

## ON BEING EQUALLY FREE AND UNEQUALLY RESTRICTED

[ An Epistemic Analysis of Sartre's Ontology on Freedom and Restriction ]

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The intent of this paper is to capture the essence of Sartre's understanding of the relationship between freedom and restriction. Sartre's claim is that freedom and restriction are uniquely related--in that each can be defined only in the context of the other and that one without the other is an abstraction. What brings freedom and restriction to such close proximity in Sartre is his epistemic understanding that every choice involves both the projection of what is not and the negation of what is. Sartre's ontological analysis of freedom and restriction in the context of each other is the basis of this study.

To Sartre,<sup>1</sup> the being, which is what it is, cannot be free.<sup>2</sup> Only the being which is paradoxically defined as "being what it is not and not being what it is"<sup>3</sup> can be free. What the for-itself (human consciousness) lacks is ontological fixity--free from ontological fixity the for-itself is free to choose what is not and negate what is (of consciousness). While the for-itself without the in-itself (the inert world of things) is an abstraction,<sup>4</sup> the for-itself cannot be reduced to the in-itself-- if it were so--then it cannot be free. Only the being which, though not independent of the in--itself yet other than what it is, can be free. For human reality to be free it must necessarily be what it is not and not be what it is.<sup>5</sup>

To be free to Sartre is to be free from *being* what it is. To be other than *what it is* affords the for-itself to choose *what is not*<sup>6</sup> and negate *what is*.<sup>7</sup> The nature of consciousness, further to Sartre, is such that it is perpetually choosing,<sup>8</sup> as such, involved in perpetual negation.<sup>9</sup> The facticity of having to have to choose what is not purports the necessity of having to have to negate what is. And if having to have to choose what is not brings into focus the facticity of freedom, having to have negate what is brings into focus the question of being restricted and its link with the actuality of having chosen what is not.

What is consciousness? " ...consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself."<sup>10</sup> As such, the being of the for-itself is defined "...as being what it is not and not being what it is."<sup>11</sup> Consciousness is what it is not because it is not what it is, in that it cannot *be* what it is. "...my ontological structure is not to be what I am and to be what I am not."<sup>12</sup> That is why it is argued that consciousness is always other than what it is.<sup>13</sup>

In what way is the "is" of the in-itself different and distinct from the "is" of the for-itself. When we say the in-itself "is" --it is what it is, in that it cannot but be what it is--it is fixed. When we say that the for-itself "is"--it is what it is not, in that it cannot *be* what it is. The for-itself is what it is *not* what it is. Being free from *being* what it is, is to be free to choose what is not and negate what is. Yet the for-itself is--is what it is not and is not what is. This definition reveals that the "is" of the for-itself is unfixed/free unlike the "is" of the in-itself which is fixed and because the for-itself lacks ontological fixity,<sup>14</sup> it is free to choose what is not and change what is. Human reality cannot *be* anything, because it is not a *thing*. To *be* (if that is possible) in terms of the for-itself would have to be a synthetic totality of the two categories of beings--an in-itself-for-itself<sup>15</sup>--an ontological impossibility.<sup>16</sup> (Should that be a given it would be god.<sup>17</sup>)

The being of human reality is suffering because it rises in being as perpetually haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it, precisely because it could not attain the in- itself without losing itself as for-itself. Human reality therefore is by nature an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state.<sup>18</sup>

And this totality can not be given by nature, since it combines in itself the incompatible characteristics of the in-itself and the for-itself.<sup>19</sup>

The "...being of human reality, is originally not a substance but a lived relation."<sup>20</sup>

Man cannot *be* what one "is" nor what one "is not." "Man is neither the one nor the other of these beings, for strictly speaking we should never say of him that he *is* at all. He is what he is not and he is not what he is...."<sup>21</sup> "What the for- itself lacks is the self--or itself as in-itself."<sup>22</sup> In terms of "pure reflection,"<sup>23</sup> " ...the for-itself is perpetually determining itself *not to be* the in-itself."<sup>24</sup> But in terms of "accessory reflection,"<sup>25</sup> (the context in which

*Being and Nothingness* is written) man's fundamental project due to "bad faith" is characterized by "the desire to be."<sup>26</sup> But this is precisely what cannot be, so only in "bad faith" can one attempt "to make the in-itself exist,"<sup>27</sup> or project *being as for-itself*, a being which is what it is."<sup>28</sup> But "...the for-itself by nature is the being which cannot coincide with its being-in-itself."<sup>29</sup> And to Sartre, the only being "which can be called free is the being which nihilates its being."<sup>30</sup> Thus, if the being-in-itself cannot but be what it is, the being-for-itself cannot but be what it is not, and cannot but choose<sup>31</sup> what is not.

Sartre's discussion on consciousness, freedom, choice, negation, and restriction is done in the context of defining what it is to be Human. What does it mean to be Human can be best addressed in the context of two questions -- what does it mean to be free? and how and when is one restricted? These questions do not neutralise nor negate each other. In that, they deal with two distinctive and fundamental aspects of what it means to be Human. In defining what it means to be Human, Sartre argues that to be Human is to be both unrestricted/free and restricted.<sup>32</sup> To Sartre, man is unrestricted in a distinctive and definable way but also restricted in a definite and practical sense. What Sartre equates as being unrestricted/free in no way negates his definition of what it means to be restricted. Man is free in a given sense and restricted in another. If freedom is defined as the facticity of having to have to choose (and this is absolute) then there is no opposing reality to this fact. Being restricted or "limited" (in Sartrean terminology) is not the opposite of being free because man can never be restricted in terms of the facticity of having to have to choose. As such, being limited or restricted does not mean one is not free (to choose).

Having to choose is having to have to choose what is not. Having chosen what is not is having to have to negate what is and if having to have to choose what is not is what makes the for-itself free, having to have to negate what is makes the for-itself *restricted--restricted* until what is, is negated in the light of what is not. As such the question of being "enslaved," "restricted," or "imprisoned," are titles given to people-in- situations in the light of what is not of given choices. There are no *free* situations, there are only free beings. As such, only free beings can make a given situation "restricted" in the light of what is not. A restricted situation is a situation by choice to be negated. It is only in a given situation one discovers that man is both unrestricted and restricted in a definable way. One is free in that in any given situation one can always choose what is not. But what is of a given situation, in the light of what is

not<sup>33</sup> of given choice to given person makes what "is" intolerable and unbearable, as such, what "is" in the context of what "is not" makes the for-itself to be "restricted." Man is first free--as such can be limited by choice. This is why Sartre several times<sup>34</sup> emphasized the idea that "...if man is not originally free, but determined once and for all, we cannot even conceive what his liberation might be."<sup>35</sup>

This paper uses Sartre's investigation to determine what it means to be free and to define exactly what makes one restricted. To Sartre, the relationship between being free (to choose) and being restricted are two sides of the same coin. Only ontologically free Beings engaged in *praxis* can be restricted.<sup>36</sup> While Sartre constricted freedom to just "autonomy of choice" or the facility of having to choose,<sup>37</sup> he argued for the limitlessness of choice<sup>38</sup> that could be limited only by choice<sup>39</sup> or death. This phenomenological investigation is used to argue as to why man is free and men are *equally* free, and how man is restricted and men are *unequally* restricted?

### Being Equally Free (To Choose)

To be free/human,<sup>40</sup> to Sartre, is having to have to choose. Humans are creatures who choose.<sup>41</sup> "...we are a freedom which chooses."<sup>42</sup> As such we are condemned to make choices<sup>43</sup>--one is "not able not to choose."<sup>44</sup> The imperative nature of choice -- one must choose is such that one cannot be but choose--it is "necessary for me to choose."<sup>45</sup> But while one is indeed free to choose, one does not choose to be free.<sup>46</sup> The "... fact of not being able not to be free is the facticity of freedom."<sup>47</sup> To be conscious one has to choose and one has to choose in order to be conscious.<sup>48</sup> Freedom, Sartre argues, "... is the freedom of choosing and not a freedom of not choosing."<sup>49</sup> But while one is not free not to choose,<sup>50</sup> one is free to choose not to choose.<sup>51</sup> To choose not to choose is a choice--choice to choose not to choose, or in Sartre's word "Not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose."<sup>52</sup> Again, while one cannot choose to be free one freely chooses<sup>53</sup>. As such if one is to define ontological freedom as the capacity to choose, then man is free and always free to choose.

What does it mean to be free? to Sartre, is the same as asking what does it mean to be Human? "What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the being of "human reality." Man does not exist *first* in order to be free *subsequently*, there is no difference between the *being* of man and his *being-*

free."<sup>54</sup> If in the ontological realm one cannot but be Human then one cannot but make choices.<sup>55</sup> If one cannot be Human sometimes and not be Human at other times, then one cannot be free sometimes and not be free at other times.<sup>56</sup> If one cannot be *more* Human than Others, then one cannot be *more* free than Others.<sup>57</sup> If one cannot be *more* human in a given situation than in another, then one cannot be more free in one situation than in another.<sup>58</sup> "Man cannot be sometimes slave (not free) and sometimes free; he is wholly free and forever free or he is not free at all."<sup>59</sup> Man is free and always free to choose and men are always free and equally free to choose. If one is born--one is born free--free to choose and one must choose until death.

A man cannot be more of a man than others because freedom is similarly infinite in each ....It matters little how quickly or slowly we have understood, since understanding however it comes to us must be total in every one or not at all.<sup>60</sup>

After a careful ontological analysis Sartre concluded that man is free and free because "man is freedom".<sup>61</sup> According to Sartre's phenomenological investigation he argued for two categories of beings--one is the inert world of things--uncreated,"contingent"<sup>62</sup> material and therefore determined <sup>63</sup> and the other is Human consciousness-self-caused<sup>64</sup>, nothingness/immaterial and therefore free.<sup>65</sup> One is pure being the other pure intentionality. One is pure substance, the other refusal to be substance.<sup>66</sup> One is determined the other codemned to be free.<sup>67</sup> One is determined to *be* what it is, the other is determined to be other than what it is.<sup>68</sup> To Sartre, the nature of consciousness is self-causing and self-determining, as such he purported the idea of a theory of free consciousness which in turn is the basis for what defines man as being free.<sup>69</sup>

Man is free because he is not himself but presence to himself. The being which is what it is can not be free. Freedom is precisely nothingness which is *made-to-be* at the heart of man and which forces human reality to *make itself* instead of *to be*. As we have seen, for human reality, to be is to *choose oneself*; nothing comes to it either from the outside or from within which can *receive or accept*. Without any help whatsoever, it is entirely abandoned to the intolerable necessity of making itself be--down to the slightest detail. Thus freedom is not *a* being; it is *the being* of man--*i.e.*, his nothingness of being.<sup>70</sup>

Sartre argued for the nonmateriality of consciousness not only to avoid the trap of determinism but to identify consciousness with freedom itself.<sup>71</sup> But while Decartes identifies human consciousness with thought, Sartre identifies human consciousness with freedom.<sup>72</sup> The problem of human consciousness has been difficult ever since Decartes inquired into the realm of human consciousness. In Sartre's writing you can find this complexity expressed at its best. His struggle to define human reality can be gauged by the title he gives his phenomenological study-- *Being and Nothingness* --being referring to one's body, and nothingness referring to one's consciousness.<sup>73</sup> This is precisely how George Wald also states his understanding on consciousness.

So that is the problem of mind--consciousness--a vast, unchartable domain that includes all science, yet that science cannot deal with, has no way of approaching; not even to identify its presence *or absence*; that offers nothing to measure, and nothing to locate, since *it has no location*.<sup>74</sup>

Consciousness itself lies outside the parameters of space and time that would make it accessible to science. That realization carries an enormous consequence: consciousness cannot be located. But more: *It has no location*.<sup>75</sup>

Having argued that freedom is identical with man, Sartre then clarifies the kind of freedom he argues for. To be free, to Sartre, does not simply mean the ability to obtain ends chosen but rather to choose what is not.<sup>76</sup> In other words, success is not important as much as it is important to note that one does choose by projecting what is not. Sartre nowhere<sup>77</sup> suggests that because one chooses to do something, his venture must meet success. But while one is free to choose, one can choose only in the realm of what *can* be by choice,<sup>78</sup> and never in the realm of what cannot but be.<sup>79</sup> "A choice is said to be free if it is such that it could have been other than what it is."<sup>80</sup> Choice, Sartre argued, "...as it is made indicates in general other choices as possible."<sup>81</sup> In the realm of what can be by choice, everything is a "matter of choice".<sup>82</sup> As such, there is no choiceless choice.

One is always free to choose--not even torture can dispose one of one's freedom.<sup>83</sup> As such, one is always engaged<sup>84</sup> in some process of negation<sup>85</sup> and this is what consciousness is all about, projecting what is not and negating what is.<sup>86</sup> When Sartre defines man as freedom--it is strictly in terms of

ontology. It is in this sense that man is always free and men are equally free. Thus the master, the slave<sup>87</sup>, the prisoner<sup>88</sup>, the inventor and the discoverer are all free and equally free. Hence one cannot be ontologically not free nor more free at any time.

### **Being Unequally Restricted**

Free from being *fixed* to what it is, the for-itself is free to choose what is not. But having chosen what is not and having to have negate what is makes the for-itself *restricted*--restricted until the "is" of the consciousness is negated in the light of the "is not" of choice. And if one cannot but choose, and if every choice is towards what is not with the intent to change what is, then one cannot but be restricted (though strictly in terms of temporality and practicality). That is why the ontological impossibility of the "is" and the "is not" of consciousness to exist like the "is" of the in-itself must be understood in the context of the practical possibility (again in terms of temporality) of the "is" and "is not" of consciousness to be as the for-itself is--which is to choose what is not and be what it is not, which means: "...instead of being what one is one is conscious of it."<sup>89</sup> The relationship between the "is" and the "is not" of consciousness in terms of ontological and practical freedom reveal two inter-linked aspects of human reality--man is free to choose but when he does choose man is restricted by his choice. Not being able to *be* what one is (like the in-itself) and the ability (as such) to choose what is not is what makes one free. Free because the "is" of the for-itself is not fixed like the "is" of the in-itself. As such, it is free to choose what is not and change what is and be free *from* all what it is conscious of. Being restricted, therefore, is the result of having chosen what is not. Man is always restricted because while one is always free to choose, one always chooses what is not. In having chosen what is not, one cannot but be restricted in terms of what is.

Being restricted, like being free, can be understood only in the context of a given situation. For while one does not choose to be free, ironically only in the context of choice can one understand what makes one restricted. But since one must choose and can only choose in a situation--one is never free (to choose) except in a situation.<sup>90</sup> Choice is real and possible only in a given situation. As such, one must choose until death for until death one is situated. The only way one can escape choice and one's situation is by choosing suicide.<sup>91</sup>

What can possibly make one restricted is one's situation, but no situation in and of itself can make one restricted. One is restricted in a situation only when one chooses to confront, challenge, or change an undesired situation for a desired one. What makes one restricted is the nature and engagement of consciousness which chooses to project what is not and change what is. That is why every choice involves negation and until negation is completed one would remain (by choice) restricted. But since one is perpetually choosing, one is involved in perpetual negation--as such, one is perpetually restricted--only because one is always freely choosing what is not. Again only in the light of chosen ends one can discover what exactly in one's situation is considered restrictive and as such, what is to be negated. It is the for-itself that considers what situations are restrictive, as such, chooses to negate them. Every *restrictive* situation is a situation chosen to be negated. There are no "privileged"<sup>92</sup> or free situations--there are only free beings. Finally, no situation can rob one of the ability to choose.<sup>93</sup>

The following statements from Sartre try to capture the essence of the relationship between the facticity of having to choose, the actuality of having chosen and the historical situation in which one conducts praxis, and purports why only ontologically free beings can be practically restricted. The "...project of freedom in general, is a choice which implies the anticipation or acceptance of some kind of resistance somewhere."<sup>94</sup> But since only in the light of one's choice one discovers what is determined to be negated<sup>95</sup>--no situation in and of itself can determine what is being negated--or better no situation in and of itself can predict, determine, or dictate what one would choose<sup>96</sup>--no circumstances, however compelling, can compel one towards a *particular* choice.

No factual state whatever it may be (the political and economic structure of society, the psychological "state" etc.) is capable by itself of motivating any act whatsoever. For an act is a projection of the for-itself towards what is not and what is can in no way determine by itself what is not.<sup>97</sup>

That is why an obstacle for one may not be an obstacle for another.<sup>98</sup> "Since freedom is choice, it is change"<sup>99</sup> as such "to be free is to-be-free-to-change."<sup>100</sup> "Freedom implies therefore the existence of an environment to be changed: obstacles to be cleared, tools to be used. Of course it is freedom which reveals them as obstacles,...."<sup>101</sup> Again since no situation can rob one of choosing--freedom in this sense is total and infinite,<sup>102</sup>--if there



are limits it is chosen. "...I choose that my choice be limited"<sup>103</sup> As such "...freedom can exist only as *restricted* since freedom is choice. Every choice as we shall see supposes elimination and selection. Thus freedom can be truly free only by constituting facticity as its own restriction."<sup>104</sup> What is in terms of what is not is what makes the for-itself to be "restricted" because what is of a given situation is restrictive only in the context of what is not of given choice to a given person.

Again, what possibly makes one restricted is one's situation, but no situation can make one restricted until one chooses to change a given situation, be it a predicament like slavery or a project like flying or swimming. Not knowing how to swim does not make one restricted to swim. But the moment one chooses to swim and does not know how to swim then one becomes restricted but restricted only because one did choose to swim. So, only in the context of the actuality of having chosen<sup>105</sup> does one discover in one's choice exactly what makes one restricted. What makes us free is the facticity of having to choose but what makes us restricted is the choice to change what is. "...every choice is a choice of a concrete change to be bestowed on a concrete given."<sup>106</sup> Every choice is to change but unless one chooses to change and until change does occur one cannot but be restricted.<sup>107</sup>

Eagles do not *choose* to fly--perhaps they have to fly. But when the Wright brothers chose to fly, their flying becomes significant, important, and meaningful--not simply because they succeeded, but because they *chose* to fly. One is authentic to the extent one attempts by choice to negate what in the context of what is not. The situation can make one restricted only when one decides to change a given situation in the context of what is not. A slave is a slave only when he chooses not to be a *slave*, similarly, one who does not know how to swim is restricted only when one chooses to swim.

What makes us free is the facticity of having to have to choose (whatever this might be). What makes us restricted is the actuality of having chosen to negate (whatever is). Ontological freedom is such that it makes men equally free because all are free to choose. But the actuality of having chosen what is not makes men unequally restricted because all do not choose similarly. Being free is not a matter of choice--one cannot but be free. Being restricted is simply a result of choice--what cannot be a matter of choice. To be human, to Sartre, is to confront both the world of facticity--(what cannot but be) and the world

of choices-- (what cannot but be matter of choice) Thus to Sartre, in terms of ontology, man is free and always free, and men are equally free and always free. But strictly in terms of negation, man is restricted and men are unequally restricted simply because when we do choose we choose dissimilarly. We choose dissimilarly because whatever the historical situation might be<sup>108</sup>, what one chooses to negate is never the same.

For us, man is defined first of all as a being in situation. that means that he forms a synthetic whole with his situation- biological, economic, political, cultural, etc. He cannot be distinguished from his situation, for it forms him and decides his possibilities but inversely it is he who gives it meaning by making his choices within it and by it To be in situation as we see it, is to choose oneself in a situation, and men differ from one another in their situation and also in the choices they themselves make of themselves.<sup>109</sup>

While all are equally free to choose what is not, in terms of a given situation, we are unequally restricted, for when we *do* choose, we choose dissimilarly. Man is always free in the light of the facticity of having to have to choose what is not in the context of not being able to *be* what one is. Man is always restricted because of having to have to negate what is in the context of what is not.

### Being Human

To be human is to choose what is not and to be what it is not. Choosing what is not is a matter of choice but to be what it is not is an ontological predicament. As such, choosing *what is not* and being *what it is not* are two distinctive characteristics of the being-for-itself. To be what is not is distinctively different from choosing what is not in that, while one can choose what is not one cannot choose to be what it is not. The for-itself is free to choose what is not because it cannot *be* what it is and therefore it can negate what is. The for-itself can negate what is because the "is" of consciousness is not fixed like the "is" of the in-itself. And since what is not is chosen, having to negate what is, is a self- imposed project.

Consciousness is real; just as much as matter is real, but one is what it is, the other is what it is not. When we say something is--it is either, as consciousness "is" which is what it is not-- free, or as matter is, which is what

it is--fixed.

There are two aspects to every choice--every choice is a choice towards what is not, and every choice is also a choice to negate what is. It is the question of negation that makes the for- itself restricted, but since negation is part of choice one is restricted only by choice. And, of course, every choice is a free choice. What makes a choice *free* is that it is "chosen"--chosen against all other possibilities. Man is the "author" of all what is chosen.<sup>110</sup> If one does not choose suicide (which is also a choice) then one must continually choose until one's natural death. What is real to most people is the negation aspect of consciousness. They see human reality in constant struggle -- the struggle to negate a given situation but tend to forget that it is a "chosen"<sup>111</sup> struggle.

Is it possible to define without determining? In terms of nonhuman entities, one cannot define without determining, but in the case of human reality what determines is what defines. The facticity of having to have to choose determines that nature of human reality, but what *actually* defines human reality is one's choices<sup>112</sup>--"The essence of man is suspended in his freedom."<sup>113</sup> But since we are perpetually engaged in the process of defining oneself--"...I am more and more sculpturing my figure in the world."<sup>114</sup>--the question of defining is always incomplete until death, for when one makes no more choices-- one is at last *defined*. Human reality is "...a free and living consciousness which projects itself towards its possibility and makes itself defined by these possibilities."<sup>115</sup>

In conclusion if one cannot but be human, one is just as human inside the prison as outside the prison. As such, no situation can negate what it is to be human nor negate one's ability to choose. To be human is to choose--is to have to choose is having to have to choose what is not until death. To be human, one cannot but choose, and when one *does* choose one cannot but be restricted. Having to have to choose is having to have to choose what is not. Having chosen what is not is having to have to negate what is. And if having to have to choose what is not makes the for-itself free, having to have to negate what is makes the for-itself restricted--restricted until what is, is negated in the light of what is not. What makes us human/free is what makes us equals.<sup>116</sup> What makes us restricted is what makes us unequals. What makes us free and equals is the facticity of 'having to have to choose.' What makes us restricted

and unequals is the actuality of 'having chosen what is not' dissimilarly. Man is free and men are equally free (to choose). Man is restricted and men are unequally restricted when they do choose to negate what is in the context of what is not.

### NOTES

1. The object of this paper is to capture the essence of Sartre's phenomenological understanding of human consciousness. As such, his links with Husserl, Heidegger and Hegel are intentionally left out so as to focus on the essences of Sartre's claims.
2. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*. tr. Hazel E. Barnes, (Washington Square press, New York, 1977), p. 568. (All page references are to the translation by H. Barnes, I will abbreviate the title as *B & N*)
3. *B & N* p. 28.
4. *B & N* p. 790.
5. *B & N* p. 120.
6. *B & N* p. 562.
7. *B & N* p. 650.
8. *B & N* pp. 134, 597, 598, 615, 617, and 644
9. *B & N* pp. 29, 87, 599, 615, and 725.
10. *B & N* p. 24.
11. *B & N* p. 28, and 785.
12. *B & N* p. 633.
13. *B & N* p. 567.
14. *B & N* pp. 145, 722, and 725.
15. *B & N* pp. 776, 777, and 784.
16. *B & N* p. 140.
17. *B & N* pp. 784, and 796.
18. *B & N* p. 140.
19. *B & N* p. 140.
20. *B & N* p. 735.
21. *B & N* p. 735.

22. *B & N* p. 138.
23. *B & N* p. 798. (authentic relationship)
24. *B & N* p. 134.
25. *B & N* p. 742. (inauthentic relationship, or relationships in "bad faith")
26. *B & N* p. 722.
27. *B & N* p. 588.
28. *B & N* p. 723.
29. *B & N* p. 555.
30. *B & N* p. 725.
31. *B & N* p. 568.
32. David Detmer, *Freedom As A Value*, (Open Court, Illinois, 1986), p. 57.
33. *B & N* pp. 560-563.
34. *op.cit.* note 29, p. 63. (David Detmer cites five references to this idea with all the references.).
35. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Materialism and Revolution in LPE*, p. 244, quoted by David Detmer, *Freedom as a Value*, (Open Court, Illinois, 1986), p. 63.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
37. *B & N* p. 623.
38. *B & N* p. 680.
39. *B & N* p. 679.
40. *B & N* p. 60.
41. Bill Barger, "Sartre on Original Choice," *Philosophy Research Archives*, 2, 1105 (1977), p.11.
42. *B & N* p. 623.
43. Verner Smitheram, "Sartre and Ricoeur on Freedom and Choice," *Philosophy Research Archives*, 3, 1105 (1977), p. 59.
44. *B & N* p. 710.
45. *B & N* p. 677.
46. *B & N* p. 623.
47. *B & N* p. 625.
48. *B & N* p. 595.
49. *B & N* pp. 618 and 619.

50. *B & N* p. 710.
51. *B & N* p. 607.
52. *B & N* p. 619.
53. *B & N* p. 672.
54. *B & N* p. 60.
55. *B & N* p. 617.
56. *B & N* p. 569.
57. *B & N* p. 703.
58. *B & N* p. 702.
59. *B & N* p. 569.
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