HINTIKKA'S GAME OF LANGUAGE

1

Hintikkas break new grounds in their investigations into the 'unificatory' view of Wittgensteins from a 'pure' language point of view.[1] On their view, the two Wittgensteins can be integrated into one another, by looking at the early as having a certain phenomenology of language (symbolism) and the later as expounding a certain phenomenology about grammar (conceptualism), and seeing that the roots of the latter lies in the former.[2] What actually their investigations ultimately show is that a systematic relationship between the early phenomenology of logical form (phenomenological in the exact sense in which all logical forms are built out of the general logical form) which get manifested in the mirror theory of language (which the picture theory presupposes) on the one hand, and the latter multiplicity of logical forms which depend upon the multiplicity of grammatical forms that get reflected in the 'motley' of language-games on the other. The former results in the ineffability of semantics and the consequent distinction between saying and showing, whereas the latter results in the conceptual priority of language-games over the rule-following of language-game and conceptual impossibility of private language, and, thus, the ineffability continues in the form of phenomenology *as* grammar. Such a phenomenology as grammar is identifiable with physicalistic language, for the simple reason that such a phenomenology as grammar is also part of the physical system, and is also rooted in Wittgenstein's idea of phenomenology as grammar which identifies phenomena with grammar ('phenomenology is grammar'), an idea that dominated his middle period.[3]

Both of the above ways of thinking about language originate with the major premise which takes language as a universal medium *(linguistica characteristica)*. Whereas the above transition is to be described as one from the logical to the conceptual, the ineffability itself

is continuous with both. It is only from these observations that Hintikkas want to recover the theoretical underpinnings of ineffability of semantics from his 'critique of pure language'.[4] A total recovery would only be sponsored by looking at the idea of language-game from game-theoretical point of view of modal semantics. Such a theory is to be located at the deeper layer than the surface layer of therapy, that gets more often highlighted in Wittgensteinean investigations as inaugurating a theory of conceptual investigations into foundations of mathematics or psychology.[5] Thus, Hintikkas' investigations covers a wide spectrum of ideas that Wittgenstein enunciated during his early, middle and the later periods.

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I suggest that there are at least *two* ways one can look at the way the above investigations are carried out; on the one hand, the more controversial part which portrays the corpus of ideas as embodying a game-theoretical model of language (logic) with a formal apparatus for a theory of quantification; and on the other, a less controversial part of the game-theoretical model of language which contains a rich philo-sophical significance for a study of language. One may take them as complementary aspects of one and the same perspective, in that the understanding of the latter does not centralise the model-theoretical point of view associated with the former, while at the same time, it provides a backdrop for the former. Nevertheless, Hintikkas want to maintain certain 'opposition' between them, and the opposition is between the view of language as a universal medium and language as calculus. In a similar vein, Hintikkas hold that the distinction between them is between the concept of game of language and concept of language-game (see the section entitled 'Game of language vs. Language-game').[6]

Whatever it might be, the merit of Hintikkas' investigations, I think, is to be judged on *three* grounds: (1) the way they explore the continuity between the early (pre-1929), the middle (1929-36) and the consequent later (1936-1953) Wittgensteins, which has its focus on the doctrinal content; (2) the way the continuity is worked out from crystalline logical forms of truth-functions to the fluid logic of language-games which partly answers Wang's question (H. Wang, 1986);[7] (3) the way their game-model (Hintikka prefers the term *sprachlogic* transcends other paradigms of language including the

speech act paradigm in philosophy of language. In this article, we shall focus more on (3) since both (1) and (2) lie outside of such an outline that we attempt here.

As we remarked, the unification of the two Wittgensteins lies in the way his outlook on language is interpreted. The early view is accordingly identified with a phenomenological analysis. Its two major traits are : it is a search for ultimate logical form of the phenomenologically given (Tractarian objects); secondly, it lies midway between the empirical (science) and logical.[8] The later view is said to make a transition to a physicalistic language. The 'transition' here is to be interpreted as embodying a 'backward-looking' model, in that phenomenalistic language is regarded as the *erste sprache* (primary or first language); the significance of this for a theory of symbolism cannot easily be overlooked. On Hintikkas' reading, Wittgenstein's later paradigm takes this as 'secondary' to a more primary language, namely the physicalistic language. It is physcalistic in the exact sense in which language itself becomes part of the physical reality. The transition may roughly correspond to a transition from private language to one about public language. Public language need not necessarily be identified with the community-language, but the language whose primary purpose is 'expressive' in character. (This notion is of comparable interest to Dummett's).[9]

More exactly, the transition may be described as a passage from one phenomenology ('vertical' phenomenology of language or logical forms) to a phenomenology ('horizontal' phenomenology of grammar), which requires a 'hierarchical' phenomenology of grammar. To describe this would not altogether be wrong within Hintikkas' own terminology, as it is only the latter that completes Wittgenstein's account of language by absorbing the earlier view. It is the phenomenology in the later sense that is called physicalistic that devolves on the public character of language. Now, what is common to both of these views is that both accept the universality of language as its antecedent and the ineffability of semantics is seen as the consequent. This, according to Hintikkas, is, therefore, the benchmark of integrated Wittgenstein.

3

Hintikkas' project of theoretical (conceptual) underpinnings of ineffability semantics can easily be mooted by a singular comparison

with a similar theory advanced by Jerrold Katz.[10] Whereas for Katz, the 'principle' of effability must be regarded as embodying the secondary uniqueness (secondary because natural languages are unique in the semantic sense in that its sentences of one language are translational equivalents of some other language, which captures its sense) of natural language, for Hintikka, its theoretical underpinnings of ineffability extend as far as to suggest a surrogate for the semantics of natural languages, in that they generate a heirarchy of language schemes and consequently, they all could be accommodated within a calculus concept of language. We can call Katz's as the *sinn*-based argument for the priority of translation, and the latter simply as a hierarchical view of semantic generativism. Thus, one can make a passage from language as a universal medium to language as a calculus, however tendentious the passage may look at the outset. That is, just as for Katz, effability implies translatability (intertranslability as he calls it) and not the other way round, for Hintikka, the ineffability of Tractarian view gives way to ineffability between different language-schemes, in the *Philosophical Investigations*. This view yields two consequence : (1) Hintikkas' ineffability implies an effability (ineffability is not after all ineffable, as Hintikkas say); second, effability, in Hintikkas' sense, implies a horizontal growth of language-games. To some extent, thereafter, Hintikka also shares a translatability as trait of natural languages in Katz's sense. (I disregard for a moment the explicit opposition between Katz's translational semantics, which is opposed to any intensionalist account of meaning of the type Hintikkas' favour, but in a distinct sense). A larger question here is about the exact sense in which Hintikkas can be said to accept essentiality of translation.

If so, even while Hintikka qualifies this by saying that the ineffability of semantics is to be understood rather than overcome, he is at one with post-analytical traditions. Though the idea originates in Frege, it occurs as a 'logical consequence' of the acceptance of universality of logic (inescapability, inexpressibility). The idea of universality of language is, therefore, the lynchpin around which the entire outlook of Wittgenstein is spun. This is also the nucleus around which Hintikkas build their reading of Wittgensteins.

Nevertheless, it is the ineffability of semantics that lies at the heart of Wittgenstein's outlook on language and so, it is a pervading theme in Hintikkas' investigations too. With the game-theoretical

paradigm of logic, the ineffability is a trait that is seen as a direct consequence of the relation between syntax and semantics and the latter is again motivated to comprise a neo-critique of (formal) language in which, there appears an asymmetry between 'any' and 'every'. This is called the 'any-thesis' of the quantifiers (I am less concerned with this here, see f.n. 1). It is this which bears a contrast to language as calculus and both stem from a more sharper distinction between *logic as language* and *logic as calculus* advanced earlier by Heijenoort.[11] One interesting way of precisifying this, according to Hintikkas, is to take the contrast to be one that obtains between *language as a universal medium* and *language as calculus*. On Hintikkas' interpretation, the contrast is not as much significant as the preferred interpretation he adduces to the first limb of this idea. Following this, Hintikka might deny that the ineffability implies languages as universal medium; thus, the implication is shown to be one way independent.

Let us see how Hintikkas handle this. Now, the idea of language as universal medium requires fresh impetus more than ever. Following Habermas, we can call natural language as the universal metalanguage, and we can subsume the whole hierarchy of languages under it. To do so would be tantamount to a partial refutation of Hintikkas because they want a hierarchy of languages from the premise that takes language as a universal medium. In a way, they, therefore, reverse Habermas' idea but at the same time mock at their own distinction unless it is formulated as a distinction that obtains between 'language' and 'logic' (calculus). At one place at least Hintikka concedes that a formal and natural language have isomorphic structures, and, thus, completes the circle by saying that formal logical forms are analogical to natural language forms. This also serves as a basis for reducing natural language to a species of formal language. Natural languages are, thus, reducible to predicate logic. Hintikka also denies at the same time any recognition to speech act paradigm of philosophy of language inaugurated by J. L. Austin. This is of comparable interest to Dummett's brisk dismissal of speech act paradigm.[12] On the other hand, he takes utterances to constitute one limb of the performatives, the other limb includes non-linguistic or extralinguistic actions or activities (of searching and finding, for example).

4

As seen above, language as a universal medium is primary idea and ineffanbility is a direct consequence of this. If we, however, take it in Hebermas' way it means only that everything that could be expressed, could be expressed within a universal metalanguage and this goes against Hintikkas' idea, as shown above. In a sense, Hintikkas' game-theoretical (conceptual) analysis is directly opposed to the formal pragmatic analysis of language which Habermas motivates within his theory of communicative action. Nevertheless, similarities between these two models become apparent in their basic commitments: Both do not favour a Tarskian model of truth in terms of material adequacy conditions. First, against the common understanding that Wittgenstein's picture theory is a transformation of Fregean type of truth-function theory, Hintikka maintains that picture theory of truth is a theory about language-understanding and *a fortiori,* it is not explainable except in terms of model theory, whereas Tarski's theory may not be attributed with this trait (97). According to Habermas, Tarski's truth makes only a weaker claim as against the discourse theory of truth which tries to explain the intersubjective sense of truth (274). The discourse theory of truth gives certain priority to modality (they are hidden structures of ordinary language according to Hintikka) rather than to elementary sentences which carry empirical import. Secondly, Habermas' performative analysis of speech act takes a methodological assumption of three worlds (objective, social, subjective) all of which constitute the vertices of communicative activity; *a fortiori* it takes explicit speech acts as providing a basis for the principle of expresibility. As a consequence, it neutralises the context unlike the speech act analysis of Austin etc. Thirdly, his discoures theory of truth may be said to have a game-theoretical component so long as they adopt a performative analysis of speech acts. This is not so faithful to Habermas' own account. For Habermas, every speech act must be analysed in terms of two major components, one what he calls the 'evidential dimension', of ostensive speech acts and the other 'argumentative dimension', that are governed by 'criteria' in which the truth-claims are defended or redeemed[13] *a fortiori*, the fourth trait of discourse theory of truth is that it does not start with 'basic sentences'. On the contrary, it chooses as paradigmatic cases statements that call for grounding even at first sight hypothecally general and *model* statements, *counterfactual* and *negative* statements, to which the human mind owes its progress

(emphasis added) and lastly, Habermas thinks that temporality has its bearings on linguistic creativity (272).

Ineffability, it follows, does not provide a mere contrast but one of opposition between 'inexpressibility' and 'expressibility' of its semantics; otherwise it remains only at a tenuous level. Moreover, by making ineffability common both to early as well as later Wittgenstein, Hintikkas lose the rationale for expressing a crucial difference that underlies their own interpretation. That is, in one sense, the ineffability of semantics lies more on the vertical side of language-ontology frame, where semantics models itself on logical syntax, and, thus, the ineffability of semantics is only a consequence of ineffability of syntax. It is manifest in Wittgenstein's distinction between 'saying' and 'showing'. Since philosophical propositions are not on the side of saying, they are only shown. The ineffability of basic semantic relations (what is a name, what is an object, how they are related?) leads us on towards the showability of logical forms (64). In sharp contrast to the above, the ineffability of semantics in the second sense leads us on towards the consequence of the ineffability of syntax (of natural language). This also lends the rationale to Wittgenstein's use of grammar (or semantic rules of grammar). This is because language comprises both intralinguistic as well as extralinguistic activity (compare Dummett again). This is what Hintikkas identify with horizontal and vertical development of language, as seen from the language-game account of language. If this is so, then the picture of later Wittgenstein that emerges out of Hintikkas' reflections, is all the more confusing. For it includes ineffability in both of the above senses and hence this double-ineffability vitiates the very idea of language game concept of language. For this simply holds that neither semantics be allowed to be modelled on syntax and *vice versa*. As Hintikkas take the latter, it, however, allows the semantical issue of private language as leading towards a public language, in the exact sense in which it leads to the proof which says that language also has no 'private syntax'. This is the tenor of Hintikkas' reconstruction of Wittgenstein's *reductio* of private language argument. Thus, the latter account of ineffability is claimed to be holistic in that it includes both language - world correction, as well as interlinguistic phenomena, and private, public sub-systems; in addition, they also include the contrast, given as vertical and horizontal languagegames, which is, however, far more significant than the above.

5

The exact sense in which its singnificance is understood may be delineated as follows: the horizontal account of language is highly significant in that it stands for the interrelation between different language-games (*satz-systeme*).[14] It is this that presupposes a hierarchical arrangement of language-games raised from 'inside-out', rather than 'outside-in' as it is in the case of Habermas. A hierarchical arrangement of language games requires that we distinguish between 'primary' language-games and 'secondary' language-game. This significance of the hierarchical arrangement lies in the way the primary and secondary language-games is related in a rather unique way. In consistency. with the primacy Hintikka has attached to semantics (semantics is a model of syntax), now let us say that the ineffability here demands that our syntax is corrected to other's semantics. This is where Hintikkas locate the origin of what they call as public language. The syntax/semantics distinction calls for several such contrasts like private/public sub-systems of language, besides the vertical and horizontal language-games and intralinguistic and word-object semantics (in the plural). This is actually the basis for Hintikkas' broad-based holism. Unlike other varieties of holism, Hintikkas' is broad based for the very reason it includes the phenomenon of language also, i. e., language as it is experienced. Thus, in a sense, Hintikka is forced to take the stand that the ineffability is not ineffable after all.

An important feature of advancing the hierarchy of languages is to introduce us into the differences and interrelations among the language-games. It is here Hintikkas tread on a new territory wherein typology of language-games are distinguished. The most paradigmatic type here is physiognomic language-games, which Hintikkas regard as the 'most important kind of public framework'.[15] The reason why physiognomic (sometimes it is physiological) language-games are paradigmatic is that it is explainable in terms of a public language system. Wittgenstein's preference for this is due to the fact that it makes learning possible. Learning the semantic use of words (to fix the meaning of words appropriately) is primal part of the game. Private syntax is just a derivation from public semantics. It is only from this Hintikkas develop their eleven theses about the differences and interrelationships between various language-games.[16]

A primary language-game is defined to be about the most primary experience, say, colour experience. Its exact analogue is also a primary but it is called physiological language-game, called visual experience. Such of those primary language-games are incorrigible in that they are not revisable and they provide direct word-world linkage. Now, the relation between primary/secondary language game and the private/public language games is brought out in the following way; the laws governing the private and public language games are so logical as to warrant a 'necessity' at the level of primary, but they are not the same, as they are separated at the secondary language games. It is for this reason that the secondary language games expect us to distinguish criteria and rules, whereas they have no role at the primary level. Another key difference between primary and secondary language-game is that we can deploy our model concepts like knowledge, belief etc. in the secondary rather than in the primary language-game. Doubt, correctness, and mistake are typically modal in this respect and they, therefore, belong to the secondary language-game. In a sense, therefore, the propositional attitudes are not primary. The tenth thesis states the distinction between primary (phenomenological) and the secondary (physical) language is one that obtains between parallel languane-games, while at the same time neither one of them can be adjudicated to stand for unique language-games. Thus, the continuity between primary and secondary language-game is made very obvious. Let us try to understand the continuity a little further.

While emphasizing their continuity, we must understand that they can never be separated but at the same time they are *ex-hypothesi* alternative language-games. The continuity is derived from the way the *Bezeichung-Gegenstand* (word-object) model operates in the realm of private sensation. They are alternative in the sense that one can 'drop-out' without the other. Consider, for example, the sensation and manifestation of sensation which Wittgenstein discusses in sec. 270 of PI. Hintikkas comment :

> 'In neither language-game is the relation of the external manifestation of a sensation and the sensation itself evidential or justificatory, nor is there room for doubt or mistake in either of the two cases. And not but the least, in neither type of language-game is there a hint that the private experience itself is not real and important' (277).

Hintikka is right in thinking that the above three comments underscore much of the strain of the argument against the possibility of private language argument, as it is conventionally clarified. Further, what Hintikkas tell us here illuminate the following points : that neither privacy nor publicity rely on exclusive criteria; that mistakes (rule-violations, for example) are not explainable as such, and that the real private language argument is one that does not quieten privacy as merely a ghostly counterpart of the public.

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Having explained the relationship between the two language-games in the above way, now Hintikkas pass on to deal with the rationale for the alternativism in the above. Tracing it to the distinction Wittgenstein himself makes between, 'primary' and 'secondary senses of the work' in his PI (216), Hintikka passes for comment. Primary and secondary language-game are alternative in the sense that though primary is incorrigible and the secondary is not, they are, in a sense, on par with each other. They are on par with each other because the primary language cannot overlook the secondary language-game. *Pari Passu*, the relation between word-world relationship is not quite inde-pendent of various language-game that occur in a variety of what Carnap calls 'conceptual frameworks'. The point is that the incorrigibility of the primary language-games, in other words, can never be independ-ently motivated from secondary language-games which are not so in-corrigible. Thus, the rationale of the above distinctions lies in the way they are alternative to one another-alternative to one another in the exact senses that we can drop that beetle from the box; so a child can be trained to make use of many corrigible moves in language-games. Fitted into part of the learning process, they stand for some sort of foregoing ('abdication' or 'abrogation') of earlier moves. Though 'lying' for example, is conceptually a secondary language-game, one has to learn it any way.

A hierarchy of languages is constructed by 'superimposing' one upon the other, in as much as a secondary is superimposed on a primary language-game. If so, then the exact relation between them becomes a question of crucial importance and also it has immense bearings on the interpretation of Wittgenstein. Thus, when they are superimposed one upon another, it does not mean that we have worked out in *toto* a

complete identity between pain (inner, psychological and internal event) and painbehaviour (outer, overt, and external manifestation). Nor is it possible for us to say completely that we have tried to drive a wedge between them. The relation between them is the relation between two language-games, one superimposed upon the other, and hence the problem that is focused here is not easily resolvable by means of evidence, justification, criteria and symptoms. The point that should be borne in mind here is that the primary is not justified without the secondary and *vice-versa*; or simply that each one is a move in a language-game. It is only such a move between one language-game to another that is conceived in the thought-experiment in PI (203). Hintikkas are not alone in pointing this to us. As Stuart Shanker, in yet another context, focuses on a very similar problem in the context of Wittgenstein's critique of Hilbert's metamathematics (is called a mathematics in disguise) and the critique of incompleteness theorem (is called a bogey).[17] However, we shall look into the relation in a little more closely in the context of Hintikkas' reading.

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One must try to read a deeper significance into Hintikka's manoeuvre: that is, what he is developing here is a version of the argument against the individuality of languages, versions of which one comes across in Quine, Davidson and Dummett (Elsewhere I have identified this as a distinct post-analytical trait).[18] I stop short of arguing here for the above though. It is briefly explained as follows: it subscribes to the possibility of one language within the other (Habermasian form). It can take yet another form with an inverted image of the above: this yields a sort of Russell-Tarski hierarchy of languages. In Hintikkas' terms, this is what exactly that should be christened as the concept of language as a calculus. We need not spend time on this as a trait of languagehood, except noting that this is what Hintikkas' implicitly aim at (compare Davidson's translationhood as the trait of all languages). It is easy to show that these are all certain family-resemblance concepts about language, translation, and the priority of one over the other.

One can easily guess why Hintikka does not prefer to deduce the relationship between primary and secondary language-game as a direct consequence of the ineffability thesis. The reason is to be sought in the

way Hintikkas allow a transition from one language to the other, which is seen as an alternative to the original. Thus, seen in conjunction with the above point made in the last sentence of the previous paragraph, we are not making a transition to yet another important way of conceiving language simpliciter, but only another way of conceptualising about language, which is not entirely different from the one above. I read this as a crucial significance of the distinction that Hintikka has drawn between language as a universal medium and language as calculus, notwithstanding the exact distinctions that do not come apart.[19]

The relationship between the primary and secondary language-games now does in no way strengthen any inductive 'move' to one more modicum of certainty but only to depict the character of a new language-game. Hintikkas' point is that abrogation is not generating a 'gameless situation' but a new language-game. Nevertheless, Hintikkas' emphasis on an alternalism could only be thought of as minimal. Such a minimalist position, according to my reading, evokes a corresponding constraint on the paradigm of later philosophy. The reason for this is that it does not explain the exact relation that prevails between two alternative language-games that is in a sense philosophically illuminating. Shanker perceives this as the underlying problem of later Wittgenstein, but his proposed solution is much more complicated to foster a comparative study within the compass. That should await yet another occasion. So also his exposition drains off the therapeutical strain in him which probably stands in the forefront of current research on Wittgenstein, taking ever so many new forms. Hintikkas quote simlar remarks from his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* in support of the above point.[20]

What kind of game one plays, thus, assumes semantical significance and the relationship is not epistemic in any sense which requires justification. From Hintikkas' point of view, the way to find a niche for semanntical phenomena requires us to see the inseparable conceptual tie as one that is analogous to 'searching and finding' a counterexample within the ambit of particular language-games. One can elucidate Wittgenstin's idea of criteria by saying that the hierarchy of language requires a hierarchy of criteria without overlooking its primary association with incorrigibility, since we do not need criterion *per se* for a primary language-game. We do not need them, as they are not applicable to them. So, the secondary language-games are to be

correctly located at the space of possibilities, where the possibility of 'error'(*satzsystem* violations) are not ruled out. Hintikka comments that there is no such possibility *in* the semantical state of nature *before* or even in primary language-games'.[21]

Since there is no 'private syntax', doubt, correctness, mistake all belong to the secondary language-games. Similarly, paradigmatic first person statements (especially propositional attitude statements given in the from of 'I hope', 'I expect', 'I know' etc.) also belong to the secondary language-games. *A fortiori*, the syntax of these statements are analysed in terms of the semantics of language-games in which this has public references. The modalities as they are called are properly analysed as not in the way non-modal components stand in logical relations to one another, but in the way the different modalities occupy their respective in the public language-game. Hintikkas conclude their comparative investigation of lannguage-games by generalising the above framework for the specific analysis of modal statements involving propositional attitudes. That is, he says that both the descriptive (that p) as well as the modal part (e.g.I believe) require a public language framework but at the same time they fail to comment on why they are, then, to be syntactically distinguished and what exactly their ultimate significance for understanding Wittgenstein's (Hintikkas') reading of this type of analysis.[22]

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

Acknowledgement :

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1. Jaakko Hintikka has both a formal (geme-theoretical model of logic) as well as an informal *sprachlogik* (game theoretical model of language) that appear in a mixed form throughout his writings. My aim is restricted to the latter rather than the former. I have made an attempt to study the former or their actual relationship in my 'The Significance of J. Hintikka's *Sprachlogik'* (Ms.). Much of the material for this present quest is dictated by Hintikka's recent appeal to an integrated Wittagenstein as evidenced in his *Investigatying Wittgenstein*, Co-authored by M.B. Hintikka (Basil Blackwell, 1986.)

2. The label 'symbolism' takes the representative character of language with or without its affiliating relation to reality, and the label 'conceptualism' refers to the conceptual content' that is associated with the semantics of natural language. It is this combined characteristic that Hintikka calls the 'ineffability of semantics' and centralises in the whole of his investigations.

3. See Appendix to Chapter 6 ('Wittgenstein in Transition') for part of the German version of Wittgenstein's section entitled 'Phanomenologie ist Grammatik' from the *Big Typescript* No. 213 (von Wright's Catalogue): pp. 159-160 of Hintikka (1986).

4. See p. 17ff. Hintikka identifies this with the discovery of theoretical limits of language in the Kantian way, but adds two essential qualifications. That is, on the one hand, he makes it applicable exclusively to language exactly in the way Witgenstein did it, in that it circumscribes the paradox of transcendental knowledge (p.5) while at the same time removes another Wittgensteinean dimension away from it, namely the therapeutic. Hintikka makes this explicit : 'Its primary function is theoretical and *not* therapeutical' 189) (emphasis added).

5. If Hintikka's investigations are contra-therapeutical, then one thing becomes obvious : that is, it contrasts with other approaches which make much of the therapeutical dimension. Stuart Shanker, for example, in an avowed neo-therapeutical approach traces it to the very nature of philosophical analysis. See his *magnum opus, titled Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in Mathematics* (Croom Helm, 1987).

6. See especially section 4 of Chapter 9 ('Language-games in Wittgenstein's Later Thought') entitled 'Language-Games vs. Games of Language' : p.217.

7. H. Wang's question appears in his recent book titled *Beyond Analytical Philosophy* (M.I.T. Press, 1986). He is concerned with the way the same 'logic' that informs the 'rigour' and the 'fluidity' of the early and later Wittgenstein respectively.

8.   See L. Wittgenstein *Remarks on Colour* ed. and translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Basil Blackwell, 1977) esp. II sec. 3.

9.   There are many traits that seem to be common between the approaches made by Hintikka and Dummett. For example, Dummett notes it as a 'contest' (199) between two conceptions of language, namely, language as communication ('code' theory of language) and language as an expressive vehicle of thought, a distinction that moves in the direction of regarding language of thought as having a representative character but at the same time without committing itself to it completely, thus coinciding with the above view of symbolism (see f.n. 2 above). But Dummett is certainly something more which cannot be unloosened within the compass here. It is only from here Dummett proceeds to take philosophy of language as foundational to philosophy of thought. A contrary view holds them to be isomorphic and is prevalent among many thinkers. See for example, Christopher Peacocke, in his 'Metaphysics of Concepts', *Mental Content* (Vol.C.No.4) 1991, pp. 525-546.

10.   For a more interesting articulation of such a view, see Jerrold Katz, see esp. his contribution entitled 'Effability and Translation' in *Meaning and Translation: Philosophical and Linguistic Approaches* ed. by F. Guenthner and M. Guenthner-Reutter (Duckworth, 1978) pp. 191-234: esp. 219, 220 and 223.

11.   Heijenoort, 'Logic as Language and Logic as Calclulus' in *Synthese*, 17 (1967) pp. 324-30. In my opinion Hintikka alters the above distinction in a substantial way.

12.   According to M. Dummett,since the Gricean approach to the speech-act paradigm of language is 'no more than a sophisticated version of the code conception of language' (198) it should be considered only as a 'misconceived strategy' (197). I think the alternative model is Dummett's but at present it is hazy and unclear: see also f.n. 8 above.

13.   For this and the remarks that follow here, I am indebted to J. Habermas for the clarification he has made but which still continues to be misinterpreted. See his 'Replies' appended to the volume on *Habermas: Critical Debates* ed. by J.B. Thompson and David Held (M.I.T.Press, 1982) pp. 219-283.

14.   S. Shanker introduces two significant locutions in this connection, namely *satzsystem-following* and *satzsystemviolation* to explain the 'inter-play' (*Wechset-spiel*) between two alternative mathematical (conceptual) frameworks. See esp. his *Gödel's Theorem* (Croom Helm, 1988): pp. 155-256, esp. 204.

15.   See p. 272; Hintikka (1986).

16.   The eleven theses are elaborated in Chapter II of Hintikka.

17.   S. Shanker discusses Wittgenstein's reaction to Hilbert; his (1988) discusses Wittgenstein's reaction to Gödel in a very extensive way while focusing on the 'interplay' between two alternative systems; see f.n.14 above.

18.   I am not alone in calling this as post-analytical; Nancy Murphy's 'Scientific Realism and Post-Modern Philosophy' nominates W.V.O. Quine as a 'a post-modern epistemologist' (294); See *Philosophy of Science* , 41 (1990) 291-303.

19.   One may still distinguish between philosophy of language *simpliciter* and philosophy of language. Whereas the former is *ideological* and comparable to Husserl's ideal as found in his *Crisis*, the latter is post-analytical, and this accounts for the differentiation of their political import.

20.   Hintikka quotes from Vol. 2 (p.684).

21.   287; Hintikka (1986).

22.   The issue, I think, is one about mapping of the relation between syntax and semantics. See also my comments on 'Does Transcendental Subjectivity Meet Transcendental Grammar ?' (to appear).