of all values. It is as a philosopher of freedom that Sartre's contribution to existentialism is most brilliant and does most honour to the enlightened tradition of his country"¹. The concept of freedom is thus essential to the philosophy of Sartre. The reality of freedom is emphasised by him over and over again to such an extent that it may without exaggeration be regarded as the central theme of his philosophy. Freedom, for Sartre, is the ground all value and meaning. Values are the fruits of free choice; they have no objectivity or independent status. Values are not out there to be discovered as the given. "My freedom", says Sartre, "is the unique foundation of values and that nothing, absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values". Moreover, "What we called freedom is", according to Sartre, "impossible to distinguish from the being of 'human reality'". Man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the being of man and his being free". Anguish is "the reflective apprehension of freedom by itself". Orestes' defiance in *The Flies* makes the human situation remarkably transparent, when he says "Alien to myself, I know it. Outside of nature, against nature, without excuse, without recourse save myself. But I shall not return under your law; I am condemned to have no other law but my own. Nor shall I return to nature, where a thousand paths are marked out, all leading upto you. I can only follow my own path. For I'm a man, Jupiter, and each man must find his own way"². "In anguish", says Sartre, "I apprehend myself at once as totally free and as not being able to derive the meaning of the world except as coming from myself"³. Here when he says "myself", as appropriately pointed out by Croshy, he could just as well have said "from my freedom", for that is what he intends⁴. The meaning of my life is whatever I decide it to be in my

unrestricted freedom. There is nothing like human nature, an essence of the self, constraining us to behave in a predictable way. New dimensions of the present and the future can undo the essence which we have fashioned for ourselves as the outcome of our past free choice. "The meaning of the past is strictly dependent on my present project. I alone in fact can decide at each moment the bearing of the past By projecting myself toward my ends, I preserve the past with me, and by action I *decide* its meaning"⁵. Men can transcend their characters or the "essences" which they have given to themselves in the past. The whole course of our lives including the values by which we live our lives are however left "without justification and without excuse", according to Sartre, because "as a being by whom values exist, I am unjustifiable. My freedom is anguished at being the foundation of values while itself without foundation"⁶. This speaks of the radicality of Sartre's conception of freedom. "Values are either sheerly invented or freedom is completely unreal. There can be no middle ground"⁷. Sam Keen seems to have an admirable insight into Sartre's view of freedom when he says "If there are any 'oughts', any given standards of good or evil, or any invasions of human life by powers beyond its control, there is no freedom"⁸. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre seems to have developed a theory which points to the ultimate subjectivism and arbitrariness of freedom, and therefore "a doctrine of absolute freedom such as Sartre's is also a doctrine of *absurd* freedom"⁹. But it is important to note that "the social and cultural constructions in the midst of which individuals find themselves, including the roles to which they are relegated and by which they are objectified by others (e.g. Black, Caucasian, Aryan, Jew, crippled, ugly, beautiful, criminal, saint, shopkeeper, civil servant; see Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*) are givens to be transcended, as all givens are necessarily transcended, by the nihilations of the for-itself"¹⁰.

What makes this freedom a source of misery, rather than joy, is that by my freedom "I am condemned to be wholly responsible for myself" and to "carry the weight of the world by myself alone without anything or any person being able to lighten it". To discover the full meaning of radical freedom is to experience "abandonment", in the sense of finding "myself suddenly alone and without help"¹¹. Sartre writes as follows in his *Existentialism and Humanism* which deserves to be quoted here at length in order to understand his exact position regarding freedom. "There can no longer be any good *a priori*, since

there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that "the good" exists, that one must be honest or must not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men. Dostoevsky once wrote "If god did not exist, everything would be permitted", and that, for existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself. He discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. For if indeed existence precedes essence, one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism-man is free, man *is* freedom. Nor, on the other hand, if God does not exist, are we provided with any values or commands that could legitimise our behaviour. Thus we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does"¹². Referring to Ponge, Sartre points out, "Man is the future of man"¹³. Stavrogin who commits suicide in Dostoevsky's novel *The Possessed* has been rightly depicted by Crosby as "an embodiment of the Sartrean ideal of absolute freedom and even of perfect "good faith"¹⁴. Stavrogin's life is miserable in spite of his freedom. "Freedom is not enough, it alone cannot confer meaning on life"¹⁵, this is Dostoevsky's point. A life based only on freedom is "vertiginous"¹⁶. As Roquentin says in *Nausea*, a freedom like this "is rather like death"¹⁷.

Crosby rightly remarks that "Sartre's doctrine of radical freedom calls the possibility of genuine human community into question, not only with respect to its negative implications for shared truths, meanings, and moral values, but in other important respects" like "the acute sense of separation and loneliness implicit in Sartre's insistence that each of us is condemned to be wholly responsible for herself"¹⁸.

Moreover, it is also to be noted that according to Sartre "the freedom of others is a constant threat, enigma, and embarrassment to me, just as my freedom is to them. I cannot avoid converting them into objects for the utilization of my freedom and they cannot avoid doing the same in relation to me. Conflict between or among individuals is thus insurmountable; each atomic centre of

freedom works relentlessly to absorb all other centres of freedom into the orbit of its projects and concerns"¹⁹. Sartre clearly states that "it is useless for human-reality to seek to get out of this dilemma: one must either transcend the other or allow oneself to be transcended by him. The essence of the relations between consciousnesses is not the *Mitsein* (of Heidegger): it is conflict". Sartre also points out, "While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me ---- conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others". Freedom thus in Sartre ends in "despair of the possibility of community, at least in *Being and Nothingness*", as appropriately pointed out by Crosby²⁰.

The exaggerations in the claims in respect of freedom and responsibility in the writings of Sartre are too obvious to escape our notice, but the truths conveyed to us through those very exaggerations are no less significant. "The rock will not be an obstacle if I wish at any cost to arrive at the top of the mountain", says Sartre. This picture of man is no doubt an encouraging one, but it is an exaggerated picture nevertheless. Antony Flew seems to be right in his remarks that "the most press-on regardless assault may simply, and perhaps fatally, be defeated; while if it succeeds, its success will have been precisely in overcoming (what were by the very attempt chosen) obstacles"²¹. Sartre may be making "quite reckless claims about the massive scope"²² of human agency when he says that "man being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders", but the insight gained through this cannot be set aside as trivial by any stretch of imagination. It seems somewhat unfair, and mostly unwarranted, therefore when philosophers like Sartre are taken to task for entering into "successive orgies of pretentious verbosity and elaborate mystification"²³ at the hands of linguistic philosophers like Antony Flew. One is reminded here of the reaction of those philosophers who, as Edie points out, "see in Sartre 'major', if rather too morbid and personally objectionable, novelist and playwright but *not a philosopher*, at least in the commonsensical British sense of the term"²⁴. The point, however, is that, as Edie has rightly observed, "very few personages in the history of philosophy have been both major playwrights and technical philosophers as well. Sartre's very versatility is a cause of suspicion to contemporary academic philosophers"²⁵. Ācārya Śāṅkara here in India was not only a great philosopher, he was also a man of great poetic

genius, as is evident from his inimitable work *Saunderya Laharī*. Sartre similarly was not only an authentic philosopher, he was a great literary figure too of the present century. Exaggeration apart, it is the philosophical insight which is of utmost importance in Sartre. "It is of crucial importance", says Crosby that "we do not make Sartre's mistake of overestimating the extent of our individual freedom"²⁶. And this criticism of Sartre is alright so far as it goes. Bernard Loomer is quoted by Crosby to make the point that "we are not only free. We are also driven by irrational impulses and destructive compulsions. We are sometimes held fast in the vice of emotional and intellectual fixations ----- In our felt entrapment we may have the depressing feeling that our civilized attitudes are a veneer that comouflage the hidden demons that mock at our pretensions". It is further pointed out that "the demons who swell within each of us may not be solely of our own creation. They may also have a communal origin. There are socialized demons or communal shadows"²⁷. And yet Crosby in all fairness also admits that "while we do not have the limitless freedom that Stirner and Sartre often seem to think we have, the bold overstatements of their philosophies can help to jolt us into realizing that we have much more freedom than we usually credit ourselves with and hence, our common future is significantly open, not fixed or foreordained"²⁸. Rightly emphasising the importance of human freedom, Sartre has pushed this theme to a "ridiculous extreme"²⁹, one might say, but what is significant is that Sartre has highlighted the capacity in man "for self-transcendence, meaning that we do not have to settle for what we already have become, give up because of past disappointments or failures --- or acquiesce in the psychological or sociological theories that would deny the considerable scope of personal freedom"³⁰. Sartre's picture of "man being condemned to be free", with its typical insight, is however only a partial one, even if we conveniently ignore "the reckless claims" and over-estimations" of Sartre. The picture needs to be modified, and supplemented by other pictures of man like that of Brahman, as *nitya śuddha buddha mukta svabhāva*, as one who is intrinsically pure, intelligent and free. Let us now examine what the Vedānta of Śāṅkars has to say about man and his freedom.

What is of utmost importance for Śāṅkara is the knowledge or *jñāna* of man, not the embodied being of course but in his essence, as the *Brahman* or the ultimate non-dual Reality, the Vedānta passages like *Ahaṃ Brahmāsmi*, *Tattvamasī* etc. being the source of this unique knowledge or realisation. This

knowledge is unique and is the most important because it brings about freedom or *mokṣa* as it is called in Advaita Vedānta, which is otherwise denied to man on his empirical plane fraught as it is with misery and distress on account of varieties of limitations and constraints like duality (*dvaita*) and multiplicity (*nānātva*). *Dvitiyādvai bhayam bhavati*; there is fear when there is duality, says the *Upaniṣad*, and this duality is due to our ignorance. Once the oneness of the self with the *Brahman* or the non-dual ultimate Reality is realised i.e., once *Ātmajñāna* or *Brahma jñāna* which is the same of course dawns on man, there is no limitation or constraint left for him who has attained absolute freedom (*mukti*) through this *jñāna* or knowledge. He becomes a *jīvanmukta* or a free man during his lifetime itself. All others who are deprived of this knowledge are not free of course, and they are bound by so many constraints of body, mind, intellect, considerations of station and its duties, birth, death, old age, internal and external laws and what not. This in a nutshell is the theory of freedom (*mokṣa*) or liberation, as it is popularly called, in Śāṅkara Vedānta. Man of course is intrinsically free; he has only to know or realise this in order to be free. He needs to be reminded of his true nature, that is all, and once the realisation of the identity of man in his essence with *Brahman* or the ultimate non dual reality dawns on him, he becomes *jīvanmukta* or free in his life time itself. It should be noted here that *jñāna* instead of being merely a means of freedom is itself considered in Advaita Vedānta to be the goal for which every one should aspire only for its own sake in as much as illumination of *jñāna* itself is considered here to be freedom. This becomes evident if we deal with the Vedāntic conception of freedom at great length.

It has often been misunderstood that according to Śāṅkara, illumination or knowledge (*jñāna*) is a mere means of freedom. But it is more appropriate to say that freedom, according to Śāṅkara, is nothing but illumination (*jñāna*). ‘*Śrutayo Brahmavidyānantaram mokṣam darśayantyō madhye kāryāntaram vārayanti*’, as Śāṅkara would tell in his commentary on *Brahma Sūtras*, 1.1.4. It is true that at places Śāṅkara speaks of *jñāna* as a means to liberation e.g. when he says ‘*Niḥśreyasaphalam tu brahmavijñānam*, in his commentary on *Brahma Sūtra* 1.11. or when he says ‘*mokṣa-sādhanaṁ jñānam*’ in *Upadeśa Sahasrī*. But in all such cases it is a mere concession to the popular way of expressing the idea and moreover the context in which such statements are made should never be lost sight of. In the *Upadesa Śahasrī*, for example, *jñāna* as an

instrument of freedom can only mean the bookish knowledge of Brahman or *vākyād vākyārtha jñāna* obtained through *śravana* only which is to be firmly entrenched in the mind of the listener through *manana* and *nididhyāsana* finally culminating in *Brahmajñāna* in the sense of *Brahmāvagati* or the full comprehension of *Brahman*. And in the commentary on the first Sūtra, “*Athāto Brahma-Jiñāsa*” Śāṅkara being primarily interested in showing the difference in the fruits of *dharmajijñāsa* and *Brahma jijñāsā* naturally talks of *mokṣa* or *niḥsreyasa* as the fruit of *Brahmajñāna* just to contrast it with worldly prosperity (*abhyudaya*) which is the fruit of *dharmajñāna*. As a matter of fact, however, there is nothing more to be aspired for beyond the comprehension of *Brahman* (*Brahmajñāna*) in Advaita Vedānta, be it a *Vaikuntha*, a state of *Kaivalya*, *ānanda* (bliss) or *nirvāna* (extinction). *Illumination or jñāna* is freedom and it itself is a bliss or *ānanda*. Where *jñāna* is used in Śāṅkara Vedānta as a mere means (*pramāna*) for the comprehension of Brahman (*Brahmāvagati*), as for example when Śāṅkara says *jñānena hi pramāṇena avagantumīṣṭam Brahma*, there *jñāna* to my mind should be taken to mean a mere word to word, bookish, understanding of *Brahman* from the *Śāstra* i.e. *vākyādvākyārtha jñāna*. In that sense alone *Brahmajñāna* and *Brahmāvagati* can be distinguished from each other, for otherwise *jñāna* in the sense of *aparokṣa jñāna* is certainly indistinguishable from *avagati*, and *Brahmāvagati* or *jñāna* in this context should mean an immediate and full comprehension of the nature of the Real which constitutes the *puruṣārtha* or the aim of man and is identical with freedom (*mokṣa*).

Some of the misconceptions associated with the idea of freedom (*mukti*) in Śāṅkara Vedānta are subjected to trenchant criticism by Vidyāraṇya in *Pancadaśī*. Enlightenment does not make one unfit for worldly transactions, otherwise it would be a kind of illness which of course it is not. The knowledge of truth is not something like the disease of consumption which makes one incapable of normal dealings. The idea is that illumination does not affect our normal life in any way. There is absolutely no difference between the ignorant and the enlightened as regards their activity or abstention from activity from the point of view of the body, mind and intellect. *Pancadaśī* is quite clear on the point that freedom does not consist in being like sticks and stones abstaining from food etc.

That the enlightened is not forgetful about the world, that illumination

does not destroy duality, that it only make one realise the self as real and the unreality of the world only in a specific sense is clear from the following passage of *Pancadaśī*. “*Ātmadhīreva vidyati vācyam ne dvaitavismṛtiḥ*”. Vidyāranya caricatures the idea that illumination consists in forgetfulness of the world of duality by pointing out that inanimate objects like pots should in that case be half-enlightened in as much as they do not have any knowledge of duality. *Pancadaśī* is rather very clear on the point that the knower of truth fulfils his worldly duties well, as they do not conflict with his knowledge. In order to perform the worldly activities, according to *Pancadaśī*, it is not essential that the world should be taken as ultimately real.

What are required for doing normal activities in the world are the means such a mind, speech, body and external objects. They are not made to vanish by enlightenment. So why can the enlightened not engage himself in worldly affairs? Therefore, as knowledge of truth does not affect the means such as the mind etc. the enlightened person is able to do worldly activities such as ruling a country, study of logic or engaging in agriculture. The enlightened one, like an expert who knows and understands two languages, is conversant with both the bliss of Brahman and the worldly joys and does not see any conflict between the two. The idea of freedom (*mukti*) as something mystical and other-worldly is thus entirely ruled out by *Pancadaśī*. It is as if some one has mastery over two different languages; as there is no incongruity here similar is the case with one having illumination continuing to be conversant with the worldly affairs. What is important to note in this connection is that the enlightened person is not affected or disturbed by the pleasure or pain caused by *prārabdha*; thus and only in this sense he is a free man. The only difference between the enlightened who is free and unenlightened who is in bondage is that the former remain undisturbed and patient through all his afflictions due to *prārabdha* whereas the latter is impatient and suffers on account of this. This is how and this is the sense in which the metaphysical concept of freedom in Indian thought, instead of remaining confined to the conceptual level alone, is seen to have a definite bearing in our practical day to day life. Attainment of freedom (*mukti*) by no means makes one other worldly or merely contemplative in character transcending, and thereby becoming totally unfit for, the day to day affairs of the world. Though undergoing similar experience or engaged in similar activities it is freedom from misery that characterises the enlightened whereas the

unenlightened continues to be subject of misery. The above discussion should dispel once and for all several misconceptions about the nature of freedom (*mukṭi*) in Indian thought.

As far as the ethical aspect of freedom is concerned, it is to be noted that the enlightened one is in a definitely advantageous position to do good to the society without any attachment whatsoever and the life of a *jīvanmukta*, though in itself beyond good and evil, can thus be conducive to the social welfare. In any case, there cannot be any question here of his life being one of unbridled licentiousness like that of a debauch. His life is a life of detachment alright, but at the same time the world can benefit immensely by his teachings. As an *Ācārya* he can be a source of unfailing inspiration to the entire erring humanity. That is why such an enlightened person is described by Śāṅkārācārya as both '*Vimukta saṅga*' and '*Sadāpāradayāmbudhāma*'³¹. *Ācārya* Śāṅkara is very clear about the life and conduct of such men of wisdom, the enlightened ones. There are great souls, says Śāṅkara; calm and magnanimous, who do good to others as does the spring (*Vasantavallokahitam carantah*)³², and who having themselves crossed this dreadful ocean of birth and death, help others also to cross the same, without any motive whatsoever. Here the words '*Vasantavallokahitam carantah*' doing good to the world like spring, refer to the spontaneous goodness of the enlightenad. It is indeed a pity that this spontaneous goodness of the freeman, in the context of Indian thought has not been sufficiently highlighted while the freedom's (*jīvanmukta*'s) life has been depicted as one of sheer moral indifference and callousness by those who are alienated from the Indian culture in some form or the other.

True, there is a sort of "supermoralism, the state of being beyond good and bad"³³ set up as a model here where the life and conduct of the enlightened person are supposed not to be subject to normal ethical considerations, but from this it does not follow that the enlightened person could be immoral. Wherever it is stated that evil actions do not affect him, i.e. the enlightened person, it is to be construed as a praise of the state of enlightenment, *Brahmaṇo jñāna māhātmyam*, as Śāṅkara would call it³⁴. This does not and cannot mean that the enlightened person as matter of fact could indulge in evil actions, because there would be an obvious anomaly to speak of an immoral *jīvanmukta*. As a matter of fact, *jīvanmukta* is beyond the polarities and is at the same time, and precisely because of his transcendence, immensely helpful as a guide. He is a man of

unparalleled benevolence doing good to mankind with a rare spontaneity. A unique status is assigned to *jīvanmukta* in the Indian cultural milieu; here is a model of spontaneous goodness flowing from the intrinsic nature of one who is not entangled in polarities.

But what is this spontaneous goodness supposed to be? If it is spontaneous, can it be good in any ordinary sense? In the ordinary parlance we speak of goodness only when there is a moral choice and when the choice is genuine. If there is no genuine choice left for the *jīvanmukta*, can he be regarded as good in any sense whatsoever? Rather it would seem as if *jīvanmukta's* activities could be only mechanical and automatic, and therefore, not good in any sense when there is no possibility of his becoming evil under any circumstances. The vital question at issue here is whether the situation envisaged in this context where the *jīvanmukta* chooses the good over evil because of his natural inclination for the good reduce the *jīvanmukta* to the status of an automation. I do not think so. Goodness is spontaneous in the *jīvanmukta* only in the sense that it becomes his second nature³⁵, so to say, to do good, to choose good over evil. Although, the theoretical possibility of a *jīvanmukta* choosing evil over good cannot be ruled out altogether, such a possibility is never actualised in his case simply because the choice of good over evil becomes natural to him or in other words, it becomes his *svabhāva*. I do not think that there should be any inconsistency in visualising some such situation in the case of a *jīvanmukta* and his spontaneous goodness.

Actual choice of good as a matter of practice is what is meant by spontaneous goodness in this context and it is, therefore, neither an impossibility nor is it a sort of automatic or mechanical conduct where the words like 'good' and 'evil' would be inapplicable. The *jīvanmukta* is himself not touched or affected by the consideration of 'good' or 'bad' but his choice is always in favour of the good over evil and his activities are always conducive to the good of the mankind.

There is no question, therefore, in Śāṅkara of anyone being condemned to be free or the freedom of one coming into conflict with that of the other. Moral values, or any value for that matter, though not ultimate, are not arbitrary

in Śāṅkara Vedānta. They are to be honoured both by one who desires freedom and even after freedom has been gained in knowledge. In the former case it is a part of the *sādhana* itself, a part of the process by which *citta śuddhi* or purity of mind is obtained which in its turn is essential for the knowledge of Brahman while in the case of the latter it becomes spontaneous, a second nature, so to say, on the part of the Freeman not to transgress the moral values. God is not redundant for Śāṅkara either. Everything has its due place, its due value being kept in tact in Śāṅkara Vedānta. They are all important on the empirical plane of course; whether it is a case of secular activity or religious devotion, nothing is arbitrary, purportless or meaningless. Only they do not have any ultimate significance, that is all. What's of utmost significance is the realisation of Advaita which alone can make as free. What is significant from Śāṅkara's point of view again is that the *jīvanmukta* or the free man, as we have noted earlier, does not live a self-centered life, but is a great asset to his environment and the society. His very conduct, his guidance as Ācārya, is beneficial for the humanity at large (*Vasantavallokahitaṃ carantah*); he is spontaneously altruistic in his conduct. This aspect of freedom is missing in the picture of a man who is condemned to be free in Sartre. There is, however, one significant point where Sartre and Śāṅkara would agree, and that concerns the capacity in man for self-transcendence. Man with all his misery and distress is not bound by the circumstances, which appear to be so very inexorable, so very intransigent after all. He has the capacity to break the chains which he himself seems to have imposed on himself and his conduct. In Sartre, the choice is an absolutely free choice, not determined by any conditions of the past, not by any condition whatsoever. As Sartre puts it, "either man is wholly determined (which is inadmissible, especially because a determined consciousness i.e. a consciousness externally motivated becomes itself pure exteriority and ceases to be (consciousness) or else man is wholly free",³⁶. Man, being consciousness as such in Advaita Vedānta, is by his very nature absolutely free. For Sartre, consciousness is "a project of being. In "bad faith" consciousness takes itself for a thing, for a role, for an ego etc",³⁷. In Śāṅkara Vedānta also consciousness in the empirical plane becomes bound by the limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) on account of wrong knowledge (*mithyājñāna*). The realisation of the true nature of man as pure consciousness makes him free. Unlike Sartre, however, the

realisation in Vedānta is associated with pure bliss, bliss being the very nature of man. “*Cidānanda rūpaḥ Śivōhaṃ, śivohaṃ*”. Man is essentially and intrinsically of the nature of bliss, consciousness and purity, and freedom consists in a realisation of this nature of man. The picture of freedom given here in Śāṅkara is a sublime one, and though belonging to a tall order perhaps, it cannot be regarded as something unachievable either, for it has been seen to have been realised in the lives of *jīvanmuktas* like Kānci Paramācārya, Rāmakṛṣṇa Parmahansa and Rāmana Maharshi, to name only a few belonging to this cultural heritage.

NOTES

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1. Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism* (Translation and Introduction by Philip Mairet) (London, 1966-Reprinted.), pp. 18-19.
2. *The Flies*, as quoted in Footnote 20, J. M. Edie “Sartre as Phenomenologist and as Existential Psychologist,” E. N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (eds.) *Phenomenology and Existentialism* (The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967), p. 151.
3. Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*. Hazel K. Barnes (Trans) (New York, 1966), p. 48.
4. Donald A. Crosby, *The Spectre of the Absurd* (State University of New York Press, 1988), p.89.
5. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York 1966) p. 610.
6. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (London, 1957) p. 38.
7. Crosby, *Op. Cit.*, p.92
8. Sam Keen, *Apology for Wonder* (New York, 1969)
9. Crosby, *Op. Cit.*, p.95

10. *Ibid.*
11. Cf. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*. (London, 1957) p. 555-556
12. J. P. Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, pp. 33-34
13. *Ibid.*, p. 34
14. Crosby, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 98-99
15. *Ibid.*, p.99
16. Philip R. Fandozzi, *Nihilism end Technology; A Heideggerian Investigation* (Washington D.C., 1982).
17. J. P. Sartre, *Nausea*, Lloyd Alexander (trans), New York, 1964
18. Crosby, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 108-109.
19. *Ibid.*, p.109
20. *Ibid.*, p.110
21. Antony Flew, 'Is There a Problem of Freedom?' EDO PIVCEVIC (Ed.), *Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding* (Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 209.
22. *Ibid.*, p.208
23. *Ibid.*, p.202
24. Cf. James M. Edie, "Sartre as Phenomenologist and as Existential Psychoanalysisit, 'E. N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (eds.), *Op. cit.*, p. 140
25. *Ibid.*, p.141
26. Crosby, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 414-415 n. 10
27. *Ibid.*, p.415. Reference is made here to Bernard Loomer in Sibley and Gunter (eds.) *Process Philosophy; Basic Writings* (Washington D. C. University Press of America, 1978).
28. Crosby, *Op. Cit.*, p. 369
29. *Ibid.*, p.268
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 369-70
31. *Viveka Cūḍāmani*, 486
32. *Ibid.*, p.37
33. R. D. Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣhadic Philosophy* (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1968), p.224

34. Cf. *Chândogyā Upaniṣad*, IV 14.3, “*Yathā puskarapalāṣa āpo na śliṣyante evamevaṃ vidi pāpam karma na śliṣyate iti*”. Cf. Śāṅkara’s commentary on the above, “*Śrunu tasya mayocyamānasya Brahmano jñāna mātmyam yathā puskarapalāṣe padmapatra āpo na śliṣyante evam yathā vakṣyāmi Brahmaivaṃvidipāpam karma na śliṣyate na sambādhyate iti*”.
35. Cf. Sureśvara, *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi*, IV. 69, “*Utapanātma prabodhaṣya tvadveṣṭṛtvādāya guṇāh, Ayatnato bhavantyasya na tu sādhanārūpinaha*”.
36. Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (Trans) Professor Hazel Barnes (London, Methuen & Co, 1957) p. 442
37. Edie, “Sartre as Phenomenologist and as Existential Psychoanalyst”, Lee and Mendelbaum (eds.), *op. cit.*, p.169.