

## FREEDOM AS ACT OF TOTALIZATION : A CRITIQUE ON SARTRE

BHAGAT OINAM

This paper consists of five parts : one, lay out of the plan, two, ontological structure of action, three, nature of practico-inert, four, act of totalization as act of freedom and five, conclusion.

### I

It is one of the most problematic issues among the scholars of Sartre as to whether Sartre believed in the individual freedom (in the existential sense) in his later works. This refers to his works like *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, *The Problem of Method*, *Existentialism and Humanism* etc. The question primarily arises out of the debate on whether there should be a dichotomy between 'early Sartre' and 'later Sartre'. I shall not go into the debate, but take up his books *Critique of Dialectical Reason* and *The Problem of Method* to understand as to how he places human action amidst the collectives and groups. Though I shall try to explore more into the contents of these books, I may, at some instances, take account of his *Being and Nothingness*. However, my exposition, in any case, should not be seen as a comparative study between the *Being and Nothingness* and the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. If one tries to do so, the whole perspective upon which I have attempted to deal with human freedom may look misrepresented or gets misinterpreted.

The debate on early and later Sartre, however, is not completely invalid. The distinction primarily takes into account the question on human action. And when we make a discussion on action, we exclusively take it as voluntary and intentional. This makes our action a free act. Subsequently, it leads us towards the concept of freedom. So, the debate is on the issue that Sartre could not

continue with his earlier found freedom of the *Being and Nothingness* after coming to terms with Marxism.

The debate to my mind, seems superfluous and misdirected. Instead, what we should look out for, is the analysis of a particular concept or a line of thought which Sartre has developed and nourished throughout the span of his philosophical life. Seemingly, what I propose to do in this paper is to take up the concept 'totalization' and other related concepts and show that Sartrean conception of freedom is clearly presented through the act of totalization.

Act of totalization is seen by Sartre in the light of framing the ground for human action. In the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, he was more interested in dealing with action within a larger assemblage, in groups, series, institutions etc. Further, he also sees man as an embodied consciousness<sup>1</sup>. Human beings are not merely inert bodies like stone, table or chair, nor are free floating consciousness like Plato's soul<sup>2</sup>, who could determine his birth. They are both body and consciousness. It is by virtue of their being body that an act of body upon body is possible. And it is in light of this bodily act mediated by the act of consciousness that we understand Sartre's conception of human action. Since action is performed out of constant act of mediation between body/matter<sup>3</sup> and consciousness, we shall first discuss the ontological structure of human action. Later, we shall see how Sartre developed the concept of action within the social nexus, in the act of totalization through third-party-mediation.

## II

As mentioned earlier, Sartre's philosophy of action does not include any form of causal explanation. He finds the debate between intentional and causal explanation of human action as an outcome of our ignorance of the very nature of the human action. He writes:

"It is strange that philosophers have been able to argue endlessly about determinism and free will, to cite example in favour of one or the other thesis without ever attempting first to make explicit the structure contained in the very idea of action. The concept of act contains, in fact, numerous subordinate notions which we shall have to organize and arrange in hierarchy ..... we should observe first that an action is on principle intentional. The careless smoker who has through negligence

caused the explosion of a powder magazine has not acted. On the other hand, the worker who is charged with dynamiting a quarry and who obeys the given orders has acted when he has produced the expected explosion, he knew what he was doing on, if you prefer, he intentionally realized a conscious project',<sup>4</sup>.

Since, action is always intentional and intentionality implies freedom, then human action is inconceivable without freedom. Since the smoker has not acted intentionally he cannot be said to have acted. Perhaps, this concept of action would solve the age old debate on free will versus determinism. If we proceed with this line of argument, we may derive the proposition that actions are intentional and cannot be otherwise. And, intentionality since involves act of consciousness, the subject (person) is solely responsible for the action. To be responsible means to be responsible for the consequences of the actions which the subject, himself/herself has performed. It is this capacity to choose ones own actions and also face responsibilities for one's own actions that one can be called a free human being. So, freedom implies the capacity to choose and to face responsibility for the choice one has made. Since 'choice' is 'choice for action', we ought to understand the ontological structure of action. Action is understood in terms of concrete physical act, i.e. a bodily act. A body cannot act on a non-body. So, body acts on body only.

Let me first clarify as to what is meant by 'body' here. So far, the word 'body' has been used to mean that which will consist of animate body (human body) and inanimate body (stone, table, plant etc.). The term has so far been loosely used to accommodate both animate and inanimate bodies/matters. But from here, onwards, we shall make a distinction between the terms 'body' and 'matter'.

- (i) Body will refer to animate body (human body excluding the consciousness), and
- (ii) matter will refer to inanimate objects (both physical and a construct).

An action can be bodily, only in the sense that a body can act on another body or matter.

But one may raise a question whether a body (excluding the consciousness) can ever act on other bodies or matters. An act has to be understood in terms of subject-object relationship. A body-subject cannot act on a body-object in

exclusion of other factors. For bodies are unconscious and an 'unconscious' cannot act on another 'unconscious'. So, the mediation<sup>5</sup> is made with the help of the conscious, i.e. 'consciousness'. The reason is that an (bodily) act has to be intentional and as discussed above, intentionality is possible only with the help of consciousness.

Now, we have arrived at a paradoxical situation where body is talked of in terms of minus consciousness (i.e. body to body relationship), yet action has to take place with the act of consciousness. This paradoxical tension is bridged by the concept, 'Being-for-itself'. Sartre defines For-itself as follows:

"The nihilation of Being-in-itself; consciousness conceived as a lack of Being, a desire for Being, a relation to Being. By bringing Nothingness into the world the For-itself can stand out from Being and judge other beings by knowing what it is not. Each For-itself is the nihilation of a particular being"<sup>6</sup>.

Being is. It includes both In-itself and For-itself, latter nihilating the former. Further, Sartre writes:

Being-for-itself must be wholly body and it must be wholly consciousness; it cannot be united with a body. Similarly being-for-others, is wholly body; there are no 'psychic phenomena' there to be united with the body. There is nothing behind the body. But the body is wholly psychic"<sup>7</sup>.

The need for studying For-itself is felt because it is the For-itself as a body and also as a consciousness who acts as the subject. We cannot visualise an action, so to say, the 'freedom' without the For-itself. It is by virtue of its being 'no-thing' (nothingness) that it strives for Being (completeness, inertness).

Coming back to the discussion on action, it is the For-itself, both as a consciousness and as a body, acts as a subject on other bodies, matters or For-itselfes<sup>8</sup>. Ontological structure of action, thus, is that body (For-itself) acts on body/matter with the mediation of consciousness (For-itself).

Keeping this structure as the foundation, Sartre develops his theory of action by the act of totalization of reciprocity, mediated through the practico-inert. He formulates it by coining certain concepts like totalization, mediated reciprocity, practico-inert, third party etc. The interesting aspect of the

discussion, here, is that Sartre sees totalization as the constantly developing process of understanding and making history<sup>9</sup>. And history is made through mediated reciprocity of binary and ternary relationships and also through the act on the practico-inert. So, before studying the totalization of reciprocity, we shall make a study of the practico-inert.

### III

Sartre defines practico-inert as 'matter in which past praxis is embodied'<sup>10</sup>. It is the embodiment of the past praxis because it is a product of human praxis. So, it neither exclusively means all forms of physical matters nor 'product of human labour' in the strict marxian sense. It is a kind of material embodiment comprising of both the concrete material reality as well as abstract construct. In other words, it will encompass both means of production (machines etc.) as well as human constructs (society, association, values etc.).

It seems that Sartre has a wide spread conception of the practico-inert. Any part of nature on which human interference is made, can be considered as practico-inert. Practico-inert is an outcome of dialectic because the very concept of practico-inert is dialectical in nature. Dialectic is 'not a truth, not even a conjecture, but is the type of thought which is necessary, prospectively in order to elucidate a self-developing investigation'<sup>11</sup>. Before man started humanizing nature with the help of technology (from ploughing and fishing to the use of atomic energy), there was no practico-inert. With the advancement of knowledge (magic, science, and technology), man creates a new alternative world to satisfy his needs and creates his own history. What he creates to satisfy his needs is the practico-inert. He then confronts the practico-inert. And it is through the process of confrontation and interaction that human history is made, making history an outcome of the dialectics (a self developing process with man in the centre).

Interestingly, Sartre sees an autonomy in the practico-inert that at one point of history, it starts dictating its terms to man by becoming an 'exis'<sup>12</sup>. This can be seen in Sartre's example of Chinese peasants who ruthlessly cut down forests to meet more land for cultivation. The deforestation resulted in the imbalance in the ecological system leading to untimely and severe damage of life by floods. Man's constant effort to humanise nature sometimes leads to

disastrous catastrophes. The most obvious example of practico-inert turning 'exis' is the present state of fast advancing industrialisation.

From the above mentioned descriptions on practico-inert, we may draw relevant points which will serve the purpose of our discussion on 'action' and more specifically on 'totalization'. One, practico-inert is any part of nature (matter) on which human interference is made; two, it is the outcome of human need; three, it gradually becomes an exis, thus confronting man; and four, it is through constant action and interaction between man and practico-inert that human history (if not a genuine one) is made.

Let us, now, draw a continuity in Satre's thought on the nature of action. As discussed in the Part II of the paper, human action is possible when For-itself (as body) acts on body/matter, mediated by the For-itself (as consciousness). This statement may now be seen in the light of our understanding of the practico-inert: Man (For-itself) acts on practico-inert (matter) to make history through the act of totalization. And totalization is possible only through mediated reciprocity. Interesting feature of the practico-inert is that it does not remain passive. It bounces back on human beings. It enslaves man by becoming exis. In fact, human history is the history of constant struggle between man and his objects of creation. His object of creation may be in the form of art work, civilization, culture, value, technology etc. Man creates them, yet he, too, is bounded by the dictates of these matters.

#### IV

For-itself does not act on matter alone, it also acts on bodies (other For-itself), i.e. 'For-others'. What we have understood so far, as body-object is the 'For-others' so far as they are seen as others in the eyes of the subject. I (For-itself) may, in turn, become 'body-object' in the eyes of other 'For-others'. So, man does not act on practico-inert alone, but also on other men (For-others). The relationship is more vividly visible in the case of the latter kind, i.e. between man to man. It is through man's act both on other man as well as on practico-inert that praxis<sup>13</sup> is performed, leading to the making of history.

Totalization and praxis are closely related. While praxis is a group or individual activity with some goals ahead, totalization is the constantly developing process of understanding and making history. Making of history is

what Sartre calls 'totalization'. Since totalization is an activity with certain goals (totality), it is understood only in terms of human praxis. Perhaps, Sartre meant by totalization an act of unification of experience on the part of human consciousness whereas praxis is the external act of doing on the basis of this unification. It is the constant act of goal making. This act is the visualisation. And it is upon this visualisation that praxis is performed.

If we proceed with this distinction between totalization and praxis that while totalization is act of unification of experience on the part of human consciousness, praxis is the external act of doing on the basis of the unification; it necessarily follows that praxis is not possible without the act of totalization. Sartre writes:

“.....Praxis, in the first instant, is nothing but the relation of the organism, as exterior and future end, to the present organism as a totality under threat; it is function exteriorised”<sup>14</sup>.

So, praxis is an external act to realise certain goals or ends. Totalization, on the other hand, can be described as an act of project making. Since praxis is an activity to achieve some ends, it already presupposes a prior act of totalization, for human activity is not possible without some project before the performance. Sartre further writes:

“.....praxis, born of need, is a totalization whose movement towards its own end practically makes the environment into a totality”<sup>15</sup>.

Thus, praxis is also an act of totalization as well as an activity to realise the totality (which has been totalized).

Interestingly, Sartre sees totalization, not as a single act, but a constantly developing process. Totalization is always encompassing in character. It visualises a process of action to be performed. And this process is directed towards a goal, which Sartre calls as 'totality'. He writes:

“A totality is done completed ..... The critical experience is within a totalization; it is itself both totalizing act and its own totalization, the multiplicity is in process of synthesizing into a unified object. The act of totalization can be autonomous from, or external to, that which it totalizes. It is a real moment in ongoing totalization, in so far as this is incarnated in all its parts and is realized as synthetic knowledge of itself”<sup>16</sup>.

For Sartre, one's past or future goal or object of imagination will be a totality. My future goal or past (as totality) is inert, passive and complete in itself. I may set a goal of achieving first class in graduation, in which I may succeed. After my success I may further set new goals, say to become a teacher. Yet my becoming a graduate remains a totality since it is a goal complete in itself and the effort or activity in which I constantly engage myself to achieve the goal is the totalization. Interestingly, each time one totalizes he sets a totality encompassing all other earlier totalities. Similarly, each act of totalization encompasses earlier totalizations. And totalization is momentary for every moment new totalization takes place encompassing the earlier totalizations and totalities.

Totalization gets more complicated when we talk of interaction within larger assemblage in collectives and groups (For-itself with For-others). It gets marked by binary and ternary relationships. In a binary relationship, one to one correspondence between, (i) man to man, or (ii) man to practico- inert can be found; whereas in the ternary relationship, a person (A) will mediate the interaction or relation of two other persons, say (B) & (C) Here, we find the inclusion of a third party. Interestingly, this relationship is not one sided, but has mutual reciprocity. R.D. Laing writes:

“In reciprocity, each may make himself a vehicle of the other's project, so that the other will make himself a vehicle of one's own. Then there will be two separate transcendent ends and the reciprocity will have the character of an exchange. Or, each makes himself the means of the other for one joint end, which will be unique and transcendent. I recognize the other both as the means toward a transcendent end of my own, and as a generator of the project for which I am a means. That is, I see him as an agent of a totalization in his movement towards his ends in the same movement as that whereby I project myself towards my own; and I discover myself to be object and instrument for his ends by the same act whereby I constitute him as object and instrument for my ends”<sup>17</sup>.

In reciprocity, thus, each respect the others' praxis. Though each individual includes other in his act of totalization and *vice versa*, yet each one of them realises that other is equally an agent as much as he is. That is what Sartre calls as reciprocity which is possible between two free individuals. Had it been an



act between man to man in alterity, it would not be considered a genuine form of human relationship. Further, in group movements where each individual gives up some of his personal interests and works with others for a common interest and goal, members of the group constantly totalize one another. I totalize others in my totalization and others totalize my totalization in their individual totalizations and so on. Each individual totalizes the other remaining inside the group<sup>18</sup>. Each is a third party to the others. Each totalizes as a third party. We may take note of Sartre's example of a road mender working on the road side and a gardener planting the seedlings<sup>19</sup>. These acts are, however, isolated acts. But Sartre as a third party totalizes, by mediating both of them.

We may, now, note an interesting aspect of the mediation. We have already discussed earlier with regards to binary relationships, the double aspects of it viz., (a) man to man relationship and (b) man to practico-inert relationship. In fact, binary/ternary relationships are possible through mediation by both the confronting sides. But the way the mediation will take place between man vs. man will be different from that of man vs. practico-inert. While the former will be largely marked by reciprocity (except for bad faith)<sup>20</sup>, latter is marked by alterity<sup>21</sup>. In the latter, genuine praxis is lost and is marked by materialized praxis<sup>22</sup>. The practico-inert constantly robs us of our genuine action. Man's action (self-for-self) in a factory no more remains his own. It is bought in lieu of his wages. It becomes for others (other-for-other). So, the mediation between man and practico-inert is devoid of reciprocity.

In the relationship between man to man, it is not completely devoid of alterity. Series<sup>23</sup>, as described by Sartre is marked by alterity. The example of queue in a bus stand as given in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* can be referred here. Some people are smoking, while others are reading newspaper and so on. They are plurality of solitude. It is the provisional negation by each of their possible reciprocal relations, marked by a negation. I have nothing to do with you. All are in their own world negatively, by taking no notice of each other except as a member in a quantitative series<sup>24</sup>. The notion of negation as inherent in the very nature of seriality can be seen as parallel to internal negation<sup>25</sup>, as Sartre visualised in the *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre sees that there can be no relationship at all if two bodies are completely exterior to one other. My seeing of others' bodies as separate and exterior to mine is due to cognizance of the fact that others are not me. This capacity to negate myself

from others is what Sartre terms as 'internal negation'. Existence of the other as a subject is apprehended prior to the involvement of the body as a mode of mediation. Sartre writes:

"The appearance of the Other's body is therefore, the primary encounter; on the contrary, it is only one episode in my relations with the Others and in particular in what we have described as making an object of the other. Or, if you prefer, the other exists for me first and I apprehend him in his body subsequently. The Other's body is for me a secondary structure"<sup>26</sup>.

Similarly, individuals involved in the series are basically bodies. And an absence of relationship between two bodies in exteriority can be applied in the case of the series. The numerical relationships among the passengers in the bus are self made. Prior to the negation of the bodies, they too know that they are all human beings, able for reciprocity. It is their internal negation, the capacity to negate oneself from others that made the passengers remain in exteriority from one another. So, we may note that idea of negation in seriality is nothing new, but an application of the ontological structure of negation as studied in the *Being and Nothingness*.

Similar is the case with institution. People are not recognized by their personal individuality, but by their power and status. The person as an individual freedom becomes inessential. This inessentiality is due to structures of power and status. In the process, individual somehow loses his freedom. We may, therefore, see the institution as a perverted form of a group. But an institution is necessary for a group to exist longer. This inessentiality of persons is the outcome of each person's impotence born of the belief in the inalterable character of institution. Sartre writes:

"But this inessentiality does not come either from the institution to the individual or from the individual to the institution: it is actually practice isolating itself in so far as it is produced in a common milieu defined by new human relationships. These relationships are based quite simply on serial impotence : if I regard the institution as basically unalterable, this is because my praxis in the institutionalised group determines itself as incapable of changing the institution; and this impotence originates in my relation of circular alterity to the other members of the group"<sup>27</sup>.

As we can see from this passage, it is my freedom to let my praxis in the institutionalised group be reduced to impotence. I have equally the freedom to come out of it. My becoming impotence is a choice. So, Sartre does not lose sight of his basic thrust that 'man is freedom'.

## V

Two lines of arguments may be drawn from Sartre's philosophy : (i) Human praxis and totalization is the outcome of scarcity and philosophy of freedom will dawn when the problem of scarcity is overcome<sup>28</sup>. (ii) History is human history and it is collectively constructed<sup>29</sup>. These two propositions can, now, be seen in the light of the arguments so far formulated in this paper.

Sartre sees 'scarcity' as the foundation for any form of human action and praxis. This foundation, however, is derived from Marxian concept of scarcity. However, problem of scarcity can be better understood in terms of need-lack relationships. Sartre writes :

".....need is the first totalising relation between the material being, man, and material ensemble of which he is part. This relation is universal, and, of interiority. Indeed, it is through need that the first negation of the negation and first totalization appear in the matter. Need is a negation of the negation in so far as it expresses itself as a lack within the organism; the need is a positivity in so far as the organic totality tends to preserve itself as such through it"<sup>30</sup>.

Need is a positive quality and need is always need of something (matter). Sartre further correlates need with lack as need emerging out of lack, on the other hand, is a negation, my lack of food etc. Lack is seen as the basis upon which idea of need emerges. As R. D. Laing puts it:

"Whether the relation is man to man, or man to matter, the fundamental relation in our history is reciprocal of need-scarcity. It is the contingent determination of our univocal relation of materiality. Scarcity in the material world is constituted by need. This dialectic can also be viewed starting from scarcity, not from need"<sup>31</sup>.

Thus, scarcity is seen as the theoretical basis for both totalization and praxis. Interestingly, what Sartre formulates as lack is the new version of the old Marxist

term 'scarcity'. A particular lack can be overcome when a need (for a lack) is fulfilled. My lack of wealth makes me feel the need for wealth. My lack of wealth is an emptiness, conveying a negative meaning; whereas my need for wealth implies a satisfaction with the possession of the wealth. Latter carries a positive attitude. Need is opposed to lack. Since lack is a negation, need becomes negation of the negation. Sartre sees material scarcity as the basis of human praxis. Had man been complete in itself (Being), the question of human praxis could not have arisen. What one should see in this context is that it should not be only material scarcity that determines human praxis but also the nature of human finitude itself. Man being finite has the constant desire to be complete to realise the being. And it is man's constant thrust to be complete that also makes him visualise totalities through constant totalization. So, it is not only the material scarcity, but also the ontological structure of finitude that enables man to perform the act of praxis.

It is Sartre's over emphasis on the structure of lack-cum-scarcity that makes him blend existentialism with Marxism. His statement that marxism is the only philosophy of our time is mainly due to the fact that he sees marxism as the philosophy of scarcity. And as discussed above, praxis is the outcome of scarcity. So, we may conclude that Sartre's over emphasis on scarcity leads him to see 'philosophy as the philosophy of scarcity alone'.

However, Sartre has a vision of an end to this problem of scarcity. He writes:

"As soon as there will exist 'for everyone' a margin of 'real' freedom beyond the production of life, Marxism will have lived out the span; a philosophy of freedom will take its place. But we have no means, the intellectual instrument, no concrete experience which allows us to conceive of this freedom or of this philosophy"<sup>32</sup>.

In spite of the doubts about the philosophy of freedom being realised in actual life, we can be hopeful that the vision for a philosophy of freedom will dawn in actuality. Rest can be left to history.

Let us now see the second proposition that history is a collective construction. It is not an individual alone who makes history. Others too, make it. So, at times, history looks like an alien force dictating terms to individuals. This statement only shows the 'appearance', the way history is shown to us.

History is not a practico-inert. It is the outcome of human praxis. But this praxis is not an isolated individual praxis, but a constitutive praxis, a product of mediated reciprocity of binary and ternary relationships. If history escapes me, it is not because I am the only one, others also make history '33 Examples to cite the case are that of Tibet in our times and Sepoy Mutiny/Great Uprising in Indian history during 1857. British army suppressed the rebels and stole away their praxis. Well, of course, under definite historical conditions - division of different small and weak kingdoms and each rebel group fighting for their own interest, without any unified effort. Further, Indian middle class did not support them. And thus, praxis of the rebel groups were suppressed. Ant it is unfortunate for the human race that history has always been made by the victorious group of any class (group) struggle. Nevertheless, each group and within that, each individual makes an effort (if not all the time) to perform a praxis, even if his/her praxis is stolen away. Our point of discussion is the effort on the part of the individuals/groups to constantly totalize and thus perform the praxis. Success or failure for a praxis is beyond the realm of freedom. It takes note of several other historical factors.

To conclude, we shall make two observations in the light of the two lines of argument stated in the beginning of this section. First, it is true that human history is the outcome of scarcity. But Sartre's formulation of the 'philosophy of freedom' after the 'philosophy of scarcity' is a redundant one. There cannot be a state of freedom away from that of the scarcity. That would be a Godly world. What is important is the constant struggle of man to get away from scarcity by fulfilling the 'lack'. It is true that the vision is of a Godly world where there is no more 'need'. But freedom as we understand in the light of human action and subsequently through totalization and praxis, can be visualized and meaningfully talked about only under the world of scarcity. It is in the effort to solve scarcity that human freedom is realised. The moment scarcity is solved, there will be no freedom either. Human existence cannot rule out the ontological presupposition of finitude and lack. It is by the very nature of facticity that man is a lack. And freedom is possible only in the act of solving the lack. So, freedom cannot be visualized in a world outside that of scarcity. It is to be realised within.

Secondly, nature of history as both (a) collectively determined and (b) as outcome of man-practico inert confrontation, should not lead us to think that

history is the alienated product of human praxis. Though it is true that one does not exercise genuine freedom during the formation of series and institutions, yet fused groups show exercise of genuine freedom. Since fused group is marked by mediated reciprocity of totalization, praxis of the group becomes praxis of the individual. Constitutive praxis merges with constituted praxis. Interestingly, the span of any fused group is short, often giving way to series or institutions. But the moment of formation of fused groups and exercise of praxis within it are genuine moments of freedom. Since fused group has short duration, freedom is also short lived. But the interesting part of the nature of human freedom is that most of the time freedom is eluded by alienation through bad faith and passivity. What we should note is that fluctuation and momentariness of totalization and praxis marks the very nature of freedom. Therefore, human freedom is realised in momentary act of totalization of mediated reciprocity within the boundary of scarcity and finitude.

### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. By embodied consciousness, the implication is on the dual character of man, both as a conscious being as well as a body. This duality is for the sake of conceptual understanding only and should not be seen in the light of Cartesian dualism. In fact, consciousness is merely an act and it is rooted in the ontological presence of the body.
2. Jean-Paul Sartre, (1956, reprint 1966) *Being and Nothingness*, trans. by H.E. Barnes. New York : Washington Square Press. Pp. 131-132.
3. So far the distinction between 'body' and 'matter' has not been made. As we proceed, the distinction will more visibly be made. Body means human body (a living one) and matter means inert objects. It may be a natural object or a human construct.
4. *Being and Nothingness, op. cit.*, p.559.
5. Mediation refers to bridging of a gap or making a dialogue possible.
6. *Being and Nothingness, op. cit.*, p.800.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 453.
8. For-itself is not an aggregation of body and consciousness. It is wholly body and wholly consciousness. Further, For-itself also acts on other For-itself/For-itself. It need not act on bodies and matters alone.
9. Jean-Paul Sartre, (1960, reprint 1982) *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, tr. by Alan Sheridan-Smith, Edited by Jonathan Ree. London: Verso. p. 830.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 829.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
12. Sartre uses the term 'exis' to mean the autonomous character of the practico-inert, the stage where it exerts its authority over man.
13. Praxis is defined as 'activity of an individual or group in organising conditions in the light of some end'.
14. *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, *op. cit.*, p. 83.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
16. Laing and Cooper, (1971) *Reason and Violence*. London : Tavistock Publication. p.103.
17. *ibid.*, p. 109-110.
18. Mark Poster, (1975) *Existential Marxism in Post War France*, Princeton University Press, Pp. 291-291.
19. *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 101 & 110.
20. *Being and Nothingness*, *op. cit.*, p. 559.
21. Sartre defines 'alterity' as relation of separation, opposed to reciprocity. *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, *op. cit.*, p. 827.  
R.D. Laing further puts that 'the structural aspect of the transition to and from self-for-self to other-for-other Sartre calls alterity, and the movement he calls alteration'. *Reason and Violence*, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
22. *Reason and Violence*, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
23. It is an ensemble each of whose members is determined in alterity by others (in contrast to group). *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, *op. cit.*, p. 829.
24. *Reason and Violence*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 121-122.
25. *Being and Nothingness*, *op. cit.*, Pp. 445 & 803.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 446.

27. *Critique of Dialectical Reason, op. cit.*, p. 79.
28. Jean-Paul Sartre, (1963) *The Problem of Method*, Trans. H.E.Barnes, Methew and Co. Ltd., p. 34.
29. *Ibid.*,Pp. 88 & 90.
30. *Critique of Dialectical Reason, op. cit.*, p. 80.
31. *Reason and Violence, op. cit.*, p. 113.
32. *The Problem of Method, op. cit.*, p. 34.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 88.