

## BOOK REVIEWS

1. Tandon, Dr. Alok : *MAN AND HIS DESTINY* (with special reference to Marx and Sartre), New Delhi, Indus Publishing Company 1994, pp. 232, Price Rs. 275.00

Human bondage and liberation constitute the most important theme of philosophical inquiry both in the east and the west. In the modern west Freud, Marx and Sartre have offered the most illuminating explanations of man's enslavement and his emancipation therefrom. The root cause of human bondage and sufferings are the suppressed desires of the past stored in the unconscious mind, believes Freud. The present economic system, supported by false theories regarding human consciousness, argues Marx. lead to human misery. The projected desire of man to achieve self- identity in the manner of God's being, says Sartre, is the cause of his frustrations and condemnations. The present book of Dr. Alok Tandon, which is a modified version of his doctoral thesis, centers round the views of Marx and Sartre with occasional mentions of Freud where necessary. Both Marx and Sartre, the author opines, share the common concern for human salvation though the diagnosis offered and the treatment prescribed are different. This point underlying the complicated layers of propositions and argumentations of the philosophies under reference has been competently and comprehensively brought about by Dr. Alok Tandon.

In the brief Introduction Dr. Tandon places the problem in a historical perspective. He surveys the history of western philosophy from Socrates to Nietzsche with a view to showing the development of the concept of man in the changing historical and social conditions of the Greek, medieval, modern and contemporary periods. Marx's view of man and his destiny form the theme of the 2nd and 3rd chapters respectively. The author draws heavily from Marx's original writings specially *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, *Das Capital* and *Grundrisse*. Second chapter has two sub-sections dealing with the concepts of human nature and alienated human personality respectively. Human nature, writes Dr. Tandon, is fully reflected in man's "species nature" which is a life of free, conscious and purposeful activity. This activity is a process of self-creation in which man transforms objective reality into human reality. Alienation, the author further says, engulfs the whole

of human life in its political, moral and aesthetic aspects and most significantly, it is not only the worker who is alienated from his products and fellow beings, the capitalist too is alienated. Emancipation of the worker, therefore, is the emancipation of entire humanity. Freedom as the 'positive power to assert true individuality' is the topic of discussion of the next chapter. Marx's concept of 'whole man' has been presented through an analysis of the closely linked concepts such as genuine and imaginary needs, love and human relations, private property, machine, labour and praxis etc. The controversy regarding earlier and later Marx has also been raised and Dr. Tandon is of the view that this division is not absolute as at no stage of his thought Marx surrenders his 'basic ideal of human self-development through productive activity in the future communist society.

In a similar way Dr. Tandon rejects the view that there is a radical break between earlier Sartre, and later Sartre. In the subsequent two chapters meaning of absolute human freedom and its impact on human existence have been explained through elucidation of the complicated concepts like transcendence, the other, the situation, responsibility, death and God. The author further delineates the notions of bad faith, abandonment, anguish, authenticity and failure etc. to underline the fact that the Sartrean man is an ever open possibility and that man alone is respectable for being what he is.

After a brief statement of the reasons that led Sartre to embrace the Marxian view of human nature in place of the existentialist one as enunciated in the *Being and Nothingness*, Dr. Tandon performs the difficult task of presenting the real face of the "Marxist Sartre" in the 5th chapter. The subtle concepts of dialectic, praxis, seriality and group etc. have been ably analysed so as to bring into relief the points of agreements and disagreements between Marx and Sartre. In the author's opinion though Sartre does continue with the basic ideas of *Being and Nothingness* in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, the meaning of those ideas does not remain the same. However, I feel this contention ought to have been elaborated in some greater detail.

The 7th and 8th chapters characterized by philosophical maturity and intellectual impartiality do real credit to the author. Herein he exposes the inner contradictions and ideological defects of Marx's thought and the invalidating factors of the Marxian theories. The chief merit of Marx, Dr. Tandon concedes, lies in his capacity to understand man in the context of his socio-economic

conditions. About Sartre, the author agrees with Mr. Flynn's evaluation that there are many unresolved contradictions in Sartre's account of man and his freedom but an existentialist philosopher like Sartre is not bothered by such contradictions, complexities and paradoxes as it is exactly to bring us face to face with realities of human existence, rather than to remove them by abstract logical reasoning, that the existentialist writer aims at. And, in Dr. Tandon's opinion, no thinker other than Sartre has done it better. Sartre the "Marxist existentialist", as the author puts him, rectifies Marx's error in the formulation of human freedom. The place denied to individual human freedom in the Marxian scheme of things has been restored by Sartre. But both these champions of human freedom, concludes Dr. Tandon, have not been able to define the nature of ultimate human freedom nor have they been able to present a clear picture of this 'intersubjective community in which this freedom can be realised. A synthesis of Marx and Sartre, Dr. Tandon further argues, can pave way for a 'Coherent social philosophy to guide our actions to realise human destiny' (p. 206). However Dr. Tandon only suggests the need for such a synthesis. He has not worked it out. Perhaps he has left it to another volume in which a complete synthetic view of human freedom and destiny can be fully propounded.

The book is a valuable addition to the comparative literature on Marx and Sartre. Although there are certain repetitions which could have been avoided; but even these contribute to the understanding of the reader as he is constantly reminded of what has been said earlier. The division of chapters into too many sub-titles seems unnecessary. The language is simple, arguments are coherent and presentation is lucid. Viewed against the background of the collapse of Marxism in the former USSR and expanding global economic system in the world, the book makes an interesting reading.

**S. Mishra**

2. Saral Jhingran, *SECULARISM IN INDIA - A REAPPRAISAL*, Har- Anand Publications, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 287.

A positive fall out of the Ram Janmbhoomi / Babri Masjid controversy and subsequent communal tension has been the generation of serious debate about the meaning of secularism in the Indian context. The debate is characterized by a degree of frankness which was not found earlier. But much of the writing on 'secularism' is also characterized by a dogmatic, partisan approach where one is not even willing to consider the other point of view. It is taken for granted that one must either be a wholehearted supporter of votaries of 'Hindutva' or of their opponents, referred to by B. J. P. and their supporters as 'pseudosecularists'. That there can be a different, neutral point of view is ruled out. We find therefore much mudslinging, name calling and provocative rhetoric, with little or no effort to appreciate the complex dimensions of meaning and practice of secularism in India.

Saral Jhingran's book is an interesting, insightful and refreshingly non-partisan discussion of these complexities. She is equally vehement in her criticism of both Hindu and Muslim fundamentalism and advocates the policy of State distancing itself from all religious viewpoints as far as possible. The foreword to the book has been written by Shri Harbans Mukhia (Centre for Historical Studies, J. N. U., New Delhi) while Shri Asghar Ali Engineer (Chairman for Study of Society and Secularism, Bombay) has written the introduction.

Jhingran does not restrict herself at conceptual analysis but also discusses the historical background of the development of secularism as an ideology in India. The book not only attempts to analyse the meaning of religion and secularism and their relationship but also provides an account of reformist movements, both Hindu and Islamic, in modern India and debates in the Constituent assembly and their impact on the Indian understanding of secularism. A detailed discussion of provisions in the Indian Constitution and the current debates on 'majoritism' and 'minoritism' is also provided in part II of the book.

Jhingran thinks that religions and secularism are not antagonistic. She

reconciles the two by making a distinction between essential and peripheral aspects of religion such that inner piety, faith in some absolute spiritual power and commitment to lead a moral life become central to religion while most credal beliefs, rituals and rules of conduct specially pertaining to secular matters like birth, marriage and death etc. become secondary. She admits that this is not how a religion's role is generally perceived, quite often religions claim to govern almost all aspects of personal and social life. While Hinduism allows a cleavage between religious matters on the one hand and secular and moral affairs on the other, to a greater degree, Islam is more emphatic about religion governing all aspects of believers' lives. Contemporary protagonists of Christianity also increasingly advocate the right of the religion to concern itself with secular matters. But Jhingran insists that religion can be accommodated within a secularist ideology only when its hold over secular matters is loosened and more or less nullified.

Jhingran defines secularism as an ideology which emphasizes individual's autonomy and commitment to a rational, scientific outlook to life and world. In the West secularism developed against the backdrop of a conflict between state and religion, hence the emphasis upon a separation between State and the Church. But in India, secularism was evolved with a view to unite followers of different religious traditions in their fight against a foreign power, The focus here is, therefore, on a policy which neither favours nor discriminates against any religion and yet gives all of them full opportunity to develop. However, the effort to accommodate religions in secular life was expressed by many nationalist leaders through a policy of 'sarva dharma sambhava' or equal respect to all religions. Jhingran rejects this approach categorically because it brings religion to the centre stage of secular life and discourages a rational critical appraisal of religion, culminating quite often in equal toleration of all religious dogmas and practices. This approach, she argues, has led to a tendency on the part of nationalist leaders in the past, as well as in contemporary political life, to tolerate and accommodate communalism. The spirit of religious tolerance, therefore, has to be combined with strict neutrality of State to all religions and a clear demarcation of religious and secular spheres and autonomy of the latter. Equi-nearness embodied in the ideal of equal respect to all religions has to be replaced by equidistance from all.

Jhingran tries to show, through a detailed account of constitutional provisions, that Indian State embodies the spirit of 'dharma-nirapekṣatā' only

partially. It involves itself with maintenance and promotion of religious institutions. Moreover, there are inherent conflicts in its policy which on the one hand, gives individuals full freedom to profess, practice and propagate their religion and, on the other, reserves the right to regulate, restrict, even prohibit religious practices. Constitutional provisions for special rights and safeguards for minorities further complicate the matter. Jhingran adds an interesting new dimension to the discussion by linking the issue of secularism with that of reservations for the socially and educationally backward castes. Continuance of such reservations as well as minority rights is against the spirit of secularism according to the author, since both presuppose that the State's treatment of individuals would be on the basis of their religious/caste identities. Secularism demands that religious identity be rendered totally irrelevant as far as education, employment and other secular matters are concerned. Separate personal laws are also theoretically incompatible with secularism for the same reason, though they may be allowed to continue for some time on pragmatic grounds. The tendency to treat communities rather than the individual as the basic unit in social political discourse has to be given up in a secular society.

Jhingran argues for strengthening of a synthetic secular national culture by emphasizing the commonalities shared by different religious groups within India. Religion is not the sole determinant of culture. On the one hand contribution of Muslims to Indian culture has to be fully acknowledged and on the other it has to be granted that Hindu culture and ethos will have a natural predominance in this synthetic culture because of historical reasons. Talk of such a culture does not negate the religious or cultural pluralism in India but only requires us to simultaneously emphasize the shared values, norms and ways of different groups. Religiosity, importance of one's religious/caste identity and family in life, emphasis upon religious tolerance are some such shared characteristics which Jhingran singles out. One fails to see however, how these characteristics can provide the basis for or impetus to a secular national culture. The point that people's several secular identities can and do help them to unite on non-religious grounds is well taken. Still it is highly questionable that shared religiosity or emphasis upon religious identity can help to strengthen a secular national culture which has to be based on a humanistic ideology. Jhingran's contention that secular Indian identity can include religious faith and values without dogmas of any religious tradition is far from clear.

Jhingran repeatedly states that secularism is not hostile to religion but

ultimately it emerges that religion can be accommodated within a secular society only in a highly emasculated form. Divergence of an internalist and an externalist perception of the nature and role of religion acquires significance in this context. Secularism demands a marginalisation of religion in social, political life and restricting it to one's private life. Practice of religion in a full blooded sense is definitely antithetical to secularism. Jhingran argues for a total indifference on the part of the State to religions and sometimes carries it to unrealistic limits. It is questionable whether this would be desirable or practical in a deeply religious society still plagued with illiteracy and superstition and which has not yet internalized the values of equality and dignity of human persons. It would have been pertinent to consider how a viable medium for checking retrograde social and religious practices can be evolved under these circumstances.

In spite of Jhingran's tendency to over-argue her case quite often and punctuate her writing with several quotations, this book deserves serious consideration for its refreshing candour.

**Vibha Chaturvedi**

3. Karen Armstrong, *A HISTORY OF GOD : THE 4,000 - YEAR QUEST OF JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM*. New York : Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1994. Pp. XXXIII + 460.

At the outset it may be noted that the title of this comprehensive work is quite misleading, for God, who dwells eternally beyond time or space, properly bears no history. What is obviously implied is that throughout history a great many theologians in the absence of concrete evidence have recorded their views as to what they imagined God might be like, so that theology itself becomes little better than a critical history of theologies either accepted or rejected. Armstrong's book looks at the history of God from the Jewish and the Muslim as well as from the Christian perspective beginning at the very dawn of civilization in the Middle East from where, it is alleged, the idea of the God of the Western world ("our" God) has gradually emerged. It is possible that Yahweh, the monotheistic God of the Hebrews arose from the worship of not alone one but many tribal gods, although Yahweh, the God of Abraham has been traditionally understood as one more or less universal God so sacred as to be defiled if an attempt is made even to address Him by name.

In the coming of Christianity and the writing of the New Testament Gospels and the Epistles, historical fact has surely been overlaid with mythical elements portraying the significance of Jesus of Nazareth and his ministry. The doctrine of the Incarnation, for example, was gradual and complex in its development, and it may be observed that Jesus himself never claimed to be God. The supposed embodiment of God, an inaccessible divine essence in the man Jesus scandalized both Jews and Muslims who found it blasphemous. Nor have all Christians felt comfortable with the Trinity declaring Jesus to be One indwelling with what purports to be a monotheistic God now existing in three Persons. Even St. Paul, the earliest of the Christian evangelists, who in his missionary journeys and Epistles established the religion we now know as Christianity, never said that Jesus was God or the incarnation of God himself. The Trinity for Christianity is a conciliar doctrine in that it was packaged together at the Council of Nicaea in Asia Minor as late as 325 A. D. Those who oppose it maintain that Jesus was only promoted to divine status, that Divinity was not natural to Jesus since it was bestowed upon him as a reward or gift. Although the doctrine has persisted to the present day, it has at various times



been seriously called into question as a human fabrication repugnant to reason.

Turning to Muhammadanism, it was Muhammad ibn Abdullah (The Prophet) who brought to the tribes of Arabia a new spirituality which soon established not only an empire and unique civilization reaching from the Himalayas to the Pyrenees, but was the means of founding a new religion known as Islam (surrender to God). Muhammad had come to believe in al-Lah (Allah), the one supreme God as set out through the writings of the quor'an (or Koran), dictated by The Prophet himself and meant to be recited. Through the revealed words from the pages of the Muslim Bible, Islam has been unmistakably represented as a monotheistic religion, and is remarkably similar in this respect to Judaism.

Prominent among the *Faylasuf*, or those dedicated to a rationalistic interpretation of Islam was Abu Nasr al-Farabi (d. 980). This movement reached its apogee in the works of Abu al ibn Sina (980-1037), better known as Avicenna. Avicenna commented on Aristotle and subscribed to belief in an ultimate Uncaused Being, absolutely perfect, as the First Cause of all that exists, although toward the end of his life he seems to have turned toward mysticism. We are also introduced to Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali (1058-1111), an influential figure in religious philosophy who found solace in a form of Sufi mysticism and who gave an important place to both reason and mystical tradition in Islam.

Many attempts have been made to prove the outright existence as well as the Being of the God of religion. For example, Rabbi Moses ibn Maimon (1135-1204), usually known as Maimonides wanted to show that the Jewish faith was based on rational principles, although he insisted that God in Himself should remain ineffable and incomprehensible to human reason. The Christian theological Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) is remembered for his ontological proof where God is defined as that beyond which nothing greater can be conceived. In recent times, Martin Heidegger (1899-1976), although the moral value of his work has been suspect because of his association with the wartime Nazi regime in Germany, claimed God as an apophatic "Wholly Other" having no existence, yet that which makes all other existence possible. Meister Eckhart, the thirteenth century Dominican preacher and theologian stated that our highest parting is when we take leave of God as the Godhead. We have come to believe that God is significant to us only in the manner in which we are able to speak of Him in metaphor, which is saying a great deal about our own ideals and

aspirations, largely impossible of attainment.

One thing that stands out in today's theology in the Western world is a mysticism that is ready to acknowledge the human imagination as the chief architect in religious thought and thinking. The only way to conceive of an imperceptible God is by means of a symbolism; in fact God would not be important if it were not for an iconoclasm which busies itself in striking down false notions of the Deity. Ultimately we know nothing about a God that is eternally hidden from us. God does not resemble any other being and God exceeds all ideas that it is possible to have about Him. As stated in the book of Exodus (Chapter 3:14) of the Hebrew Old Testament, Yahweh, the God of Moses is a Deity that simply *is* ("I am that I am"), the divine Being that dare not be called by name. In fact there has been a strong tendency toward mysticism and a mystical spiritualism in Western religious thought through the centuries. The spiritual outlook of Islamic Sufism desires no more and no less than a self-emptying ecstasy in striving for an experience of the Divine, although there could be no possibility of any direct contact with God who is beyond the reach of mankind. The Jewish Kabbalists, who believed that the true mysticism of God would be revealed on the last Day of Judgement played a dominant role in the spiritual life of Judaism during the sixteenth century. Reason cannot settle the question of what God really is or whether He actually exists.

It must be that Armstrong's book is meant to appeal to the general reader interested in religious matters and the nature of God. In spite of endnotes amounting to seventeen pages and a full bibliography, references and quotations are given from translations of, and commentaries on, the writings of the original authors. The book is neither a text nor an outstanding scholarly work. The scope of the enterprise is too wide and spread too thin over three millenia or more and inclusive of three religions. Many personalities are summoned in almost a name-dropping fashion, with complete justice done to none of them. The overall conclusion seems to be that the contemplative silence of the mystic is in the last analysis the type of experience to which the community of believers in the religion must be ready to respond, whether that religion be Judaism, Islam or Christianity.

**Albert W. J. Harper**

4. Patnaik, Tandra : *ŚABDA : A STUDY OF BHARTRHARĪ'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE*, New Delhi, D. K. Publishers, 1994.

For Matilal, *sphoṭa* represents a high watermark in Indian linguistics and philosophy of language.<sup>1</sup> Following his lead, Tandra Patnaik (1994) has attempted a systematic enquiry into the ancient (6th Century A. D.) text of Bhartrhari with a view to proving its credentials for current analytic philosophy of language.<sup>2</sup> *Sphoṭa* has no known analogical counterpart in the west. That alone makes her enterprise a difficult one. The issues before her are roughly framed in the following questions : Is *sphoṭa* an ultimate metaphysical principle of language? Is *sphoṭa* the *a priori* of all communicative functions of language? Is it an analytical tool that far surpasses all that is developed in the west? Again, Is *sphoṭa* an idealized communicative scenario that provided an *explanation* for the failure of communication? Not only these questions are interlinked, but, on her view, they receive a positive answer. Her positive answers centre around an assumption which holds that Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya* is a full-fledged philosophy of language (10). Nevertheless it passes comprehension how that surpasses any other view, whether Fregean, Russellian, Wittgensteinian, Austinian, Searlean, Gricean, and Davidsonian.

Analytical traditions started as a movement coinciding with the linguistic turn at the beginning of the century but it has grown into a highly sophisticated professional variety with a history of its own. It has made important in-roads into philosophy of language on the one hand and philosophy of mind on the other. The former takes language to subserve the interests of semantics of natural language while the latter made philosophy itself into a cognitive discipline like psychology. It passes one's comprehension to think why should anyone desire to evaluate *sphoṭa* in the light of a plethora of western theories. Granting that such a worthwhile comparison is more than plausible, what unique merits would it accrue to the Indian theories. As a treatise in comparative analytical philosophy therefore, it is flawed to the core. Eventhough the choices are narrowed down to speech-act philosophy of language and much effort is made in the direction of fusing them into one her Gricean encounters bear very little fruit. If only she is aware that speech act philosophies have become increasingly discredited today, she may not have any use, much less for a comparison.<sup>3</sup> Her major criticism

about Grice is that it is overstretched because it is mono-intentional. Unless a theory is duo-intentional like Bharṭṛhari's, it cannot contribute to the understanding of the metaphysics of communication in which the hearer's part should also be equally emphasized. With this, whatever primal link the above set of questions have, is thrown out of gear.

On the positive side, Patnaik's analysis of *sphoṭa* as a three-tiered structure of communication consisting of three stages, namely *paśyanti*, *madhyamā* and *vaikhari*, with the same(?) *sphoṭa* on either poles of communicative act, leads us to more questions than could be answered. If *sphoṭa* refers to a certain linguistic potency and granted that both the speaker and hearer have *sphoṭa*, the question may be asked whether they possess same *sphoṭa* or different *sphoṭa*. Either way, the dilemma is imminent. It is here that it is conceptually augmented by *Pratibhā* which brings in holistic constraints. No doubt, *Pratibhā* is holistic, but it resists analysis of the type we are familiar in the west. This probably restrained Matilal not to go beyond the above characterization. I tried to go beyond it but ended up with a string of hypotheticals in my characterization of *Pratibhā* holism.<sup>4</sup> It is welcome that Patnaik is chary of any such characterization, but the only defect is that she could not sustain an indigenous interpretation. Later I shall point out how this leads to further conceptualism and thereby makes the issue more complicated without any hope for redemption. I think, the basic deficiency lies in trying to express oneself in the western idiom, which seems to me to be inadequate for doing justice to Bharṭṛhari's original ideas.

For Patnaik, the *sphoṭa* philosophy of language is governed by the following assumptions : (a) the language as (an object of study) is the means of philosophical (higher) knowledge; (b) *Śabda* is to *śabdabrahman* what a method of analysis is to philosophy (163). Two important lemmas follow : (1) the linguistic method of *mahāvākya*s to reach *Brahman* knowledge is to be denied (8); together with (2) its attendant mysticism. This speaks much about the tenor of her interpretation of Bharṭṛhari's philosophy of language. Following Strawson, Patnaik thinks that the formalistic and communication - intentional theories of language and meaning are locked in 'homerick struggle'. Where Patnaik differs from Strawson is that *in lieu* of taking grammar to be *moebius strip* (of our conceptual structure), she takes language-as-use has an ultimate metaphysical end point, and thus making *Śabda* as the *a priori* condition of linguistic

understanding (56), more in Kant's sense than in Strawson's sense.<sup>5</sup> It is surely allied to an idiomatic construction of *a priori* of communication, as the emphasis is felt to be throughout on communication.

As a primary *pramāna*, it leads to a form of linguistic cognitivism (all cognition is permeated by language) or *śābdabodha* (93). If for Strawson, linguistic categories determine conceptual categories and for Whorf, language determines the form of metaphysics, for Bhartḥ hari, *sphoṭa* embodies an ultimate metaphysical principle. If so, it stands Strawson's dictum which holds that language is metaphysics (ontology) on its head by holding that language (or its metaphysics) is the metaphysics of the world (Philosophical knowledge about reality). It thus passes from metaphysics of the language to the metaphysics of the world (or says that the metaphysics of the world is in the language). A deduction such as the above is qualified by saying that metaphysics of the world remains aloft 'in spite of' the metaphysics of the world. There is therefore a gap to be filled in.

The all-comprehending power of language (it comprehends reality) is called *śabda-tattva*. It represents a unitary principle of speech, grammar, meaning and above all, understanding, *Sphoṭa* itself is a syntactic-semantic-pragmatic notion, characterized at (a) phonetic level (*dhvani* with *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta* types), syntactic (*vācaka*), semantic (*vācya* given in terms of *vācya--vākya-bhāva*) and pragmatic (intention is given in terms of *Kāranakārya-bhāva*). It is the ultimate substratum of language. We can call it as a proto-unitary phenomenon (47). The above claims are summed up to : it represents a protosyntactic as well as ultra-pragmatic aspect of language. How such a tall claim is to be substantiated? Patnaik includes the three Strawsonian categories of sentence, its use and the utterance in her notion of uttered speech act which is probably the fourth category. We must only recall that Strawson differentiated them however. But this is interpreted as the central peculiarity of the philosophy of *Vaiśāṅkya* (92 ff) by Patnaik.

Patnaik recognizes that philosophy of language has an interface with philosophy of mind. But it seems to me that she prefers to identify the former with the empirical tenets and the latter with the transcendental tenets. Patnaik talks about certain structural identity between what is spoken (what is thought of) and what is understood sensed as meaningful). Such structural identity is worked out exactly in two ways : (1) logical structure of propositions (search

for logical forms) and (2) an informal way in which the content is ascribed. But Patnaik's identity relation cannot be identified with any of these, since it is more metaphysical in character. She obviously grants that this taps the resource of *sphoṭa*, in that it absorbs the three stages mentioned above. Patnaik's belief is that western theories fail to explain why communication fails whereas *sphoṭa* can explain why this is a non-occurrence and hence the 'three stages amply illustrate a typical Bharṭṛhariian secure uptake and thereby explain how communication cannot fail'. I think Patnaik is obliged to posit the same *sphoṭa* which accounts for the same uptake. Does Patnaik's intentional uptake confront Davidsonian malaprops? No.

Let us look at *Pratibhā* holism to some extent : *Pratibhā* literally means the inner intuitive linguistic disposition (56). As far as I gather, *Pratibhā* represents the disposition to understand while *sphoṭa* is a disposition to speak in order to make people understand. *Sphoṭa* theory recognises two levels of intentions (speaker's intention, and hearer's intention). They are called *abhiprāya* and *tātparya* (68-9). Now, a dilemma arises whether you require the same *sphoṭa* or different *sphoṭa* to explain this difference. Sure, both are not Gricean, and so Patnaik's thesis fails to convince us with a philosophical model, like the one we are acquainted within the west.

Next occurs the diatribe : she argues that Bharṭṛhari's philosophy of language is not Fregean because the three stages of *Vaikhari vāk* do not correspond to Frege's own distinction between thought (sense of the proposition), judgement (assertion that takes on truth values as referents) and the assertion which brings out the force of utterance. Such a comparison is somewhat misleading (116). It is not Russellian because it is neither identifiable with the Fido-Fido theory nor with a theory of definite descriptions because it makes the gap between natural language and formal language wider than it is necessary by being forced to posit a realm of logically proper names (72). It is not Wittgensteinian because neither of the models of Wittgenstein, namely the essentialistic or the non-essentialistic models could be fitted into his philosophy of language (69 ff). In other words, Bharṭṛhari's variety posits primary and secondary meaning on the one hand, where the latter roughly corresponds to metaphorical meaning, and literal and contextual on the other hand (77). It is not positivistic because he is not guided by the verifiability criterion of meaningfulness which makes a distinction between sense and nonsense. Other theories such as Austin's, Searle's, Grice's theory will not come closer to

Bhartrhari's theory because they all collectively fail to explain the failure in communication, as explained before. Besides, Austin's perlocutionary speech acts stops at certain effects on the hearer, whereas what the theory is expected to explain how the hearer can understand that should be explainable in terms of a prescriptive. Moreover, perlocutionary act remains only at the level of speaker's meaning and cannot get across to the hearer's meaning (99). Searle's speech-act analysis of language in terms of propositional act and force is apt to dissatisfy us because it takes language as an intersubjective common bridge, and *a fortiori*, hardly succeeds to explain failure (101-2). Besides, it comes within the fold of formalistic theory which is anathema to Bhartrhari. Davidsonian theory is of the course very influential after Tarski. But it is too much obsessed with the conceptions of truth and propositions which are formalistic in its core. I do not want to argue that these are not defects of a theory or theories. Nor do I want to defend them against her attack. but my question is what exactly is the model she has in mind so as to fit Bhartrhari's model into it. If they are not relevant, and Bhartrhari's is a unique model, then why go in for a comparison except when they are supposed to illuminate Bhartrhari's model. The comparative modeling is not the least warranted by the inadequacies of the analytic models (98 ff).<sup>6</sup>

The account is most flawed only when it is seen in the background of holism (79). A number of obscure definitions are given and the word 'holism' is interpreted so liberally to tell us that Bhartrhari's is not holistic in this sense. Let us see one by one the various definitions that are offered in the course of her investigation. Firstly holism is identified with wholistic account of language, meaning that there is an all-comprehending view of language. Just as reality is a undifferentiated whole, so is language. Thus, Holism = df. reality is a undifferentiated whole or unanalysable whole (125). This metaphor suggests that the cookie-cutter metaphor (of realism) is wrong.<sup>7</sup> Here is a case for transcendental isomorphism in which language and the world is transcendently ideal and undifferentiated. We can never carve out our world as per the dictates of our language. If so, how we understand what is called languaging which stands for a certain world loadedness (pan-verbalism). Bhartrhari's holism is said to be indential with intersubjectivity *simpliciter* (45). 'For Bhartrhari, language is not simply analysable in terms of phonetics, syntax, grammar and semantics. Language is, above all, movement for communication, It is intersubjective, where speaker and hearer have an active role to play' (45). It is

the sequenceless nature of *vāk* (45) or the 'total unit of linguistic potency' (46). Thirdly, it is holistic in the sense that it can accommodate the analysis of both kinds of sentences, namely the declarative and the non-declarative. Formalism is not merely a causality but an anathema.

Holism is supposed to be a world-view in contradistinction to the metaphysics which is monistic in its core (126). Holism distances itself from any metaphysical trap of monism, and to say that this represents a world view which influences semantics stands Quinean accounts on its head (for Quine, it is semantics which determines the shape of ontology; Quinean quantification is the ontic idiom *par excellence*). I think there is a rough distinction in saying that holism is ontological and holism is a means of description of anything ontological. So Patnaik's thesis which claims that holism is natural and ontological is highly problematic. Further, the uniqueness of sentence - holism is spoken of as the doctrine of *akhaṇḍapakṣa*, which contains two aspects, namely that (1) the sentence is an indivisible unit and (2) the sentence meaning is grasped as a whole. This stands in contrast to *khaṇḍapakṣa* theories which subsumes both *abhitānvayā* and *anvitābhidānā* theories of language. It can be argued that these theories are at the most a sort of ramified contextualism<sup>8</sup> and not holism as such. To which Bharatṛhari adds the holism from the hearer's perspective and hence it is ramified once more.

In conclusion, what arguments Patnaik supplies in support of holism? (1) *Vāk* is not just uttered or articulated speech, but it is a multi-layered phenomenon. This warrants a unitary reading of Fregean sense; it is not merely meaning but it accords intention as a unitary entity. Such unitariness is assumed by the speaker (142). (2) thought is so structured so that even *pv-p* conveys a unitary meaning (141 ff); and (3) the sentence meaning is wholistic, because it is wholistic to the speaker. This is surely to beg inordinate questions, and not an echo of Davidson, as it is claimed.

## NOTES

1. For Matilal, *sphoṭa* represents 'one of the most important contributions to the central problems of general linguistics as well as of philosophy of language' (77); see Chapter 7 of B. K. Matilal's *Word and World : Indian contributions to the study of language* (Oxford, 1990).



2. *Śabha : A Study of Bhartṛhari's Philosophy and Language* ( D. K. Publishers, New Delhi. 1994).
3. See for example Dummett's, 'Language and Communication' in *Reflections on Chomsky* ed. by Alexander George (Oxford, 1989).
4. 'Holism : Bhartṛhari and Quine', delivered as the Presidential Address to the 68th session of Indian Philosophical Congress (Abstract).
5. 'Moebius Strip, is a mathematically - puzzling one dimensional continuous ring having as inside, no outside, no beginning, no end and so it converges with itself. The convergence symbolizes the structural kinship, the intimate relationship between subject and object, matter and energy thus demonstrating the error of any attempt to bifurcate the observer and participant, the universe and may, into two or more systems of reality. See for a more perspicuous explanation in the R. N. Anshen's Notes on 'Moebius Strip' prefixed to N. chomsky's *Knowledge of Language : its nature, origin and use* (under the series called Convergence, Praeger special Studies, New York, 1986).
6. Recently, models of comparative analytical philosophy have been evidenced in Matilal-Sen-Shaw approach to Indian philosophical studies.
7. The Cookie-cutter metaphor is due to Hilary Putnam, see has *Many Faces of Realism*.
8. This is worked out in my article on 'Does Syncategorematicism imply Ramified-contextualism?' in *Indian Darsanas* (to be published by Department of Sanskrit, University of Calicut).

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