

ASSOCIATION THEORY OF MEANING : A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LITERATURE

Music is, by its very nature powerless to express anything at all, whether a feeling, an attitude of mind, a psychological mood, a phenomenon of nature, etc. (Stravinsky in Cooke 1959 : 11)

There is virtually unanimous agreement that C major is a cheerful key. (Young 1991 : 240)

The controversy continues : Does art have meaning ? Is there a language of art ? Is music a language of feeling ? Does art express meaning like language expresses meaning ? Can music represent objects ?

Scruton (1983 : 62) wrote that music has no power to represent anything. Furthermore, *Nobody has yet shown that ordinary musical understanding is linguistic in form and it is doubtful that it could be shown.* (Scruton 1980 : 333) And Hanslick (1982) holds that music expresses nothing at all beyond itself. An attempt will be made here to show that art, including music, can represent, and does have meaning in a way similar to the way in which language has meaning. This first requires a brief analysis of meaning.

The traditional and common view is that *Words have meaning. Words possess meaning, and, The meaning is in the word.* We look for meaning in words. We look, but we do not find meaning as such there. Words do not have meanings as people have books. They do not own them. Nor would we wish to say they possess them or are possessed. We must look elsewhere. Words, marks and sounds are thought ideas. Meaning is the representation of ideas by means of words, so the meaning is not in the word, but in us.

Meaning becomes a synonym of *idea*. But ideas, thoughts, concepts, etc. are rejected in contemporary philosophical psychology as being pseudo-psychological terms (Shibles 1974a, Wittgenstein 1968). In place of *thought* we may put *self-talk* and *utterances*. Thought reduces to language. If *idea* is mentalistic, then so also is *meaning*. The common view of meaning as the representation of ideas is, then, rejected. Quine (1964 : 77, 160) wrote, *The notion of there being a fixed, explicable, and as yet unexplained meaning in the speaker's mind is gratuitous*. On these views, neither language nor art can express ideas, because there are none (cf., Lyons 1968 : 401, 408, 474). Dewey (1965 : 189) states, *It is heresy to conceive meanings to be private, a property of ghostly psychic existences*. Our task becomes that of finding a nonmentalistic theory of meaning. Contextualist theories such as that of the pragmatist, and Wittgenstein's view of meaning as the use of a word in a language-game, satisfy this criterion.

How does "chalk" mean chalk ? The quotation marks around "chalk" mean that it is to be treated as a word, that is, as marks or sounds (Shibles 1970). As such, it is an object. We nonmentalistically associate this word with the object, chalk. How this is done need not concern us. That it is done does. We learn the meaning of words in this way. The meanings of a word are the associations between the word, one object, and another object. Meaning is associations of objects. In terms of language-game theory, it is associations of words with words, and words with contexts (games).

The association theory is not new, but the nonmentalistic theory is. David Hartley (1666/1749 : 416) wrote, *Particular kinds of air and harmony are associated with particular words, affections, and passions, and so are made to express them*. Passions are simple *ideas* united by association (p. 368). Kivy (1980 : 77) speaks of music which conventionally expresses emotion, such as the minor key with dark emotions, as *customary associations*. He and Charles Arison (in 1752), present the view that music arouses emotion by association with past ideas. Behrend (1988 : 206) speaks of *musically suggested feeling*. Gombrich's (1960) *equivalence response* reduces to association.

Deryck Cooke (1959 : 174-175) develops a language of music whereby elements of music are associated with human emotions. He gives the following terms of what he calls the basic meanings of the musical vocabulary of emotion : tone - color depends on *the warmly passionate strings, the pastoral flute and oboe, the querulous or comic bassoon, the heroic trumpet, or the solemn trombone or on such individual discoveries as Berlioz's shrilly vulgar E flat clarinet, Strauss's spiteful oboes, Mahler's viciously sardonic trombones, and Vaughn William's lachrymose saxophone.* (p.112) The musical vocabulary itself includes, for example, that minor second renders *spiritless anguish*; minor third, stoic acceptance or tragedy; major third, joy; sharp fourth, *devilish and inimical forces.* (p. 90) Rising pitch is an outgoing emotion; the ascending major third gives a positive, bright emotion or joy (p. 115). In general, the major interval is said to yield pleasure, the minor - pain, and the contrast between them provides tension and contrast.

In this way, we can associate music with emotion. Although Cooke rejects cognitive (linguistic) associations with music, it is clear that music by association with language connotation can also express cognition. This view gives meaning to Leahy's (1976 : 153) view that music evokes emotion, but does not express it. In any piece of art or music, we need only specify the cognitive and emotive associations we make with the work to see what the art means. *Art expresses y, means. We associate art with y.* We do not express or *press out* ideas into words as we might pour water into a glass. If meaning were the expression of the ideas of a person, it is not clear what would be meant by the expression, *the meaning of painting.* It is to personify. We say, *Language has meaning*, but objects, including art objects, are not languages and so would not have meaning. However, on the new paradigm, music has meaning in the sense that any object is rich in associations. *Understanding art* involves becoming aware of these associations. The formalist view that the meaning is only in the object, and the expressionist view that the meaning is only in the subject, is resolved. It is an either-or fallacy. Music has internal associations with other sounds and it also has external associations with every other known object including human language and emotion. Young (1991 : 235) says, *I hold that the character of a key is due to its suitability for the writing of music*

which resembles aspects of human expressiveness. Both the formalist and the expressionist are correct. In music, we find tension, expectation, counterpoint, contrast, rage, and gentleness. We find the same in spring and winter and the weather, but in a different way. Each subject matter, as each art, has its own unique associations. Each language, each artist, each perceiver is in this sense unique. Human emotion can never be the same as musical emotion or architectural emotion. Each of the arts renders emotion in its own way to create metaphorical insight into emotion itself.

We may now ask, *What does this painting tell us about the painter, the society, the culture, morality, our humanity?* Art can tell us about all of these. In everyday life, we read off endless things from observing a person's face. We can say, *This musical performance has no heart.* What music and art can say and express is no longer a mystery. But there is more to association than we are aware of, something akin to subliminal perception.

Ivan Fónagy (1963) has shown by behavioral research that people regard front vowels as light, and back vowels as dark. The r-sound is more wild, rough, swirling, less smooth, more masculine, than the l-sound. M and l are sweeter than t or k. R is more read than k. The associations reach beyond each sense to other senses (synaesthesia) (cf., tone-poems). It is shown that books on phonetics and linguistics and books for singers are rich in metaphors. Every sound has its own color, pitch is *high* or *low*. The voice is *neutral*, *white*, *hard*, *trailing*, *broken*, or *wet*. Vowels are *light*, *dark*, *sharp*, *thin*, *wide*, *feminine*, *masculine*, *hard*, *strong*, *fine*, *high*, *deep*. Poetry is usually only understood because of such subtle or secondary associations or connotations. A language requires general agreement of associations. There is a dictionary and relatively fixed vocabulary. We can look up a word. Nonlinguistic objects also have associations and connotations, but these are not so fixed or agreed upon. We do not have a connotation dictionary. We cannot look up poetic meanings because the meanings deviate from the usual communicative associations. The connotations of trees and sky do not form a language. The gloss for *stone* will not be found to be *security* or *masculinity*.

Fónagy is a Freudian, but that theory is found unacceptable in view of such books as MacIntyre (1958), and more recent work in philosophical psychology. Instead, we may explain such concepts as the *unconscious* by suggesting that what we mean by them is the subtle associations and connotations we make, which we are aware of only by experiment, or when they are pointed out to us. We need not ask, *Where are the associations when we are not thinking of them?* The *unconscious mind* is not an invisible, mystical entity behind the scenes, but rather it may be regarded as nonmentalistic associations we do make. It is in this respect that, *Art is an expression of the unconscious*, may be clarified.

As a test to show that we make associations of which we are not aware, two figures may be presented, one of the bean shaped object, the other of a star shaped object. The viewer is asked to associate two nonsense words, *krick* and *boang* with each object. The results in nearly every case tested, revealed that nearly one hundred percent of the students labeled the bean-shaped object, *boang*. We need not ask why. What is significant is that its association is almost universal. We could similarly determine the associations one makes with various kinds of lines: straight = rational, curved = emotional, ascending = optimistic, wavy = active, etc. Each color has similar associations.

The more we can learn about the associations we make we can understand about how we think and what art can teach us. Art can give us knowledge in the sense that by our becoming more aware of our sensual associations, the subtle connotations hidden in words and objects, we become more aware of our thinking generally. We become less captivated by implicit suggestions. Therapy and dream analysis involve just such concerns. In therapy and argument we need all the associations available in order to understand and see what is and what is not relevant to problem solving.

Some things are central. If we know a person's root metaphors, their basic permeating belief systems (religion, political beliefs, etc.) we know a lot about their associations. We want to know the self-talk and perceptions of the artist and appreciator of art. We cannot know all of this, yet such knowledge is crucial for understanding human

behavior and art.

One paradigm of association is preference and normality. To ask for association is to ask for usual, or primary, as opposed to remote, or farfetched associations. That is, we can ask, *What do you most closely associate with x?* Another is to ask for rules or laws of association. MacGill (1838) gave four laws of association as the basis of the figures of speech, thus making a connection with metaphor which is a fundamental basis of the arts. Association: a) by cause and effect (metonymy), b) by contiguity (synecdoche), c) resemblance (metaphor, analogy and simile), d) by contrariety (irony and anithesis).

We may examine associations by means of paradigms. To ask for all the associations possible would be a misconceived demand for evidence. New paradigms can always be constructed. Art itself contributes to the possibilities and evaluations of new associations.

By association we may sometimes mean evaluation. Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1967) used this in their *Semantic differential* measure of meaning. One may scale any term as follows: good 1)-2)-3)-4)-5)- bad. For example, one may associate jazz with #1, or *very good*. The scale need not be constructed in terms of polar opposites as they have done. It would also have to include terms which are most relevant to the topic of concern. But one may also use the scale to ask regarding: intentional - accidental, clear - ambiguous, positive emotion - negative emotion, insight - lack of insight, harmonious - chaotic, unified - disorderly, common - farfetched, sincere - insincere, practical - impractical, rational - irrational, moral - immoral, etc. One may be asked also to simply describe the art object as one experiences it. Kahans & Calford (1982) used the semantic differential to show that music may produce a positive change of attitude of the patient towards the therapist. Music therapy association constitutes a laboratory or microcosm for the client's life and problems; and rational lyrics have been used to induce clients to be more adjustive (Bryant 1987).

Music has connotations which create tone-poems. The emcee in the musical, Cabaret, supposedly connotes and symbolizes

decadence. He is gaunt. His knees jangle in his sharp movements as if he were a skeleton. His face is painted white, giving a surreal and unusual grotesque appearance, as well as suggesting death personified. He takes on the role of a female dancer only to reveal his male identity at the end of the dance. He paints his lips in a bizarre manner perhaps mockingly suggesting the lips of women, yet unlike lipstick any women or even any clown would wear. His voice is shrill and mocks as he introduces and welcomes people to the life and tragedy of the decadent Cabaret.

This seems to be what we want in an explanation of meaning. We seek a) perceptual, b) cognitive, and c) emotive associations. We translate our perceptions into a story. We wish to learn the various ways in which we may understand the art object - or anything at all. As a consequence of the above theory, some additional questions find answers :

- a) Art does not have to be intended to have emotive and cognitive meaning.
- b) Nature and any object whatever can have such meaning as well.
- c) Aesthetic meaning depends on value and emotive associations.
- d) All if the emotions may be associated with any object, for ex., suggestions of a sunset may be : hope, death; of clouds : freedom or fear of rain.
- e) Associations which do not conform to reality or consistency, result in fallacies such as : Personification, pathetic fallacy, anthropomorphism, and empathy (understood as identity with the object). Schizophrenic *thinking* is a breakdown of the self.
- f) The more we know about association (and metaphor), the better we can understand and express cognition and emotion in art.
- g) Art is like a puzzle requiring solution, putting clues together.
- h) Does art give knowledge ? Yes, in the sense of new associations. If it is nonverbal art, it may be limited or largely perceptual pleasure, such as the taste of ice-cream.
- i) Can music make us moral ? This has been a controversial question at least since Plato's attempt to connect music and morality. On the association theory, music can suggest and encourage the desirable and undesirable through its associations

of the presence or lack of: balance, harmony, gentleness, order, etc. Gentle intonation gives a different message than harsh, belligerent tones of voice or music. By association art and music can, within their limitations, express an ethos. For example, music can have and mirror (imitate) gentleness or it can bring about calmness. It can restructure our thinking.

One theory of expression is generated by a pun, by taking emotion literally: Meidner's (1985) article is entitled, "Motion and E-Motion in Music." The thesis is that because *emotion* is a kind of *motion*, it is associated somehow with motion in music or the other arts. Kivy (1980: 35), for example, presents Webb's view that music is movement, and emotion is movement, thus the movement of music causes movement (e-motion) in us (cf., Budd 1987). The gait and bearing of a person is associated with the movement of music. Budd (1983) presents the view that words which describe music, such as *excited*, and *calm*, also describe bodily movement. *Movement* is also a musical term and generates the idea that *the movement* (musical) is *moving* (in the sense of emotional).

The classical formalist position is that of Hanslick (1982: 74) who holds that music is *tonally moving* forms* (*tonend bewege Formen*). For him, only the motion of music is like the motion of emotion (p. 53). By reducing music to motion, it supposedly makes it more objective, places it within music itself rather than in the subject. It is an attempt to reduce cognitive emotion to bodily feeling. The German word, *Regung*, refers to both emotion as well as to movement (quick tempo, rapid scales, falling intervals, vibrating bass, etc.) of music which causes emotion. *Movement is heard in music.* (Davies 1983: 232)

It is controversial as to whether or not the movement is in the music (formalist view), or in us (expressionist view). Hanslick (1982) says the beauty is in the music, the expressionist says it is in us. Scruton (1983: 94) says the movement is not literally in the music at all, but in us. The attempt to reduce e-motion to motion is a semantic attempt to resolve the controversy. However, on the cognitive theory of emotion, emotion is not movement (Shibles 1974). It is cognition which causes bodily feelings. The bodily

feelings are themselves often disturbances, or deviations (movements) from our usual emotional state. But emotion itself is not mere movement, nor is it based solely on the perception of movement.

Rather, it is the case that we may associate motion in music with human bodily movement. A slow movement may be assessed with slow gait, a quick tempo with running, or even joy. We may relate musical movement to each emotion in this way without controversy. Along these lines, Callen (1982 : 386) asserts that music can *fictionally* express our emotive life because of the dynamism and other qualities in the music.

Is art (painting, music etc.) a language ? This depends upon what is meant by language. It is typical that when art is regarded as language, no definition or meaning is given. Our common language is everyday language. There are also the various languages of each discipline. Each universe of discourse such as physics, music, painting etc. has its own terminology, techniques and methods. But all are based on or presuppose ordinary language. Even mathematics is based on ordinary language. We do not speak mathematics or geometry. Without ordinary language they would be unintelligible, and furthermore, without language we do not know what any thinking would be like. The various arts are also based on ordinary language. The painter speaks about *blue, lines, texture*, etc. and reads, talks, or teaches about art. The arts are not nonverbal disciplines, not pure sensuous involvement as is so often claimed.

Attempts have been made to reduce one discipline to another, to reduce, for example, music to mathematics or physics, to reduce experience to physiology, to reduce quality to quantity, to reduce anything to whatever it is not. Transformational grammarians are notorious for having attempted to reduce ordinary language to structure and formal syntax. The result has been the failure to account for the way in which ordinary language works. Poetry, metaphor, emotion have not been able to be accounted for by such methods. Linguists are increasingly going beyond mere syntax and structure to concern themselves with pragmatics, semantics and ordinary language (cf., Kövecses 1990, Lakoff & Johnson 1980.)

Attempts have also been made to reduce ordinary language to symbolic logic, a quantitative system based on the mathematical model. Philosophers and numerous philosophical journals presuppose that symbolic logic is an acceptable problem-solving tool. They are, as it were, captivated by a model or paradigm. The attempt was most recently made by Wittgenstein (1961) himself in the *Tractatus*, to reduce language to symbolic logic, a calculus of sentences. But his *Philosophical Investigations* (1968), perhaps the most significant and influential philosophical work of the Twentieth Century, argues that the attempt must fail due to a faulty view of meaning and language. On this basis, he returns us to a more full and adequate analysis of ordinary language, thereby establishing the well-known ordinary - language philosophy which caused a permanent change in the way in which philosophy is done. He wrote, *It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard of ways.* (# 133, p.51) John Dewey (1964) and F. Schiller (1912, 1930, 1932) had long ago attacked symbolic logic and formal logic as being philosophically unsound, and unacceptable as methods of solving practical problems as well. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche (1954 : 481) had long ago entered the debate : *In logic reality is not encountered at all, not even as a problem.* Langacker (1988 : 13) states, *I opt for a cognitively and linguistically realistic conception of language over one that achieves formal neatness at the expense of drastically distorting and impoverishing its subject matter.* F. Waismann (1968 : 22-23) wrote, *I am not letting out a secret when I say that the ordinary rules of logic often break down in natural speech - a fact usually hushed up by logic books If logicians had their way, language would become as clear and transparent as glass, but also as brittle as glass : and what would be the good of making an axe of glass that breaks the moment you use it ?*

Because symbolic logic is so entrenched, as Freudianism had been until recently, a few recent statements may be added to the controversy at least for the purpose of showing that it is a controversial method of analysis. Seale Doss (1985 : 129) calls for *an outright acknowledgment that the theory of formal logic is quite simply and quite fundamentally wrong.* Robert Fogelin (1985 : 1) speaks of the need to learn to present and understand

arguments and that *Formal logic ... has not fulfilled this function.* (cf., Shibles 1985 :185 - 210).

Among aestheticians, Croce (1917 : 147) said, *As the science of thought, logic is a laughable thing.* Collingwood (1938) attacks logic for, among other things, omitting intonation and thereby omitting much of the meaning which argument and understanding depend. He argued that the logician is an alienist. Logic erroneously excludes emotion as well. *The 'proposition' understood as a form of words expressing thought and not emotion, as constitution and unit of scientific discourse, is a fictitious entity.* (p. 266)

It is not mathematics nor formal logic, but informal logic, rhetoric, metaphor and the analysis of ordinary language which we mean by language. This is a language all theories, including skepticism, must ultimately use and return to. This is what is meant here by *language* in its full-blooded sense. It is language that is adequate to the task of understanding poetry, literature, music, and the other arts. It includes syntax and formal structure, but does not exclude semantics and pragmatics. Thus a reduction of art to a formal language is bound to fail.

It was argued that language has meaning by means of associations. *Expression and meaning* encompass a word-field of related terms : For *express* in, *x expresses y*, we may substitute : causes, correlates, effects, imitates, characterizes, releases (e.g. emotion), explains, clarifies, communicates, symbolizes and renders metaphorically. These may be seen as different kinds of associations. Art is language in the sense that it can perform each of these tasks. For the above reasons, we may reject Scruton's (1981 : 327) statement, "*Expression*" must not be confused with '*association*.'

The *language* of the arts performs many of these tasks, but in one fundamental sense they are not languages. Language is a set of traditional and agreed upon associations of words (marks and sounds). There are restrictive rules of grammar and fixed dictionary definitions. The arts typically have neither fixed rules nor dictionary definitions. A music dictionary is language about music, not musical language. In this sense, one may also speak of the language of clouds.

Musical notes are not linguistic vocabulary. They are only a *vocabulary* of music. Tones in music do not, in general, have the purpose to refer to objects by means of agreed upon associations. *Music... is... an abstract art, with no power to represent the world.* (Scruton 1983 : 62). This is only partially true. Tones may only suggest objects, as in a tone - poem. They cannot, but do not clearly denote. Program music gives the listener suggestive instructions as to what to listen for. Examples are found in the symphonic poems of Liszt, Beethoven's *Pastoral Symphony*, Strauss's *Don Juan* and *Don Quixote*, or Debussy's *La mer*. The title of a painting may give similar clues. It is to preserve the uniqueness of a painting to merely number it, or to name a jazz piece, *Sky Train*. or *Chasing the Bird*.

Any object may connote, but to be a language it must have agreed upon denotation. Nor are tastes language, though there may be a *language* of taste. One major difference between art and spoken language is that between perception and *conception* (language-use). A taste is not a word though what taste would be for us if we had never learned a language is speculative. A melody is not a sentence, though we speak of a musical *phrase*. A symphony is not a speech.

While recognizing that art is not a language, it may nevertheless have some of the functions of language and expression. The concept of association reveals what these functions are. We can paraphrase in language the associations a specific line, melody, or combination or colors have for us. Kivy (1980 : 77) calls traditional associations *conventional associations*, and *contour* refers to the *congruence of musical 'contour' with human emotion*. For example, rapid tempo, major key, etc. refer to happiness. The classical and romantic periods each developed characteristic symbols, meanings. Individual artists, e.g., Chagall, may develop symbolisms of their own making. Compared to the richness of language the nonverbal arts cannot expect to develop more than illustrative or primitive language. They cannot alone produce argument or conceptual clarification. They stand closer to sensual experience and enjoyment, or cryptic or unasserted thought symbolism, than to intellectual understanding. For those who give epistemological primacy to language, what non-sensual insight is given, is given because

perception (seeing-as) and the subject matter are verbalized. Words are set to music, painting is described. And as Scruton (1983 : 93) points out, a chord may be given different and even conflicting descriptions.

Art in fact destroys our language and our usual associations, and in so doing, shows both the limits, and possibilities of our language. It is a strange-making, and astonishing, and so restructures our lives. Here association becomes rhetoric where rhetoric is metaphor, using such techniques as oxymoron, reversal, juxtaposition, substitution - and deviations from the traditional, normal, expected, practical, desirable, etc. We discover new ways of seeing, hearing and moving (cf., "Metaphor as association." Shibles 1971a : 373, 1971b).

Leonard Bernstein (1976 : 181) holds a formalist view of expression according to which music has only musical meaning. We may first hear sounds in everyday life, but then learn to *dissociate* them in order to create abstract music : *Meaning is not in terms of jonquils and daisies, but of notes and rhythms.* He illustrates by means of Beethoven's Symphony Number 6 in F which clearly is meant to have nonmusical meanings. The first movement even has the subtitle, *The Awakening of Cheerful Feeling on Arriving in the Country.* There are even onomatopoeic references such as bird calls and pipes of shepherds. But Bernstein points out that we can also listen to this without the extramusical imagery and references, and that it still makes good sense musically. We may then hear music alternately as related to everyday sounds, as dissociated from them, and as abstract musical metaphor. A standard photograph is to abstract art as the sound of a brook is to music.

Putman (1987 : 57) asks, Why is there sad and joyous music, but no 'shameful' or 'embarrassing' music ? We see that there can be shameful and embarrassing music by means of associations. Embarrassment means awkward, stumbling; *shame* means guilt and disgrace, and certainly music can render these. It is the special skill of the artist to do so. Heroism as well as cowardice and retreat have been artistically portrayed.

A significant paradigm of association is intonation. By means of intonation, we may express anger, love, irritation, impatience, deceit and an unlimited number of cognitions and emotions. It is like a second language. It is a folk truism that how something is said can be more important than what is said. It may possess more credibility. It is always surprising to see how captivated we are by the myth that a sentence does, or even can, mean only one thing. Each sentence can mean an unlimited number of things. Collingwood (1938 : 264ff). stresses this importance of one's tone of voice. Without it one cannot speak of understanding an argument or discourse. Intonation in everyday language may be more aesthetic than a symphony. Any language can be spoken beautifully. Language can be a symphony.

Speakers are able to detect the meanings of thousands of intonations. These sounds take on the status of a language. There is, given careful attention, much agreement about their meanings. The loudness, tempo, etc. tell us things like, *I do not approve, You irritate me, I am depressed, You are charging too much*, etc. Our ears are attuned to this.

It is not then surprising to find that many base the expressivity of music on the expressivity of the intonation of language. Sparshott (1980 : 126) held that music imitates the voice. He calls this phenomenon, *musica humana* (p. 123). Hoaglund (1980 : 347) wrote, *The expressive power of some instrumental music may derive from its appropriating and reproducing such features of a spoken natural language as phrasing, cadences, intonation pattern.* Music is even personified and heard as an utterance, according to Kivy (1980 : 28 ff., 57, 77). Baroque music conforms to the accents of the human voice (Palisca 1980 : 173). Budd (1985 : 175), on the other hand, holds that expression in music cannot be based on expression in the human voice. Langer holds a similar view (Hoaglund 1980 : 345). One of the reasons one may propose for this diversity of views is that little research has been done on meaning and emotion in speech intonation. Couper-Kuhlen (1986 : 180) wrote, *Virtually all past studies of intonation and attitude have been unsatisfactory.* And Rischel (1990 : 400) stated, *Prosodic categories are ill-defined in phonetics.* Price (1988 : 215) and Levinson (1982

: 335) take the narrow formalist position that it is only the object, the tones which produce meaning, nothing extramusical or subjective. It is difficult to understand how any object can have meaning in itself without humans to give it meaning.

Wittgenstein (1968) gave epistemological primacy to language. Among others holding a similar view are : Barthes, Derrida, Dewey, Chomsky, Hartnack, Heidegger, Muller, Peirce, Ryle, Sapir, Shibles, Waismann, Whorf, and Winch. This means that the scientific method is not based on observation (naive empiricism), but on language. The concept of 'seeing as' shows that sensation is always conceptualized, that we never have pure sensation. Cognition or language-use is bound up with all perception. Perception comes classified and evaluated.

Similarly, Collingwood (1938 : 249) holds that expression is language; there is an *identification of art with language*. If there is no language, there is no expression. Without it there are just crude feelings. Language is needed to reach the level of emotion, to correct the impressions into ideas by means of language. *The English tongue will only express 'English emotions.'* (p. 245) Emotion as expressed in German, for example, is different semantically and lexically, but also syntactically. In German, like French, emotions primarily make use of reflexives, for example, *I am angry*, becomes, *I anger myself (Ich argere mich.)* (Cf. Shibles 1990 ab).

Art is by its very nature cognitive. The music we hear which seems like pure sensation would not be music without language. Kivy (1980) says that dogs cannot hear sounds as music. This is the reason why. If language has epistemological primacy, we cannot get outside of language. We cannot base it on seeing or hearing. We are caught in a *linguo - centric* predicament. We can only use the language-games of explanation, description, etc., but none will get us outside of language (Shibles 1972 : 82 - 102). *I cannot with language get outside of language. (Ich Kann mit der Sprache nicht aus der Sprache heraus.)* [My translation. Wittgenstein, 1964 : 54] There are no real explanations of language. To explain is to play one among many language-games. To find out what language is we can only *look* and *see*. But what it is will be determined by the language we see it as.

This may be applied to art. Inasmuch as art presupposes language, language is a given and cannot be transcended. Music, for example, as a universe of discourse has epistemological primacy in its seeings as and metaphors, and we cannot transcend or get outside of it. I can with music not get outside of music. I can play the language-game of explaining it or relating it to mathematics or the language of cognition and emotion, but that does not provide the true, essential or absolute explanation. It does not explain away the language-game of music. Language is bound up with perception and perception is bound up with language. Alone each is an artificial construct. Music is linguistic and language is musical.

Philosophy

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