ARE QUINE'S TWO DOGMAS STILL DOGMAS?!

1. Is Quine an Anti-individualist?

Recently Richard Creath has proposed that the 'strong dispensability' is open to the tu quoque response (Quine too has a dogma) in which there also figures a counter analytical notion of analyticity (Quine's is a dogma even without this). Thus, even if Quine's objections are valid, we need not read it as ruling out an epistemic notion of analyticity such as the one Carnap has advanced in his definition of analyticity as interchangeability salva confirmatione (observational as well as inferentially confirmable) and, thus, delivering a final blow to the notion of analyticity. On Creath's view, therefore, Quine's interchangeability salva veritate test for synonymy will turn out to be yet another dogma, for the simple reason that Quine's epistemology without it will have its own defects. In what follows, I shall defend the view that Quine can still be understood as pronouncing the death of dogmas even after a review of his sixty-year old counter to the dogmas.

The line of resistance I hope to offer here is drawn out from Quine’s attack on essentialism about language and the consequent anti-individualism that is the benchmark of Quine’s post-analytic turn in philosophy. The anti-individualistic turn, in my view, has a positive concern too. There is a way of showing that his critique of the analytic-synthetic dualism coheres with both the propositional anti-individualism and the primacy of translation. Anti-individualism in Quine’s sense drops the intrinsic nature of propositions (p is analytic/synthetic etc.) Since the argument itself is purely linguistic in character, it works against the essentialistic views of language. Its positive fallout is the primacy it offers to translation.

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Theoretically, meaning and translation are the two limbs of Quinean semantics. Once the primacy of translation is assumed, then the required conclusion about anti-individualism follows from it. Hence, the endeavour is to draw out a positive lesson from Quine’s critique. The primacy, as I argue, is conceptually necessary to sustain a basic stance about Quine’s philosophy of language. Nevertheless, such conceptual necessity, in my reading, is not to be explained by means of either a conceptual assimilation, or by means of a conceptual legislation exercised in an ad hoc way, so as to buttress an ‘indispensability argument’ for translation. Nor is it clear that translation provides a prior condition of the possibility of language itself. What I want to say about the primacy must be understood as part of Quine’s meta-reasoning about the (concept of) language itself. The primacy, therefore, does not stand for any one of the above, but only to subserve a conceptual point about language itself. The conclusion about anti-individualism serves only a philosophical point. However, there is yet another, more interesting way of looking at the connective link between translation and language. It is suggested by a formalistic scheme in which the transference of predicates from one language \( (L_1) \) to another language \( (L_2) \) is seen to provide a logical model of language itself (that is how, predicates are understood homophonically). Looking at this way requires the resolution of the connecting link at three different (interrelated, though independent) levels, namely the epistemic, logical and ontological levels, however overlapping they might be so as to yield a coherent picture of the world. Granting that such a scheme is quite possible, still one theorizes only at a ‘possible’ level and not at the actual level. I should concede that issues are far too important, but within the framework I interpret Quine, they can be set aside for a moment so as to concentrate on the anti-individualistic strain behind his metareasoning. The primacy may be post-analytical and not logical, nor is it epistemic or ontological.

Quine’s retrospect finds no necessity to trace the controversies that surround his critique. Without it, the two dogmas are still dogmas. The reasons are as much revealing as his own views on logic, language, science, and mathematics. If so, then his case against the two dogmas is as strong as ever; so to say, the dogmas are not dead after all. Nevertheless, there is yet another way of looking at it; that is, Quine may be understood as following a sort of anti-individualism about languages. Anti-individualism comes in various
guises. Tyler Burge and Hilary Putnam are good examples. One may also mention Davidson and Rorty as well. Burge counters individualism as a method in psychology following Marr’s theory of ‘visual’ anti-individualism. Putnam blends anti-individualism and Quinean untranslatability so as to critique functionalism in psychology. Samuel Wheeler turns the negative aspect of anti-essentialism into a positive message of philosophical recipe about deconstruction and attributes this to Quine, Davidson and Derrida. Following Wheeler, Rorty evokes the negative side as leading towards the narrative account of neo-pragmatism.

Rorty calls this as the contingency of language, (Rorty’s anti-individualism is global since it is based on the contingency of language, mind and society), whereas Davidson’s and Putnam’s are translational for the simple reason they have a Quinean premise about translational indeterminacy. Andrew Cutrofello, in yet another context, calls it as a doctrine of inscrutability of languages (‘languages are inscrutable’) and attributes this to Quine himself; he thereby means first that it is impossible to obtain a unique language to which a particular expression would belong, and second that it is impossible even to determine with rigour, the boundaries which separate one language from another. Nevertheless, one may say that Quine has not in totality rejected the way we ‘individuate’ statements as analytic and synthetic (negative thesis), but only they are anti-individualistically/nonindividually individuated (positive thesis). This attribution of anti-individualism to Quine leads towards a further consequence for language and languages. In the final showdown, we can know that the dogmas have identical roots, since their common enemy is only individualism of statements.

It was only Gochet who first challenged Quine with regard to the identity of roots (infra). But for Quine, they are au fond identical as both are used primarily to individuate sentences, and a fortiori, to individuate language schemes. The streak of anti-individualism is obvious. Davidson’s poser lies in his challenge to the very idea of conceptual scheme in which he proved that translatability is the criterion of languagehood, even between radically different languages. Assuming for a moment that Quine has a theory of understanding, one can argue that only a thin wedge divides Quine’s theory of understanding, in terms of equivalence between occasion sentences from Dummett’s theory of understanding, understood as a proxy for
a theory of meaning. The whole confusion about Dummett’s dictum which says that theory of meaning is a theory of understanding is that it is considered in the form of $a = a$, whereas the right way is to see it as $a = b$, where $a$ and $b$ stand for the theory of meaning and a theory of understanding respectively. What these theories share is a triad that can be called post-analytical, which dispenses with the view of language called as language *simpliciter* and passes on to one which holds that languages are learnable or understandable. Quine’s view of language as an episodic interaction with co-speakers and the environment is an inauguration of this trend in his first ever attempt to domesticate logic, in favour of language as an articulated structure. Such a reading is due to Dummett. If the refutation of Gochet’s disproof provides one angular viewpoint, Quine’s Dummettian theory of understanding provides yet another viewpoint, towards which I turn now.

2. Quine’s Theory of Understanding

Quine’s theory of understanding grows out of the following stages of enquiry as expounded in his article on “Mind and Verbal Dispositions”.

First, what I call, is an affinity thesis, which holds that mind and language are one way independent. That is, one can derive conclusions about the former from the premises of the latter. Quine’s theory of understanding is ascriptive---- motivated in that it is poised to tell how other-ascriptions (how ascriptions attributed to others) work and hence fall in line with anti-nativism. Ascriptive, in a sense, constitute a first generation anti-nativists. Anti-realists are anti-nativists only in this sense. Looking at this way, Putnam’s attribution of ‘sophisticated mentalism’, therefore, commits a mistake in attributing something which Quine does not hold. Second is what I call a *combinatorial productivity* thesis which claims that the way sentences are produced is via a combinational logic (syntax, so to say) (a kind of manifestation argument). Quine does not have so much as an acquisition argument; what blocks this move is that whereas ‘idiosyncracy’ of language can be admitted, idiosyncracy of acquisition may not be. Thirdly, with regard to the question about meaning, the thesis invites a dual context; on the one hand, it is supposed to tell us under what conditions expressions are meaningful and, on the other, it is supposed to tell how to obtain synonymy for a given
expression. The latter is, however, much more crucial. There arises what is called a theory of understanding which is more aligned to the second aspect referred to in the above, and it is given in terms of paraphrasing (86ff). Quine’s point is to claim that ‘synonymy/paraphrase explains understanding’ (first aspect) is no more difficult to maintain than the one which holds that meaning explains understanding. Quine wonders whether grasping meaning is a mentalistic enterprise and if so, it is worst at that (87). Subsequently, Quine develops what can be called a theory of understanding by distinguishing three modes of understanding comparable to later Wittgenstein’s sense of erklären, namely the mentalistic, physicalistic and the behaviouristic. Each one requires a different account of causation. In contradistinction to the other two, behavioural explanation helps us to arrive at the understanding of an expression, in the way outlined above.14

The next important stage in Quine’s theory of understanding defines truth as a great leveller (87-8). The full significance of this point is understood when truth is interpreted as standing for an adjusted standard of understanding. Now, the stage is set for defining meaning in terms of understanding, or what we can call an improvised theory of understanding. Quine’s improvised theory of understanding is given in the following dictum:

A understands E (an expression) if he knows its truth-conditions (88).

It is claimed to be applicable both to the domain of occasion as well as standing sentences. Nevertheless, there is a comparison as well as a constrast. The comparison is that occasion sentences are understood in terms of equivalence. The contrast is that standing sentences are understood in terms of interanimation or network of other sentences, which Quine calls as a theory. Ultimately, the holistic outlook determines the way the sentences in other domains are understood. So much to sustain the Dummettian interpretation of language as an articulated structure.

3. Quine’s Real Challenge

Contra Davidson, Quine’s anti-individualism is poised to disprove a universal trait for all language such as the one Carnap evolved in his true-in-L for a variable language (L).
If Carnap’s is an endeavour to read universal grammar of all languages, Tarski’s is also yet another pedigree of the same type. As Rorty concedes, the snow-bound regularities \textit{a la} Tarski is a one-way fallout of translation. This follows from saying that his T-sentences will not as much yield a philosophical theory of truth, as a philosophical scheme of translation does. Quine also does not agree with Tarski’s conclusion about the closure of natural languages (semantical closure), and this follows from his ecumenical assumption (We shall understand this as saying that there is only one among many) about the translatability of object-language to metalanguage. The former project can be allied to Katz’s proof$^{13}$ about the ‘logical’ possibility of translation of languages that is based on the denial of the uniqueness of each language (residual anti-individualism), whereas the latter passes from a non-individualistic premise to the individuation of language. (I am not as such concerned with truth-definition of all formal languages, as with its manner of proof). A point in my favour here is that Kantz’ anti-individualism arises on account of anti-nativism (Katz rejects the classical view of competence that was due to Chomsky) and turns to a platonistic view of grammar. There is an obvious friction between the two tendencies of platonism and anti-nativism which I overlook here. The point of Quine’s refutation about Carnap, in other words, is that it cannot consider analyticity as a universal trait on the basis of the following equivocation, namely analyticity in $L_1 = \text{analyticity in} \ L_2$. Anti-individualism may be taken as a positive consequence of translatability in Katz’s sense, and paraphraseability in Quine’s sense.

In a similar vein, Quine’s challenge to the Tarski-style truth definition may be said to go through the following steps: his object language-metalanguage distinction cannot presuppose that there is a truth-definition for a unique formal language; further, it cannot also apply uniformly to all languages without begging the question. Tarski’s dilemma is seen as: neither can he start from the unique nature of a single language, nor can he attribute the truth definition as a universal trait for all languages. The essence of the above rebuttal must be understood to derive part of its strength from some such conception of language considered as a calculus (\textit{calculus ratiocinator}).$^{16}$ More interestingly,
what I am saying here is that Quine's anti-individualism must be seen as the argumentative part of his animadeversions about the thesis of radical indeterminacy of translation. Dummett closes off Quine's outlook by calling attention to the 'picturesque way' Quine was led to theorise about how two speakers speak for which translation provides the necessary model. Nevertheless, Dummett's way of reading the 'significance' leads him in a different direction. In my understanding, the above mentioned premises about Dummett's reading of Quine, and Putnam's use of the untranslatability as a premise about his anti-individualism (presented as a critique of functionalism) directly entail a Quinean sort of anti-individualism (I compare Quine's variety with Burge's below). Against Dr. Marathe's contention to change the picturesque model to a logical one (see f.n. 5, Supra), I can only say that my post-analytical reading may not as much warrant as we desire (I agree with him in all aspects of his criticism).

Tyler Burge takes Quine's anti-individualism, as a corollary of his critique of analytic-synthetic distinction with which he expresses agreement. But at the same time he wants to draw the conclusion that there are sentences that are both analytic (logically or vacuously true) as well as synthetic (factual). This is too drastic a conclusion to draw. What it misses in Quine's account is that synthetic statements (observation statements) enter holophrastically (now Quine calls this as sensory neural intake; taken thus, it gets the following definition: an observation sentence is holophrastic iff it is a response to or it is anchored in a sensory neutral intake) before they become analytic via analytical hypothesis. Rightly understood, holophrastic construals have the potency to demand translational schemes, and a fortiori, biconditionals, so much so that the former is the conceptual analogue of the latter. So, a synthetic statement can become analytic. (This is not, however, to make a claim that synthetic statements are analytic and vice versa). Thus, Burge's attribution of anti-individualism is not complete for the very reason that it does not invite him to consider this part of the argument which holds that such unique trait cannot be considered to individuate sentences as much as they individuate the languages. For Burge, Quine's anti-individualism no more implies a semantic individualism than an epistemic one. Further, such an imposition prevents him from attributing the following conclusion: one can derive the identical root of the two dogmas from Burger's
argument but at the same time it hardly contributes towards any positive understanding of Quine’s own position.

4. Gochet’s Point Refuted

But Gochet’s point against Quine’s claim is that Quine cannot show that the evaluation of the dogma of analytic-synthetic distinction cannot be linked with the evaluation of dogma of reductionism without begging the question. He gives the following scheme of argument.

1. Let us assume that they are linked, and a fortiori, they support each other.

2. Prove that either one of them as dispensable will leave the other as an ‘unsupported dogma’.

3. But supposing that this unsupported form of dogma is also seen as one about the distinction, then it leaves the distinction intact.

4. Quine’s original assumption is that the refutation of one dogma is a refutation of the other.

5. If (3) is true, (4) cannot be maintained.

6. Hence, the original assumption cannot be guaranteed.

The above argument given in the form of reduction proves at least one point; namely, that there might be a link, but that it cannot be assumed in the above way, without committing the fallacy of begging the question.

How, then, the link is to be justified? Quine’s recent retrospect suggests that a moderate holism can be assumed which consists of clusters of statements that are analytic (logical/mathematical) and synthetic (scientific statements). The links are provided by the inferential relations of the former towards the latter. The cluster of statements provide enough ‘semantic mass’ so as to yield an ‘observation categorical’ (whenever P, then Q, where P is an observable condition and Q is a check on this).19
It is this aspect that marks it off from the salva confirmation account of holism. Pursuing this, we may find that while salva veritate holism (Quine claims it to be moderate) is implicational of a unique kind, salva confirmatione (at a low-level) in that it is only a reformulation of the verification principle in terms of inferential relations acting both ways. The latter is also definitional (guaranteeing mutual interdeducibility which it owes to Russell′s contextual definitions), since it is just an offshoot of the erleb (erlebnisse) account of Carnap′s Aufbau (constitutive definitions). But Quine marks off his holism as based on coordinating definitions (Zuordnungs definitionen). Quine has a clear advantage over Carnap in two ways: (1) analytic-synthetic is ordered in terms of implication; and (2) One can specify the revision as striking at either end and accordingly interanimate mutually. Coordinations, in Quine′s sense, must be understood as conveying the following dictum: any drastic enough revision strikes anywhere, even at the interior (analytically true or logically true statements). The link between the above two categories is symbiotic to the link between theory and experiment and the underlying ‘logical’ relationship is one of implication. Thus, the cluster of theoretical sentences implies (⫋) observation categoricals. Besides implication relation, they are one way independent. Quine claims that the link between analytic and synthetic statements is one between mathematics (sentences of pure arithmetic and differential calculus, and possibly other fragments of what Quine calls applicable mathematics′) and scientific statements. This clearly proves why should one reject Burge′s reading.

5. Quine′s Model Revisited

The above picture of Quine′s model of language replaces the previously known straightforward central-periphery account, which did not talk about the inferential relations in this particular way, nor did it explain the link between logic, mathematics and science in the above way (Fig (i) below). Now, revision can strike anywhere and reverberate to the interior, subject to the constraint that obtains from the maxim of minimum mutilation. Necessity bears an inverse relation to revisibility. As part of the learning of theory/language, it starts with observation sentences (thing-language) and passes on to the scientific clusters (theory) and to the interior mathematical
statements. The scheme is roughly shown as below:

![Diagram showing language as an articulated structure episode (shared) language with analytic-synthetic Sentence logic (regimented) and semantic clusters observation → categorical logic (severely regimented) → output observation sentences.](image)

Fig. (i)

Now, with the semantic clusters, the former negative implications of meaning of the Word and Object-model has been kept in a way. Moderate holism looks for a bigger cluster in which ‘scientific sentences cannot in general be expected to imply empirical consequences by itself’ (272). The right-hand side shows how the schema for one-word sentences ultimately makes way and ‘reifies’ into semantic clusters of analytic sentences. While the holoplastic construals embody the structure of empirical knowledge (by virtue of the way a word enters into different structural formation of theories), holism refers to its form; even so, the semantic clusters stand for the content.

6. A Review

In what follows, I shall review Quine’s anti-individualistic argument against the individuation of sentences of a given language, and thenceforward to language scheme itself. The former is obvious and easy to understand, that is, Quine’s position is against the uniqueness of the linguistic trait of a sentence being analytic/synthetic. The original argument, as noted, was due to Tyler Burge. According to this argument, propositional attitudes *vis-a-vis* intentional content are anti-individualistically or non-individualistically individuated.
Burge turns this into a view about anti-individualism in semantics. Burge accepts Quine's denial of the analytic-synthetic distinction, but this point of disagreement with Quine is over calling the class of analytic statement as degenerate, since they are also matters of fact. The mutual exclusion of the two types of statements is refuted by saying that there are analytic statements which are also factual. This leads him ultimately to posit 'translational' rather than literal meaning and treat it as quite independent of the above distinction. Burge also does not accept the critique as applicable to the distinction between linguistic and other sorts of truths (Burge accuses critics of Quine's as 'conflating' the above distinction). Burge's positive position can be paraphrased as follows: Individual words and their meanings depend on 'translational meaning' used by others, and language is exactly in this sense 'social'. Anti-individualism implies a 'semantics of idiolects' and, therefore, it is not incompatible with innatism or nativism which postulates innate competence. But the only problem is to give content to the latter idea. Now, the above argument of Burge can be reformulated as: If Quine's anti-individualism is taken for granted, it might fall in line with a Quinean sort of innatism (Burge characterizes it as 'minimal competence'). Burge's anti-individualism is, therefore, not totally free from a residual (minimal) competence view, it follows, therefore, on Burge's view, there is no way of doing semantics without matching it with competence.

7. Burge Vs. Quine

Quine may not so much require minimal competence as in Burge's sense for the simple reason that he wants to explain it in terms of 'nerve ending'; if that is explainable in terms of it at all, it is so explainable. Hence, he may be attributed with a view which holds that competence can mismatch semantics. The other differences between the anti-individualism of Burge and Quine are summarised as follows:

1. Burge concedes that translation is so interwoven with meaning: nevertheless, it does not call for abandoning a view of language, that can be called language simpliciter.

2. Burge's anti-individualism does not extend to languages; that is, the depiction of the relation between two languages (e.g. language and metalanguage).
(1) and (2) force him to grant minimal competence to the speaker.

3. It takes in it the direction of epistemic utility (truth of meaning is dubitable). This is contra Quine.

4. Individual semantics is in interaction with social environment including language (language as social meaning has a social character).

For Burge (4) is a logical consequence of the type of anti-individualism he wants to advocate.

His only failure is to read this as a significant point about Quine’s anti-individualism. We must also concede, with Dummett, that (4) has never been explained within the existing models of language such as communicative, vehicular, expressionist etc. Quine’s is a new one which considers language as an articulated structure with the episodic interaction with its environment, and his ‘picturesque’ way of using translation to explain stimulus synonymy among speakers compliments his open admission to reduce language to a severely regimented variety of logic. Schematically, anti-individualism, thus, becomes an explanans, for the social character of meaning/language. Burge concedes (4) can never bee explained except by bringing in a ‘translational meaning’. Quine’s corresponding position is schematized in figure (ii) as follows:

![Diagram](attachment:diagram.png)

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**Fig. (ii)**
Perhaps the above considerations of language leaves language as a third-world phenomenon along with science and mathematics. Science is a succinct expression of culture.

8. Conclusions

Let us consider Quine's critique of analyticity as aiming to undo a unique linguistic trait that individuates a sentence within a unique language (each language has its own unique trait or traits) by looking at it within a larger scheme, as shown above. Quine's definition of analyticity will end up with the following condition.

1. A sentence is analytic for a native speaker if it is true by virtue of its meaning and its truth is learnt by use of one or more of its words in such a way that it is domestically (homophonically) interdefinable '(intradefinable in a special sense within the parameters of the above schema) so as to yield the following schema (2).

2. Two expressions are (stimulus) - synonymous iff their biconditional or equation is analytic (now Quine replaces this with an input -output model, according to which the input is the neural intake and the output is the assent to a sentence; however, it is parallel in that a class of sensory intake gives rise to the notion of stimulus meaning. The obvious advantage of input-output model is not functional but to secure intersubjective semantics.)

Now we must also see whether (2) is consistent with my attribution of anti-individualism to Quine. Firstly, it is not a functionalistic model because it does not extend the input towards the input to the structural representation in the brain; second, it does not make observation statements as giving rise to assent (because it takes the input to cause the assent so much so that observation statements are the in-betweens of neuro-psychological mechanism and the external linguistic manifestation.)

3. The domain in which it is individuated remains somehow redundant.

4. Even if they are individuated as such, they remain mostly
irrelevant. Now, 1-3 can be understood to give a 'generalized' sense of analyticity.

5. Such of those sentences are analytic so long as they are unrevisable. That is to say, the scheme 'P is analytic iff ...' will be thrown away when (3) becomes void. Hence (3) is also to be regarded as another condition.

Having said all these, the last condition (6) would be formulated as follows: - 6. 'If the two expressions equated in (2) and (5) above belong to (two) different language (schemes), then their biconditional is far from analytic (emphasis added); this is just to obviate the need to transcend a single (home) language. This is also attuned to warrant (1), especially the clause which holds that they are domestically interdefinable'.

The emphasis laid herein gets further elucidation from Quine, in what is called as UIPM-test, (following his article on “Use and its Place in Meaning” that gives us a notion of cognitive synonymy. But the point of the above test does not as much warrant to invert Quine’s argument as to show that this has no bearings on his indeterminacy. But, it may be taken as an argument which proceeds from a major premise about translation (without begging any questions) towards meaning. Quine’s point in the above, therefore, is that such a transcendence is ‘incoherent’ belonging to no language (271). Such a position may be called a ‘sectarian’, (means that it is one among many) following Quine. The sectarian position with regard to synthetic (occasion) sentence is less bothersome than the sectarian position with regard to analytic (standing) sentences. Quine’s critique, therefore, starts from no such premise as the denial of meaning, but from an ecumenial position which serves only as a heuristic. At the same time Quine’s anti-individualism does neither take ‘sophisticated mentalism’, as an option, suggested by H. Putnam, nor does it argue for the uniqueness of conceptual scheme.  

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. Such an argument is found in Richard Creath’s article on “Every Dogma has a Day” in *Erkenntnis*, 35 (1991), pp. 347-389.

3. Essentialism is under attack simultaneously from two sides. One from the deconstructive side and the other from the post-analytic side. Anti-individualism belongs more to the latter than to the former. A fusion of these two views is currently understood both from the positive side (e.g. Samuel Wheeler) as well as from a negative point of view (Richard Rorty).


5. The particular line of criticism Dr. Marathe adopted is too strong to overcome within the compass of the paper. However, I mention here the chief lines which forced me to reconsider certain points made earlier in the paper. However, I escape the wrath of his critique by taking shelter under a post-analytic interpretation. The primacy in this sense is not indispensability. (see fn.4 above). I have also given due weight to his questions in the interpretation to the distinction which I make between the ‘ecumenical’ and ‘sectarian’ later in the essay. To some extent, this brings alternative systems of translation and alternative systems of logic closer, and this is also warranted by Quine’s outlook.


7. For a kindred opinion, see Andrew Cutrofello’s “Quine and the Inscrutability of Languages” in *International Studies in Philosophy* (1992) pp. 33-46. A more positive label is suggested more recently in R. Rorty’s writings. *Pace* Davidson’s willingness to drop the intrinsic nature of language, Rorty calls this as the contingency, as opposed to the ‘necessity’ of language, and defines it as follows: ‘Davidson’s polemic against ...... the scheme content model........ are parts of a larger polemic against the idea that there is a fixed task for language to perform, and an entity called ‘Language’ or ‘the language’ or ‘our language’, which may or may not be performing this task efficiently (p.13). See Rorty’s essay on
“Contingency of Language” in his Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge, 1989). See also fn. 6 below. In my view, Rorty is Quine-coherent or Davidson-coherent on the one-hand and Putnam-coherent on the other (see fn...10 below).

8. These contrary ways of stating anti-individualism are due to Tyler Burge (see fn. 18 below).

9. Such an argument is due to Paul Gochet; see his Ascent to Truth: A Critical Examination of Quine’s Philosophy. (Munchen, Mein: Philosophia Verlag, 1986): see pp. 20-21. For Gochet, the presupposition concerning unity of the two dogmas amounts to committing the ‘fallacy of begging the question’, simply because the refutation of one (say reductionism) leaves the other (analytic-synthetic distinction) intact, that is, as an ‘unsupported dogma’ (emphasis in the original.) A fortiori, contrary to what Quine claims, the refutation of one is not a refutation of the other (emphasis added). Gochet finds Quine’s ‘stronger claim’ about their having ‘identical roots’ is difficult to reconcile with the above, without the above mentioned fallacy (pp.20-21).

10. The interpretation I offer is quite independent of, but at the same time, consistent with Rorty’s own (see fn. 4 above). For Rorty, contingency squarely depends upon the lack of boundaries that ‘break up’ between languages. It is here the term ‘translation’ is appropriate. Rorty conflates between language as a medium of expression and language as representation and his thesis about contingency is, thus, simply vulnerable (p.11). Tyler Burge, for example, discusses Quine and H. Putnam as representatives of anti-individualism. I hasten to add that this marks off what is characterized as ‘post-analytic’. I work out this in my The Major Analytical Traditions (ICPR Research Project). See Burge’s acknowledgements in his article on “Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-1990” in Philosophy in Review (Philosophical Review, 1992), pp.3-52; see esp. fn. 65 for a remark about Putnam’s anti-individualism. Putnam’s is clearly post-analytical and is interpreted in another paper titled “H. Putnam’s Critique of Functionalism” (Ms.)

11. The locus classicus for Quine’s theory of understanding (meaning) is “Mind and Verbal Disposition” in Mind and Language (Wolfson College Lectures, 1974) Ed. by S. Guttenplan (Clarendon Press, 1975); pp. 83-96. This is the first time Quine’s theory of understanding is studied.


13. For Quine, the proper way of explaining (erklären in Wittgenstein’s sense) the meaning of a sentence is in terms of understanding which involves the reduction
of this into dispositions of assent/dissent for occasion sentence, but at the same time it involves 'interrelation of sentences' in terms of paraphrasing or translation. For all these, translation provides the necessary heuristic, however complicated it might be. A coincidence of dispositions yields a behavioural theory of understanding, and a satisfactory equivalence gives a behavioural account of equivalence. Meaning and translation are, thus, the two semantical notions that are complimentary to each other (p. 89). For the use of the notion of *erklären* within Wittgenstein’s theory of understanding see P.M.S. Hacker and G. Baker’s *Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein’s PI* (Vol.1) (Basil Blackwell, 1980\1983). See also f.n. 24 below.

14. For Quine, behavioural explanation remains the only option, and that too, in his sense.

15. For J. Katz’s anti-ondividualism which denies that each one of natureal languages has a unique property, see his ‘Effability and Translation’ which explores the logical possibility of translation *Contra* Quine. His ‘translational theory of meaning’ (Christopher Peacocke’s expression) entirely depends on a propositional (sense) paraphrasing. Katz works against the ‘rationalist hypothesis’ which holds that there is an explanation of the uniqueness of natural language (213) and proposes the principle of effability as a proxy for translation (209). Its residual character is derived from the passage from a theory of meaning towards a logical possibility of translation. Katz’s article appears in the anthology on *Meaning and Translation: Philosophical and Linguistic Approaches* (eds.) F. Guenther and M. Guenthner Reutter (Duckworth, 1978), pp.191-234.

16. For a study of the significance of the well-established distinction between language as a universal medium (*linguistica characteristica*) and language as calculus (*calculus ratiocinator*), see my "Hintikka's Game of Language" in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, 1993; pp. 145-160; it has roots in the distinction V. Heijenoort makes between logic as language and logic as calculus in his 1967 article under the same title, which appeared in *Synthese* 17, pp. 324-30.

17. M. Dummett’s metaphorical attribution is found in his study "The Significance of Quine’s Indeterminacy Thesis" in his *Truth and other Enigmas* (Duckworth, 1978), pp. 375-419; see esp. p. 376ff for language as an articulated structure; and p. 389 for a discussion on the 'picturesque' model. Dummett contrasts the 'solipsistic' model of the 'Two Dogmas' with 'Communicative model' of *Word and Object*. For Dummet the significance of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation cannot rest upon a premise about the indeterminacy of meaning.

18. Tyler Burge’s explicit commitment to an anti-individualistic stance, appears in a larger corpus, starting with "Individualism and the Mental" in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 4. pp. 73-121, followed by his 'Other Bodies' in *Thought and Object* (ed) A Woodfield (Oxford, 1982); For a more elaborate argumentation, see his "Individualism and Psychology" in *Philosophical Review*, 125 (1986) pp. 3-45 and the "Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception" in *Subject. Thought"
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19. Translation is related to meaning via understanding. In what follows, I summarise Quine’s Review; see f.n. 3 above. (The pagination refers to his article).

20. For a review of previous central-periphery model, see my "Quine’s Model of Language" in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, 1979.

21. Burge’s argument, without a positive tenor, appears dubious. See his most recent article quoted in f.n. 8 above for the above view.

22. Notwithstanding Burge’s debt, Burge accuses critics of conflating the distinction between truths which are true by virtue of meaning and synthetic truths about world, on the one hand, which he accepts, and the distinction between linguistic truths and factual truths on the other which he does not; see esp. f.n. 14 in his contribution in “Wherein is Language Social?” in Reflections on Chomsky (ed.) Alexander George (Oxford, 1989), pp. 175-191.

23. For Burge’s treatment of ‘minimal competence’, see his ‘Intellectual Norms’ etc. see f.n. 14 above. Quine’s model, like Putnam’s, in my understanding, assumes neither ‘minimal competence’ nor a ‘lingua mentis’.

24. For a critical understanding of the relation between competence and semantics, see my review of the debate between Martin Davies and Crispin Wright in “Can Competence Mismatch Semantics?” (Paper presented in the Indian Philosophical Congress (63rd Session); see the abstract (1988), wherein I find fault with Davies for misinterpreting Wright’s denial of competence. The issue seems to be a larger one than I had supposed.

25. Dummett’s contribution to Alexander Geeorge’s volume on Reflexions of Chomsky makes the distinction between language as a medium of expression and language as a vehicle of thought sharper than ever. See his article on “Language and Communication” which appears to me as an analysis of fundamental notions of language, and is somewhat more sanguine than the distinction between language as a universal medium and language as calculus, made popular, by Hintikka and others; see f.n. 23 above. The lingua mentis is a sophisticated variety of Chomsky’s faculty of language, and is due to Hilary Putnam’s attack. For his anti-individualism vis-a-vis translatability, see his Representation and Reality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988). Obviously Punnam has changed his mind from his earlier reading of Quine (see f.n. 8 above).

26. Burge marks a distinction between two types of meaning namely ‘explicational meaning’ and ‘translational meaning’ and explains why one cannot be confused with the other in his article quoted in f.n. 18 above; see also f.n. 14 above.
27. See Quine’s “In a Praise of Observation Sentences” in Journal of Philosophy (1993), pp. 107-116. Quine continues to speak about individuation in spite of evidence to the contrary. These evidences are cited in the article referred to in f.n. 4 above. Quine’s holophrastic construals provide a stance against any from of individuation.


29. Alston formulates an argument which gives primacy to translation; see his contribution titled as “Quine on Meaning” which appears in The Philosophy of W.V.O. Quine (ed) P. Schlipp and Hahn (La Salle: Open Court, 1986). pp. 49-72; see esp. p.65.

30. Putnam’s attribution appears in his article noted in f.n.8 above.
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