

## II

## LINGUISTIC SOLIPSISM

Razzaque's (IPQ, July, 1995) exposition of linguistic solipsism is not only unusually short (a small paragraph (p. 208-209) but also misleading. He does not clearly distinguish linguistic solipsism from ontological and epistemological solipsism. The subject or I can be in the centre of world, knowledge and language, respectively, in accordance with ontological solipsism, epistemological solipsism and linguistic solipsism. The world is my world, I can only know what experience, and I only understand what I mean by 'pain', for example, in "I am in pain" represent three kinds of solipsism - ontological, epistemological and linguistic respectively. Razzaque makes a confusion of the three and picks up one or another at wish. He says 'linguistic solipsism regards that my sense-data belong to me and others to them' (p. 208). But the same may be true of epistemological solipsism. He says 'Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* spells out in defense of solipsism' (p. 212) and cites the aphorism 5.62. This aphorism may be interpreted as indicating how significantly linguistic solipsism defends the view-point of ontological solipsism. Moreover, spelling out in defense of solipsism does not necessarily mean spelling out in defense of linguistic solipsism. In fact, considering the preface of the *Tractatus* wherein Wittgenstein asserts that *Tractatus* is the final verdict on all philosophical disputes (see p. 29) and relying on Wittgenstein's truthfulness to his communication with Drury (see Drury (1981) p. 110) wherein he asserts his intention of dealing philosophy as a business so that a final settlement of the disputes is aimed at, one should treat his discussion on solipsism as to be showing how solipsism is not a real problem to be wondered about. In other words, aphorism 5.62 of the *Tractatus* is more profitable as an argument for the aphorism 7, 'whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent', and, hence, for the uselessness of talking about solipsism, rather than as an argument in support of solipsism.

The received view about later Wittgenstein is that Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of private language. Contrary to this, Razzaque seems to be interpreting PI : 243 as the supporting premises for the conclusion that linguistic solipsism is irrefutable. One may not insist on the retainment of the received

view but one may expect from Razzaque the reasons for which he deviates. If he deviates his reasons should precede his deviation. No reason has been advanced by Razzaque. In fact it is not clear why Razzaque seeks to use *Tractatus* and *PI* to describe solipsism or to provide a supportive argument for solipsism. The former seems to be the case from the manner in which he switches on to Wittgenstein, the latter from the procedure of deriving the conclusion -- 'Thus individual experiences cannot be expressed in physical language' (p. 213) -- immediately after the discussion on (or, rather, quotations from) Wittgenstein.

If Razzaque accounts Wittgenstein in order to defend linguistic solipsism, not just to describe solipsism, then, he should have offered a clarification for his new or unorthodoxical interpretation. On the other hand, if the account is just for the sake of description or exposition of solipsism, then, Razzaque does not seem to have any substantial argument in defense of linguistic solipsism. He 'aims at a defense of linguistic solipsism against the physicalists' endeavour of refuting it' (p. 207). Now let a defense be like this : The secondary qualities are so subjective that no statement of quantitative terms can render the meaning that a statement of qualitative terms gives to us; when the latter is having a secondary quality as its predicate. For example, 'Grass is green' or 'This object is green' cannot be replaced by 'The colour of grass is in the range of such and such wave length' or 'The colour of this object is equivalent to a ray of light in such and such wave length!'

If one is not satisfied with this defense, I believe, so will one be with Razzaque's defense of linguistic solipsism. However, it may be assumed that Razzaque is strangely convinced of that linguistic solipsism is irrefutable but, somehow, fails to make explicit his reasons for which he is so convinced. Above all he defends linguistic solipsism.

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