

## THE MANDUKYA UPANISAD AND KARIKAS : THE ADVAITIC APPROACH

(00). I am deeply grateful to my teachers, Professor Ashok Gangadean, Haverford College, USA, and Shri. Devarao Kulkarni, *Vedānta Kāryalaya*, Bangalore, for introducing me to *Advaita Vedānta*, and for continuing to nurture my apprenticeship in *Advaitic Thought*.

1.00. This paper attempts an introduction to the *Mandūkya Upaniṣad* and *Kārikās*. An aim of this paper is to curb blatant misconceptions about the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads*. The explication here definitely shows that the line of interpretation favoured by Bradley York Bartholomew in his "Inner Self Located" (*Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XVIII, No. 4) has no foundation in the *Upaniṣads*. B.Y. Bartholomew seems to suggest that the *Turiya* is a cavity inside the brain. This conclusion is simply ridiculous.

1.001. The *Mandūkya Upaniṣad* has some relevance to the ontological difficulties which naturally erupt when one distinguishes the "mind" and that which is "external" to the mind. Instead of immediately entering the *Upaniṣad's* core, it seems beneficial to prepare by first critiquing various views which have emerged regarding this distinction. The reason for doing so is to elicit a sense of the philosophical arena within which the *Upaniṣadic* insights are relevant. In this way we will become acquainted with the conceptual tools necessary for reading the *Upaniṣad*. This is very important because the *Upaniṣad* is not situated at the level of presenting views about the world/ reality; rather the *Upaniṣad* investigates the very fact that it is possible to articulate differing views concerning reality.

1.01. The distinction of matter and mind seems: chairs, the sun, space, the physical body, etc., are considered "material," and the mind is considered the "immaterial," or, simply, "the mind." The mind is

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commonly thought to be waking, (when awake) dreaming (when dreaming) and deep sleeping (when deep sleeping). That it is not the mind, understood as the "immaterial," which is "undergoing" these "changes" (i.e., waking - dreaming - deep sleeping - waking-....) is one of the conclusions put forward by the *Upaniṣad*. This is, however, not of immediate concern since the positions outlined below do not utilize the ontological information available in all the "three states" in their attempt at discerning the nature of existence. The positions below restrict the foundations of their respective analyses to the knowledge obtainable in the waking state.

1.10. We may roughly present these positions as possible responses to an ontological puzzle which seems to emerge when one distinguishes the material from the immaterial:

(a) Is the "internal-mind" "prior" or is it the "external-material" which is the truly "primary"?

1.11. We can now see the outlines of two broad, mutually exclusive positions regarding (a) :

*Position 1:* The mind is theorized to be an expression of the functioning of the brain; much like the relationship between heart beat and the heart respectively. It is held that the body (brain) is being primary, and thus matter is the ontological "cause" of the mind. There might be two variations:

(1) The nature of mind is such that the material world "structures" mind - mind is analogous to a "blank tablet."

(2) The nature of mind is such the mind is "structuring" what is external to it. Yet, matter is still paramount. This is akin to notions where consciousness is said to "shape" phenomena, and yet consciousness is dependent on matter to exist.

*Position 2 :* Mind/consciousness is asserted to be supporting matter. Accepting this view might yield two sub-positions:

(1) Individual minds cause their respective bodies/brains; however, the external object structure the individual minds.

(2) There is only one mind which is causing everything else, and it is also structuring everything (solipsism perhaps).

1.12. Both the above hierarchies<sup>2</sup> seem plausible (in at least the sense that they may be considered philosophical positions). But is this situation satisfying? There seems no ground for certainty if one subscribes to either of the hierarchies by the very fact that an opposing hierarchy exists.

1.13. Postulating that existence is, in its very nature, contradictory is not the proper approach to resolving this, for existence/reality (understood in the broadest possible sense) is the very standard of ontological harmony. This suggests that we encounter mutually exclusive hierarchies (Position 1 vs. Position 2)<sup>3</sup> because the manner in which we are *thinking* about reality does not reflect of reality's harmonious<sup>4</sup> nature. The faulty mode of thinking seems (term this "Logic 1"):  $X = X$  where "X" stands for any type of distinction. (X might be a certain belief, a certain state of affairs, any "this.") If Logic 1 is faulty, then Logic 1 must not exist. That is, when Logic 1 is considered inappropriate, then another "logic" (term this Logic 2) must be operating (since existence is operational), but one may not be aware of Logic 2's nature even though one must always be utilizing it/functioning within it. (This is analogous to the way in which one might live under gravity's influence while being unaware of its existence.) Mutually exclusive hierarchies exist because we have a mistaken way of thinking (Logic 1) about what it means for something to be distinct from something else.

1.14. The nature of Logic 1 and how theorizing under its influence seems to lead to contradictions need further articulation. Holding that a "section/segment/part" of reality is ontologically capable of existing by itself (or independently of the other segments) is the essence of Logic 1. It is only when one adheres to this supposition can one hold that a part "supports" other parts, or that a part is "prior" to another part (and one can then proceed to hypothesize a ontological hierarchy such as Position 1 or Position 2). A strategy, then, for establishing Logic 1's inappropriateness is to show how hierarchies are untenable. If we find contradictions at the very core of hierarchies, we may then conclude that the manner of thinking that led us to believe in the validity of the hierarchies, Logic 1, must be false:

Position 1: Matter 'causes' mind. (A is the ontological cause of B)

This is senseless since, strictly speaking,  $\text{mind} \neq \text{matter}$  ( $A \neq B$ ). The only way this might be true is if mind is reducible to matter. But this is blatantly false because, for example, if one is thinking of a tomato, one's brain, the matter, is not physically turning into a tomato.

Position 2: Mind causes matter.

Again this seems meaningless since  $\text{mind} \neq \text{matter}$ .

So why do we even begin to make statements like, "A causes B"?

It is because we have a certain naive approach to reality - we think that segments of reality (mind or matter in this case) can exist "independently" of other segments (Logic 1), and this leads us to propose that one segment may be causing another's being. However, nothing can ever be the ontological basis for anything else (if that thing is to maintain its identity as what it is), therefore Logic 1 seems mistaken.

1.15. Logic 2 is ( $\sim$ Logic 1). Thus Logic 2 is condensable as:  $X = (\sim Y)$ ,  $Y = (\sim X)$  where "X" and "Y" represent different "points of distinction". If X is *any* point of difference/segment of reality (beliefs, theories, a grain of sand, space, and "this"), then that segment is that segment because no other segment is that segment, and the truth of this is not based upon that segment being that segment (i.e., not upon  $X = X$ ). Under Logic 1,  $X = (\sim Y)$  was obviously true if  $X = X$  and if  $X \neq Y$ . But we have already discarded  $X = X$ , therefore, Logic 2 does not assert a relationship between segments; rather it concerns the very existence of segments. For example, a grain of sand is that grain of sand because another grain of sand is not that grain of sand, a tree is not that grain of sand, a thought is not that grain of sand, a monkey is not that grain of sand, and briefly, the rest of existence is not that grain of sand. Under Logic 2, existence is literally a "sea of difference" where no "section" is identical to another "section" of existence. Two "sections," however, may resemble one another. We are not here positively characterizing Logic 2, for Logic 2 is strictly nothing more than the negation of Logic 1. We may remind ourselves that Logic 1 is a manner of approaching difference, and thus Logic 2 signifies approaching reality while not being in the "mode" of Logic 1.

1.20. The *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* investigates reality while being cognizant of the inadequacies of Logic 1. As we discuss the main body of the *Upaniṣad*, we shall hopefully see better what exactly is meant by Logic 1, and also see that rejecting Logic 1 leads to the statement, "Existence is One without a second". It should be noted that by rejecting Position 1's and Position 2's source, Logic 1, the *Māṇḍūkya* renders Position 1 and Position 2 irrelevant to a full understanding of existence.<sup>5</sup> The *Upaniṣad* scrutinizes the deep sleep, dreaming and waking "states" in Logic 2's mode of thinking. Since Logic 1 is abandoned, the ontological features of all the three states are given equal weight in determining the nature of existence. Under Logic 1's influence, it was easy to consider the waking as the "primary" state which gave rise to the other. But adopting Logic 2 demands a revised approach which examines the three states without ontological prejudice.

1.21. The first observation is that waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping are "interwoven". One does not, as it were, "hop" from waking to dreaming to deep sleeping, as though these were three absolutely separate states. There is continuity, ontological harmony. The states seem to melt into one another—there is no clash within this process. This melting of one state "into" the other seems akin to a "shift in emphasis." That is, it is not the case that upon waking, for example, that we are disconnected to the dreaming or to the deep sleeping. The latter states seem to "recede," or lose their emphasis, so to speak; they do not utterly disappear when one "wakes up". Similarly, upon "going to sleep", the waking world does not disappear; rather, the shutting of the sensory organs leads to the "bringing to the fore-front" what were already "there": dreaming and deep sleeping. We will see how the fact of the occurrence of "shifts in emphasis, and the fact that we are aware of the "shifting" are crucial to the *Māṇḍūkya*'s assertion that reality is "One without a second".

1.22. The Second observation is that waking and dreaming states are characterized by differences while the deep sleeping state is without difference. That is, in the dreaming and waking states of one's experience, differences are experienced (and thus these are "dual states"), while in the deep sleep state, differences are absent (and thus this is the "not-dual/singular state").<sup>6</sup>

1.23. The deep sleep state is such that the difference between the self, or "I" and what is "outside" the "I" seems non-existent. Differences do not seem to exist when one is deep sleeping. Thus, the "I," *when considered as something which is identifiable as different*, does not exist within deep sleep. Therefore, there are no "experiences", within deep sleep since there needs to exist an "experiencer", and an "experienced" for experience to occur). Therefore, the "experience" of deep sleep is not "experience" in the usual sense of "experience". Then, whence comes the conviction, "I was existing in deep sleep"? It must arise, it would seem, from the fact that one *was* the deep sleep.

1.24. Of the dream and waking states the following may be said: differences/segments/things in the former seem discontinuous, disorderly, chaotic at times, and in general unlike the continuity, order, and linearly progressive nature of the latter. This fact does not, however, prevent the question: "Is the ontological structure of the waking similar to that of the dreaming?" The first step toward answering this question is to discern the ontological nature of the dream. A clear conclusion seems that Logic 1 is inapplicable to the dream state. To establish this, let us analyze the ontological components of the dream state. There seem to exist various differences/segments of the dream (and the "point of awareness" in the dream is also one of these differences-the "experiencer"). For example, suppose one is dreaming that one has wings and is flying in the sky. There exist the following relevant distinctions: the winged body, and the "locus" of awareness which is "doing" the experiencing, and the sky and various other "objects" of the dream. The "dream mind" is not identical to the sky, nor is it identical to the winged body - all three are distinct. Now, is Logic 1 applicable to any of these differences in the dream? Do any of these objects "self-exist" so that they are capable of supporting other aspects of the dream? Obviously not, because it is the dream itself which is being these distinctions and no one distinction is capable of causing the being of any other. Thus, though not obvious when dreaming, it is the "dream/dreamer" which is being the winged creature, the sky, the "dream-locus of awareness/dream mind", and any and all differences of the dream. Logic 1 would contradict this fact because under Logic 1, each of the differences is somehow self-existent, capable of causing, or being prior to the others. (Position 1 and Position 2 would then emerge by proposing different candidates as the truly self-existent. Position 1 would claim that

the winged body, the sky, etc., as primary (by labelling them "matter"), and Position 2 would claim the dream-point of awareness, ("mind") is the most primary. But the absurdity of such a conflict is obvious - none of the segments of the dream are self-existent; rather it is the dream which is existing as all of them.) Therefore, Logic I should be rejected as inappropriate to the dreaming state. Note here that the relationship between the dream and the various segments/differences of the dream is not of whole to a part, for each part is *fully* the dream-the dream is all that there is. This does not, however, deny the existence of differences in the dream; rather, differences are heightened, for no single point of difference can claim ultimate reality for itself. Now, given that Logic I is inapplicable to the dreaming, what may be said of the nature of the waking?

1.25. The waking world/state is similar to the dreaming; and it might even be declared another kind of dream *qua* ontology - i.e., *qua* the fact that Logic 1 is inapplicable to both states<sup>7</sup>. Since this is a central notion, fully marshalling arguments seems desirable:

(a.25) As proposed in section 1.21., the three states seem to "melt" into one another. There is no "break" in the fabric of being as one wakes, dreams and deep sleeps. Thus, there is no reason not to suppose that the waking is a dream. This is not solipsism, for the *Māṇḍūkya* pauses to properly analyze the *ontology* of the dreaming state. It is not the case, in the dreaming, that the dream-subject's (the winged creature's, for example) mind is "giving rise" to the dream, rather it is the dream which is being every distinction in the dream. Similarly, the waking-subject's mind does not give rise to the waking state either; rather it is the "waker/waking" which must be *being* the entire waking state. The full argument unfolds thus; since Logic I is clearly inapplicable to the deep sleep, and since there seems to be a melting, or a *shifting of emphasis* from the deep sleep to the dreaming, Logic I is inapplicable to the dreaming. Similarly, Logic I is inapplicable to the waking world for the waking world is also a product of a shift in emphasis.

(b.25) Since the argument in 1.14. suggests that Logic 1 does not fit the ontology of the waking state, and since the dream also does not afford Logic 1, dreaming and waking must be similar, and both must reflect Logic 2. It should be strongly noted, however, that dreaming and waking remain different *qua* their differences. The similarity is ontologi-

cal, and, therefore, phenomenologically, the waking state may be considered more "concrete."

1.26. The above leads to the following further step: the "feeling" of "I" everyone is sometimes aware of, is that which is being the waking state, the dreaming state, and the deep sleeping state in the same way as the dream is being various differences in the dream. This is revealed when one says, "I slept", "I" woke", "I dreamt". This "I" is the One without a second, the *Turiya*. For, the only way to account for the fact that we are indeed aware of the three "states" of our being, given that with each "shift" in emphasis from one state to the next, the respective selves (the waking body-mind, dream body-mind, the nothingness of deep sleep) in the states are "disappearing" into each other, is to posit that we are not restricted to any of these selves. Just as we know that we exist during deep sleep because we are deep sleep, we know we exist in dreaming because we *are* the dreaming, for otherwise, (if we were strictly the dream body-mind) the disappearance of the dream body-mind (which occurs while waking and deep sleeping) would mean that we would not possess any knowledge of having existed in dreaming. But we do have the recollection of having dreamt. This implies we are the dreaming while dreaming. Similarly, we are the waking state, and not just our respective waking body-minds.

1.261. To reiterate, *if the "I" were exclusively the dream-self*, then the disappearance of the dream-self/dream-body- mind-complex would have meant the annihilation of any sense of having existed during the dreaming. Similarly, one recollects that one was awake, because one is the waking, for if this were not so, the experience of the disappearance of the waking-self when dreaming (or deep sleeping) should have meant the loss of the memory of having existed. But the memory of having "been" persists through the shifts, and this is the "I", the *Turiya*. The "I" should *not* be considered as limited to the variety of differences (including the waking selves and dreaming selves) that might appear in dreaming and waking. Nor is it solely restricted to the "singularity" of deep sleep. This "I", the One without a second, stands in the same "relation" to dreaming, waking, and deep sleeping as the dream stands to the various differences of the dream. The One without a second is being all three states, and is the only existing. The steps to the realization of the One without a second is as follows:



(1) Since Logic 1 is not applicable to the waking state, the ontological nature of the waking state must be similar to the *ontological situation* in the dreaming, since Logical does not apply to the dreaming also. Therefore, the myriad of differences in the waking state are the "waking" itself, just as the numerous differences in the dreaming are dream itself.

This implies that the waking self (and all other distinctions in the waking) is really the waking.

Similarly, the dreaming self=dreaming, and the deep sleep "self"=deep sleep.

(2) Observation: we are *aware* of having dream, slept and having been awake. Indeed we say "I woke", "I slept", "I dreamt". Thus, the waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping are "in continuum" with one another, and are not disconnected.

Now (1) and (2) imply

(3) Waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping must themselves be the being of the ultimate existence the "I". That is, the fact that the waking, dreaming and deep sleeping share the same ontological structure, Logic 2, and the fact that these exist in a continuum, and not disparately, suggests that what we were calling the waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping is really the unifying principle, "*Turiya*," the very "I" which each one of us "feels" when one utters, "I".

Thus, the pattern of argument here renovates our understanding of the "I" (the immediate "feeling" that we all have-- and indeed the reader of this paper must be experiencing at this very moment) as follows:

(\*) We initially think the "I" to be one of the waking, dreaming, or deep sleeping selves (the waking self is the common candidate).

(\*\*) When we realize that these selves *are* actually *the* waking, *the* dreaming, and *the* deep sleeping respectively, we might be tempted to consider the "I" as one of these.

(\*\*\*) However, we must arrive at the further recognition, owing to the fact that we are aware/know that these states are not absolutely disconnected, that really, the waking, dreaming, and deep sleeping are the "I", itself. That is, this "feeling" of "I", has always been, and is.

the three states, and thus It is all that there is, was, or will be. Calling the "I" *Turiya* does not gesture to some other fourth state, rather its intent is to capture the fact that we have cleared away mistaken notions (\*,\*\*) of the "I"'s nature.

1.2611. The *Turiya* is all distinctions -- there is no other outside it. It should not be confounded *with* the simple unity -- the one with a second, a third, a fourth, etc. The proper formulation is perhaps: everything is the "I" is not anything. All is It, but It is not in anything.<sup>8</sup> It cannot even be conceptualized as the "that which cannot be conceptualized". Knowing It is to recognize that one is always being It. In the context of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* *Turiya* is Divinity, the only existing reality which is fully each one of us (understood as distinct waking-selves, dream-selves) and more. The One without a second is not the logical sum, [waking + dreaming + deep sleeping], for then the individual pieces (dreaming, deep sleeping and waking) would not be *fully* It. Note how this dissolves the initial ontological concern (a) of section 1.10, for the immaterial and the material have all been revealed to be the One without a second. The non-ontological issues concerning (a) can be left to the physicists.<sup>9</sup>

1.2611. There might arise a confusion here-- one might argue: if it is the case that, for example, mind is fully the *Turiya*, why then is it false to say that "mind causes matter" (Position 2)? The response to this is rather obvious: since the *Turiya* is also fully matter, we can also assert, "matter causes mind". This implies that "matter causes mind" and "mind causes matter" are equivalent. However, one usually means to exclude the possibility that "matter causes mind" when one asserts "mind causes matter" when one is operating outside of Logic 1.

1.262. Since all this is quite subtle, presenting a thorough rewording of the argument seems appropriate:

(a) *In the waking state*, one recollects three states of being -- dreaming, waking and deep sleeping. *When awake*, one usually considers the three "states" as follows: "I have a self -- a body-mind complex. When I am dreaming, my body 'rests', while the mind dreams, and deep sleeps". Call the self which reasons thus, "The question that is being posed of the waking state is: Does the waking have the same "ontological structure" that the dream possesses?"

(b) *In the dreaming state*, one is also capable of recollecting three states of being -- one might *dream* that there are "three states". That is, one can *dream* that one has a body which "rests", and a mind which dreams and deep sleeps. One then, when *dreaming*, might say: "I have a self -- a body-mind complex. When I am dreaming, my body 'rests', while the mind dreams, and deep sleeps". Let us call the self in the dream which is capable speaking so, "the dream-self". The ontological structure of the dreaming is: there exists a dream-self (that point of "awareness" which might be accompanied or might be unaccompanied by a "body"), various other "objects", which are distinct from this dream-self and with which the dream-self interacts, and finally, the "dream" itself -- which is *fully* being the dream-self and the various other differences in the dream. Now, *within the confines of the dream*, none of the various distinct elements of the dreaming can conceive as an "entity",<sup>10</sup> the dream/dreaming. For, meaning can only be achieved by the activity of delination, and the dream is not distinguishable in the dream. That is, in a dream, only "sections" of the dream may be articulated meaningfully. Thus, attempting to utter, "the dream" in a meaningful manner fails (*qua the dreaming -- we do, however, possess a meaningful notion of the dream since we can distinguish the dream from the waking, and from the deep sleep -- but we are incapable of defining the One without a second because the Turiya stands in the same relation to the three states as the dream does to its segments*). What can be asserted, or *known* meaningfully by any entity in the dreaming is precisely the fact outlined here: the dream-self may come to realize the sense in which the dream cannot be known. Thus, though the dream-self may come to realize the sense in which the dream, the dream-self may "recognize" itself as being the dream. (Similarly, I can come to recognize that I am *Turiya*, however, I cannot *characterize* myself as a "this".)

(c) *In deep sleeping*, one is the deep sleeping, and it is because of this fact that one is able to later recollect, "I deep slept". Because there is literally no notion of "another" in deep sleep, and indeed there is no "notion", including the notion, "there is no notion", it is impossible that one could have experienced deep sleep while being distinct from it. Thus, one is not distinct from the deep sleep while deep sleeping.

(d) Of the relationship between the dreaming and deep sleeping, there is not much room for controversy since it is easily seen that dreaming and deep sleeping are in "one continuum" -- that is, the dream is nothing other than a "shift out" of the deep sleeping. An interesting query, however, arises regarding the waking state: is the ontological situation of the dreaming (the "relation" previously discerned between the dream, and the various entities of the dream) applicable to the waking? One might ask oneself, "Is this waking-body, and waking-mind really the 'waking' just as the dream-mind and dream-body are the dream?" As the first step toward a response, let us examine the main reason which might hinder such an assertion. That reason seems to be rooted in the sentiment that the waking-mind, or the "point of awareness" in the waking is in fact what became the dream, and the deep sleep. Thus, one may be led to believe that there is no justification for instituting the ontological structure of the dreaming to the waking. This sentiment is not, however, sufficient reason for rejecting the ontological similarity, for such a sentiment might be present even while dreaming -- that is, such a sentiment is quite possible in dreaming -- where, obviously, the ontological situation in question holds. That is, it is quite possible to *dream* such that one "wakes up" from another dream. While *dreaming*, one can feel exactly what one might feel when "awake": "I was dreaming, and my mind was that dream, and it was my mind which also deep slept." Therefore, the existence of this sentiment can never be sound reason for rejecting the imposition of the ontological structure of the dream on to the waking. One may, however, object that the occurrence of this sentiment in the waking deserves "greater value" than the occurrence of the sentiment in the dream because of the "greater order" of the waking. In other words, the fact that the waking world seems to be "regulated" when contrasted with the dreaming is reason enough for weighing the arising of the sentiment in the waking in a higher stead than the arising of this sentiment in the dreaming. For, one may say, in a dream anything might occur at any moment, but in the waking, there is a certain consistent "movement of phenomena". For example, in a dream one might turn into a goat, but such an occurrence is impossible in the waking. However, this objection does not seem sustainable, for:

(1) We must first observe that these arguments are being considered in the waking state, therefore, one must show care by not allowing the vivacity of the waking to become overwhelming.

(2) Since the same sentiment (that of thinking the "dream" to be a function of the "waking") might arise both in a "ordered" situation and in a "disordered" situation, how "ordered" is the ordered situation (waking) given the fact that when one is in fact "in" the disordered situation (dreaming), one perceives not that disorder, but in fact considers that disorder the very nature of order?

There is surely a difference between the waking and the dreaming. It is a fact that the phenomena, or "occurrences" in the waking are different from those of the occurrences in a dream. Does this, however, entail that the sentiment arising in the dream is inferior to the sentiment arising in the waking? Such a move can only be an assumption, a "labelling" of one set of phenomena as "superior" in their "reality" than another set of phenomena. Indeed, such a labelling is no different than when one asserts *in a dream* (*call this dream 1*), after having dreamed of having woken up from a dream (*call this dream 2*), "dream was disorderly, I am now in the 'ordered state'". The truth of the matter is that one has moved from one dream to another (where the phenomena are different-- that is how one distinguishes between dream 1 and dream 2, while being in dream 1), and this fact does not entail a movement from one ontological structure into an utterly different ontological state. These conclusions seem to suggest that there cannot exist any arguments based upon the phenomena occurring in the waking state which oppose the introduction of the dream's ontological structure to the waking. Again, this is true because, regardless of what phenomenon of the waking state is offered as an objection to the conclusion that the waking has the same ontological structure as the dreaming, the mere occurrence of that phenomenon can never exclude the possibility that the waking and the dreaming have the same ontological structure because that very phenomenon could have occurred in a situation where the ontological structure in question was operational. (I.e., the same phenomenon could have occurred in a dream, therefore, the mere occurrence of the phenomenon in the waking-- such as the sentiment that the dream is the waking mind-- cannot shed light on the nature of the ontological structure applicable to the waking world.) Thus, asserting that it is the "waker"/waking which is fully being the various differences in the waking (space, the moon, stars, planets, human beings, animals -- all the distinctions present in the waking universe) in the same manner that the dream is fully being the various differences in the dream seems quite plausible.

(e) It remains to suggest arguments for introducing the ontological structure of dreaming to the waking. The "flow" from one state into

another seems a sound reason for supposing ontological similarity, for it would seem that it is impossible for one ontological situation to be meshed with a completely different ontological situation. The "flow"/"shift of emphasis" argument, however, depends on considering the dreaming and the waking as equally real (or equally false)-- that is, analyzing the fact of the "melting" without regard to the "reality" and "unreality" issue (which is actually a species of "primary" and "secondary"). Even though it is not precise to speak of "real" and "unreal" regarding the three state, it may be instructive to utilize those sentiments in our arguments. To "real" and "unreal" let us associate Logic 1 and Logic 2 respectively. It may be asserted: Dreams are unreal, and Logic 2 is applicable to dreams, therefore, Logic 2 is unreal. This implies that the waking world is real, and Logic 1 is applicable to the waking, therefore Logic 1 is real. However, this statement is being asserted *while* awake. *While* dreaming, the dream is being considered real by the dream-mind: thus, *while* dreaming, it may be asserted that the dreaming is real, therefore Logic 1 is applicable to the dream. Now, if dreaming is considered real in the dream, there must be something unreal by virtue of which the real can be the real. This implies that the waking becomes the unreal, therefore, Logic2 must be applicable to the waking state. Now this is a peculiar situation, for depending on the state, one is compelled to interchange the ontological structures: while dreaming, Logic1 seems applicable to the dream, and Logic2 to the waking, and while awake, Logic1 is applicable to the waking, and Logic 2 to the dreaming. This suggests three possibilities: both the waking and dreaming "have" both Logic 1 and Logic 2, or both waking and dreaming have Logic 1, or both waking and dreaming have Logic2. The first possibility, that of "both Logic1 and Logic2", can be disregarded as obviously contradictory- Logic1 and ~Logic1 cannot both be true at once. Regarding the latter possibilities, if we restrict the investigation to the waking and dreaming states, there seems nothing which will enable us to determine the correct ontological structure-- it might be Logic1 or Logic2 (over-looking for the moment the arguments presented in previous sections of this paper against Logic1). The deep sleep state must now be brought under consideration, for this state is clearly "in continuum" with the waking and the dreaming. Obviously, in deep sleep, Logic1 is inapplicable, for the deep sleep is without any distinction. The question of the self-existence of "segments" does not arise at all in deep sleep. Therefore, we may conclude that Logic 1 is inapplicable to the waking and the dreaming since the dreaming and the waking "melt" "in" and "out"

but logical oddity as opposed to a valid deductive argument. This follows from the very nature of *vyāpti* itself. Had *vyāpti* been an analytic relation, the conclusions of Nyāya valid inferences would have not contained new information in them other than their premises. But since they do contain in them new information other than their premises on the Nyāya account, *vyāpti* relation holding between them cannot be said to be analytic. We cannot say that their premises with the negation of conclusion imply contradiction. This becomes quite explicit through the analysis of the *vyāpti* notion itself in the following way:

Needless to say that different Nyāya thinkers have defined the notion of *vyāpti* in different ways over the centuries from different points of view. Annambhatta, for example, defines '*vyāpti*' in terms of a 'concomitance-rule' and gives the example, 'where there is smoke, there is fire' in illustration of such a rule. In other words, for him 'where there is smoke there is fire' - such a rule (*niyama*) of concomitance (*sādhacarya*) is *vyāpti* (*Yatrayatra dhūmah tatra tatra agniḥ iti sādhacarya niyamaḥ vyāptiḥ*).<sup>5</sup> What he means is that *vyāpti* is the co-location of a probans (*hetu*) with a 'probandum (*sādhyā*) that is not the negation of an absolute absence which has co-location with the probans'. (*Hetusamānādhi karanāntyantā bhāva apratīyogisādhyasamanadhi karanyam vyāptiḥ*).<sup>6</sup> Gangesa propounds the view that *vyāpti* is the co-existence of the probans (*hetu*) with the probandum (*sādhyā*) which is not determined by the determinant of the negation of the absolute non-existence which co-exists with the probans, but whose negation does not so co-exist. (*pratīyogya-samānādhi karaṇa - yat - samanadhi karanāntyantā bhāva-pratīyogitāvachchedakāvacchinnam yān na bhavati tena samam tasya samānādhi karanyam vyāptiḥ*).<sup>7</sup> According to Udayana, *vyāpti* is the relation between the probans (*hetu*) and the probandum (*sādhyā*) without any limiting adjunct (*Anaupādhikah sambandho vyāptiḥ*).<sup>8</sup> This means, in other words, when the probans and the probandum are unconditionally related, we have *vyāpti*. While Vallabha defines '*vyāpti*' in terms of a 'universal relation'. (*kārtsnyena sambandho vyāptiḥ*).<sup>9</sup> For him it is the co-existence of the probandum (*sādhyā*) with all instances of the probans (*hetu*). On the Vācaspati Miśra's account, *vyāpti* arises from the very nature of the probans (*hetu*). It depends on the very essence of the probans, so that when the probans as such co-exists with the probandum (*sādhyā*) as such, we have *vyāpti* (*svābhāvikaḥ sambandho vyāptiḥ*).<sup>10</sup> This is also the view of Varadarāja. But for Vātsyāyana *vyāpti* is any co-existence of the probans (*hetu*) with the probandum (*sādhyā*) (*sambandhamātram*

*vyāptih*).<sup>11</sup> In other words, whenever the *hetu* co-exists with the *sādhya*, we have *vyāpti*. It is now quite obvious from the given illustrations that *vyāpti* is formulated from varying viewpoints. But there is one thing common to all its various formulation which is, I think, undoubtedly held about the nature of *vyāpti* that it is a necessary relation. It holds not only between two concepts, pervaded and pervader, but also propositions expressing them. Its necessity can be viewed and interpreted from three different angles: logical, epistemic and ontological. All these three angles are no doubt different and distinct but in the *Nyāya* theory of inference they are quite mixed and interconnected. Because of this reason the conditions of inference in *Nyāya* differ from the western one. All this is required for an inference to be possible and valid. On western view like that of B-Russell it is the logical condition, that is, a relation of implication or entailment between propositions which constitute premises and conclusion of inference. Epistemic condition is no condition, on this view, for an inference to be possible. We can validly infer one proposition from another proposition (or a set of propositions) without knowing any proposition to be true. But on the *Nyāya* account, apart from the logical condition the epistemic condition is also required for an inference to be possible and valid. No inference, on this view, is possible unless premises are related and known to be true. In other words, inferences, on the *Nyāya* account, are possible only when we have knowledge of *pakṣadharmatā* as qualified by *vyāpti*. Both *pakṣadharmatā* and *vyāpti* constitute the ground of inference. It is because of this reason the notion of 'validity' is used in both the systems, *Nyāya* and western, in different senses. But since my concern in this paper is just to examine the nature of inference in *Nyāya* from the logical point of view, not epistemic or ontological, I shall not discuss them unless the discussion demands. From the logical point of view it can be said that *vyāpti* is, on the *Nyāya* account, a necessary relation but non-analytic. Its necessity is objective, not subjective. It holds not only between two concepts, pervaded and pervader but also propositions in which their use occurs. Consider, for example, the following argument as illustrated in *Nyāya* :

All smoky objects are fiery.

This hill has smoke.

∴ This hill has fire.

This is a valid argument. In it *vyāpti* relation holds not merely between smokeness and fireness, or smokeness and smoke or fireness and



*Objection 3 :* The argument here seems entirely like the "Poori Dough" hypothesis. Such a formulation is blatantly absurd. That is, to say "all this is One without a second" is analogous to saying that existence is a mass of Poori Dough - some same "stuff" which constitutes everything.

*Response:* This is a dangerous confusion. Let us explore the Poori Dough hypothesis. Let us imagine a mass of Dough. Imagine that two figures "X" and "Y" are sculpted from the Dough such that the quantity of Dough in X is greater than the quantity of Dough in Y. Now, we must ask the question, "Is the Dough that constitutes X identical to Y's dough?" Clearly, the answer is "No." For the Dough which is in X is in X, and in addition, the Dough in X is of greater mass than the Dough which is in Y. But the ontological nature of a dream is different. Each "segment" of the dream is *fully* the dream. It is not the case that there are smaller quantities of dream in different entities in the dream- all are the dream, and the dream is restricted to no single one of them. Similarly, the *Turiya* is fully everything. Existence itself is *Turiya*.

1.30, The *Māṇḍūkya* considers the purpose of this analysis to be therapeutic. The ethical approach is thus psychological, aimed at renovating one's *thinking* from that of Logic 1 to that of Logic 2. The cause of fear, which seems at the root estrangement from the "other," is deemed to be Logic 1, for it is Logic 1 which proposes that one exists independently of the other. Rejecting Logic 1 affords a way of accepting the fact that there are differences without this fact impinging upon the fact that everything is unified. Logic 1 is what makes difference and unity seems contradictory and problematic, but reality (which seems diverse in its unity) cannot be a problem, for reality/existence is the very standard by virtue of which one knows what it means for something to be problematic or otherwise. What is contradictory is Logic 1, not existence.

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# Notes

1. "Primary" "prior," and similar words are used equivalently throughout this paper. They are meant to highlight ontological status. For example, the ontological status associated with "brain" in the sentence, "brain causes mind" leads us to say, "the brain is primary." "Causality" here is to be comprehended ontologically and not in the sense of the causality involved in someone kicking a football. I.e., the concern here is not with the efficient cause, to use Aristotle's term.
2. Roughly, whatever the possible variety. Position 1 places body, objects on "top" of a "ladder of primacy" while Position 2 places consciousness/mind on top.
3. Now, the same opposition might be seen within the general position-deciding between the various permutations--these will be "sub positional" conflicts. If it be objected here that we have a fine method of choosing between one position or another based upon, say, "scientific investigation", we can surely argue, "why consider a certain methodology of approaching phenomena as leading to the truth?" Is not such a move (that of "science") ultimately based upon the *supposition* of the validity of such an approach? We must remember further that science might help us discover causal chains--the "occurring" of phenomena in a certain order, but does this mean that it aids in the discovery of ontological primacy? Whatever may be the case, surely there exist mutually opposed ontological possibilities regarding the mind and body, the material and the immaterial, and complex issues therein. Their existence is itself philosophically significant.
4. The mere fact that mind, body, and objects interact smoothly.
5. Māndūkya Kārikā, Chapter IV, Verse 5, *Eight Upaniṣads with the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya* Volume 2. Translated by Swāmi Gambhīrānanda (Calcutta : Advaita Ashrama, 5 Delhi Entally Road, 700014). Seventh Edition, 1989. (All references to Verses from this source.)
6. *Māndūkya Upaniṣad*, Verses 3,4,5.
7. *Māndūkya Kārikā*, Chapter II, Verse 4.
8. *Māndūkya Kārikā*, Chapter I, Verse 7.
9. There can be a legitimate physics, for the waking state is not a dream insofar as "disorder" is concerned. Thus, we can be certain of causality of the sort seen in the kicking of a football. But what this causality entails has been renovated. That is, the situation is similar to what might happen

in a dream where someone kicks a football: of course the football has been kicked, but the kicker, the ball, the fact that the ball travels, are all fully the dream. Therefore, from the perspective of the dream itself, there has been no kicking, or causality. Similarly, all that exists is said to be One without a second, and in this sense, there is no kicking, nor causing, nor body, nor mind, nor anything, but only the One without a second.

10. By "entity" or "a point of difference" we mean to signify any difference whatsoever. That is, "X" is an "entity" if X is in any way different from some "Y". Thus, for example, "mind" is an "entity" just as chair is an entity if by "mind" one means something different from what "chair" signifies. This feature seems to be in the very heart of meaning -- if one is to successfully mean something, one has to distinguish something from something.
11. *Māndukya Karikā*, Chapter I, Verse 1.

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