BOOK REVIEWS

I

Nyāya Philosophy Of Language : Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of *Upamāna* and *Śabda* sections of *Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī* by John Vattanky, S. J., Sri Satguru Publications, A division of Indian Books Centre, Delhi, 1995, pp xiv + 558, Price Rs. 600.

In recent years there have been some attempts to study systemtacally the philosophical speculation of classical Indian Philosophers on language. Such works as Gavarinatha Sastri's *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning,* Vishnupada Bhattachariya's *A Study in Language and Meaning : Some Aspects of Indian Semantics,* Kunjunni Raja's *Indian Theories of Meaning,* Subramanya Iyer's *Bhartṛhari* and more recently Matilal's *The Word and the World,* are outstanding works in this field. All the same a need for a comprehensive presentation of various aspects of actual philosophy of language from original sources has been long felt.

The work under review meets just this need. John Vattanky's *Nyāya Philosophy of Language contains analysis,* text, translation and interpretation of the *Upamāna* and *Śabda* sections of *Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī and Dinakarī.* There have been some attempts to translate the *Muktāvalī,* but this is the first time that *Dinakarī* is translated into any modern language Indian or Western. Although this is the first volume to appear, the author states that it is actually the fifth volume in a comprehensive project of translating the whole of *Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī and Dinakarī* and interpreting them with the help especially of *Rāmarudrī* and *Subodhini.* Dr. Vattanky's work is indeed a great step forward in *Nyāya* researches. The reason is that in the study of the *Navyanyāya, Kārikāvalī* with its commentary *Siddhantamuktāvalī* both by Visvanātha, *Pancānana* with the commentaries *Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī* by Dinakara and Ramarudra respectively have been of decisive importance for the last few centuries as advanced introductions to the subject matter. In fact, their importance is only next to that of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and its various commentaries. That is why, in the traditional way of studying *Navyanyāya,* a mastery of *Kārikāvalī, Muktāvali, Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī* is considered highly desirable. This practice has been followed through out India in the last few centuries. It

shows therefore, the intrinsic worth of these works and so it conveys also the acute need of a systematic translation and interpretation of these works.

The translation under review is indeed quite faithful to the original Sanskrit text, without at the same time doing violence to the structure of English language. Yet as the author himself points out there is the problem of not yet standaridised translations of technical terms. In this respect too, the author has made commendable contributions.

However, the present work is much more than a translation. There is a detailed and systematic commentary on each significant expression of *Muktāvalī* and *Dinakarī* taking into account all the important points and subtleties to be found in *Rāmarudrī*. Ample use has been made of *Subodhini* a brilliant commentary on *Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī, Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī* by the great royal sage Parikṣit Thampuran of Cochin. In fact any one who carefully and systematically studies this translation and commentary will be in a position to appreciate the precision and depth which the *Naiyāyikas* show when they deal with the various problems of Philosophy.

The following are the main topics dealt with in this volume : The nature of Comparison, Nature of Verbal Knowledge, Means of Knowing Denotative Function : Grammar, Other Means of Knowing Denotative function,, Denotative Function is in the Individual Qualified by Form and Universal Division of words Implication (*lakṣaṇa*), Compounds, Causes of Verbal knowledge : Contiguity (*āsatti*), Semantic Competency (*yogyatā*), Syntactic Expectancy (*ākānkṣā*), Intention of the Speaker (*tātparya*), and as appendix Comparison and Verbal Testimony as Separate Means of Valid Knowledge. Even this bare enumeration of the topics discussed shows that the work is quite comprehensive.

However, a note of caution to the reader is in order : The present work is not an easy one. This is chiefly due to the difficulties inherent in the subject matter itself. It is well known that *Navyanyāya* revels in a high degree of abstraction and a rigorously exact terminology. There is also the problem arising from the difficulties in translating technical terms. If one wants to study *Navyanyāya* in depth, one has necessarily to get oneself familiar with these aspects of the subjects, much in the same way as when one sets out to study mathematics one has to become acquainted with mathematical terms and concepts.

However, it is neither impossible to master the contents of this book nor *Navyanyāya* itself. One has to set about it step by step systematically. As the author himself points out a good starting point for this purpose would be to study thoroughly *Tarkasaṃgraha* by Annambhaṭṭa with his own commentary, *Dīpikā,* rather than any other work in any modern language about *Navyanyāya.* A mastery of a good deal of elementary knowledge that is contained in these texts is presupposed while embarking on the study of the present book.

The method recommended by the author in studying the book is valuable: At the first reading one should get a general idea of the topics discussed. For this purpose the best is to start with the portions dealing with *Muktāvalī.* The discussions in *Dinakarī* and *Rāmarudrī* are much more advanced. One should study these discussions again and again and follow the arguments carefully till one fully grasp them. For this purpose, continuous study of the original texts in Sanskrit or their translation with the help of the commentary is indispensable.

A few points which would have added to the usefullness of the book may also be mentioned here : Dealing with the discussions of the opponents both within the Nyāya school and outside the Nyāya school the author restricts himself to the arguments as presented by Dinakara and Ramarudra. It would have been helpful if he discussed them in the light also of the more basic texts of the *Nyāya* and other traditions. Secondly comparisons with Western philosophy of language would have been enlightning.

A further aspect of Nyāya Philosophy of Language, namely the actual process of verbal knowledge of different sentences could have been developed, though it may be pointed out that this is not discussed in detail in *Dinakarī* or *Rāmarudrī.* A final point is the price of the book : It is too high for Indian scholars; it is hoped that a cheaper edition for the average Indian reader will be brought out soon.

Yet for all these, any one who carefully and consciously studies this book will acquire a first hand knowledge of all the salient features of Indian Philosophy of Language in general and *Nyāya* Philosophy of Language in particular. I have no doubt that this pioneering work is indeed a landmark in *Nyāya* Studies and will be received enthusiastically by the learned public.

Baliram Shukla

II

Halbfass, Wilhelm (Ed.) *Philosophy and Confrontation : Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedānta,* Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995, pp. viii + 369.

"PHILOLOGY PROBLEMATIZES -ITSELF,
ITS PRACTITIONER, THE PRESENT"

- Edward Said (*Orientalism*)

'Philology and Confrontation' is a collection of essays of Paul Hacker. They are primarily concerned with "Traditional and Modern Vedānta". It is edited by Prof. Wilhelm Halbfass and has a foreword by Lambert Schmitheusen.

The book is divided into three sections, the first one dealing with "Philological Explorations" in Śankara and the Tradition of Advaita Vedānta and consists of five essays as do the other two sections. The second section is entitled "Non-Dualism and its Implications : Understanding and Confrontation". The third section consists of Reinterpretations of "Neo-Hinduism and Modern Vedānta". Prof. Halbfass has written an introduction which provides a bio-graphical and conceptual background for reading Hacker's essays. As Prof. Halbfass told this reviewer the volume under review was inspired by J. L. Mehta's translation of some essays by Hacker for reading in the class.

Perhaps it is from within philosophy that we are permitted a privileged perspective which would enable us to think that the philological turn in the history of ideas which, though arising from Lorenzo Valla in the Renaissance, is fundamentally inspired by Nietzsche and Saussure, Nietzsche, for whose philosophy the "past" becomes the loci of an intense but scattered discourse, could possibly be an instance from which one can read into the philological and, perhaps more specifically, the "Indological" project of the nineteenth century, Philology, Nietzsche believed, succeeds if its practice is able to establish a profound relation with modernity. The knowledge which philology produces as knowledge of the ancient world is exhaustible : what the concern of the discipline

should be for Nietzsche is to ''reach the roots of the matter''. Paul Hacker in *Philology and Confrontation* is presented to us as a philologist, indologist and a theological thinker with comparative interests. Comparisons and the comparitive method dominate to a certain extent most of the essays in this book.

The thematic setting of Paul Hacker's work is Śankara's Advaita Vedānta and what he chose to call Neo-Hinduism. Hacker remains a controversial figure in the history of German Indology from Schlegel to the present day. From his thesis on ''*Studies in the Realism of Turgenev*'', submitted to the Univerisity of Berlin, to his short stay at Darbhanga (Assam, India) and his conversion to Catholicism in 1962, he remained a figure who haunted the erudite domains of European Indology. Hacker characterised his work as a ''field of rubble of unfinished projects'' and he expressed in his writing the hope that someone may put these ''projects'' to ''positive'' use or reveal their blind spots through critique. Prof. Halbfass organises this ''rubble'' and presents it to us, but Hacker's writings hardly appear to lack a finished sense inspite of the metaphor he used. Schlegel and Hacker, the names can be uttered in one breath not merely for the reason that both are milestones in the chequered and relentlessly debated history of European Indology, but also because Hacker held the very same Chair at the University of Bonn which was first held by A. W. Schlegel. Schlegel's career also parallels Hacker's insofar as the influence of a conversion to Catholicism inspires and influences their research (Schlegel converted to Catholicism in 1808). For Schlegel it was the twilight of his work as an indologist but for Hacker it meant dawn by way of the influence of Aquinas which offered him grounds for comparative incisions. Hacker's post-conversion theological horizon enabled him to reframe and rethink his positions on classical Advaita and the relations between Christian ideas and the reformist ideologies in nineteenth and early twentieth century India.

One senses, while reading Hacker, that perhaps he is uncomfortable with the ''western'' practice of ''detached'' scientific investigation. On the other hand he valorizes the ''prayojana''; the concept of purposiveness which can be found in Indian modes of enquiry.

The first section of essays is an explicitly philological exercise which explores the foundations of Advaita. The first essay is occassioned by a polemic with J. Gonda, over the dating of Śankara and the authenticity of the writings

attributed to him. Hacker attempts to disclose the textual historical origin of the traditions which understand Śankra as an incarnation of Śiva and as hero of Hindu cultural politics whose "digvijaya" contributes to establishing a Hindu unity of consciousness. It is Madhvacharya's cultural politics which is at work in this context with the back drop of Muslim dominated Vijayanagara. Hacker documents the Vaiṣṇavite origin of Śaṅkara and offers as argument among others Maṇḍanamisra's notion of "*paramśivabhāva*". Thus this great opponent of Vedānta's phraseology indicates his Śaivism and suggests the difficulty in accpeting radical differences between Śaivite schools. Śaṅkara's references, Hacker claims, are more specifically to the archaic Ruḍra than to Śiva. This misrepresentation of backgrounds originates from Vidyāranya's 14th century text "Śaṅkaradigivijaya". The belief that Śaṅkara founded Cloisters (mathās) of Advaitists is also contested by Hacker and is attributed to Madhva's cultural-political imagination. Hacker argues on the basis of Vaiṣṇava symbolism in the works of Śaṅkara that Advaita flourished in Vaiṣṇavite circles. His philological expertise is subsequently applied to the problem of authorship of Śaṅkara's work where he contravenes many traditional claims. Stylistic devices which fashion the authorship of texts for example "Pujyapāda" etc. are analyzed by him. The first specifically philological section closes on a note which fuses Śaṅkara scholarship with a historiography of the Advaita schools. Hacker's problematic revolves around "determination of the authenticity problem, reassessment of the doctrines peculiar to Śaṅkara and investigation of the development of his thought".

Section II is perhaps the philosophically more relevant section. The theory of degrees of reality in Advaita is explored by examining the Advaita ordering of the concepts of unreality. Here Hacker compares and contrasts the work of Gauḍapāda and Vimuktātman to articulate his own position on the typology of being in Advaita. Perhaps the essay on Śaṅkara's Anthoropology would be instructive for those who would collate Advaita and the political reality of India in a programmatic or even historical spirit. Hacker believes that in Śaṅkara's monism we cannot posit a discourse of anthropology as his illusionism overshadows his specific "anthropological" consideration. Self is one and the "interpenetration" (Hacker's term) of self with the psyche, the body and the multiplicity of selves are unreal in the last analysis. The spiritual self is *Svārtha, Svataḥsiddha* and *Svayamjyotīstva*. This self is distinct from the self of cognition

and cannot be an object of cognition. Its correlation to the cognitive self is the basis for the principle of existential unity by the construction of the Ego. Hacker expounds Śaṅkara's position as being within dogmatic illusionism but presenting an unparalyzed attention to reality. The key concept of this interpenetration is Śaṅkara's use of the verb ''eki-kṛ'' which opens the narrative of subjectivity as unity. In ''Being and Spirit in Vedānta'' Hacker compares what he believs are ''the highest accomplishments'' of metaphysics i.e. Aquinas' concept of being and ''cit'' in Vedānta which he renders in German as ''Geist'' has been translated into English as Spirit. The philosophical adventure of the word ''Geist'' can be persued from Goethe to Heidegger and to Jacques Derrida : but it is interesting to observe the word ''cit'' which is understood as ''thought'' perception, intelligence, understanding, animating principle of life as well as ''spirit'' to be given the specificity of ''spirit''. The next comparitive exercise is between Vedānta and Proclus' ''Stoicheiosis theologike''. Here the concept of ''cit'' is further elaborated in the context of the Neo-Platonist 'Nous'. As 'Nous' paves the way for Christian cosmology, Pure Spirit creates the possibility of that unity which is man. Hacker is sensitive to the immense structural and notional differences in these two discourses of Oneness.

The portions of the book (III Section of Essays) which explore colonial history and the formulations of Neo-Hinduism as well as Hacker's characterization of Hindu ''inclusivism'' is, to say the least, thought-provoking. Hacker undertakes to reframe an important part of Indian cultural and social history by showing the heterogenous faces of the Indian Renaissance. The figures which dominate the established ideologies of interpreting history (from the 19th century) are presented in an oblique light. Hacker's 13 theses (pp. 251-52) on Neo-Hinduism present the problem of interpretation of Vedānta in colonial India in a candid manner. He traces the Christian and nationalist inspiration of Neo-Hinduism by documenting extensive conceptual borrowings. The conflict between traditional and its Neo-Hindu progeny in the figures of Gandhi, Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan are problematized. Hacker highlights the gap in the concept of ''dharma'' in Hindu scripture and Gandhi's and Vinoba's reinterpretations. The Politics of the Ramakrishna mission and the development of its ethical positions are mapped by understanding Vivekananda's ''religious nationalism''. Radhakrishnan's despair over Indian realities is seen projected into his philosophical writings which for Hacker lack a ''scholarly distance''.

Hacker is specially relevant for contemporary debates which try to come to terms with complex and overdetermined realities of religious ideologies and their political implications in India. His work definitely adds insights to our views on "tolerance" or the "equality of all religions" as presented in Neo-Hinduism. Though Hacker's work on Luther suggests an attitude toward critical reflection which is tinged with Catholicism, his thought which can be charcterized as "the Christian and Indian way of thought" (as he himself calls it) remains forcefully relevant.

Prof. Halbfass' work as Editor of this volume is commendable for recognizing its timeliness and relevance to present-day thought not only in Indology but in other social sciences as well. His introduction to this volume is entitled "An Uncommon Orientalist : Paul Hacker's Passage to India", where he stresses Hacker's position that Hinduism is a collective level ascribed by Western scholars to the diversity and multiplicity of "one geographical and historical region".

Halbfass defends Hacker's approach to India inspite of the "intellectual and rhetorical fire works" of Said, and others. Hacker, not choosing to 'represent' Neo-Hinduism, chooses confrontation over interpretation in the fields of comparative religion and theology. But Hacker's sensitivity to the 'otherness' of non-European traditions can never be underestimated.

R. S. Dalvi

III

Nayak G.C., *Philosophical Enterprise And The Scientific Spirit*, Delhi-110 007, Ajanta Books International, 1994, pp. xii + 160, price Rs. 195/-

This book comprises fifteen Philosophical essays written by Prof. G. C. Nayak on different occasions and published for the first time in collected form. The themes covered are varied and thus evince the multi-faceted erudition and scholarship of the author. The book takes its title from the heading of the very first essay presumably because the author considers that essay to be of seminal importance for all those who want to indulge in the enterprise of philosophic inquiry. He very rightly claims that the philosophical enterprise is "not opposed to and is rather one with the scientific spirit or temper which is displayed in its over-all anti-dogmatic stance" and that "it does not and need not confine itself strictly to the models adoted by Science as it is practised by the scinentists either inside or outside their laboratories ". (p.ix) Thus it is a never-ending scrutiny giving rise to more and more of critical reflections. In this respect, the author brackets philosophy with science, characterising both of them as intellectual warfares against the tyrrany of 'idolas' in the Baconian sense. In the Essay proper, he claims that while justification for science usually flows from its workability and utility, philosophy cannot be justified by reference to that criterion. The value and contribution of philosophy "is not easily discernible to a superficial observer". (p.3) Making, rather cryptically, a distinction between internal justification and external justification and taking 'utility' in its two senses, narrower and broader , it is claimed that philosophical pursuits could be said to be useful only in a broad sense. Rationality and criticisability cannot mark the dividing line between the two. The first section of the Essay naturally leads to the all-important question : How is philosophy to be justified after all? In the remaining sections, the author attempts his own plea for doing philosophy. But not without grinding his own philosophical axe! He does not approve of essentialism in philosophy because essentialistic approach, according to him, results into an 'inveterate metaphysical bias' 'which has plagued the major

philosophical systems in the history of human thought, and proposes in its place his own notion of philosophy, philosophy of commonism or what he calls as 'commonistic philosophy' which is basically non-essentialistic according to him. He discusses at length the commonistic view-point of Medhā Ṛṣī in the context of knowledge and further presents and anti-essentialistic Buddhistic theory in its *Mādhyamika* form as propounded by Nāgārjuna and Chandrakīrti. The entire discussion is illuminating, scholarly and thought-provoking. Nevertheless, one cannot embrace the non-essentialistic posture without meeting the challenges which such a posture flings at us. The non-essentialistic position of Buddhism has not gone unchallenged in the history of human thought. If philosophical enterprise is to allign itself with our day-to-day transactions of life and with the pursuits in science, it may be necessary to get rid of 'essentialistic illusion' but it would be too simplsistic to suppose that there are no illusions with non-essentialistic perspectives. May be, our philosophical enterprises, whether essentialistic or non-essentialistic, are all illusory. Dr. Nayak however does believe that there is a strong case for non-essentialistic perspective.

The second essay viz., 'Computational Model, Pāṇinian Structure and some Problems of Language', is a very short essay. Though short, it reveals Nayak's depth of linguistic and grammatical studies of Sanskrit as a language. The essay is full of insights into the nature of syntax and sematics of a language and their inter-relationships. While the essay ends with the hope that "the combination of Sanskrit and computer, provided it is worked out in the right direction and in an appropriate manner, is expected to be of a special value and interest" (p.32), it very rightly cautions us not to be emotional about the whole issue, which should be judged only with scientific temper and decided on the basis of structural and syntactical compactness needed for developing artificial intelligence.

Third essay, "Why should I be Rational "? sounds more like Bradley's question in the field of Ethics : Why should I be moral? Question raised by Nayak is certainly fundamental. It is debatable whether philosophers alone are faced with this question. It's a philosophical question concerning the entire intellectual enterprise of mankind, no matter to which field it refers. In a sense it is a moral question of a choice of reason and not of faith, of knowledge and not of ignorance or error, of wisdom and not of dogma. Referring to the age-old controversy between faith and reason and drawing upon some celebrated writers

in this context. Nayak has thrown a flood of light on the nature of knowledge. I think, he is successful in showing that knowledge is intimately connected with reason. Any belief, if it is supported by rational grounds, can be elevated to the status of knowledge but this presupposes that there are standards of rationality which are uniform and universal. Nayak however questions this presupposition. ''The framework changes, the perspective shifts, there is radical transforamtion in the whole outlook and the standards of rationality no longer remain the same, rational grounds for holding steadfastly to a belief for centuries after centuries are subjected to criticism by fresh standards and may come to be seen as irrational after all. And this seems to be the real crux of the problem regarding rationality''. This is followed by a very illuminating discussion of 'objectivity' and 'truth' which endorses again the slippery character of rationality. And yet, arguing with great pains the intimate association of rationality with the concept of truth - and nothing but objective truth. Nayak explains how ''constant vigilence, diligent inquiry and persistent investigation are the inescapable and the inevitable price to be paid for the sake of knowledge, for getting the truth which is not self-evident ''. In the remaining part of the Essay, the author stresses the most important point that ''far from being superior to rationality, the irrational cannot be on a par with rationality''. Irrationality is antagonistic to the intrinsic goal of human beings, viz., the goal of knowledge. It is rationality that lends us the promise to lead us to this cherished goal. It is obvious that if knowledge is respected by all of us as something intrinsically worthwhile, one does not see how one can escape the *prima-facie* obligation to be rational rather than be irrational.

In ''Religion, Secularism and Scientific Temper'', an essay which is crucial in the present context of Indian society. Nayak firstly clarifies the notion of religion and then places it in contrast to secularism, the hallmark of which is scientific temper. The two need not be, in his opinion antagonistic to each other. To be secular, one does not have to be an atheist and materialist. Imbued as it is with scientific temper secularism need not have any concern whatever with the spiritual and religious matters which every religion necessarily implies. Nayak holds discussion on this point to support the view that a secular man may study different forms of religion with a scientific temper, developing a detached outlook for different forms of religion. But Nayak does this only in order to make us see further problem involved from the point of view of rationality of

which a secularist makes so much. Nayak discards Nehru's conception of secularism which means equal respect for all religious faiths and also Radhakrishnan's notion of universality of spiritual values that may be attained in different ways. They would involve too many philosophical difficulties and reduce secularism to an article of faith. In the latter half of his essay, . Nayak speaks of a form of secularism designated as 'Transcendental secularism', which according to him, is both trans-religious and trans-secular. The conceptions of niṣtraiguṇya, sthitaprajña, guṇātita and jīvanmukta come very close to illustrate this kind of secularism. A limited dimension of scientific temper is also attached to it. The essay ends with a truly graphic picture of a man who is truly religious,not in the traditional sense, but in the sense that the life of such a man like the lives of Christ and Buddha is dedicated to the removal of human suffering from this world. One may suspect that Nayak is fondling with too abstract and perhaps also too impracticable form of secularism but then, are not all ideals advocated by philosophers like that?

''Social Justice and Dharma'' is an another crucial essay in which Prof. Nayak presents his reflections freely and frankly. If Dharma is supposed to hold the society as a whole, then the notion of Varnāsharm Dharma is not only inadequate but it is also positively unjust. Nayak is of the view that social justice as it was practised on the basis of Dharma in ancient India is not sacrosanct. *Dharma* as a social force does not seem to fare well with all the constituents of the society. There cannot be , according to Nayak, a universal and eternal Dharma. It may undergo change and be replaced by new and better dharma. Nayak writes very forcefully in this context that'' the myth of *Dharma* in the sense of something of a permanent value in all possible circumstances is doomed at the very outset in view of a changing system of values relevant to a certain context only''. (pp. 58-59). The notion of *sādhāraṇa dharmas* does not seem to do good either. It's not that Nayak does not recognise the role which these notions play in the society but his contention seems to be that they are inadequate to handle complicated situations where we are ''called upon to make choice and pass our judgement in accordance with the scheme of values chosen by us''. We are thus led to the notion of *Sādhu Dharma* - ''dharma that respects the dignity of others as much as it respects one's own'', a dharma which inherently implies the notion of being fair to everyone in the society. Nayak draws our attention to the difficulties involved in the conception of 'Perfect social justice'

and warns us that it's a myth. He thinks that ''social justice can be meaningful within a context beyond which it loses all its significance'' and that there is nothing like Social Justice immutably fixed once and for all. ''The notion of social justice must be an open one, subject to scrutiny from time to time in the light of the changing social needs. The essay ends with presentation of what Nayāk refers to as ' a working social justice', which conception is debatable but not unreasonable. His notion of *dynamic varna vyavastha* is however strewn with some difficulties which it may not be difficult to foresee.

All the above essays are then followed by at least four essays which may be grouped as essays on thinkers. A comparative study of Kautilya and Gandhi deals with the problem of the morality of ends and means in the political sphere and is at once thought- provoking and critical. It should however be noted that much philosophical water has flown under the bridges between the times of Kautilya and Gandhi. In-depth studies of both these thinkers will reveal only superficial similarities between the problems which they handled. Such a study has however a controversial character and uhe problems cannot be taken as settled once and for all. In 'Indian Culture and Nehru, The Rationalist', Nayak has been unduly harsh on Nehru and charges him with some kind of self-conceit for expressing his desire in his will to immerse his ashes in Ganges and also scatter them on vast fields of his motherland. As compared with several other leaders of our land, there is no doubt that Nehru was a rationalist in his approach to Indian culture but this should not be regarded as if he was rationalist out and out. Nehru was not a radical rationalist of spinozistic brand, nor a systematic philosopher as such. Rather his approach to life was a humanistic approach and it would not be fair to lay at his doors a charge for what he was not. His political career and patriotism apart, his life and lives of many others who champion scientific outlook raises a rather important question as regards the relationship between reason and emotion, a question that has teased philosophers from ancient times. Must a rationalist be always averse to having emotions? I think self-realisation consists in striking a middle path between the two. In ''Tagore's Philosophy of Religion'', Nayak gives us a very absorbing portrait of his religion as religion of poet moved by spiritualistic, humanistic and above all, aesthetic concerns in human life. He does not agree with Naravane when the latter characterises his humanism as 'aeshthetic humanism' for the simple reason that such a characterisation would tend to make us ignore other seminal and

significant aspects of his humanism. Nayak's contention is that it is important as it gives to Tagore an extolled ieda of God as the companion of the poor and the weak and this is important as it gives to Tagore's thought a commonistic touch. The Essay on Radhakrishnan viz., ''Radhakrishnan's Philosophical Insight: An Appraisal'' is addressed to seek answers to two important but interrelated questions : Was Radhakrishnan a mere interpreter of Indian thought? Was he a philosopher in his own right? Nayak says right at the beginning of his essay that he can establish in *his* own way that Radhakrisnan was not a mere interpreter of others' thoughts but was very much a philosopher in his own right. One would naturally expect that Nayak speaks of Radhakrishnan's handling of some philosophical problems and the novelty of his approach to them as compared and contrasted with the approaches to those problems by others whether Indians or non-Indians. Nayak does not do anything of the sort but profusely quotes from Radhakrishnan's *An Idealist View of Life*, to present his (Radhakrishnan's) views on Intuition and simply claims that it is an example of his unique as well as critical insight into the philosophical problems''(p.94). There isn't any argument for the claim he makes nor is there any analysis of what Radhakrishnan claims on behalf of intuition. The essay therefore seems to me to be too weak and unlike other essays in the book.

The book under review contains four essays which are testimony to the profound scholarship which Nayak can claim in the area of Advaita Vedānta. ''Max Mueller and Vedānta Philosophy '' is an essay towards defending Max Mueller's claim that in Indian Philosophy and particularly in Advaita Vedānta, there is signficant place for ethics and morals against the charge to the contrary made by some scholars in the West. Such a defence, it is obvious, cannot made by some scholars in the West. Such a defence, it is obvious, cannot be made merely by citing passages from the ancient philosophical literature but by undertaking careful cultural and sociological studies because ethics and morality are not simply concerned with the up-liftment of an individual. They have a social dimension. It's not really *my* happiness alone that matters; the happiness of the society in which I live is much more important and must have a crucial place in the pursuit of ends and goals in my life. What is the obligation on a free Jeevan Mukta person to do any good work for society? What if he does not do anything and remains indifferent? The realities of Indian life that have come down to us historically show what kind of moral sensibilities our ancient

societies had cultivated on the whole. Can we meaningfully talk of *the Indian Ethics* or *the Indian Moral Philosophy* in the sense in which we speak of Ethics in the West or Western Moral Philosophy? Nayak has raised an important issue but his treatment seems to me to suffer from certain limitations arising from his own covictions about Advaita Vedanta. In ''Śaṅkara and Linguistic Philosophy'', he is on right lines when he picks up issues with some modern overexuberant interpreters who have construed Śaṅkara as an advocate of only linguistic analysis as a means of illumination. Nayak points out that Śaṅkara is more concerened about the illumination of only Mahāvākyas that appear in Upnishads; that Avidyā or Adhyāsā, in Śaṅkara Vedānta, is not to be taken merely as a linguistic confusion and that ''distinctionless non-dual reality has an ontic status in Advaitā Vedāntā''. (p.lll) He clearly points out that *Vidya* in Śaṅkara is 'Vastusvarūpāvadhāraṇā' and not mere linguistic illumination. Since according to Śankarā, Avidyā is pervasive and deep-rooted, the analysis of language becomes no doubt necessary but it cannot be considered as sufficient for the realisation of Brahaman as contemplated in the Mahāvākyas and endorsed by Advaita Vedānta. In ''Śaṅkara's Formulation of Vedānta'', Nayak reinforces the same point and further concentrates on three different points raised by Klive such as (i) whether Śaṅkara is merely a commentator or a free thinker and philosopher (ii) what meaning if any do the Mahāvākyas have or are they meaningless and (iii) whether Māyā is an explanatory principle in Śaṅkara Vedānta. On the basis of available texts, I think that Nayak makes his points against Klive most succinctly with no dogmatic pretensions whatsoever. In order to make oneself better understood and to have better understanding of others'', there seems to be no way out other than discussion, and more of vigorous discussions''. These words of Nayak reflect scinetific spirit for which he has stood all through his presentations, in this as well as other books. In the last essay of this group viz., ''The Advaita Philosophy of Value - A Review'', Nayak offers some further clarifications of 'Transcendental Secularism', a rather queer label chosen by him to designate the Advaita philosophy of value. We have already referred to his earlier claims in this behalf. In his own words, ''There is transcendence in some form or the other involved here, transcendence of various 'isms', transcendence of duality and consequently of all injunctions and prohibitions of day-to-day moral and religious life, and even of secularism of the popular variety with which we are normally acquainted''. Nayak offers very stout defence of this conception in order to place it beyond the charges of

vagueness and obscurity. Whether he suceeds is debatable.

In the last but one essay - 'Does Life Have A Meanin g?'Nayak is placing before us a case for optimism in life rather than pessimism. Barring aside very few and rare souls like Christ and Buddha in ancient times and Gandhi in modern times, most of us are satisfied with contextual and piecemeal situations that provide meaning to our lives. This is alright so far as it goes. But, for Nayak, ''the question about the meaning of life is a challenge to bring out a universal design, if possible, which gives meaning to our short and apparently pointless sojourn on this tiny planet of ours''. (p. 145) He believes that ''if such a universal design is not available, no other meaning in limited sense can be a substitute in its place'', It is needless to say that Nayak has argued out his viewpoint very well though the clouds of skepticism and agnosticism will always hang over such ticklish philosophical matters. The last piece viz., ''Deep-Seated Delusions, Buddhism and Mahākaruṇā''- does not speak of delusions to which some are subject and others are not, but it speaks of all pervading basic delusion because of which each one gets an inflated sense of arrogance in respect of values pursued in one's own life and ignores the vital discrimination between what happens to him till one is alive and what becomes of him after his death. Can values then retain during man's life-time the attraction (which they are supposed to have) , in the face of real and utterly inevitable annihilation, a writing on the wall as it were? Can one face the predicament with equanimity and get rid of deep-seated delusion resulting from *Ahankāra*? Nayak finds answer to that crucial question in the Buddhistic ideal of *Bodhisattva*, driving force of whose life is *Mahakāruṇā*.

All these essays are interesting and together underline some of the salient features of Nayak's own philosophy of Commonism. His philosophical enterprise is infused with undogmatic scientific spirit and it covers up major philosophical issues of deep concern to all of us. One may not agree with everything that Nayak says and proposes. These essays have however capacity to provoke and stimulate new thoughts and new ideas. The success of the book would certainly lie in this and hence it is recommended for studious reading.

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