

IS THERE A BREAK IN SARTRE'S THOUGHT ?

I

Philosophically, it is quite plausible to be concerned with the ways of being of consciousness *qua* consciousness alone. With such a concern in view it is also possible to view consciousness as an absolute in so far as the relation of consciousness with itself is concerned. In itself, such an undertaking does not necessarily commit one to any individualistic or suprahistorical view of consciousness, though it does not rule out such a possibility either. In this context, Sartre, who, in his phenomenological ontology of *Being and Nothingness*¹, was primarily, if not altogether, concerned with the being of consciousness *qua* itself, has, however, been, often, accused by his critics of expounding a suprahistorical of consciousness— a charge to which Sartre should be least susceptible, if his often repeated existentialist principle that existence precedes essence is adhered to.² Added to this problematic existentialist principle is the itinerary of Sartre's post-1946 thought which is historical, if not altogether "Marxist", in its approach and method. Has Sartre, therefore, changed after *Being and Nothingness* to accommodate the social and historical into his thought? Has he given up his so rich insights of *Being and Nothingness* concerning human situations, as Mary Warnock so often moaned? Is there any, of that all too famous, "epistemological break" in his thought as well ?³ Or, has he after all succeeded, as Sartre has so often claimed⁴, in bringing together the fruitful insights of both existentialism and Marxism?

II

As has been so often pointed out by many of Sartre's critics⁵, Sartre's conception of consciousness as outlined in *Being and Nothingness* seems to lack the required passivity to explain any social

involvement. For, while it is one thing to maintain that the realms of meanings, values, etc., come into being with the upsurge of the for-itself, it is quite another to overlook sociohistorical conditions that facilitate such creations, especially when we desire to situate the for-itself as a being-in-the-world.⁶ Because introduction of any passive structures into consciousness amounted to depriving Sartrean consciousness of its translucency and freedom, a theory of consciousness that allowed habitualities to reside in consciousness amounted to committing an act of bad faith and thus denial to consciousness of its agonizing freedom. The in-itself in *Being and Nothingness*, therefore, had almost no 'signifying force of its own'.⁷

Furthermore, as freedom, for Sartre, 'was not an essence hiding behind the manifest structure of human reality', a paradox seems to arise between 'Sartre's phenomenological description of human reality as free and the "unfree" mode in which human reality inhabited its freedom'.⁹ Freedom, indeed, for Sartre was human in its essence and not natural, or natural only to the extent everything human is natural. In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre, therefore, spoke of freedom only in relation to that aspect of human reality which is not yet, i.e., the future.¹⁰ He viewed it as "surpassing of the given".¹¹ For Sartre, in *Being and Nothingness* and other fictional works that exemplified the ontological thesis of *Being and Nothingness*¹², to be human is to be free, though freedom was also never considered as that which was bestowed on the for-itself as some divine grace from above by our benevolent gods in heaven. Gods in fact were never permitted any role in the Sartrean scheme of things. The very being of human reality, thus, consisted in making free choices in concrete situations, i.e., all choices are choices-in-the-world.

Furthermore, having participated in the Second World War, Sartre's early thesis of ontologized freedom, especially in fictional works, seems to be coloured by certain ethical overtones. Because freedom, for Sartre, 'was not available only to an elite because it possessed some special quality, whether it was reason or the prerogatives of birth.... (But) freedom.... enveloped every human being at every moment of existence'.¹³ Any denial or restriction of freedom, for example, by a Nazi, a colonist, a racist, a patriarch, etc., was, therefore, nothing less than a denial of our humanity to us. To deny freedom is to *eo ipso* deny us our humanity through reduction of our being

to the status of an in-itself. Sartre, thus, having 'erased the specificity and historicity of freedom' freedom in his framework of *Being and Nothingness*, came to be universalized 'as a natural aspect of the human condition'.¹⁴ But such a viewing of freedom left unanswered questions that are so central to the human condition. For example, 'if freedom did indeed define consciousness, how was it possible that it was so absent from human experience? Why was it so difficult for human beings to be human beings?'¹⁵

While attempting to understand the implications of these questions we need to consider the importance of consciousness' relation with the given, for 'freedom is originally a relation to the given'.¹⁶ And, what exactly is this relation? The relation, says Sartre, is such that 'the given does not cause freedom (since it can produce only the given), nor is it the *reason* of freedom (since all "reason" comes into the world through freedom). Neither is it the necessary condition of freedom, since we are on the level of pure contingency'.¹⁷ And 'contingency and facticity are really one'.¹⁸ It is, indeed, true that a for-itself is 'never free except in situation'¹⁹ or 'within a condition'²⁰, but for-itself's relation with its situation or condition in *Being and Nothingness*'s framework appears to be quite one sided. This is so because in articulating freedom-situation relation Sartre 'marginalizes situatedness in favour of autonomous freedom'.²¹ The following passages clearly bring out this problem :

- (i) Man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the being of man and his being-free.²²
- (ii) I am absolutely free and absolutely responsible for my situation.²³
- (iii) Each for-itself, in fact, is a for-itself only by choosing itself beyond nationality and race just as it speaks only by choosing the designation beyond the syntax and morphemes. This "beyond" is enough to assure its total independence in relation to the structures which it surpasses; but the fact remains that it constitutes itself as beyond in relation to these particular structures.²⁴

'The paradox of freedom' is, thus, that 'there is freedom only in a situation and there is a situation only through freedom. Human-reality everywhere encounters resistance and obstacles which it has not created, but these resistances and obstacles have meaning only

in and through the free choice which human-reality is'.²⁵ And this paradox, indeed, was not without far-reaching consequences for the philosophy of *Being and Nothingness*. It is, in fact, Sartre's over-emphasis on surpassing the given *vis-a-vis* situatedness that *Being and Nothingness* could provide no examples of authentic freedom, even the term "authenticity" appeared just once and that also as a footnote. Sartre states _____

It is indifferent whether one is in good or in bad faith, because bad faith reapprehends good faith and slides to the very origin of the project of good faith, that does not mean that we cannot radically escape bad faith. But this supposes a self-recovery of being which was previously corrupted. This self-recovery we shall call authenticity, the description of which has no place here.²⁶

Does description of authenticity, therefore, have no place in *Being and Nothingness*? It appears that *Being and Nothingness* lacked any description of authenticity because here freedom was characterized by Sartre as "a constantly renewed obligation to rename the Self which designates the free being".²⁷ Any discourse on authenticity is barred from *Being and Nothingness* because 'my freedom is the unique foundation of values and that nothing, absolutely nothing, justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or that particular scale of values'.²⁸ And because this freedom was necessarily pinned with a feeling of anxiety, Sartre became an easy target of Marxists who argued that through anxiety burdened freedom Sartre merely universalized the specific experience of his class; that Sartrean freedom 'typified the despair of living in bourgeois civilization at the time of its "crisis"'.²⁹ And didn't Sartre himself state in *What is Literature?* - 'Ourselves bourgeois, we have known (only) bourgeois anxiety'.³⁰

Before reaching any final judgement on limitations of Sartre's ideas of freedom, authenticity, inauthenticity (or bad faith), etc., etc., it may perhaps be useful to first situate Sartre's ideas in their intellectual context. In this regard, it would be relevant to see how Frederic Jameson has tried to define authenticity in contradistinction with inauthenticity and how his attempt to see both authenticity and inauthenticity through their dialectical relationship contributes to our understanding of the human situation. Jameson, thus, asserts that inauthenticity, for both Heidegger and Sartre, was viewed as temporally prior to authenticity

(not necessarily but factually) because it is over and against the former that the latter constitutes itself as 'the primary mode of being of human life. Genuine authenticity is, therefore, not a state.... but rather something precariously wrested from inauthenticity, reclaimed and reconquered from it, and in perpetual danger of collapsing back into the older form.... For this reason we would do well.... to consider the idea of authenticity a critical one : for it cannot be defined in itself but only against some preexisting situation and state of inauthenticity which it is designed to correct or remove. We are, thus, led to explore the idea of authenticity through its opposite'.³¹ Furthermore, not everything concerning anxiety (i.e., the eternal pairing of freedom with anxiety), as stated by Sartre, was negative because the idea of anxiety did express at least some truth concerning the possibilities of transformation of a decadent society by trying to spell out the meaning of anxiety. But 'because Sartre in 1943 did not present his own concept of freedom in relation to a historical situation, much of the specificity of his ideas was lost'.³² What Sartre, therefore, seems to be guilty of, in *Being and Nothingness*, is ontologization of a situation-bound experience of a specific historical period, namely, of our contemporary decadent society. It is, indeed, in context of these problems with Sartre's notion of freedom that Lukács in his *Existentialisme ou marxisme*, a work chiefly directed against Sartre with short sections on Merleau-Ponty and de Beauvoir, had charged Sartre for hypostasizing the 'discontents of bourgeois society as universal dilemmas of man'.³⁴ Similar opinions were voiced against Sartre among others by Henri Lefebvre, Henri Mougín, Jean Kanapa, Roger Garaudy, and Herbert Marcuse.³⁴

Furthermore, while Sartre might not have entirely succeeded in making clear the paradox of freedom and facticity in *Being and Nothingness*, his attempt did still reveal, as Lukács was to recognize in his otherwise polemical work, "the importance of the individual's decision, which bourgeois determinism and Marxism habitually underestimate.... At the moment of making a decision the individual always finds himself confronted by a certain degree of freedom".³⁵ That the element of individual decision is not to be dispensed with is further evident from Marxism's viewing of "all social activity" as being "composed of individual acts".³⁶ Even according to Marxism, the influence of material conditions is "realised" as Engels said only "in the last instance".³⁷ The

question of prime importance is thus : if Marxists themselves could assign some positive role to subjectivity (Lukács, for example)³⁸, then, why was it that even for most celebrated Marxists (Henri Lefebvre, for example) 'no tactics were too low' in their struggle against Sartre? Why was it that Sartre's philosophy for them was at best "neurosis of interiority, a schizophrenia"?³⁹

Keeping in view the attack that was launched against Sartre after publication, in 1943, of *Being and Nothingness*, it appears that the difference between Sartre and Marxism was sharpened more because of the manner in which two philosophies expressed their ideas than due to any inherent incompatibility between their principles, a fact which increasingly comes to the fore with Sartre's incorporating of the historical side of human existence in his later works without entirely giving up his concern for individual freedom. While discussing the possibilities of coming together of Sartrean existentialism and Marxism, it is important to note that in the French context both existentialism and Marxism began their individual journeys through rethinking of Hegel's *Phenomenology*. 'Both accepted Hegel's early attempt to define human reality as unfolding in time, as an essentially temporal phenomenon'.⁴⁰ Was it, therefore, all that impossible to reconcile Sartre's existentialism which stated that the existence preceded essence and Marx's predominantly materialistic interpretation of history according to which 'it is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness'?⁴¹ Isn't it true that both philosophies give primacy to life over thought? It is, indeed, true that Marx's approach with its emphasis on economy can very well be termed as collectivist, but collectivism is not all that there is in Marxism. Similarly, while Sartre in his early philosophy was primarily concerned with probing man's relation to himself, the social was not altogether missing in his philosophy. The latter point, however, requires some further elaboration.

Firstly, we need to note that Sartre's refusal to permit inclusion of any socially and historically acquired structures into consciousness has been quite problematic. But we need to place this problematic in its proper intellectual context, for the basic thrust of the philosophy of *Being and Nothingness* is of refuting determinism and dispelling of the essentialist "illusion".⁴² That, in this exercise, Sartre overstated his case cannot undermine the importance of his attempt. It is in

the light of such an attempt that we can understand why consciousness could encounter the world only passively. If consciousness was allowed to constitute the world in any deeper way by getting involved in it, then it would have become like world, 'passive, rigorously ordered, unfree'.⁴³ Accordingly, the aspect of historicity of human relations seems to be especially missing in Sartre's analysis, 'perhaps from an undefined fear that this would impinge on the total freedom of the individual'.⁴⁴ The problem of accounting for concrete social determinations of the for-itself— (the relations of production), 'the family of his childhood, the historical past, the contemporary institutions',⁴⁵ etc. - thus remained unresolved. Within the framework of *Being and Nothingness*, it, therefore, became quite problematic to understand how consciousness could be 'colored by its social involvement'.⁴⁶

Furthermore, the Other, in *Being and Nothingness*, appears either as a being-looked-at or as a being-looking-at, i.e., the famous looking/looked at dyads.⁴⁷ In the former case I objectify the Other and in the latter it is me who is being objectified by the Other. 'Le regard is', therefore, 'the foundation of all interpersonal relations'⁴⁸ in *Being and Nothingness* because sadomasochistic circularity lies at the heart of all interpersonal relations.

However, from the perspective of social ontology, what is important is the fact that Sartre recognizes two centres, the "Us" and the "We", as collective aspects of the Other, though Sartre admits no plural look—an aspect which is of considerable importance for Sartre's developing of philosophical Marxism in his *Critique* project.⁴⁹ For, it is in the *Critique* that the static interpersonal relations of his early philosophy are set in motion through their grounding in human history. However, while inclusion of the Us and the We seems to fulfil a great gap in social ontology of *Being and Nothingness*, the ontological asymmetry which Sartre maintained between the Us and the We became a final obstacle in facilitating any fruitful dialogue between Sartre of 1943 and Marxism. Sartre, in this regard, states :

There is no symmetry between the making proof of the Us-object and the experience of the We-subject. The first is the revelation of a dimension of real existence and corresponds to a simple enrichment of the original proof of the for-others. The second is a psychological experience realized by an historic man immersed

in a working universe and in a society of a definite economic order. It reveals nothing particular; it is a purely subjective *Erlebnis*...

...The We-subject... supposes one way or another that the Other's existence as such has been already revealed to us. It is, therefore, useless for human-reality to seek to get out of this dilemma : one must either transcend the Other or allow oneself to be transcended by him. The essence of the relations between consciousness is not the *Mitsein*; it is conflict.⁵⁰

III

The social model of *Being and Nothingness*, therefore, seems to break down for the conflicts find no synthesis in this work.⁵¹ In *Being and Nothingness*, as Merleau-Ponty remarked, 'the anti-thesis of the for itself and in itself often seem to be alternatives instead of being described as the living bond and communication between one term and the other'.⁵² The dialectic of *Being and Nothingness* is, thus, "truncated"⁵³ to the extent its "social space" is 'merely an extension of the self-other relationship that obtains between any two for-itselfs'.⁵⁴ What was in short left out in *Being and Nothingness* was how consciousness could be involved in the world without totally losing itself into it. What it lacked was 'the moment when the subjective and objective conditions of history become bound together... *L'Etre et le neant* does not yet offer this social theory'.⁵⁵ But, while *Being and Nothingness* may lack any explicit social theory, it does still 'pose the problem of the reciprocal relations between consciousness and the social world as vigorously as possible by refusing to admit of freedom outside of a situation and by making the subject in no sense a reflection... but a "reflecting reflection" in accordance with Marxism'.⁵⁶ If such was the case, then, why was this work received with so much of hostility by Marxists? An answer to such a question can perhaps be attempted if we have a look at what according to Marxists is Marxism, for this alone can help us in assessing whether Marxism can be synthesized with Sartre's existentialism or not.⁵⁷

Regarding the question of Marxism, however, there are problems about Marx's own position, for while some Marxists argue for a collectivist and economic determinist Marx, some others stress Marx's humanist side. Both groups, however, find support for their inter-

pretations in Marx's early and later writings alike.⁵⁸ The supporters of the former interpretation have generally cited Marx's Preface to his *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, *Capital*, *Marginal Notes on Wagner*, etc.⁵⁹ Similarly, the latter interpretation has been supported by having recourse to Marx's manuscripts of 1844 which were not available to Marxist scholarship earlier than the fourth decade of the twentieth century. This radicalized and revolutionized understanding of Marxism, because number of references appeared in these manuscripts concerning what constitutes human essence and man's alienation and estrangement from the same. Some other works which supported such a reading of Marxism were Marx's early political writings on France, *Grundrisse*, and certain remarks in *Capital* on "The Fetishism of Commodities".⁶⁰

In what follows, I shall be taking up only determinist readings of Marxism because most of Sartre's leading critics did subscribe to some kind of determinist reading of Marxism or other. It appears that the orthodox reading of Marxism generally sought to find 'necessary connections between apparently disparate conditions in the economic and in the cultural spheres'.⁶¹ For orthodox Marxism, there was a causal link between economic conditions and the sphere of ideologies. Roger Garaudy, one of the leading philosophers of the French Communist Party, for example, considered true Marxist perspective as one that subordinated individual project to situation 'as superstructure to base'.⁶² Similarly, contrary to Sartre's understanding of human reality, the subject for Marxism, according to Henri Lefebvre, 'is always social man, the individual viewed in his actual relationships with groups, classes, society as a whole'.⁶³ For Georg Lukács, Marxism distinguished itself from other approaches to society not through the thesis of economic determinism but through its conception of "concrete totality", i.e., the view that particular things and events have to be seen as parts of a whole, a whole which is concrete and not an abstraction'.⁶⁴ It is the category of "concrete totality" that, for Lukács, governed reality. For Lucien Goldmann, however, the defining characteristic of Marxism is the collective subject, where by collective subject Goldmann means 'a certain number of individuals (who) find themselves engaged in an ensemble of mutual relations and of relations with the surrounding world, such that their behaviour and their psychic lives constitute a structure that renders intelligible certain transformations of this world'.⁶⁵ The fundamental charge of Goldmann on Sartre is, therefore,

that Sartre 'cannot consistently maintain a theory of collective responsibility because he lacks a concept of collective subject'.⁶⁶

Such approaches, according to Sartre, however, amounted to collapsing of 'individual praxis into impersonal process or statistical generalization'.⁶⁷ Dialectical materialism, for Sartre, by ascribing dialectic to Nature reduced human reality to things. But such an attempted reduction by itself can never produce class consciousness, for it is absurd to speak of class consciousness or revolution with respect to things. Sartre could, therefore, argue that while idealism deprived man of his freedom by tying him to *the given*, materialism robbed him of his freedom as well by reducing him to the status of a thing, by denying him 'the possibility of *rising* above a situation in order to get a perspective on it'.⁶⁸ There is, thus, not much difference between what idealism and materialism offer to a revolutionary. Sartre sums up the entire gamut of things as follows :

Materialism offers the revolutionary more than he asks for. For the revolutionary does not insist upon being a things, but upon mastering things...⁶⁹

Both idealism and materialism cause the real to disappear in like manner, the one because it eliminates the object, the other because it eliminates subjectivity.⁷⁰

Both the approaches, according to Sartre, lead us to idealism because 'there are two ways to fall into idealism : The one consists in dissolving the real in subjectivity; the other in denying all real subjectivity in the interests of objectivity'.⁷¹

Sartre's aim through these criticisms was, however, not of refuting Marxism in favour of some kind of positivism or idealism because Sartre firmly believed that Marxism is the only living 'philosophy of our time'.⁷² A philosophy beyond which we cannot move by rejecting or surpassing it because we have not yet gone 'beyond the circumstances which engendered it'.⁷³ Such is the case, because we can never have more than one *living* philosophy at a time. Because a living philosophy gives expression to the general movement of society that engendered it, it is the mirror through which the rising class of society becomes self-conscious.⁷⁴ 'A philosophy remains efficacious so long as the

praxis which has engendered it, which supports it, and which is clarified by it, is still alive'.⁷⁵ There is no going beyond a philosophy so far as society has not gone beyond that historical moment which a *living* philosophy of the time expresses. Sartre is, thus, not against Marxism *per se*. What he is against is a particular rendering of Marxism, namely orthodox Marxism.⁷⁶

The Marxism of his day, according to Sartre, was in the grip of "sclerosis", "sclerosis" that is not indicative of normal aging.⁷⁷ Contrasting the Marxists' approach to society *vis-a-vis* Marx, Sartre states that while Marx never sacrificed the uniqueness of the event while subsuming it under a whole, Marxists' approach is, on the contrary, characterized by getting rid of the concrete meaning of the event for some pre-established ideas or aphorisms. In this regard what we, therefore, need to note is that it is one thing not to treat facts as isolated happenings but to see them as bound together through relations of *interiority* to a larger whole, and quite another thing to throw 'over to the side of chance all the concrete determinations of human life'⁷⁸ for the sake of some abstract universality. In Marx, there is not only a move from concrete to the universal but from universal to concrete as well. When Marx subordinates the concretes to a larger whole then he does it not to lose it but to discover the latter by means of the former. With Marx concepts always remain open and thus serve as convenient tools for understanding social reality. With Marxists, however, 'they are posited for themselves as an already totalized knowledge.'⁷⁹ Through their aphorisms they force the event to yield to 'the *a priori* analyses of the situation... In the Stalinist world the event is an edifying myth... A worker is not a real being who changes with the world; he is a Platonic idea'.⁸⁰

Therefore, while contemporary Marxism embraces all human activity, 'it no longer *knows* anything'. Its concepts are *dictates*; its goal is no longer to increase what it knows but to be itself constituted *a priori* as an absolute knowledge. In view of this twofold ignorance, existentialism has been able to return and maintain itself because it affirms 'the specificity of the historical *event*; it seeks to restore to the event its function and its multiple dimensions'.⁸¹ Marxism and existentialism do not, however, aim at two different things but their object is one and same. The only difference is that while 'Marxism has reabsorbed man into the idea.... existentialism seeks him everywhere

Where he is, at his work, in his home, in the street'.⁸² And in so doing existentialism is not seeking either to go beyond Marxism or to rejecting it, for Marxism is the only *living* philosophy of our times beyond which we cannot go without going beyond the conditions that engendered it. Existentialism, on the contrary, is 'an enclave inside Marxism, which simultaneously engenders it and rejects it... historical materialism furnishes the only valid interpretation of history and existentialism remains the only concrete approach to reality.'⁸³

IV

Sartre's philosophy, thus, does not aim to be unfaithful to the general principles of Marxism, but as an ideology of existence with its "comprehensive" method, it seeks to bring to Marxism that which the latter lacks, i.e., the 'hierarchy of mediations which would permit it (i.e. Marxism) to grasp the process which produces the person and his product inside a class and within a given society at a given historical moment'.⁸⁴ Unlike Marxism, Sartre with his "progressive-regressive method" is able to locate the point of insertion of an individual into his class, nationality, race, etc.⁸⁵ Every individual's being, for Sartre, is constituted in and through the general movement of history, though every moment of this generality is lived by an individual 'as an absolute in the depth and opaqueness of childhood'.⁸⁶ The mediations which every individual effects in living his life, therefore, refer 'on the one side to objective structures, to material conditions, and on the other to the action upon our adult life of the childhood we never wholly surpass'.⁸⁷ Sartre's aim is, thus, not to sacrifice subjectivity for the world or *vice-versa*, but to establish 'such a correlation of the one with the other that neither a subjectivity outside the world nor a world which would not be illuminated by an effort on the part of a subjectivity can be conceived of'.⁸⁸

While agreeing with Marx that 'men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past'⁸⁹, Sartre asserts that it is men who make their history and not prior conditions, for if conditions were to create men then 'men would be merely the vehicles of inhuman forces which through them would govern the social world'.⁹⁰ The concrete material conditions do exist for Sartre

as well and give direction to the general movement of history, but human *praxis* 'goes beyond them while conserving them'.⁹¹ Thus, men in making their history both objectify themselves in it and are also alienated through such objectification through loss of intentionality of their individual project(s). And to the extent individuals are alienated from the total objective result of their *praxis*, history appears to them as a foreign force. For Sartre, it is only through the concept of *project* as that which is not yet that *praxis* as a mediation between two moments of objectivity can be accounted for.⁹²

Through assigning of such a mediating role to *praxis*, Sartre does not, however, deny a "determining" role to material conditions but merely establishes functional autonomy for his existential studies. And Sartre is able to argue for such an autonomy in and through his concept of *project* because project 'as the subjective surpassing of objectivity towards objectivity... represents in itself the moving unity of subjectivity and objectivity'.⁹³ It, however, needs to be noted that the autonomy of Sartre's existentialism emanates from the negative qualities of Marxists and not from Marxism itself. Accordingly, so far as 'orthodox Marxism does not recognize its anemia, so long as it founds its knowledge upon a dogmatic metaphysics (a dialectic of Nature) instead of seeking its support in the comprehension of the living man, so long as it rejects as irrational those ideologies which wish, as Marx did, to separate being from knowledge and, in anthropology, to found the knowing of man on human existence, existentialism will follow its path of study.. (But) from the day that Marxist thought will have taken on the human dimension (that is, the existential project) as the foundation of anthropological knowledge, existentialism will no longer have any reason for being. Absorbed, surpassed and conserved by the totalizing movement of philosophy, it will cease to be a particular inquiry and become the foundation of all inquiry'.⁹⁴

The idea that there is a break in Sartre's thought cannot, thus, be sustained because Sartre's basic ontological position of *Being and Nothingness* does not really change in *Critique I*. Such a reading of Sartre's works is possible because even in the *Critique I* Sartre bases his philosophy of history on the individual *praxis* rather than on the collective/group *praxis*. In fact the *Critique I* seems to offer us what was missing in Sartre's early philosophy, namely, a way

of understanding individual's relations with larger social formations. 'It is (therefore) unjustified to speak of a break if one surveys Sartre's overall philosophical development. There is, rather, a continuity within his thought'.⁹⁵ There is no break in Sartre's thought, in spite of changes and deviations, because every change is not a break. Furthermore, such a reading is further supported by Sartre's own reflections on the matter in the posthumously published second volume of the *Critique*.⁹⁶

It is important to take cognizance of *Critique II* because it is in this work that Sartre takes up the thorny issue of the structural unity of his thought through both rethinking of his ontology of *Being and Nothingness* and by providing the hitherto lacking ontological basis for *Critique I*. Through *Critique II* Sartre, thus, not only seems to perform his all too famous synthesizing activity on his own thought, but his new reflections also remove negative tonality of his philosophy.⁹⁷

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3. Mary Warnock, *The Philosophy of Sartre*, London, Hutchinson & Co., 1965, pp.135 ff; *Existentialism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 92 ff; Leo Fretz, "An Interview with Jean-Paul Sartre". In H.J. Silverman and F. Elliston(eds), *Jean-Paul Sartre, Contemporary Approaches to his Philosophy*, Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1980, p. 222; Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, London, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1969, pp. 32 ff.
4. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Literary and Philosophical Essays*, tr. Annette Michelson, London, Rider and Co., 1955; pp. 185-239; Jean-Paul Sartre, *Between Existentialism and Marxism*, tr. John Mathews, New York, Pantheon Books, 1983 pp. 33-64; *Search for Method*, tr. Hazel E. Barnes, New York, Vintage Books, 1968. This work is hereafter cited as SM.
5. See *infra* notes 34, 35, 62 and 65
6. According to Thomas Busch, 'the central weakness of *Being and Nothingness*

was its inability to offer an intelligible relationship between freedom and situation/facticity. Sartre claimed that human reality was both free and situated, but his debt to the *cogito* tradition (Descartes/Husserl) in developing the former conflicted with his debt to Heidegger's historicity in developing the latter', "Sartre on Surpassing the Given", *Philosophy Today*, Vol. 35, 1991, p. 26.

7. Mark Poster, *Existential Marxism in Post War France : From Sartre to Althusser*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 285.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
10. *BM*, pp. 559-711; Thomas R. Flynn, *Sartre and Marxist Existentialism*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 13 ff. and p. 213, n. 30.
11. Busch, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
12. See for example, the following works of Sartre : (i) *In Camera*, London, Penguin, 1958, (ii) *The Age of Reason*, London Penguin, 1961; (iii) *The Flies*, London, Penguin, 1962.
13. Poster, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
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16. *BN*, p. 625.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, p. 653.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 666.
21. Busch, *op.cit.*, p. 28.
22. *BN*, p. 60.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 653.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 666.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 629.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 116, In *War Diaries*, written just before *BN* and generally treated as a rough draft of *BN*, the theme of authenticity was given considerable more attention by Sartre than it acquired in *BN*, though the role of situatedness was undermined by Sartre in *War Diaries* as well.

See, Jean-Paul Sartre, *War Diaries*, tr. Quintin Hoare, London, Verso, 1984, pp. 54 f.

27. BN, p. 72; Flynn (1984), *op. cit.*, pp. 3 ff.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
29. Poster, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
30. Jean-Paul Sartre, *What is Literature?*, tr. Bernard Freehman, New York, Washington Square Press, 1966, p.174.
31. Frederic Jameson, *Marxism and Form*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981, *op. cit.*, pp. 276-77.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
34. Henri Lefebvre, *L'Existentialism* (1946); Henri Mougins, *La Sainte famille existentialiste* (1947); Jean Kanapa, *L'Existentialisme n'est pas un humanisme* (1972); Roger Garaudy, *Le Communisme et la morale* (1947), Cited in Poster, *op. cit.*, pp. 121 f.
35. Georg Lukacs, *Existentialisme ou marxisme?*, Paris, 1948, p. 105, Cited in Poster, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.* See, Frederick Engels' Letter to Joseph Block dated September 21-22, 1890. In *Marx-Engels Selected Works*, Vol. III, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, pp. 487-89. This work is hereafter cited as *MESW*.
38. Georg Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness*, Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1971.
39. Lefebvre (1946), *op. cit.*, p. 19. Cited in Poster *op. cit.*, p. 116.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
41. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *The German Ideology*, Moscow Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 42.
42. Jameson, *op. cit.*, p. 275.
43. Ronald Aronson, "The Roots of Sartre's Thought", *TELOS*, no. 13, Fall 1972, p. 53.
44. Poster, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
45. Sartre (1983), *op. cit.*, p. 35.
46. Dreyfus & Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 230.
47. Cf. BN, pp. 471 ff.
48. Flynn (1984), *op. cit.*, p. 19.
49. *Ibid.*, See, Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Vol. I, tr. Alan Sheridan-Smith, London, New Left Books, 1976. This work is hereafter cited as *Critique I*.

50. BN, p. 555. Also see, Flynn (1981), *op. cit.*, p. 346; Flynn (1984) *op. cit.*, pp. 20 f.; Poster, *op. cit.*, pp. 94 and 96.
51. Flynn (1984), *op. cit.*, p. 85.
52. Maurics Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-sense*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1964, p. 72.
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54. Flynn (1984), *op. cit.*, p. 29.
55. Merleau-Ponty (1964), *op. cit.*, p. 81.
56. *Ibid.*
57. Hazel E. Barnes, "Interoduction", In *SM*, p. viii.
58. Althusser (1969), *op. cit.*, pp. 33f.
59. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1984, pp. 20-22;—*Capital*, Vol. I, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1978, pp. 20-21 and 715; *Karl Marx on Value*, Belfast, British and Irish Communist Organisation, 1971.
60. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Moscow, Progress Published, 1977;—*The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* in *MESW*, Vol. I, pp. 398-487.
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61. Flynn (1984), *op. cit.*, p. 137.
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66. *Ibid.*, p. 174.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
68. Sartre (1955), *op. cit.*, p. 220.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 231.

71. *SM*, p. 33.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
73. *Ibid.*
74. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4. Similarly in the *Critique I* Sartre stated that 'Marxism is History itself becoming conscious of itself', *Critique I*, p. 40.
75. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
76. By orthodox Marxism, following Flynn, we mean 'dialectical and historical materialism as interpreted by Communist Party of the USSR and diffused through out the world by the party apparatus', Flynn (1984) *op. cit.*, p. 235, n. 27.
77. *SM*, p. 30.
78. *Ibid.*, 82.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-25.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
83. *Ibid.*, pp xxxiv and 21 (modified).
84. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
86. *Ibid.*
87. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
88. Sartre (1955), *op. cit.*, pp. 231-32.
89. Marx, *MESW*, Vol. I, p. 398.
90. *SM*, p. 87.
91. *Ibid.*
92. "Praxis", for Sartre, "is a passage from objective to objective through internalization", *ibid.* p. 27.
93. *Ibid.*
94. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
95. Fretz, *op. cit.*, p. 222.
96. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Vol. II, ed. Arlette Elkaim-Sartre, tr. Quintin Hoare, London, Verso, 1991
97. I am indebted to Prof. Bhuvan Chandel & Prof. Rekha Jhanji for going through earlier versions of this paper and for helping me shape many of my ideas..