

KNOWLEDGE OF VALUE

The aim of the present paper is to elucidate the nature of knowledge of value and to show that there is no fundamental difference between knowledge of value and creation of value i.e., knowing a value is constituting it. There is no sense in saying that I know a value, yet I do not want to actualise it. Knowledge of value at the same time means choice of value. Knowledge of value is not propositional, it does not uncover what it is but has got illocutionary force (to use Austin's language) of transforming the very being of the individual. Here, it is important to distinguish the knowledge and the content of value in *oratio-obliqua* and *oratio-recta* i.e., mentioning the concept of value and using the concept of value. One might refer to value in the third person which is mentioning the concept of value in *oratio-obliqua*. The primary use of value is only in the first person (based on the content of consciousness of the person), other uses are only parasitical on it. In the present paper we are not interested to analyse value in *oratio-obliqua* which concerns value at the second remove i.e., value as commodity of social transaction. We propose to discuss value in *oratio-recta* which delineates creative innovation in value experience.

In the first place, it is important to distinguish knowledge of value from knowledge of fact and knowledge of possessing a skill i.e., in which sense 'knowing an ideal' is different from 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. The three kinds of knowledge are interlinked without being identified with one another. 'Knowing an ideal' presupposes information and skill but it is not exhausted or defined in terms of them. This highlights the supervenient character of an ideal. 'Knowing that' refers to or comprises of factual propositions which can be true or false. Such propositions refer to state of affairs

which are either affirmed or denied. Factual propositions can be of past or present but they are not future-oriented (unless they are predictions). 'Knowing how' involves skill which is a capacity to control and regulate the objects or their clusters and their processes of change. Skill is the ability on the part of the agent to identify, fabricate and implement the relevant steps to secure the product sought. Any skill entails judging suitability of some means to realise acknowledged ends. For example, the skill of the doctor is in bringing optimal results, it is in his therapeutic performance— by his expertise based on evaluation of the pathological condition of the patient as well as his medical competence in implementing the relevant course of the treatment. In other words, the doctor adheres to a pre-set paradigm of good health, as an objectively determined norm, in view of specifics of the each case which is in distinction to his 'professional value' of removing afflictions of mankind.

Skill is about the present and anticipated future. 'Knowing that' is the assertion of discrete states, in 'knowing how' there is succession of states which can be regulated and controlled (if there is genuine capacity) by conduct which amounts to an intended project. Value refers indifferently to past, present and future. The apprehension of value is not only at present moment but it serves as a paradigm for evaluating (past actions) and guiding future actions.

A great deal of philosophical reflection has been done in the past on exact manner of formulating ideals on the grounds of appropriate locutionary information and dependable understanding of the relationship of means to ends. Is there or is there no determination of ends on the basis of knowledge of fact relevant to human activities and adequacy of some activities to produce certain consequences? So, philosophers have argued to establish that truly basic to any ideal are facts (of course even among themselves they make different levels of givenness) which are not impervious to human intentions, needs, goals and even the latter are reflections of one's own body as well as mental dispositions. As such there is double dependence of values both in terms of (1) feasibilities of value and its realization in the world (2) articulations of values from the matrix of one's attitudinal dispositions, body states, stock of mental images and verbal sequences. Against such naturalism, it is maintained in the present note that values are neither equivalent nor derivable from determinate set of

either some facts or by introduction of some constitutive definitions. Ends are recognised independently and are not accumulated from sheer accretions of means. In fact the appropriateness of means is judged through ends. Value is not to be derived from any stock of conditions. Stock of knowledge is only an enabling condition but no set of such conditions can be a determining condition. What determines a value is reflective appraisal that goes beyond the enabling conditions. The individual can hold a value which might be in conflict with the demands of his own nature, inclinations, habits or society. Value can arrest, check or reverse the normal anticipations of hitherto gathered stock of 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. The same fact can be apprehended in alternative value and the same value may manifest in alternative facts. For example, a teacher's giving lenient marks to a weak child may be interpreted as an act of generosity or an act of achieving the ideal of equity by giving the beneficiary the essential and desirable confidence that he is like other children. We can also see this assessment as embodying on the part of the teacher his excessive devotion to the balanced growth of the child as intrinsic part of his vocation. Similarly, different means can be adopted to attain the same value. Justice can be achieved by various means i.e., by punishing the law-breakers, by removing the procedural delay etc. All these instances are designed to make the point that knowledge of norms does not entail any particular specific strategy.

It is often argued that there can be various perspectives even in 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. The nature of 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' is not simple or unproblematic. There is immediacy even among objects of 'knowing that', which are alternatively appropriated later by our different cognitive judgements. One does acknowledge the contribution of mind in appropriating perceptual judgements and that goes contrary to the simplistic notion of knowing that as basically revelatory of the external object (naïve realism). The same fact can be interpreted in alternative ways. One can intergrate and assimilate the object in different ways. Sometimes, the two propositions may refer to the same information. For instance, the propositions (1) The number four is greater than three, (2) number three is smaller than four refer to the same information. But in the paradigm of 'knowing that', subject is determined by the external object in terms of the content of the representation. The implications of 'Knowing that' depend upon a certain state of affairs. 'Knowing

that' is asserted with truth-claims and truth-claims of 'Knowing that' are nothing if they do not implicate some particular fact. In case of 'knowing that', act, content and object are distinguishable. Likewise, in 'knowing how' the relationship of means and ends sought is not simple and call for knowledge conditions in terms of 'knowing that'. Besides that, in 'knowing how', one can adopt different skills to get the same thing. There can be different stages as warranted by alternative means referring to the same end. But each alternative will have its own constraints. One may adopt different means for swimming, there can be different types of physical movements i.e., movements of hands, breast etc. But keeping oneself aloft on the surface of water is one of the determining conditions. Further, 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' are affirmed or refuted on the basis of empirical evidence. 'Knowing that' is subject to improvement and revision by the appropriate evidence, there are rules and criteria of accepting evidence that could have alternatives. 'Knowing how' is appraised in terms of efficiency to bring about a certain state of affairs.

Value autonomy, on the other hand, is of a different order. One should not mix up immediacy of knowing 'that' and 'how' with valuational immediacy. The former set of immediacy is passive as against what we call constitutive 'experience of value' which both in form and content seems to fuse in subjectivity and does not merely represent an 'external presentation'. Value is not determined by any finite set of conditions. It is contra-factual and occasions the freedom of the individual. Value experience, accordingly, is transcendent of the historic conditions of life of the person as well as the natural order of things. The biographical antecedents of the individual are to be distinguished from valuational constituents that are reflected upon by the individual. The historical facts of the agent are not determinants of the valuational cognitions. The relationship between values and their opposite conditions of adequate realisations is not pre-determined and any coincidence between the life of the individual and his values, need not be thought to be mutually interdependent. The life conditions do not have symmetrical role in articulations of value experience. The same pattern of desires, needs and their backdrop of realization could present to human awareness drastically incompatible values. A great failure may bring about to a person to realise the value of renunciation of material possessions. While another similar

experience on a historic occasion may arouse the same person to the value of courage under adversity and struggle against odds. The reverse might happen to another person. He may learn renunciation in victory and courage in ordinary circumstances. The third person may see the vanity of all hope either in failure or victory. Here, the important philosophical issue could only be the question whether on the ground of psychological correlates and unique sequence of each individual memory, the so-called 'same person' is really the same person. In other words, underlying the great rigmarole of finitude, truth is that we are genuinely in depth 'different being'— a saint, a poet, a lover, a philosopher, a criminal, articulated by collaterally 'defined values', often peopling the same bodily location.

What the above contrary instance of correlation of different types of intentions and their realisations or frustrations demonstrates is that a man can realise a value independent of any particular specific scenario, though some scenario is always called for as it is not possible to think of value in vacuum. The agent sidesteps his own historicity or could transfigure and transform 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' which constitute the scenarios of the subject in specific historic episode. This reveals the dimension of value, though rooted in temporality and historicity (even in plurality), is, however, timeless. It helps human awareness to transform finitude into unconditioned imperatives as universals. This awareness does not disregard the basic concrete conditions or reject those as of no consequence but assimilates in our intense revelatory values. These varied conditions are not incompatible with the positing of these revelations of not yet realised possibilities of human subjectivity. It is in reorganising and reconstituting the given world that value reveals their dynamic potential. Once a value is recognised, it is not vitiated by the external conditions; the hostile consequences in no way could disvalue it. Values cannot, thus, be supported or repudiated by empirical evidence. It is not the material success or failure which defines value. If one has not succeeded in actualising the value, the failure would be taken to be of means and not of value by one who has experienced it. By others it is only through *oratio-obliqua* or 'mentioning of values' which never possesses value experience itself, but disputes its externalisation. If charity producess bad

consequences, there is nothing wrong with the value of charity, but with the modes of realising it. This is what we mean by intrinsicity and autonomy of value and freedom and creativity of the agent. To say that I cognise goodness in *x* means I apprehend *x* to be good. The judgement is neither on mental facts, nor on objective state of affairs but on the intentionality of the cognising subject. The statement is about the way of constituting a value on the basis of entertaining the good reasons for value and judging them as sufficient to be universal.

Value depends upon the appropriation of consciousness. The relationship between consciousness and the object of value is internal. In cases of 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' the relationship between consciousness and the object is external. My subjective self is distinguishable from my information and skill whereas my value is not different from my own being. Value does not make one more informed or efficient but transforms the very being of the individual. It is in this sense we can say that knowing a value is ideal self-formulation. Value and person are coeval i.e., self-revelation and axiogenesis are interdependent. Here, person is not to be understood in terms of psycho-physical reality but as self-positing subjectivity. The concept of person is non-naturalistic, it is neither determined by internal states of the body nor by external objective facts, but is characterised by a free transcending act which is to be explained in terms of creative acts. The person is in terms of his value-profiles and value is dependent upon the constitutive activity of consciousness. As person is defined in terms of values, there is no genuine perception of incompatibility of any intrinsic value by the person. Once a value is recognized, it does not remain my value but is held to be the value. Therein lies universalisability of value. Values are not chimeras and psychic events having compulsive praxiological determinations. The realm of value is the realm of objective uncertainty, creativity and freedom. Further, knowing a value commits oneself to a distinct praxis. This is the difference between axiological formulation and theoretical construction. Value is not an abstract ideal, it must press for its realization. Knowing an ideal is knowing its function as guiding conduct. In other words, knowing a value commits oneself to make choices and perform actions.

Thus, one of the contentions of the present paper, as I would like to reiterate, is that our philosophical analysis of value and understanding of subjectivity have not been recognized to be as close as in fact they are. The process of constituting intrinsic value by subjectivity does not presuppose any metaphysical conception of self. The twin conditions of creativity and universal obligatoriness are fused in human freedom. Conceptually, self (person) and value are different, the former is ontic, the latter is normative but the experiential content is identical.

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