SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE STATUS OF THE WORLD
(JAGAT) IN ŚAṆṆĀRĪTE ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

SANGHAMITRA DASGUPTA

The question about the status of the world (jagat) may be an age-old one in vedāntic literature; but it has become urgent and important, because of the fact that there are almost opposing views regarding the world developed in the writings of post-Śaṅkara vedānta. The situation seems to be more complicated, because each of the theorists further claimed to derive his legacy from Śaṅkara’s own writings. Śaṅkara’s writings on the other hand due to its richly suggestive character seem to ‘accommodate diverse interpretations with an apparent ease’. Consequent upon this in the later writings of advaitic literature itself two dominant theories have been evolved. They are popularly known as Vivartavāda and Drstisrśtvādā respectively. The first theory holds that the world is a mere appearance of Brahman, the only reality and its exact nature cannot be categorised as either sat (Being) or asat (Non-being). It can not even be said as ‘sadasat (combination both ‘being and non-being’), because this would involve explicit ‘self-contradiction’. Its exact nature, strictly speaking, is ‘anirvacanīya (indeterminable). According to the second theory, the world is as good as a case of ‘total fiction’ like a ‘hare’s horn’. For it, ‘its percept is perception and anything external to perception does not exist’. Under the spell of such contrary claims among the later advaitins themselves, it is not easy to say which of the views is more faithful development of the philosophical position of Śaṅkara. But any effort in order to determine such an issue would exclusively require a presentation and a preliminary examination of the divergent claims. By way of critical exposition of both the theories summarily, here I shall try to argue that we can not claim to have explained these contrary interpretations about the status of the world (jagat) unless we have recognised each view as an outcome of a particular time milieu. And my effort here is to argue that a careful consideration

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of the historical and cultural situations of Śaṅkara's own time would be a more favourable condition in defence of the interpretation of the world by the Vivartavādins. A close look at the socio-cultural background of the philosophical enterprise of the then India in which Śaṅkara flourished would at once show that Śaṅkara was very eager to put an end to Buddhism which by then, had lost its vitality and tried to formulate a philosophy with solid rational foundation from the direct interpretation of the upaniṣadic texts. He even went a step further to declare his own philosophy as 'the upaniṣadic philosophy' (aupaniṣadādāṁ daśānaṁ). If the world were assigned a fictitious status by Śaṅkara, then he would not have built a comprehensive system which did not only speak of the realization of the transcendent reality but also emphasised the religious, ethical and social life of human beings at large. For him, there are levels of being or reality (sattā). His commentaries on vedāntic texts constitute a strong rational foundation of Advaita philosophy which can claim to quench, the thirst of the people who do not even believe in any revealed texts or mystic experience but try to understand the nature of the world in the light of 'common experience and reasoning'. From this consideration also, Śaṅkara would not support the fictitious nature of the world. But before entering into the critical exposition of the theories about the world, let us propose to discuss summarily different levels of being (sattā) in the advaita philosophy of Śaṅkarite tradition, because without a clear picture of the grades of being (sattā), it would be difficult to understand the propriety of placing the world in certain grades, be it insignificant (tucccha) or pragmatic (Vyāvahārika).

**Levels Of Being**: A comprehensive survey of philosophical literature of nondualistic (advaita) school of vedānta makes us aware of the fact that there are four levels of being (sattā). The lowest of this gradation is called 'tucchasaṁsattā'. (insignificant being). The cases of 'hares horn', sky-flower etc. have been cited as examples of this category of 'insignificant'. They are imaginary and are acknowledged as having no real status (alika). They are fictitious, mere thought constructions. They have being only as 'objects in thought or mind' but they have no epistemic significance or import, because here our reasoning is not making any assertion or decision with regard to their objective status. "Logically speaking, falsity arises only when reason makes the assertion, as in the case of the perception of a snake."4

The second level which is higher than insignificant (tucccha) is called
‘apparent being (prātibhāṣika sattā). The perceptual cognition of ‘a snake in a rope’ or ‘a piece of silver in a piece of nacre’ is often cited as example of this category of being. In the first glance we have the cognition ‘This is a snake’ and in subsequent cognition it is sublated. The next higher level is called pragmatic or functional being (vyāvahārika sattā). In case of prātibhāṣika sattā (illusory being) the subsequent cognition contradicts the previous perceptual cognition within the world itself. But in case of vyāvahārika sattā (pragmatic being) it is not contradicted either by subsequent perceptual cognition or action but only by ‘dialectical reason and realization of Brahman’. In the words of Professor P. T. Raju, ‘The innate and ultimate self-contradictions of the pragmatic world are revealed to the light of reason by its own self-reflection. That is why even if I am convinced dialectically of the rational incoherence of the world, when I look in front of me, I see the same objects existing and not contradicting my active life, whereas when once the perception of the illusory snake is contradicted by the perception of the rope, I can no longer see the snake with the same eyes, and my active life also contradicts the being of the illusory snake’.

The reality of the world is called pragmatic or functional, because although it serves practical purposes in the realm of action, it involves inherent self-contradictions and for the eradication of this contradiction, it presupposes the ultimate Being (pāramārthika sattā). In other words, only on the realization of the ultimate Being, the world’s adhoc reality is contradicted Advaita Vedānta literature contains three basic categories - sat (being) asat (Non-being) and mithyātva (falsity). Being can never be sublated or contradicted. In this sense Brahman is the only sat, the highest being (Pāramārthika sat) Again Non-being or asat can not be presented in any locus; it is ‘eternal negation’ (alīka). The false is that which can neither be categorised as Being nor Non-being. It can not be called sat or being, for the reason that it is subsequently negated or contradicted. It is also different from asat or non-being because on account of the fact that ‘it is presented in a locus’. According to Advaitins, it is the false alone which can have presentation as well as subsequent negation. This is what is expressed in the following :

“In one half verse I shall tell you what has been taught in thousands of volumes : Brahman is true, the world is false, the soul is Brahman and nothing else (Ślokārdhena pravaksyāmi yaduktair granthakotibhīḥ, Brahma satyam jagannmithyā jivo brahmaiva nāparaḥ)"
**Vivartavāda** : With this short account of the levels of reality in Advaita Vedānta, let us see how the post-Śaṅkara advaitins have propounded different theories about the status of the world. Pandmapāda (820 AD) traditionally claimed as a direct disciple and a almost contemporary of Āchārya Śaṅkara emphasises on the theory of vivarta (appearance), according to which the world is a mere appearance of Brahman, the only reality. As Brahman is non-dual, pure Being. It can not be the locus of any change or modification. Change or modification in a realistic sense means the same as the change of gold into ornaments or of milk into curd, is vikāra or parināma. It is called ‘satattva ‘nyathā pratā’ ‘Attattvato nyathā pratā’ on the other hand means the seeming and not actual modification as it is the case with regard to the appearance of water into waves, bubbles etc.; it is vivarta. So the world can not be called a transformation (parināma) of Brahman. It can not, again be equated with the state of dream, because it serves our purposes or needs and lasts until the realization of Brahman takes place. The vivartavādins consider the world as a false appearance of Brahman like the false perception of snake in place of rope. The snake is appeared as real so long as the true perceptual cognition of the rope does not take place. Similarly, the world is considered as real as long as Brahman is not realized as the only reality. The Vivartavādins contend that the world is not unreal but indeterminable. It is indeterminable in the sense that we cannot categorise it into our logical language which functions through the ‘is’ (sat) or ‘is-not’ (asat). This view has been developed in a sophisticated way due to the contributions of the followers of Padmapāda, in the Vivaraṇa school, the chief exponent of which is Prakāśātman (1200 AD). For among the traditional advaitins who are more adherents to the vivaraṇa school, the world can neither be placed with Brahman, the pāramār-thika sat nor with tuccha (insignificant) or pure fiction (i.e., hare’s horn). It is interesting to note here how Padmapāda makes a distinction between two meanings of ‘mithyā’ (falsehood) which paves the way for a distinctive status of the world from fiction. He says that we are to make a distinction between absolutely negatable and indescribable negation. The first represents the class of negatables for all times whereas the second stands for relatively negatable. The case of the world is neither absolutely negatable nor absolutely affirmable. In other words, the world belongs to a category or relatively negatable (negatable only when Brahman is realised) and relatively affirmable (until Brahman is not realised). The theorists of vivarta with their adjunctive ‘indeterminability’ try to emphasise a
‘nothing-yet-something’ attitude to the world. For them Brahman is the non-self transforming (vivarta) casual matter whereas mayā is the self-transforming (parināmi) causal matter of the world. The term ‘non-self-transforming’ is used to make it clear that the cause and the effect have different levels of reality, and the term ‘self-transforming’ emphasises the same level of reality for both.12 The word ‘relativity’ has been used with regard to ‘the affirmation and negation’ of the world in order to emphasise the fact that the worldly object is more real than an illusory object and less real than the absolute Reality.

Drśtisṛṣṭivāda : But in the tradition of advaita vedānta itself, there are thinkers who are not willing to assign the status even of pragmatic reality to the world. Like the vijñānavādī Buddhists, instead of calling the world as indeterminable (anirvācya) they are interested to declare the world as a case of total fiction like ‘hare’s horn’. They advocate the theory of Drśtisṛṣṭi. The derivative meaning of the word ‘drśtisṛṣṭi’ signifies the fact that ‘creation is nothing but apprehension’. The chief exponent of this school is said to be Prakāśānanda (1500 - 1550 AD) who authored ‘Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvali’, a post-Śaṅkarā advaita masterpiece mainly devoted to the exposition of ‘Drśtisṛṣṭi’.13 Explanation of some of the salient features of it may also be gained from ‘Advaitasiddhi’ of Madhusudana Sarasvati.14 According to this theory, subjective perception creates the so-called objects and there is no objective phenomenon apart from the subjective perception. In order words, the perceived object is nothing over and above the perception itself. This view vehemently criticises the vivaraṇa’s theory of existential gradation or levels of being. It holds that the distinction between the prātibhāṣika and the vyavahārika is not justified, because when the knowledge of Brahman dawns, the knowledge of the world stands cancelled. Since in this state the world becomes absolutely zero apart from Brahman, all distinctions are ultimately valueless, the so-called pragmatic reality of the world thus becomes nothing but fictionality (alakṣyata eva vyavahāritvam). The world for this theory, is not even an indeterminable illusion but a total fiction just like ‘a chimera’ or a hare’s horn. According to Mandaṇa, the false perception of jīva (individualized soul) is the case of the creation of false objects in the world. ‘Brahman appears as jīva’ is false as a matter of fact, only reality is Brahman as such (Brahmanah jīvabhāvaḥ mithyā, brahmaena satyaḥ).15 It is called drśtisṛṣṭivāda, because it advocates that perception of jīva is responsible for the creation of jagat or the world
Jivasya drṣṭireva viśvasrṣteh kāraṇam iti ayaṃ matevadah drṣṭisrṣṭivādaḥ iti ucyate. The theorists of drṣṭisrṣṭi tried to justify their position from Śaṅkara’s own observations and compositions too. In this context a minor work entitled ‘daśasloki’ is often referred where Śaṅkara said ‘jagat tuccham etat samastam tadanyat’ (The world is similar to insignifact being or fiction). One may also trace the hidden seed of drṣṭisrṣṭivāda in Gauḍapāda’s thought when he says ‘There is neither dissolution nor creation, neither any bonded self, nor any practicing saint, neither a person striving for salvation nor an emancipated self. This is the essence of truth’. In his commentary Śaṅkara refers to the insignificant being to ‘hare’s horn’. He says that ‘a hare’s horn is neither created nor destroyed’. If this ‘hare’s horn’ example is categorised as ‘tuccha’ (insignificant) and if we remember Śaṅkara’s comments that ‘jagat tuccham’ in ‘Dasaśloki’, the inevitable conclusion would be that ‘the would is fictitious’ and the claim that ‘the world is indeterminable’, an appearance of Brahman stands rejected. Prakāśānanda thus claims that ‘the fictitious nature of the world is the intention of advita’, according to which everything except Brahman is ‘pure nothing’. He vehemently criticises the vivaraṇa’s theory of ‘existential gradation’ and concludes that there is no epistemological ground for maintaining the distinction, between ‘the perception itself and its object’. The world is a subjective creation, a case of ‘pure fiction’. He brings the charge of ‘dualism’ against vivartavādins. For, the appearance although it is false, is an appearance which is different from ‘pure consciousness’. That is why in vivartavāda, Prakāśānanda argues, we cannot maintain the pure character of advaitic (non-dualistic) metaphysics. Brahman being pure consciousness, pure Being, is unaffected and unrelated to any object. If pure consciousness would have appeared as world, however, false it is, pure consciousness cannot remain unaffected. So if Brahman alone is real we must admit that the world as well as the avidyā are ‘pure fictions’, that is ‘mere thought constructions’. For the theorists of ‘drṣṭisrṣṭi’ this is the highest spirit of the upaniṣadic teachings. Maṇḍana Miśra further considers the worldly objects as ‘linguistic fictions’. He holds that in our everyday life, we use many objects in our pattern of behaviour that have no other character than ‘linguistic fictitiousness’ - such as ‘positive and negative injunctions, the ‘sentential meaning’ the ‘hare’s horn’ and the world too is to be treated likewise. Madhusudana Sarasvatī who devotes two sections of his ‘Advaitasiddha’ to the doctrine of ‘drṣṭisrṣṭi’ also claims it to be the highest principle of advaita (non-dualism). But unlike Prakāśānanda, he tries to
reconcile the divergent views of the advaita. In ‘Siddhāntabindu’ he interprets the term ‘tuccha’ as ‘anirvacaniya’. But Prakāśānanda, the extreme subjectivist is not ready to compromise to any view, according to which the world enjoys some kind of reality. He denies any kind of appearance, however false it may be. Thus the contention of the theorists of ‘vivarta’ that though the world does not exist from pāramārthika (absolute) standpoint, it has seeming (functional) existence, is denied. The very idea of ‘seemingness’, he argues, affects the principle of ‘non-dualism’ (advaita), the ‘seeming’ being different from the absolute. For him, neither the Brahman nor avidyā, nor even Brahman conditioned by avidyā can explain the ‘seemingness’ of the world. Both avidyā and the world are fictions’, ‘absolutely zero’. But his position should not be confused with ‘nihilism’ according to which there is no reality, because he accepts the reality of Brahman.

A Consideration of Social Milieu and Concluding Remarks:

From what has been explicated above, it appears that the philosophic literature of advaita Vedānta contains at least two opposing theories regarding the world. Now let us have a close look at the historical situation in which Śaṅkara flourished, because that may enable us to see why Śaṅkara and his immediate followers would consider the world as ‘anirvacaniya’ instead of assigning fictitious status to it. This type of consideration, to take the account of prevailing historical situation in society is important for an appraisal of any philosophical views. Because it is indeed true that the thoughts and feelings that were common to the community or masses in vague and diffused forms are being crystallised and concentrated in the philosophical writing of the age. Philosophers are, to quote from Russell, ‘“both effects and causes: effects of their social circumstances and of the politics and institutions of their time; cause (if they are fortunate) of beliefs which mould the politics and institutions of later days.”’20 Śaṅkara is surely one of such fortunate philosophers who tactfully interpreting the upaniṣadic concepts, gradually replaced the blind forces by conscious and rational foundations and offered the prevailing ethical practices a new direction. But we should not forget that he is also an effect of a particular socio-cultural circumstances. Some of his comments may apparently leave impression for the scope of subjectivist interpretation. But a close examination
of major writings with ‘intended technical meaning’ from the consideration of the then socio-cultural context opposes such an assumption (‘subjectivist account). It is true that in his commentary on ‘Māndukya kārikā’, Śaṅkara has made his voice in support of ajātavāda but here he does not mean that ‘the world appearance’ is unreal, but the ultimate Reality is uncaused and unmodifiable. The word ‘ajāta’ is intended to mean that the world is ‘not really born nor originated - that it is an insubstantial appearance deriving its validity from the substance (vastu), the ground on which it appears. It is not an active creation or manifestation by the Absolute infinite Reality or Brahman which is changeless. We may exemplify the ‘universe-appearance’ like this: when we say ‘light shines, it is not to say that light is doing any activity, but it is its very nature to shine. And the shining appears to us in the dualistic state’\(^{21}\).

A little dip into the historical situation of ancient India, where different philosophical ideals had arisen in different phases of time in order to cope with the raving for the demand of the age would tell us that in social and spiritual life, there was a revolutionary change due to the advent of Buddhism in its first appearance. At the time of Asoka, it was spread rapidly almost all over India and many other countries as well. But soon after this, deteriorated and degrading practices grew up in Buddhism. Śaṅkara, historically speaking, was born and lived in an era when the Buddhist ‘monasteries became rich centres of vested interests and their discipline became lax; magic and superstition crept into the popular forms of worship’\(^ {22}\). The influence of Buddhism upon Śaṅkara is not ignorable at all. He travelled throughout India and established four monasteries in the North, South, East, and West in order to bring harmony among the diverse thought currents that were prevalent in the then Indian Society. His conception of ‘Matha’ was an adoption of ‘sangha’ of the Buddhist culture. He felt it necessary to formulate a philosophy which is a direct interpretation of upaniṣadic texts as well as different from Buddhism. In view of the above, a person like Śaṅkara who did so much for establishing a new order of life in society cannot extend support to the view that ‘the world is fictitious or mere ‘imaginary creation’. In fact in his commentary on ‘Brahma-sūtra’ he severely criticises the vijnānāvādin’s view that ‘there is no external object but the knowledge itself’. Again, he dismisses the ‘sūnyavāda’ of Nāgārjuna by saying that a philosophical doctrine which depicts the empirical world as a transitory show of non-substantial appearance (sūnya) is not even worthy of criticism. In explaining the Sūtra
‘vaidharmyācca na svapnādivat’, he endorses the view that the mundane level of reality cannot be linked to a dream.24 The apprehension of the external world in every act of perception cannot be denied. Here he is on the same platform with the realists and the pragmatists in admitting the existence of an external world outside and independent of the subject mind and judges the validity of knowledge by practical results. The world then, according to Śaṅkara, is ‘pervaded by truth and it has truth as its substratum, as such every experience has an element of truth in it and is valid in its own sphere. However, we have the right to transcend a particular experience on a different plane in the light of higher and more general experience, but not to reject a valid experience in its own sphere’.25

Again, in the ‘Viveka-ccdāman!’ Śaṅkara highly speaks about the gloriness of being human.26 He was quite aware of the good qualities of head and heart of human being that were necessary for a balanced life in society. He did not disregard the distinction between right and wrong in mundane level, rather he offers a more solid rational foundations of ethical ideals. Against the ‘svatantra vijñānavāda’s (of Dīnāga, the author of Ālambanapurāṇa) position of ‘sahopalambhanyāma’ - to be perceived by the mind is to be a portion of the mind’, Śaṅkara developed several arguments.27 In his commentary on ‘Brahmasūtra’ (II. 2; 28) he argues for the difference of ideas and the objects in cognition (tasmād artha-jñānayor bhedaḥ). The object of knowledge is not knowledge created. Further when Diśnāga says that ‘internal consciousness itself appears as if it is something external’, Śaṅkara refutes it by saying that ‘if there is no external world’, how can he say that consciousness appears as if it is something external?28

If we consider all these, it would be evident that Śaṅkara was very eager to establish his system of philosophy in such a way so that it could make a line of distinction from the Buddhist subjectivism. The conception of one eternal Brahman was not enough to mark this borderline. The urgency was felt more perhaps for another reason that Vasubandhu (420-500 AD), the author of ‘Vijñāpati-Mātratā-siddhi’ advocated a type of idealism which was very near to the monism of the Upaniṣads.27 Śaṅkara and his immediate followers might feel it necessary to make some departure from such subjectivistc approach in philosophy without sacrificing the cream of the upanisadic teachings of the oneness of reality and this might have tempted Śaṅkara and his immediate
followers to preach a philosophy which gives some indeterminable status to the world. Even Śaṅkarā's assignment of the word 'tuccha' (insignificant) to the world in 'Daśaśloki' may be interpreted in the following way: That when a sādhaka has realised the Reality, that is to say, his essential identity with the Absolute, he would not attach any significance to the worldly objects. In other words, the very method of neti neti - not this, not this, in the gradual process of spiritual development, all the means of knowledge say, perception, inference, even the scriptural testimony) different types of worldly injunctions become insignificant because these are said to be ladder which can be thrown away after the goal is reached. This by no means, implies that they are mere 'thought constructions or fictitious. This whole bulk of consideration leads us to the conclusion that Śaṅkarā's own writings and their interpretations in the light of the then socio-cultural milieu, may serve as a strong ground in defense of the view of vivarāṇa school that the exact nature of the world in terms of sat (Being) or asat (Non-being), the popular categories of human reason accepted in Indian philosophy, is 'indeterminable' (anirvacnīya). Among the three ultimate categories - Being, Non-being and Falsity, of Advaita vedānta tradition, the world belongs to the category of falsity (mithyātvā). Here the term 'falsity' stands for 'indeterminateness'. The term 'indeterminable' (anirvacnīya) stands for the incapability of 'two-category-based' (sat and asat) human reasoning to describe the exact nature of the world. Without disturbing the monism of aupaniṣadic metaphysics, the vivartavādins assigning the indeterminate category to the world have managed to maintain their distinction from the extreme subjectivists like Viśiṣṭādvaitins.

NOTES

1. Tasmādānastīśāntaṁ vidam upaniṣadām darśanām - Bhāma-Sūtra Śaṅkarabhaṭya 2.1.37.

2. See: Chatterjee and Datta: An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, University of Calcutta, 1968 p. 375

3. It may be noted here that the advaitins have not made any distinction between 'what is logically impossible (i.e., son of a barren woman) and what is factually not true (i.e., hare’s horn).

5. The author of ‘Sarvadarśanasatgraha’ tells us that empirical reality is a product of māyā and the illusory snake is a product of avidyā - see; Anandarama edition, Poona, 1928, p. 163.


8. ‘Vivartavādasya hi pūrvabhūmir vedāntavāde parināmavadah. This is to say vivartavada and parinanavāda are not absolutely opposed to each other. This is the view of Sarvajñātām Muni.

9. Śāṅkarabhāṣya II. 2.29 thus reads: ‘Na Śakyate vaktum mithya jāgarito-paladhir upaladhitvāt svapnopalabdhivat ityubhayor antarm svayam anubhata’.

According to Śāṅkara, the dream state and the waking state cannot be placed on at par. There status are entirely different .... Dreams are private; working life is public. .... Śāṅkara’s point is to reject subjective idealism and to emphasize the phenomenal reality of the external world’ - see C. D. Sharma: *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1987, p. 268.

10. Madhusudan Sarasvati says that ‘absolute non-existent is that which is denied for all time - past, present and future in such a way that it will never be appreciated as something identifiable with an existent in any substratum whatsoever (Sarvatra traikalika niṣedha pratiyogitvam yadyapi tucchanir vacayayoh sādhāraṇam tathāpi kvacidapi upādāhau sattvena pratyunarhatvam atyantāsattvam) - Advaitasiddhi, Nirmaya Sagar Press, Bombay 1937, pp. 138-139.

11. However, according to Madhusudana, the indeterminable is that which is always negatable for all time - past, present and future, though it can be appreciated as something identifiable with an existent in some substratum at some time - *Ibid* pp. 50-1.

18. See: *Gaudapādākārikā* with *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* - 2.61-32. (Na nirodho na cotpattirna baddho na ca sādhakaḥ Na mumukṣurna vai muktā ityesā paramarthaḥ.
19. Ibid.
23. ‘Śūnyavādipasastu sarvapramāṇa vipatisiddha iti tannirākaranāya nādaraḥ kriyate/Na hi ayam sarvapramāṇa pratisiddho lokasya vyavahāro nyat tattvamanadhitāmya śakyate pahanotum, apavādabhāve utsargapratisiddheḥ’. - *Śārīrakabhāṣya* on Brahmasūtra 2.2.31.
24. Ibid, 2.2.29.
28. ‘Yadantarjñeya rūpam tad bahirvad avabhāsa’ - the first half of the 6th verse of Diṅṅāga’s *Ālambana Parikṣa*. This has been quoted by Śaṅkara before refuting vijñānāvāda in his commentary on ‘Brahma-Sūtra’. For details see. C. D. Sharma: *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy* (1987) p. 267.

Curiously enough, Nāgārjuna also says that Reality is beyond the scope of our knowability that functions through the categories of sat, asat, sadāst, neither sat nor asat. It is in other words, ‘catukṣottivinirmukta’. The world (ṣaṁsāra) is called ‘ṣūnya’ devoid of self-essence, because it is conditionally originated. The Absolute is also called ‘ṣūnya’ in the sense that our empirical concepts are not applicable there. The two-tier conception of satya - (ṣaṁvṛti and asaṁvṛti/pāramārthika) has been developed in the advaita vedānta as ‘four-tier’ being - tuccha (insignificant) prātibhāsika (apparent), Vyavahārika (pragmatic) and pāramārthika (transcendental). The difference between the two schools lies mainly on emphasis only, while Nāgārjuna emphasises on the empirical unreality of all phenomena - Śaṅkara emphasises on the empirical reality of the phenomena. Nāgārjuna emphasises on the correct ‘attitude of our knowing’, Śaṅkara emphasises on the ‘thing known’. Thus the difference is only epistemic.
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