

DUḤKHA : AN ANALYSIS OF BUDDHIST CLUE TO UNDERSTAND HUMAN NATURE

In the present paper an attempt is made to unearth and present an important clue to understand human nature and human life via analysis of *Duḥkha* as presented by the Buddha and his followers through especially probing into *Dvādaśa-nidānas* as a symptomatically diagnostic aspect of it and bring out some of the salient features of it. The entire essay has three sections. The first is addressed to marking off philosophical approach to *Duḥkha* from the non-philosophical ones. The second deals with two things : on the one hand, it distinguishes the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha* from other major philosophical approaches to it, which were developed in the Indian sub-continent; and, on the other, spells out aspects of the rationale of the buddhist approach, which makes it decisively different. The last section is directed at bringing out some of the crucial implications of the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha*.

I

Different Approaches to Duḥkha

Living beings in general and human beings in particular have an experience of pain and suffering (*Duḥkha*). Since such an experience is not a satisfying state of affairs and makes life unbearable, there is a tendency to seek deliverance or relief from it. Non-human beings also are seen adopting various means to relieve themselves from pain and suffering within their limits. Their modes, however, are reflexive, mechanical and hence, uniform in pattern, although variation on account of climatic, environmental and such other conditions cannot be ruled out. In the case of human beings the case is different. They not only seek to relieve themselves from annoying states of affairs but also of those animals and organisms, the health and prolon-

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gation of the lives of which is not instrumental to human well-being - individual or collective. Even the epistemic enterprise on the part of human beings to study plants and animals as also of treating them medically and therapeutically, is not completely philanthropic and altruistic in character. On the one hand, it enables humans to understand their own anatomy, physiology, bio-chemistry, neurology etc. better and, on the other hand, mode/s of diagnosing and curing, if possible, the various sorts of diseases, disabilities and disfunctions they come to suffer from and relieving themselves of the pain and suffering that comes to their lot as a result of them. Human approach to the phenomenon of pain and suffering coming to the lot of non-humans could, then, broadly be said to be guided by pragmatic and anthropocentric concerns.

The point of annoying states of affairs figuring in the life of the entire organic life and pain and suffering coming to the lot of all living beings is not made merely for academic purpose. In the next section we shall have an occasion to look into its profoundly significant philosophical implication, especially when we shall probe deeper into the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha*. Though, in this way, all organisms experience pain and suffering, human approach to pain and suffering is varied and complicated to fathom into and explicate the rationale by which it is backed. This is perhaps for three reasons. First, human life in its various aspects is too complex. Also, the structure and functioning of human beings is equally complex in nature. Secondly, human life is markedly purposive and intentional in nature and hence differs decisively from that of other organisms. But this also calls for a different approach to understand it in its various nuances and intricacies. We shall have later on an occasion to point out as to why a simplistic and naive approach to understand it is more likely to distort our understanding of it. Thirdly, as human life is complex and complicated to understand, so too the annoying states of affairs human beings are subjected to. That is, pain and suffering coming to human lot is not always the creation of non-human world. Nor could it be said to be determined by conditions exterior to human life - individually or collectively. In fact, it could be held without much controversy that much of the pain and suffering of human beings is of their own creation - individual or collective, deliberate or non-deliberate, direct or indirect. A case could be made out, independently of subscribing to the Law of *Karma*, as it is traditionally understood, that in the short or long run it is

human beings who can come to make their life satisfying or painful and miserable. But we do not wish to get into details of this issue here. Human life also becomes complicated to understand because such an understanding is often backed by a certain conception of human being, human life and human aspirations. And on this count, again, as we shall see, there is no unanimity. Added to this is a further rider, viz. the fact that human life may be sought to be understood holistically and integrally or aspectively and in terms of various faculties humans are said to be endowed with.

On the above-mentioned background, broadly speaking, two important sort of concerns have been adopted regarding *Duḥkha* experienced by humans viz. the philosophical and non-philosophical. For, it is not the exclusive prerogative of philosophers to understand the nature of human beings and their experience of *Duḥkha*. The non-philosophical approaches to *Duḥkha* basically concentrate on structure and constitutions of human beings-physical and/or psychological -, look for the causes and incidence of suffering through diseases or disorders, symptomatic diagnosis of the disease/disorder, at least present cure/amelioration of the malady and possibly also prevention of its incidence again. As we shall soon see, all this is relative to our knowledge, not only of human structure and constitution, but also of diagnostic, therapeutic and preventive aspects of the entire process. In the philosophical approach, on the other hand, what matters basically is the conception of man, human life and aspirations, and relationship between them. The two prominent non-philosophical approaches to *Duḥkha* are the medical (say of *Āyurveda*)¹ and psychological or psycho-somatic (say of *Yoga*)². As we shall see below, there cannot be any water-tight compartmentalization of them, since, however derivatively it may be, some aspects of them overlap. Yet, it remains a fact that none of them can be mapped onto or reduced to the other without residue. Further, it would also be misleading to hold that while philosophical approach to *Duḥkha* alone is holistic, any non-philosophical approach to it must in principle be aspectival in character.

Let us investigate into some important points of similarity and difference between these three approaches to *Duḥkha*, for better understanding of the uniqueness of each of them without losing sight of inter-connections between them.

(1) **The concern at stake** - Both in the medical as well as psychiatric approaches concerning pain and suffering there is a twin concern : To seek to understand the present disturbing state of the patient in terms of the physical and/or psychological make up, as incidence of pain and suffering is held to be on account of disturbance of homiostasis or normality,³ and curing the patient, at least temporarily, of the ailment. In the philosophical approach, on the contrary, it is neither description and understanding of pain and suffering through structural and constitutive and functional condition/s of the patient or the present state he is in that is decisively significant; nor even seeking to cure the patient of his pain and suffering is held important. It rather consists in spelling out what could be held to be a critique of it, bringing out to the notice of the concerned the very condition/s of the possibility of pain and suffering where the condition/s sought to be articulated basically being epistemic rather than structural or functional. It could perhaps also be understood as an attempt to change our perspective and approach concerning pain and suffering rather than seeking to understand it structurally or functionally and the cure of it, temporary or lasting. This is not, however, to say that philosophical approach to pain and suffering is utterly oblivious and neglectful of diagnostic and therapeutic concerns regarding them. For, as we shall see later on, were this so, there would not have been any points of convergence between medical and philosophical approaches. Nothing could be more grotesque to hold that there are none or nothing could be common among them.

(2) **Causal or non-causal approaches** - As observed earlier, a state of freedom from physical ailment is called homeostasis and so long as it persists, we do not become sick. Even in face of various kinds of bacterial infections and viruses - known or unknown, active or silent - we do not necessarily become sick, so long as our resistance power is able to withstand them. When such a resistance power declines, we succumb to the attack of the former which results into a particular kind of disease and disorder. Similarly, our psychological disorders are indicative of the disturbance of psychosomatic balance resulting into psychic disorders and abnormalities leading to sensitive, affective and/or conative imbalances. Both physician as well as psychotherapist attempt to work out and present causal analysis of the incidence of such disorders. Their therapeutic approach, too, likewise, is governed by adoption of such a causal approach, emphasising that events in the physical or living world could be analysed adopting the same kind of causal approach universally.

In the philosophical approach offering a critique of pain and suffering coming to human lot, although their psychological or psychosomatic aspects are not sought to be neglected or circumvented, and although it is not ignored that many kinds of physical ailments are often psychosomatic in origin, there seem to be at least two decisive features which mark it off from the other approaches :

(a) making a distinction between causes, motives and purposes, and (b) marking off either living world from non-living or at least human from the non-human. As we shall notice, although majority of the philosophical strands that flourished in this sub-continent uphold these considerations, there are at least some which preferred, for reasons to be brought out later, to adopt a uniform approach regarding the entire world, without making distinction between living and non-living, either totally or partially.

(3) **Weightage of symptoms** - Considered *prima facie* physicians, psychotherapists as well as philosophers seem to attach a considerable importance to the symptomatic diagnosis⁴ of pain and suffering we undergo in our life. This way considered, there appears to be considerable convergence in the approaches of all of them regarding annoyance that comes to our lot. It is looking to such aspects that a plea of adoption of medical model in philosophy concerning pain is advanced.⁵ There are certain grains of truth in this. They do not, however, exhaust the sum and substance of these different approaches.

Notwithstanding such a convergence/s, there is a fundamental difference in the approaches under consideration. Physicians' and psychotherapists' attention to symptoms is drawn with a view to locating possible causes of the incidence of the disorder, diagnosis, therapy and at least present cure. As we shall see later, broadly speaking, in the philosophic approach greater, if not sole, emphasis is laid on misconception, miscomprehension and misunderstanding as the generic source of pain and suffering coming to our lot. The route to deliverance and freedom from pain and suffering in this approach must pass through altered comprehension and clarity in understanding, not necessarily culminating in physicists' or psychotherapists' mode of their diagnosis, therapy or cure.

(4) **Tests and investigations** - As can be gauged, whereas investigative and diagnostic techniques and tests, viz. pathological,

radiological, clinical etc. - along with case history are significant in the physicists' or psychotherapists' approach to pain and suffering, they could hardly have any major role to play in the philosophic approach. This is not to say that philosophers have all along been averse to *Āyurvedic* or *Yogic* prescriptions and therapies.⁶ But they in themselves do not and cannot constitute core of it. This is more so because the philosophic approach neither concentrates on *Duḥkha* coming to human lot in a certain phase of life, space or time nor does it seek to locate its determiners in the structural or constitutive features of human body or psyche. Should this have been so, humans should have adopted only physicists' or psychotherapists' approach to *Duḥkha*. As we shall observe, although independence and irreducibility of philosophical approach has been questioned adopting positivist or reductionist stance,⁷ its very possibility and entertainability has not been deprived on that count.

(5) *Curative/therapeutic treatment* - In the physicists' or psychotherapists' approach to *Duḥkha*, as there are investigative and diagnostic tests and techniques, so too there are therapeutic, ameliorative and curative procedures and techniques. They are also seen to be changing with the attainment of greater sophistication, and growth and development of technologies conducive to them. Both these approaches concentrate upon present mitigation, reduction and prevention from further worsening of the present malady, if not complete cure of it. In the process, there is no guarantee that a newer malady will not surface or that it may not be worse than the present agony. But this is often blamed on the present level of technological advance or degree of expertise and sophistication available in a given field.

In the philosophical approach, on the other hand, its adoption is not germane to growth and sophistication through modernisation, but rather to depth and profundity of understanding human life in its various aspects - not only structural and epistemic - cognitive or justificatory -, but regulative as well. It is adoption of a particular focus or perspective and comprehension of human life in its complexity in the light of it that is of paramount importance here. That is why it is neither present nor even permanent cure or annihilation of human suffering as a whole that can be its aim. This being so, in a philosophical approach concerning pain and suffering certain paradigmatic modes of analysis of the problem are at stake. And hence being theoretically

coherent, praxiologically applicative and, to the extent possible, neither turning counter-intuitive nor fragmentary are some of the decisive features of it. Also, as we shall see, adoption of a philosophical approach concerning pain and suffering on the one hand and undergoing physical or mental torture on the other cannot, in principle, be said to be simultaneously unsatisfiable. Nor can it be said that freedom from physical or mental annoyance in itself is necessary and sufficient condition of one's adopting an appropriate philosophical approach about it.

(6) **Risk element** - The element of risk involved in physicians' or psychotherapists' claim of annihilation of and/or control over pain and suffering is indeed twofold in character. On the one hand, they being relative to the degree of sophistication and expertise attained, they may yield unpalatable consequences not only when they are misused and degraded but, on the other hand, even when they are adopted in good faith. This is especially on account of undisclosed and undiscovered side-effects of not only diagnostic but therapeutic, curative or preventive techniques adopted, drugs administered, surgeries performed etc.

In the philosophical approach, on the contrary, there seems to be only one kind of risk involved, viz. its misuse and degradation leading to deepening and proliferation of misunderstanding and misconception. One can claim that such risks of it are far more dangerous than those stemming from physicians' or psychotherapists' approach concerning pain and suffering. This, however, is highly a debatable issue and we do not wish to go into the details of it in this paper for fear of digression.

(7) **Preventive care** - In order that one should not experience *Duhkha* both physicians' and psychotherapists' attempt to take care to ensure that other things being equal the present patients do not come to suffer from the same disease or at least their present ailment does not aggravate or at least remains endurable. Similar considerations apply to the future possible sufferers and potential carriers as well. At a given time particular ailment might not have grown and manifested to warrant an emergency intervention. But taking into account the prevalent dormant or potent stage of a disease and the risks to which patient may be susceptible on its aggravation, preventive medicines and therapies are adopted. In spite of such measures, there is no guarantee that the disease may not outwit the present level of

competence to hold it in abeyance or that such measures themselves may not adversely affect the patient. There is no medicine or therapy to permanently immunise a human being from susceptibility to ailment throughout the life-span. One is at a risk of coming to suffer from different diseases or recurrence of the same. There is also a risk of viruses and bacteria turning immune to older modes of preventing them from thriving - nay, worse still, they may thrive on them with vengeance. These observations are not at all counter-intuitive as can be seen from the failure of malaria or mosquito menace eradication programme, not to talk of AIDs or cancer prevention efforts.

Thus, physicians' or psychotherapists' approaches to pain and suffering -diagnostically, curatively, therapeutically or preventively - have some important serious inherent limitations, relative as they are to the present level of knowledge, expertise and technological advancement. They seem also to be backed by a misplaced self-confidence that more intensive and wide-spread adoption of them would one day free human race from its susceptibility to ailment and disease - a dream which is often turned into a nightmare!

A philosopher, on the contrary, knows well that there is no mechanical remedy. Nor is there always a possibility to do surgery or adopt a therapy to guarantee prevention of a disease permanently. One cannot get rid of pain and suffering (*Duḥkha*) totally; nor can one immunise human life from it. One has to confront *Duḥkha* and fight against it. Philosophers in this sub-continent have always held that philosophical approach to *Duḥkha* coming to human lot is distinctive and in its core consists in adoption of an appropriate focus and perspective. Such an approach, further it is held, should be maximally universalisable, irrespective of constraints of spatio-temporal or circumstantial considerations.

Certain convergences and points of contact between medical, psychotherapeutic or philosophical approaches to *Duḥkha*, however, need not blind us to think that divergences between them are either inconsequential or dispensable. Were it so, there would not have been attempts to advance and articulate as well as defend with ingenuous arguments various attempts at philosophical approach to *Duḥkha*.

We saw above that in spite of certain points of contact and convergence, philosophical approach to *Duḥkha* differs markedly from

the medical or psychotherapeutic approaches to it, although it cannot be denied apriorily that the former must not at all be modelled after the latter.

Philosophical approach to *Duḥkha* in turn is not unitary, although certain common threads run through their divergence. To see decisively distinctive features of buddhist approach to *Duḥkha* we so far attempted to mark off philosophic approach from the non-philosophic varieties of it. But we also saw that philosophic approach in itself is not something unitary. In the following section, we address ourselves to the task of segregating the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha* from other philosophic approaches to it to see the roots and foundations of its uniqueness, so that, in the last section, we would be in a position to look into some of its salient implications.

II

Philosophical Interpretations of *Duḥkha*

The philosophical approach to *Duḥkha*, as observed above, is, no doubt, distinct and unique. It is not, however, homogeneous. There is a variety and plurality of it. Different attempts have been made by adherents of various schools of Indian philosophy to articulate the nature of human life together with or independently of the structure of human beings, their legitimate aspirations and the sort of approach they need to adopt about *Duḥkha*. These attempts, even though they differ among themselves, share certain common features and concerns, which make them broadly philosophical in character. The difference in them is due to their respective philosophical frameworks to which they adhered and attempted to explicate the nature of human life. On the contrary, the convergence is due not only to their having emerged and developed in this sub-continent sharing common civilizational thread, but also in refusing to substitute a philosophic approach to *Duḥkha* by medical or psychotherapeutic one. Consequently, their articulation of human life is distinct, not because the human being under consideration is different or the time and place variations had an impact on it, but rather because of their variant understanding of human life and its problems together with different framework of the philosophy to which a particular school was committed. In other words, philosophical analysis of the problem of *Duḥkha* and its particular mode of

resolution is guided, according to the conception of goals and aspirations of human life, the mode of living it, our conception of ourselves, of others - living beings - human and non-human - and things and objects etc., or of the world at large which is at stake. All these aspects and inter-relations between them play an important and decisive role in our understanding of the nature of human beings and *Duḥkha* coming to their lot. In spite of such differences among them at least on three counts various trends of philosophical thought originated in the Indian sub-continent exhibit a common concern that links them with one another.

(a) **Cognition of *Duḥkha* :-** All living beings undergo an experience of *Duḥkha*, although all of them may not be able to communicate it. As we shall see later, undiluted emphasis on this sort of universality is a decisive feature of the buddhist account of *Duḥkha*. All humans also suffer from some pain or ailment. They not only suffer i. e. sense but are also conscious of it, as also communicate it to others. Such a pain may be physical, psychological, social, economic, moral or even spiritual. There is no human being who has never had an experience of annoyance, pain or suffering. We mentioned earlier that one of the important features of the philosophic approach to *Duḥkha* consists in changing our perspective about it rather than putting an end to the fact of it. Although adherents of various trends of philosophical thought that flourished in this sub-continent analysed and explained the phenomenon of pain and suffering coming to our lot differently, yet none of them could be said to have presented an account of it that is apriori and regardless of experience. No trend, thus, could be branded to be presenting merely formal and analytic account of *Duḥkha*, although such an extension of it is sought to be worked out in a certain framework and backed by certain rationales, to some of which we shall return in the sequel.

(b) **Satisfaction orientation :-** Granting that in our life an experience of *Duḥkha* is unavoidable, two ways could be envisaged of confronting it, viz. pessimism or optimism. If there is not going to be overall balance of satisfaction over annoyance in our life, it will culminate into a kind of frustration and hopelessness leading to pessimism. Adherents of no philosophical trend of thought in this sub-continent advocated such a course, although it cannot be denied that in course of time distortions of the original insights and stoppage of fresh

rejuvenative thinking did culminate in adoption of fatalism and escapism giving rise to misplaced self-complacency and social parasitism. Prominent trends, on the contrary, advocated optimism, giving hope to the concerned that menace of *Duḥkha* could at least be contained within ourselves without further giving rise to weakness and vulnerability, if not surmounted or eradicated altogether. This optimistic trend manifested in twin direction, although it was accepted that both external as well as internal - understood individually or collectively - factors act as determiners of pain and suffering coming to human lot. On the one hand it was held, together with belief in transmigration and *Karma* theory along with whatever it implies, that pain and suffering in human life is the result of the doings of humans themselves. Understood individually or collectively it amounts to holding that the suffering individual or group alone is responsible for its suffering, and no one else.⁸ This trend assured internal coherence of the theory together with application of the law of nemesis uniformly through belief in transmigration. But cashing everything on its anvil and making non-incoherent sense of allocation of responsibility seems to have converted human beings into sorts of robots mechanically following the law of *Karma*, something parallel to the law of *Rta* in the cosmocentric world. We need not go into details of this here. On the other hand, especially the Buddhists, as we shall see, advocated a view, without subscribing to the law of *Karma* in its mechanical sense and yet without giving up optimism and hope, that although it cannot be denied outright that we suffer because of us, nonetheless, we do not necessarily suffer solely because of us.⁹ Further, as in the life of any living organism there are risks so too in human life, inspite of the fact that man is not only conscious but self-conscious as well, over and above being at least reasonable if not rational too. In the advocacy of these two important trends, though adherents of both subscribe to optimism, distinction between heterodox and orthodox schools came to be marginalised, if not obliterated altogether.¹⁰ But, as we shall see, it also brings forth certain decisively distinctive features of the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha*, a little deeper probing into which is hoped to be rewarding.

(c) **Morality :-** While attempting to contain, control or overcome pain and suffering - its emergence and continuation - nobody in this sub-continent advocated a view to use unfair and foul means. While advocating the path of ceaseless striving, tireless efforts, self-reliance and self-help, it is not any means - fair or foul, moral or immoral etc.

- which is held to ensure satisfaction and fulfilment in life and order in the society. On the contrary, it was stressed by them all that morality is primarily an important feature of our life, although this is not to deny that their conception of moral life was not the same in all its details. It seems to have been held almost uniformly that cessation of our being moral also marks an end of our being human, such that being moral is held to be desideratum and differentia of being and continuing to be human. This consideration is so pivotal that no stage and phase of human life - individual or social - is held eligible to be free from it. For, its essence being self-regulation and self control, its absence will entail imbalance and onesidedness in personal life or chaos and disorganization in the social. This is not again to deny there were fundamental differences concerning priority of individual over social life or *vice versa*, or the very conception of organization of individual or collective life.¹¹ We cannot, however, probe deeper into this issue here.

Such points of overall agreement, convergence and commonality concerning the approach regarding *Duḥkha* among the adherents of various trends of philosophical thought which flourished in this sub-continent is just one phase of it. Were this to be the only factor to guide their analysis and approach, there would hardly have been fundamental and decisive differences. But, as we shall soon see, such differences in their respective approaches, determined in turn by various considerations, not only mark off some approaches to *Duḥkha* - say, the one advocated by the Buddha and his followers - from others, but also bring to surface its decisively differentiating and unique features in bolder relief and marked contrast. Hence, this section is divided into two parts. On the background of common considerations, in the first part, we shall briefly concentrate on the non-Buddhists' interpretations of and approaches to the problem of *Duḥkha* and nature of human beings, along with their respective rationales. For, unless the views advocated by different philosophical traditions other than the buddhist are articulated, it would not be useful and rewarding to explicate and warrant the buddhist arguments with regard to the nature of human beings and *Duḥkha* in their life, especially since various trends flourished here concurrently and engaged themselves in prolonged dialogue and controversy with one another. Hence, on this background, in the second part, an attempt is made to analyse the buddhist approach concerning *Duḥkha* and spell out its rationale.

A

The Non-Buddhist Interpretations of Duhkha

Right from the early times, humans are not only curious to know themselves but anything and everything around them as well. Man is interested in discovering peculiarities and uniquenesses, if any, of himself and his relation to all that exists in this world as well as with the world at large. Sometimes possibility and fact of human life beyond this world is also emphasised together with various entities, facts and phenomena which humans - at least their selves - may encounter therein. We need hardly go into details of this issue here, although at least some aspects of it are undeniably interesting and challenging to tackle. In such a process of inquiry, man has indulged into finding out his similarities with and differences from other living entities - animals and trees - and things and objects that inhabit the world. Going along the way of emphasising similarity and making differences, if any, subservient or reducible to it, two trends are noticeable : (a) on the one hand, the same kind of similarity - structural or functional, constitutive or regulative - is emphasised to be operative in the entire world, animate as well as inanimate and hence it is held that nature of and interrelationship between them is explainable in the same way.¹² (b) On the other hand, going along the way of difference two-fold directions are noticeable : (i) It is held that living and non-living differ fundamentally from each other and that there are many points of similarity between humans and other living entities including plants which are of great philosophical significance.¹³ (ii) Or else, it is held that humans not only differ from non-living things but also from other non-human living organisms, and that to water down or shade off this decisive difference between them is not only philosophically unilluminative but intellectually suicidal as well.¹⁴

As can be gauged from the above brief sketch, the similarity that is sought to be emphasised between humans and non-humans is considered to be either physical (including physiological) or psychophysical in nature,¹⁵ depending upon the scope of the universality sought to be extended over the entire world or restricted to the organismic or human world. Thus, on the one hand, everything was sought to be understood in terms of structural uniformity,¹⁶ treating functional differences to be of marginal value; or, on the other hand, certain constitutive and/or functional features of organismic life or

human beings were sought to be highlighted in the light of which the latter could be marked off from anything else. Thus, broadly speaking two principal sorts of paradigms of accounting for human nature and *Duhkha* experienced by man could be said to have been operative in the sub-continent and they could be held to be reductionist and uniformitarian¹⁷ or else anti-reductionist and emphasising uniqueness and differentia of man.¹⁸ Yet, in between these two major trends there are many more of variant shades subscribing to partial reductionism or anti-reductionism or their combination. These tendencies have percolated and manifested into different shades and various levels of intensities of arguments in the philosophies advocated by the adherents of various non-Buddhist traditions in Indian philosophy. The Buddhist approach is, as we shall see, equidistant from the two extremes.¹⁹ At the same time it also refrains from striking such a compromise between them which would either be incoherent or counter-intuitive in character, restricting its analysis of the problem basically to this life - the central bone of its contention. But more of it later.

First coming to one extreme of the resolution of the problem of *Duhkha*, viz. reductionism and positivism advocated by Cārvākas. According to them, it seems, everything, including human beings, in this world, is constituted and made up of the (four) *Mahābhūtas* (elements), viz. *Prithivī* (earth), *Āp* (water), *Tejas* (fire) and *Vāyu* (air). All objects and living beings - plants and animals including human beings - are nothing else but variant manifestations of the same pattern of mechanical combinations of these constitutive elements alone.²⁰ And hence, the mode of emergence, continuation and annihilation of anything - right from things upto human beings - is explainable and understandable in the same physical and mechanical way. Consciousness, which is claimed to be the essence of human soul, is nothing else but a resultant feature and function of these material elements. And hence, it is explainable in the same manner. The same kind of homogeneous and mechanical building blocks are operative throughout the world, and phenomenon of pain and annoyance experienced by organisms in general and humans in particular being no exception to it. The advocacy of happiness as the sole goal of life is but an inevitable consequence of Carvakas' empiricism and positivism. Likewise, their universal reductionism is also an unavoidable consequence of their positivism. It is, therefore, quite obvious that according to them the entire world is not only structured and constituted

in the same way but is also governed by the same kind of mechanical laws.²¹

A slightly mitigated version of this sort of naturalism would be to hold that inanimate on the one hand and animate world inclusive of plants on the other, are constituted by similar but heterogeneous building blocks, such that while in the inanimate world there is one kind of continuity, in the animate world of another sort, and yet both these are subject to similar kind of combination in their respective spheres and functional variations are explainable in a similar reductive way.²² If hypothesis of transmigration is combined with the view under consideration then a human in this birth could be a certain sort of plant, if not stone, in the next life.²³ It may not be out of place to remark that, apart from other sworn naturalists (*Svabhāvavādins*) like Macchali Gosala, in weak moments of their consideration and haste of adopting larger and larger universalistic pattern of explanation of human nature, such a view was also endeared, however sporadically, by adherents of *Nyaya* and *Sāṃkhya*. We need, nevertheless, hardly to probe deeper into this here. This could yet be held to be one mode of opposing Carvaka brand of universalistic and homogeneous reductionism. In spite of this sort of global or non-global reductionism there is, however, an insistence on persistence, perpetuation and unaltered stability of some building blocks - physical or biological. As we shall see, this trait, alike subscribed to by adherents of the so-called orthodox and heterodox schools, is opposed and questioned by the Buddha and his followers.

On the contrary, another strand, advocated by Jainas and Sāṃkhyas on the one hand and Naiyāikas and Mīmāṃsakas on the other too is globally anti-reductionistic in character, although in a mitigated sense of the term. The Sāṃkhyas, even though they belong to the Brahmanical tradition, advocate a view that in spite of certain similarities between humans and non-human organisms, the former are distinct from the latter, while living organisms in turn are different from inanimate things. On the *sāṃkhya* view analysis of human nature and experience of *Duḥkha* is distinctively different.²⁴ It holds, perhaps on the model of organisms within the framework of which male-female distinction is clearly discernible, that although living organisms share among themselves various psycho-somatic similarities in differing degrees, being evolutes of *prakṛti* (hence perhaps the importance of *Ayurveda* and *yoga* in this trend), *puruṣa* (*Sāṃkhya* analogue of *Jīva*)

is distinct from *prakṛti* exhibiting certain oppositional and diametrically variant features, such that the genesis of all pain and suffering is twofold in nature: through (a) contact (though distant) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* (male and female? and hence the advocacy of the *Sāṃkhya* mode of asceticism?) and (b) failure on the part of *puruṣa* of the cognition and understanding that it is fundamentally different from *prakṛti* and that all roads and routes to emancipation from *Duḥkha* must culminate in isolation (*Kaivalya*) from *Prakṛti*.²⁵ In this approach, apart from belief in transmigration, suffering of the self (*puruṣa*) on account of sin and resultant bondage as well as adherence to the overall backing of the vedic lore, it is held that the same kind of *puruṣa* is eternal and common to the entire world of living organism. In the world of *prakṛti* or *Puruṣa*, both everlasting and eternal, left to itself there is neither *sarga* nor *pralaya*, they being outcome of however distant contact between these two halves of the world on account of *Puruṣa*'s failure to keep its isolation unadulterated and uncompromised due to misunderstanding, error, misconception and confusion about its own legitimate nature and status.

Although according to Jainas the world is basically constituted of *jīva* and *Ajīva*,²⁶ and although *Ajīva* objects which are unconscious are explainable in terms of *Pudgala* (matter), *Kāla* (time), *Dharma* (motion) and *Adharma* (rest), *jīva* differs from them in being alive and sensitive. Further, anything that is real- no matter living or non-living-is subject to threefold features- emergence (*Utpāda*) changeability (*Vyaya*) and permanence (*Dhrauṇya*).²⁷ Insofar as neither *Jīva* nor *Ajīva* is reducible to the other, Jainism too opposes universal mechanical reductionism and homogeneous uniformity. Yet, in its view, not only contact between but even infiltration and pollution of *Jīva* by *Ajīva* is both a possibility and fact of life. This sort of pollution of *Jīva* by *Ajīva* not only becomes possible through ignorance of *Jīva* of its true nature but also through *Karma*, which on the Jaina view is physical in nature. The contact between either the body and *Jīva*, or *Ajīva* and *Jīva* could be understood through the analogy of a cube of salt melting in water and thereby water becoming salty or, say, spreading of light or darkness in an enclosed space - smaller or larger. Although, again, through classification of *Jīvas* along certain physical parameters like possessing one, two, three, four or five sense-organs the Jaina approach cannot be said to be accepting the same *Jīva* transmigrating through the domain of the entire living world, it could be

surmised that, nonetheless, it seems to accept a certain uniformity of all the *Jīvas* within the living world, in so far as infiltration of *Karma* (*Asrava*) could be purged (*Nirjarā*) and the *Jīva* emancipated from its contact with *Ajīva* and *Karma* - infiltration and thus the *Jīva* ultimately shines in its glory.

Thus, it seems, both Jainas and Sāṃkhyas claim that human beings are distinct and superior to other living organisms in so far as they have a superior kind of lasting or permanent *Jīva/puruṣa* which is subject to the law of *Karma* and transmigration till it attains emancipation from *Duḥkha* through its severance of itself from anything else. Both, again, attach a considerable importance to misunderstanding of its own true nature on the part of *Jīva/puruṣa* which is the basic source of its torment and languishment. Irrespective of the difference between them that whereas *Sāṃkhya* belongs to the orthodox camp, while Jainism belongs to the heterodox, both of them ascribe certain differentia and permanence to *Jīva/Puruṣa*, and oppose its reduction to anything else. Biologically and even psychosomatically, therefore, according to them there are many features which *Jīvas/Puruṣas* have common among them, this being the minimum thread that makes them uniform and paves the way for transmigration over the entire domain of living beings and being subject to the law of *Karma* in the same way. As we shall see, this sort of determinism also is sought to be opposed by buddhists in their attempt to analyse human nature and account for *Duḥkha* experienced especially by humans. The *Sāṃkhya* and the *Jaina* opposition to reductionism, however, is seriously compromised, in order not to turn out to be radically counter-intuitive, in not only in so far as there are certain common cellular biological processes which occur in the entire living world inclusive of plants, but also in so far as certain physical processes occur in the entire world with some mechanical force, determinism and uncompromising character.

The Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas attempt to find out another alternative to the full-scale reductionism of Cārvākas. Thus considered, their approach is anti-reductionist as that of Sāṃkhyas and Jainas, but with a difference. They hold that human beings and other organisms have the same self (*Ātmā*) prone to transmigration and subject to the Law of *Karma*.²⁸ At the same time they also hold that any individual - say human - is a combination of body and self, and on the

level of bodily and biological make up - i.e. cellular biology - humans and non-humans have many things in common. Likewise, the structure of physical things and physical aspects of organisms including humans have many things in common. Like Jainas they thus accept heterogeneous reductionism instead of homogeneous one as accepted by positivist Carvākas, but without accepting classification of selves based on physiological basis as Jainas do. Theirs, therefore, is an attempt to strike a compromise between full-scale mechanical reductionism and cosmo-centricism on the one hand and uncompromising uniqueness of humans defended and bolstered up epistemically on the other. They do acknowledge importance of *Avidyā*. But it is always sought to be combined with analysis of human nature with reference to cognition (*Jnana*), affection (*Iccha*) and efforts (*Prayatna*) on the one hand and theory of *Karma* and the role and significance of Vedas as repository of directives concerning rituals, with or without backing of God (*Īsvara*) on the other. It could also be surmised that their acceptance of partial similarity coupled with partial dis-similarity between living and non-living is influenced by the samkhya approach concerning it, although later on it was attempted to be backed up by the *Advaita Vedānta* approach. We need not, however, enter into details of the consideration of this issue here.

While there is quite considerable agreement concerning analysis of human nature between the approaches of *Nyaya* and (*Purva*) *Mīmāṃsā*, at least so far as physical aspect of humans is concerned there is a basic difference pioneered by *Purvamīmāṃsā* at least on two counts greatly emphasising anthropocentrism. Though this seems later on to have been absorbed by *Nyāya* under the influence of *Mīmāṃsā* as pioneer of tradition, it needs to be emphasised that pioneering credit must be given to adherents of *Mīmāṃsā*. These two counts are :²⁹ (a) elaborately formulated theory of *Karma* in accordance with which three important points were emphasised : (i) on the count of allocation of responsibility of pain and annoyance that is suffered, the suffering individual or group alone should be held responsible and no one else, through doing or refraining from doing certain action in the present or previous birth. (ii) No action would vanish unless its results and consequences are suffered or enjoyed by the doer - the doer i.e. the self being everlasting and no self can be emancipated unless all the *Karmas* done by the doer are accounted for. And (iii) result of no action undertaken by some one else can ever accrue to me, come what may.

Secondly, (b) they also held that Vedic lore - especially *Saṃhitas* and *Brāhmaṇas* - is the only reliable repository of guidance concerning what to do and what not to do,³⁰ and that the analysis of human nature together with resolution of the problem of pain and suffering experienced by humans must be in accordance with Vedas for its being viable. Adherents of *Mīmāṃsā* are at least partly in agreement with those of *Nyāya* and *Sāṃkhya* - not to talk of Jainism as well - in so far as according to them the same self is prone to transmigrate in the entire domain of the living organisms, though all of them are opposed to positivistic and homogeneous reductionism of *Cārvākas*. But adherents of *Mīmāṃsā* also emphasise a differentia of humans through insistence upon deterministic application of the law of *Karma* - a deterministic and organismic counterpart of the law of *Rta* understood cosmocentrically - and the backing of the Vedic lore as the basis and foundation of the Brahmanical tradition. As we shall see, the Buddha and his followers oppose both these aspects in their analysis of human nature.

The *Advaita Vedānta* approach, at least as pioneered and articulated by Saṃkara, seeks to strike another extreme, especially as contrasted with the positivistic approach of *Cārvākas*. It holds that the same kind and pattern of self- originating agility and dynamism is operative throughout the world³¹ - both inanimate and animate - although in the inanimate world it may be unmanifested, dormant and potential in nature. It further seeks to locate seeds and basis of various sorts of annoyance, dissatisfaction and mortification we experience in the two-fold misunderstanding, error and confusion concerning (a) our own nature (*Jīva*) and (b) nature of world at large in its essence (*Brahman*) and our legitimate relationship with it, holding that the major source of pain and suffering we experience is our misplaced egoism, its independence and resulting unjustifiable arrogance that it can function and operate on its own without any constraint known or unknown. It, thus, holds that cessation or termination of pain and suffering is possible in this life itself and its essence consists in melting away of our misplaced egoism and independence through proper comprehension of the essence of ourselves, the world and relationship between them. It advocates that no sooner we become one with - better put, non-different from - the world at large through proper understanding and comprehension, all determiners of our individuality and uniqueness melt away, leaving no basis whatever for our misplaced egoism and arrogance together with independence. Thus, one becomes

non-differentiable from *Brahman* as a drop of water becomes one with and turns out to be non-differentiable from the water in which it is dropped. In this way, on this view it sees *Avidyā* - misunderstanding, error and confusion -, which is self replicating in character, to be the sole source of misery, annoyance and suffering in our life and at least one aspect of deliverance from them is disappearance of our misunderstanding about ourselves. As we shall see, the Buddha and his followers are broadly in agreement with this stance of Śaṅkara though with characteristic differences on certain other counts³².

From the foregoing it would be clear, it is hoped, that adherents of both orthodox and heterodox trends of philosophical thought in this sub-continent formulated views concerning nature of humans, other organisms, world at large and inter-relationship between them and tried to account for the problem of pain and suffering experienced by man. We also saw that reductionist or anti-reductionist approach they adopted, the sort of rationale by which they came to defend it, cuts across the traditional distinction between orthodox and heterodox schools. Many of them, again, irrespective of the traditionally emphasised distinction, hold that the essence of the termination of *Duḥkha* consists basically in the eternal self - in this life or hereafter - living in the state of painlessness, if not positively of pleasure and happiness. Apart from, further, bolstering their analysis and resolution of the problem of *Duḥkha* by subscription to the uncompromising and undiluted or else quasi or mitigated stability and permanence, adherents of some of the trends also tried to support their rationale either through its anchorage in the tradition founded by Vedas and pronouncements in them and their appropriate interpretation or subscription to the reality of God, or canonical literature as in Jainism or something else that was found to be suitable. Analysis of human nature and the mode of resolving the problem of pain and suffering experienced by humans as offered by the Buddha and his followers oppose the strands adopted by non-Buddhists - non-Śrāmaṇic or otherwise. But along with this negative and oppositional stance they adopt, which basically consists in drawing attention to the points of weakness and vulnerability in the approaches adopted by those from whom they differ, the Buddha and his followers also strive to articulate positive aspects of their approach and the sort of rationale by which it is backed, bringing in the process to surface the distinguishing aspect of it. Instead of, therefore, being merely carried away by the superficial impression that adherents of various philosophi-

cal strands addressed themselves deferentially to the problem of the mode of resolving *Duḥkha* experienced by humans, on the contrastive background of the sketch of the approaches adopted by non-Buddhists concerning the issue presented here, we proceed in the next part of this section to look into the salient and distinguishing features of the buddhist approach, so that on the background of this sort of inquiry we may be in a position to study some decisive implications of it in the last section.

B

The Buddhist Interpretation of *Duḥkha*

The Buddha is perhaps the oldest philosopher to have made experience of pain and suffering as the very starting point of his inquiry and drawn a distinction between physical and psychical aspects of *Duḥkha*. Neither, however, the Buddha nor his followers embarked upon such an investigation merely for the sake of opposing reductionist or anti-reductionist approach concerning *Duḥkha* and human nature to carve out their own stand concerning them. The latter rather started from their own honest concern about *Duḥkha* and presenting satisfactory analysis of human nature together with appropriate aspiration of human life. This is not to deny their disapproval, criticism and rejection of the views advanced by others belonging to Śramaṇic, Brahmanical or any other trend of thought. This was, nonetheless, due more to their being convinced of simultaneous non-satisfiability of their own view and that of someone else, rather than for the lure of novelty or attraction of academic deviance. The criticism of the views of others, therefore, at their hands could be said to be directed at achievement of twin objective : to expose inadequacies in them, and, as a fall-out or side effect, articulation of their own view.

The Buddha and his followers consider it to be too simplistic and unilluminative to dissolve the problem of *Duḥkha* through reduction of living organisms to physical things and holding that all of them are subject to the same mechanical forces operative on them cosmocentrically. So too do they resist the tendency to seek to highlight structural similarity among all inhabitants of the living world, as distinct from the non-living, with or without plants, and with reference to organisms advancing a view that all of them reflexly and spontaneously respond

to stimuli operative on them. This would, in their view, bring in a sort of causal uniformity, but always at the cost of denying the distinction between causes, reasons and purposes, so vital in a satisfactory analysis of the problem of *Duhkha* and human nature.

Likewise, they hold it to be equally indefensible that the problem of *Duhkha* could only be satisfactorily dealt with and respectable analysis of human nature presented provided tradition founded on vedic lore or any other similar tradition - cannonial or otherwise - is presupposed, some kind of supernatural entity like God, *Adṛṣṭa* or the like is brought in, or belief in the world hereafter and transmigration, permanent entity like self and stability, resistance to change on the one hand and a state of absolute painlessness on the other is assured. Even if such views are upheld by majority of persons, this in itself would hardly warrant their honest philosophical defensibility. Subscription to such views may temporarily embolden us to believe that we have at long last got a philosophically respectable coherent clue to the problem of *Duhkha*. But it is deceptive for the simple reason that it is counter-intuitive.

That is why the Buddha and the buddhists start with the intuitively available data which brings home transparently to the concerned the fact that any organism, however simple or complex and however varied or similar in structure, is sensitive to the phenomenon of pain, suffering and annoyance, however unintended it may be. This universal sensitivity to pain and suffering links all organisms with one another, but without subscription to some kind of permanent self susceptible to transmigration. This universal experience of and sensitivity to *Duhkha*, as we shall see, is the foundation of the epistemic aspect of the buddhist analysis of the problem of pain and suffering and account of human nature - human especially because it is only man who not only experiences pain, communicates about it but is also conscious of such an experience, attempts to analyse it and seeks non-reflexive and non-instinctive deliverance from it. It goes without saying that such sensitivity to pain is omnispatial and omnitemporal in character such that it transcends boundaries of such kinds of locality.

The Buddha and his followers also put their finger upon another equally universally important aspect concerning *Duhkha* intuitively made available. It consists in understanding that nothingg

whatsoever - proximate or distant, abstract or concrete, gross or subtle - can be permanently a source and foundation of painlessness and satisfaction, especially because there cannot be any guarantee that anything that has given us joy and satisfaction, however temporarily, would continue to do so perpetually and that it would not itself turn out to be, however unexpectedly and accidentally, source of pain and suffering.³³ Classification of things into pleasurable and painful is misleading and deceptive, not to say that it is counter-intuitive as well in so far as it is anchored in short-lived mischievous memory and is combined with the hope which we do not wish to be belied. That, thus, anything and everything could be source of pain and suffering is as much intuitively obvious and universal in its sweep that no amount of localised countervailing instances can ever falsify it. It is realisation of the significance of these two unalterable and indelible universalities that seem to have made the Buddha and his followers declare unambiguously not only that life is perpetually susceptible to suffering and desire or will to live absolutely painlessly - unless backed by wishful thinking, deceptive rationalisation and self-complacent but counter intuitive approach - is bound to culminate into a nightmare. We shall see later on why this is so. For the present, however, it suffices to note that universal sensitivity to and permanent possibility of pain and suffering are such overwhelmingly all encompassing aspects of life that no philosophical illumination would be worthy of serious attention which ignores or circumvents them. For, in so far as it does so, it can only be at least at the risk of being counter-intuitive.

Does this mean that in face of such a starkly gazing intuitively obvious universal phenomena sense of unmitigating hopelessness and despair should dawn upon us and that we should convert ourselves into a suicide squad prepared to end our lives at the earliest opportunity consequent upon comprehension of the universal sweep of such phenomena? The Buddha and his followers would be far from recommending such a course even locally, not to talk of globally, not only because if understood instinctively it would be mechanical but also because it would be counter-intuitive as well, especially because all living organisms other than human too do not resort to it, though they are no less subject to the sweep of the universal phenomena under consideration. In addition, such a course would be unmanly and unbecoming of man as well, especially because compared to many organisms the fact remains that man is superior to

them in many respects. There is, therefore, no scope for pessimism and hopelessness.^{33(a)}

It may, nonetheless, be asked that even if the course of irrationally ending life in despair may not be commendable, can we not attempt to drown the risk we encounter of our coming to suffer in the ocean of some sort of eternity and stability where the footprints of the temporary shocks of pain we experience would not be visible? Or else, can we not attempt to make figures of our experiences of pain recede in the background of some sort of stability, so that the former do not stand out in contrast to the latter and continue to fill our life with anguish, despair and hopelessness? Even if such eternity and permanence may not be directly visible, the argument continues, it could be accepted on some authority - God like or Vedic lore like or it could be inferred on the basis of clues and indications gathered from experience and bolstered up by internal coherence. It is against such a tendency that the Buddha and his followers urge the concerned to consider that such moves, although theoretically attractive, are vitiated on more than one count. First, an appeal to authority of whatever kind itself is questionable.³⁴ Inferences, likewise, concerning stability, eternity and permanence from the so-called clues gathered from experience too are as misleading and deceptive as clues derived from the cases of blighted ovum or vesicular mole,³⁵ especially since the data on which they are based are of questionable reliability. The backing of internal coherence also is misleading because if one is unaware of having started from false premises and makes valid deductions therefrom, then one is led to hold that the conclusions one has derived are truthful without realising that although the argument may be valid, both its premises as well as conclusion may not have anything to do with facts.

It might, however, be held that even if uncompromising and unbending eternity unaccommodative of any susceptibility to change and variation may not be entertained on the ground of its being counter-intuitive, partial stability combined with partial change may not be considered to be so. This is because as intuitively we notice change so too do we notice endurance through change, stability resistant of complete mutation, if not of utter annihilation. Such a kind of stability-cum-change, it may be urged, constitutes the very basis of identification, re-identification and recognition both of persons and things alike.³⁶ Such an approach, it is held further, also does not threaten internal

coherence. Hence in contrast to the former view the present one commands better respectability. Against such a kind of *prima facie* attractive argument the Buddha and the buddhists seem to advance the view that by urging the concerned to ensure that their philosophies do not turn out to be counter-intuitive they are not recommending them to be welded to commonsense, come what may. As a vigilant philosopher should not sacrifice intuition on the altar of internal coherence of his theory, so too should he not expect everything to adjust to the dictates of common-sense, however this may amount to distort an otherwise defensible theory. It cannot be said apriorily that the partial stability and the so-called resistance to change is absence of change or susceptibility to it. It could very often be a case of slow, dormant or dull change, its pace being negligible and in contrast to very rapid and aggressive one, may appear almost to be stagnant. In contrast to a supersonic plane a walking man or in contrast to a galloping Achilles, a slowly racing tortoise might appear to be stationary. But this is no reason to deny susceptibility alike of all of them to change. Such hypotheses as that of complete permanence, or partial stability, or even of permanence or stability of whatever kind as the basis of continuity might look attractive, their being proximate to and consistent with what we are normally accustomed with and conditioned to believe. But this in itself is hardly the basis to hold them to be philosophically illuminative and helpful in our being able to resolve the problem of human pain and suffering and presenting a satisfactory analysis of human nature.

It is not, however, the attitude merely of deviance and departure from the alternative trends of thought - both Brahmanical or Sramanic in origin and sustenance - that marks the strength and uniqueness of the Buddhist approach to the analysis of the problem of *Duḥkha* and human nature. Apart from the twin sort of universality emphasised earlier, the Buddha and his followers seek to draw attention of the concerned to two important aspects of their approach, each accentuating two other sorts of universalities which play significant role in their theory. The first of them, viz. the thesis of *Anityatā*³⁷ is universal in one respect while the other viz. *Anātmata* in another respect.³⁸ We propose to present a brief sketch of them with a view to coming to the grip of the salient features of the analysis of *Duḥkha* and human nature.

Anityatā (Impermanence) negatively means nothing whatso-

ever, living or non-living, inclusive of *Duḥkha*, is immune from susceptibility to change and disappearance in course of time,³⁹ not only because nothing (positive) is *Anādi* (beginningless) but also because anything that has beginning cannot be endless (*Ananta*).⁴⁰ This sort of universality, too, is omnitemporal and omnispatial in nature, making no room to any exception. *Anityatā* understood positively could be interpreted rigidly and inflexibly or else flexibly and accommodatively.⁴¹ On the former count, it means to say that anything may last at the most just for a moment. What it means to convey is that even those things or phenomena which last just for a moment do not lose their philosophical significance. On the latter count, it means to say that anything may exist at least for a moment (*Kṣaṇa*), although nothing can equal or cross the uppermost bound of it being everlasting. Thus understood, it amounts to holding that anything may last beyond a moment, never however immune to susceptibility to change. It amounts to holding that whatever be the dimension to which we micro-miniaturise or infinitely seek to enlarge the span of our life, just on that count it cannot be immunised from susceptibility to change and experience of *Duḥkha*. The universality of *Duḥkha* and *Anityatā* are so parvasive, co-extensive and all-encompassing that there would be no justifiable clue to hold either that anything is everlasting or that anything, however evanescent, is not painful; something being both eternal and free from susceptibility to give rise to pain, being counter-intuitive, is untenable.

Another sort of universality that buddhists seek to draw our concerted attention to is that of *Anātmata*. It could be understood within the framework of cosmocentric world at large or organismic world restrictedly. On the former count it amounts to holding that on the level of physical things there is no essence or core that can withstand the shocks of susceptibility to change. On the latter count, on the contrary, it seeks to emphasise that in the organic world there is nothing like self or soul (*Ātmā-Nairātmya*) that is permanent and can brave the shocks not only of susceptibility to change but also of transmigration through a chain of cycle of innumerable lives till it finally comes to be emancipated. The possibility of being emancipated does not hang upon subscription to the existence of enduring self or soul. Likewise, it is philosophically needless and fruitless an exercise to hold that recalcitrant instances like our not coming to enjoy or suffer for the results and consequences of actions performed in this life cannot be

coherently made satisfactory sense of unless we subscribe to the hypothesis of permanent and changeless self that transmigrates through the chain of lives. This is primarily because a philosophical theory of accounting for pain and suffering and presenting analysis of human nature in a non-counter-intuitive way with reference to this life alone should enjoy precedence over any theory that seeks to hide re-calcitrant instances in this life against the background of a coherent theory touching many lives but ignoring counter-intuitivity in this life. Rather, the buddhists insist that taking this life in all its aspects to be paradigmatic, its extension beyond this life should be envisaged only in a way that will not force us to compromise with any data furnished here.⁴² Thus, they repeatedly urge the concerned to shun such deceptions which, however theoretically luring and coherently attractive, are nonetheless counter-intuitive. It is this kind of liveliness to intuitively furnished data that forces them to emphasise such facts as our suffering because of someone else and *vice-versa*, and that however strong our selfish hope that we alone should reap results and consequences of our actions, performed individually or collectively, there are instances where such a hope is repeatedly belied. And hence, it is philosophically deceptive to deny this or seek to whitewash such an experience with the point of so-called allocation of responsibility of our actions only to ourselves over the backdrop of series of lives through which one's self or soul as permanently responsible agent transmigrates till it is finally emancipated. The Buddha and his followers urge the concerned to learn not to ignore the elements of risks and contingencies our lives are filled and surrounded with, and the deception we are accustomed to substitute for truth.

Although, in this way, *Duḥkha* is a fact of life difficult to be wished away, it does not follow either that our experience of pain and suffering cannot be terminated, however temporarily, or that all the *Duḥkha* we experience is due solely to our own making or external forces operative on us. Affirming the first would be tantamount to accepting hopelessness and despair as essence of life and futility of all efforts to mitigate pain in life and make it endurable and livable inspite of odds. To affirm the second would amount, on the one hand, to reduce humans to cosmocentric world and subject to the same mechanical forces, or else, on the other hand, to make human world to be totally anthropocentric, if not subjective altogether. The Buddha and his followers strive to avoid both these alternatives and hold that *Duḥkha* that we

experience is often physical as well as mental, due to external and internal determiners, sometimes first kind of factors having preponderance over the other, while at other times the converse of this, although at no time there is utter absence of any kind of determiner.

But in so far as this is so, there is a certain convergence between the physician's, the psychotherapist's and the buddhist as a philosophical approach to *Duḥkha*. It consists in two primary concerns : the diagnostic and the therapeutic. Looking to the presence of the former concern in his analysis of the experience of *Duḥkha* the Buddha has been referred to as the greatest physician⁴³ while looking to the latter as the great surgeon.⁴⁴ It is continuity of these concerns that perhaps made many later buddhists also to cultivate their interest in *Āyurveda*⁴⁵ and *Yogic*⁴⁶ as well as *Tantric*⁴⁷ practices and devices over and above the philosophic ones. We need not go into details of them here. Both these aspects also are reflected in their philosophic approach to *Duḥkha*. That is why starting with the fact of *Duḥkha* of various kinds, they proceed to articulate three aspects in their analysis of it. Apart from the diagnostic, consisting in bringing to the notice of the concerned the chain of factors determining origin and continuation of *Duḥkha* (*Duḥkha Samudaya*),⁴⁸ they also emphasise the hope-generating aspect of the possibility of *Duḥkha* being mitigated if not terminated altogether (*Duḥkha Nirodha*).⁴⁹ It is looking to these aspects that the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha* is often characterised to be medical in character.⁵⁰ This, however, is half truth concerning it. Much more than this, it also seeks to articulate the philosophic aspect of it holding that certain sort of misunderstanding and confusion is the basis of our experience of *Duḥkha*⁵¹ and the possibility of deliverance or emancipation from it in this life itself consists primarily in inversion of it and comprehending it to be an error.⁵² The Buddha and some of the older buddhists like Nāgārjuna seem to be pioneers of the thesis that right sort of philosophic comprehension⁵³ is the only dependable key to the deliverance from painfulness and suffering, although this also is emphasised later on by adherents of other trends of philosophic thought of Indian origin, their difference of opinion basically revolving around the question as to what sort of philosophic comprehension that is at stake and how to gain it, together with the nature of the state in which one gets deliverance from *Duḥkha* and misunderstanding that is determinative of it.⁵⁴ This is a very fertile area of philosophical controversy in this subcontinent which engaged attention of the concerned for centuries. We cannot, however, go into details of it here.

In the remaining part of this section we wish to highlight one important feature of the two aspects of the buddhist approach concerning *Duḥkha* and analysis of human nature, viz. *Duḥkha samudaya* and *Duḥkha Nirodha*, to bring to the notice of the concerned its decisively significant differentia as compared to other approaches concerning them, so that on their background we can proceed to bring to surface some important implications of it.

Starting from *Avidya* (misunderstanding, ignorance, error) through *Samskāra* (impressions left of *Karmic* forces), *Vijñāna* (initial embryonic consciousness) etc. to *Jāti* (birth or rebirth) and *Jarāmarana* (old age and death) the twelve spokes⁵⁵ of the wheel of *Bhava* (*Bhavacakra*⁵⁶ cycle of existence) or *Samsāra*⁵⁷ (transmigration or chain of births) that the Buddha and his followers talk of the diagnostic aspect of *Duḥkha*. But beyond this, it also highlights their philosophic insight and its universality together with its profundity. It is often held that the twelve spokes of the diagnostic and operational cycle of existence or transmigration are exhaustive collectively so that no more could be added to them, sequential in order such that their order of sequence cannot be altered or disturbed, and that while the first two of them refer to the past life, the next eight have bearing upon the present and the last two upon the future,⁵⁸ and thus they are omnitemporal and omnispatial in nature and embrative of the entire organismic life. These aspects of the cycle under consideration are certainly important. But much more important in our opinion are at least three other aspects of it which bring forth characteristic features of the buddhist approach concerning *Duḥkha* and analysis of human nature. First, the relation between the preceding and succeeding links in the chain is such that the presence - successive or simultaneous - of the succeeding could not have been the case without the preceding, and the absence of the preceding unmistakably authorises us to hold absence of the succeeding as well. In other words, while presence of the succeeding link is a necessary condition of the presence of the preceding, absence of the preceding is a necessary condition of the absence of the succeeding. Thus, the buddhist approach seeks to highlight interdefinability of necessary and sufficient conditions at least with regard to the advent of *Duḥkha* - a point of methodological strength of their approach. This feature also has a bearing upon *Duḥkha-Nirodha* aspect of the buddhist approach. But we propose to return to it later. It could also be argued that the first three *Nidānas* constitute epistemic conditions, the next five constitutive

or structural conditions, while the last four bring forth the fructifying conditions of the emergence of or control over *Duḥkha*. We cannot, for fear of digression, take up this issue here. Secondly, the cycle of *Dvādaśa Nidāna* is also known as *Dharma Cakra*,⁵⁹ meaning thereby the way we are subjected to pain and suffering to the extent to which we are passive and surrender ourselves to its impact helplessly. But more we do so, it is bound to pave a way for gloom and despair. In so far as the Buddha and his followers do not merely seek to draw our attention to such passive aspect of the incidence of the *Duḥkha*, but rather boldly wish to emphasise active aspect of its mitigation or deliverance from it, the Buddha is also held to have pioneered active reversal⁶⁰ (*Parivartana/Pravartana*) of the wheel under consideration as a gateway to deliverance from its impact through struggling against all odds, contingencies and exigencies. This also has an important bearing upon *Duḥkha Nirodha* and we shall return to it later. Thirdly, starting from *Avidyā* onwards every successive link in the cyclic or recursive series is self-replicative in character such that every succeeding link hereditarily borrows this feature from the preceding one and left to itself the process of self-replication or duplication goes on repeating with vengeance, thereby progressively weakening chances of our deliverance from their impact in so far as we continue to be passive and indolent. This means that the cycle is prone to operate as mechanically as the process of our being born, or a computer in the presence of our passivity, such that other things being equal, it is more than likely that every succeeding link tends to worsen what it hereditarily receives from the preceding, there being nothing in its power and competence to rectify it. This feature also has a bearing upon the *Duḥkha Nirodha* aspect of the buddhist approach to which we now turn.

We saw above that according to the buddhist approach incidence of *duḥkha* is more a matter of our passivity, our turning habituated and insensitive to the impact and influence of the links of the recursive wheel of its emergence. The wheel is cyclic or recursive not in the sense that in every single occurrence of *Duḥkha*, all the links of the chain are seen as repeated mechanically but rather that in such a case the same pattern of either the whole series or a segment thereof is seen to be recursively operative. In the case of deliverance from *Duḥkha* or ensuring to keep the very possibility of it open, on the contrary, it is our passivity that needs to be reduced if not eliminated altogether and the emancipation from pain is proportionate to the

elimination of our passivity. The Buddha and his followers are keen to emphasise that weakness and vulnerability of our passivity cannot be removed through hiding it behind some or the other kind of eternity - this worldly or otherwise. Nor can it be rationalised along the route of transmigration or sanction of the pronouncements in the Vedic lore. Instead, the path of deliverance from pain and suffering must be opened with our initiative, which may not result into complete cessation of *Duḥkha* till we are living, but may at least change our approach and perspective about it in such a way that we might be able to endure it without allowing hopelessness and despair overwhelming us. As we shall see, the *Karunā* of the Buddha, following which he is called the *Mahākāruṇika*,⁶¹ brings forth the healing aspect of the Buddha and his teaching.⁶²

We saw earlier that in the twelve-linked chain of incidence of *Duḥkha* the possibility of its recurrence looms large so long as the preceding link is not mitigated and its disposition to proliferate our weakness and vulnerability in the form of passivity and lack of resistance is not alleviated to the extent to which we are able to exercise control over it. The *Nirodha* of the preceding link which buddhists talk of as a necessary condition of the *Nirodha* of the following link may not necessarily be understood in the sense of complete annihilation of it. It may rather be understood as its sterilization, making it impotent, through vigilance and control, and thus ensuring that although it may remain as a dispensable appendage, it should not gather strength to proliferate our weakness to take our philosophic toll. It is for this kind of control that the eightfold path of right view (*Samyak Drṣṭi*), right thought (*Samyak Saṅkalpa*) etc. is recommended.⁶³ It is both purgatory⁶⁴ and fortificatory⁶⁵ in the former of weakness and the latter of the strength of integration of our personality⁶⁶ without adhering to permanent self or subscription to transmigration. Likewise, the reversal and inversion of the wheel of passivity is recommended to make us bold and courageous to learn ways of conquering our weaknesses through progressive fortification of our strength of proper comprehension (*Prajñā*) character (*Sīla*) and greedless satisfaction (*Samādhi*).⁶⁷ Thirdly, the buddhist approach to *Duḥkha* also seeks to proclaim as loudly and as repeatedly as necessary that one of the most decisively important determiners that stands in the way of our having proper philosophic comprehension is our misunderstanding, confusion and error (*Avidyā*) individual or

interpersonal which is self replicative in character and that so long as we continue to be bewitched by it there is no chance of the fly of *Duhkha* we experience being taken out of the fly bottle and our having proper understanding of ourselves - the key and cornerstone of our properly comprehending the nature of others and the world at large, neither reductively nor non-reductively.

The life as it is, is obviously full of exigencies, contingencies and risks. But, so long as there are exemplars like the Buddha, who not only accomplished deliverance from *Duhkha*, but filled with *Karunā* taught the concerned to face it boldly and overcome it self-reliantly without succumbing to despair and hopelessness, there is no reason to believe that we cannot live in a truly human way. The *Karunā* and the healing touch of the Buddha are the great solace and following his advice and leading life on his footsteps would authorise us to legitimately hope for our emancipating ourselves from the despairing aspect of *Duhkha*, no matter whether given rise to by external or internal factors, and integrate various aspects of our personality - physical or psychological-without presuming them to be spinning around any permanence and stability. It is a great asset of buddhist analysis of *Duhkha* and human nature that it enables us to comprehend their nature and relationship between them through consistent and non-counter-intuitive refusal to make sense of linkage and continuity without adhering to any kind of stability - total or partial, external or internal, physical or psychological. Those who are accustomed to and conditioned by modes of analysis and thinking otherwise, may find the buddhist approach to be inadequate and unsatisfactory. But it needs to be understood that it is not on certificate from them that its tenability and respectability rests. In order to discover the latter aspects of it we need more and more to free ourselves from the impacts of such impediments. Afterall, though the just born child has capability to suck breast for its survival, the mother is required to patiently teach it how to do it.⁶⁸ The importance of the Buddha lies in the twin fact : becoming himself truly enlightened and making the path of enlightenment available and open to everybody concerned without discrimination,⁶⁹ provided one is concerned and prepared to take up the task of struggling against all odds, freeing oneself from various dogmas and bewitchments as well as lures of various temptations.

III

Salient Features of the Buddhist Approach and its Implications

In the earlier two sections, we analysed the nature of *Duhkha* and human beings from different perspectives and tried to differentiate the philosophical approach to *Duhkha* from the non-philosophical ones. We also attempted to bring out some of the major aspects of the buddhist approach to *Duhkha* in contrast to other philosophical approaches concerning it that came to be developed in this sub-continent by the adherents of other trends of thought. On this background, in this section, we hope to focus on some of the salient features of the buddhist approach and bring out some of its important implications. On this count again, we hope to draw attention of the concerned, only to those features and their implications which have not been noted above. Proceeding this way, we shall attempt below to highlight four such aspects of the buddhist approach to *Duhkha* which in our opinion are of great significance.

(1) The Buddha and his followers are aware of the fact that not only experiences are held to be painful but also the circumstances and the situations we find ourselves placed in. Likewise, although it is a fact that much of the pain and suffering that comes to out lot, is due to our own volition or will together with greed and actions prompted by them, not all *Duhkha* we experience can be fitted into this category. This means, there is at least some- perhaps great amount of - *Duhkha* for which we could be held responsible only on the proviso that we mistakenly subscribe to a counter-intuitive theory of justification of our actions. We have clarified elsewhere⁷⁰ the concerned buddhist perspective and explained the rationale it is backed by. Regarding the painful experiences and circumstances, likewise it needs to be understood that although it may be true to a great extent that very many experiences of pain and suffering we have individually are on account of our misunderstanding, error and confusion (*Avidyā*), a proper mode of ensuring non-recurrence of them is to make impotent or sterilize, if not annihilate altogether, the root cause of them, viz. *Avidyā*. Thus, deliverance from the experience of pain and suffering has much to do with our personal life. But what about painful circumstances, situations, objects and things? Is it not the case that merely by changing

our perspective about them or sterilization of the root cause of such experiences of ours personally - viz. *Avidyā* would not sterilize their annoying impact on others ? Under such circumstances the situations under consideration themselves need to be changed. And they would not come to be changed merely through our passively hoping for their change without our active initiative. But with regard to such an initiative two things seem to be quite obvious: (A) Here the aspiration or the goal aimed at is hardly personal deliverance from the experience of pain and suffering. This is, again, for two reasons: (i) Even if one may not have had such experiences, one may take initiative to save others from falling into the trap of them. (ii) Even if one has had such experiences, the multitude - present as well as future - for the benefit of whom one takes such an initiative is no one in particular, although it in principle includes everyone in general who benefits from it. Nay, the others concerned may not even know and recognise it to be so. Two illustrations may perhaps help to clarify the point we are making. On the one hand, I remove a thorn pricked in my foot and throw it away on the road unmindful that it may prick again someone else. Or, on the other hand, seeing a thorn on the road I remove it and throw it away, although it did not prick me. On the first alternative, I have relieved myself from the experience of pain, but at the same time I am unmindful of others. On the second alternative, I am more concerned about the future possible sufferers. But who exactly could they be ? Here the initiative taken may be characterised as impersonal, especially since it is connected with personal emancipation from *Duhkha* of no one in particular. But is it uninterested about humanity ? Not the least. Take the second illustration. Widow re-marriage was forbidden till the late 19th century in large section of various communities in this sub-continent. When an initiative was taken to alter this circumstance and consequences which it led to, which widow in particular was the target of emancipation ? No one in particular. The initiative was taken in the interest of relieving widows in general from suffering and helplessness they were subjected to for no fault of them. But could it have been said guaranteedly that the widows, in whose interest the initiative was taken, were aware of the fact that it was in their interest ? Much more importantly, however, could anyone have been able to guarantee that such an alteration in the then prevailing circumstances would permanently put an end to the plight widows were subjected to through their widowhood ? Are there not instances of widows having got remarried and yet subjected to worse kind of suffering and humiliation ? Sure enough they are. But then is there not

a risk in the mode of this way of resolution of the problem? The Buddha and his followers would say, certainly there is. However, the element of chance and contingency was present in the former case as well. But the victimization of the concerned under the former condition could have been blamed on the passive surrender to the circumstances. In the latter case, however, inspite of the initiative to change them. The point we are labouring to make is important in two-fold ways : (a) Perhaps it is in the buddhist perspective concerning *Duhkha* alone that we get a hint that emancipation from pain and suffering is not merely personal and individual a matter, as it seems to have been accepted to be the case by a large majority of non-buddhist adherents of various trends of thought. (b) Impersonal mode of emancipation is more praiseworthy than merely personal aspect of it, given especially the fact that it is not required to be instructed to be selfish and self-centered. It is, however, a resultant feature of a great *Tapasyā* to learn to rise above it. Thus, at the hands of the Buddha and his followers the fundamental philosophical insight concerning deliverance from pain and suffering on the one hand, and the need and initiative of special reform are so inextricably welded with each other that the former without the latter is form and general direction without the content and hence barren; while the latter without the former is content without form and direction. This means two things : On the one hand, it means that any reform with personal end in view is no reform that is philosophically tenable. On the other hand, it also implies that whatever we do may not necessarily be either philosophically warrantable or conducive to social reform. We do not wish to imply that this insight remained operative throughout the period during which Buddhism remained a force to reckon with - intellectually, socially as well as morally. Its adherents, as history perhaps may reveal, compromised with pressures - willingly or unwillingly. But the fact remains, that in this sort of consideration the Buddha and his initial followers deviated from the prevalent trend to a great extent, and therein lies the distinctive feature of their uniqueness. (B) The initiative which the Buddha took was, however, much more significant than what is stated above. Its decisive aspect consists in self-suffering and self-tormenting, making one's life painful to endure so that others could be relieved of pain and suffering coming to their lot. Buddha's significance could be seen through his being considered to be a moral scientist zealously working to bring about moral transformation in the then decadent India, and Gandhiji having followed in his footsteps to bring about similar transformation in India

of 20th century. For fear of digression we cannot go into details of this point here.

(2) It is a matter of great significance and importance that the Buddha and his followers stood bravely in their analysis of *Duḥkha* and human nature without any subscription to the hypothesis of enduring self in this life or hereafter. Perhaps Buddhism is the only trend to stand committed to this struggling against any onslaught on it - be it *Brahmanical* or *Śrāmanic* in its origin and persuasion. On the one hand, combined with the thesis of universal *Anityatā* it implies that whether in the case of external world or anything that inhabits it - irrespective of whether it is living or non-living - there is nothing enduring and permanent that stands and resists the shocks of susceptibility to change and degeneration as well as decay and eventual annihilation. On the other hand, it also means that within the framework of living organisms - or life in general inclusive of plants - there is no stable self or soul that is the fulcrum of identification, re-identification and recognition of anything in this life or hereafter - if there be any - and that subscription to such a hypothesis is a source of great misconception, error and bewitchment. Buddhism, therefore, proclaimed the thesis of *Anātmata* combined with that of *Anityata*. If, on the one hand, it implied subscription to no enduring self, although everything is susceptible to perpetual change, on the other hand, it also implied that anything that is real - living or otherwise - is nothing else but a chain of successive links, without anything running through them, such that our experience of continuity is merely epistemic in nature such that it is required to have no anchorage in anything stable, permanent and enduring. As any discerning scholar of Buddhism may discover, the account of anything real that it presented - inclusive of human - seems to have taken basically three strands: (a) that there are bare particulars, without characterising them to be physical or mental, such that in so far as they are bare particulars they exhibit the same kind of features and anything that is real is merely a series of them.⁷¹ Such a position could be held to be neutral or equidistant so far as account of the bare particulars in terms of their being physical or psychical in character is concerned. (b) Emphasising upon not only cognition being private in its incidence but also upon the fact that the sort of data we rely upon in certifying our knowledge claims too is private, another trend of thought came to develop a position of solipsism⁷² with considerable zeal and enthusiasm impressing upon the concerned that anything that is real -

inclusive of humans - is nothing else but a train or chain or series of private impressions. (c) A third strand, on the contrary, emphasised upon duality of the physical and psychical nature of the bare particulars.⁷³ This itself resulted into two further sub-strands : one emphasising that the physical bare particulars are as formless as psychical bare particulars,⁷⁴ while others emphasising that even the psychical bare particulars are comparable to the physical ones in their having form.⁷⁵ We cannot go into the nuances of the details of this controversy which plagued the subsequent buddhist thought in this sub-continent. The point, however, of great significance in this context to be noted is that the buddhist thought attempted to account for human nature and human experience of pain and suffering without subscription to the hypothesis of enduring self and presented its account from the various angles that could have been adopted. (3) Broadly speaking, *Dharma* in this sub-continent meant a mode of controlling and channelising our personal passions, instincts, emotions, sentiments, lust and greed in such a way that they do not turn out to be a matter of social nuisance and do not deprive someone else from realisation of the legitimate aspiration of human life - viz. deliverance from pain and suffering.⁷⁶ But this sort of deliverance did not mean for the buddhists to be merely personal in character but rather social and pervasive in nature.⁷⁷ Likewise, *Dharma* did not consist of code of conduct and a series of rituals to be mechanically gone through. The Buddha and his followers convinced of the importance and legitimacy of his teaching held that those like them, who are concerned, being full of compassion (*Karunā*)⁷⁸ in their heart, with helping those multitude of innocent, helpless, hapless and unlucky people suffering from pain and suffering in their own lives through arduous effort and tireless striving and being compassionately concerned about others' suffering should function and operate in society in such a way that the innocent sufferers may find it to be a great solace in following them in their examples. That is, they were called upon to function and operate as genuine exemplars - persons worthy of being followed, commanding - not demanding - respect through the very exemplification of the way they lived. The Buddha knew it very well that *Dharma*, however important it is, would be barren without exemplars looking to whom the innocent sufferers may gather hope and courage to seek deliverance from despair, helplessness, agony and pain they experienced. The long forty years the Buddha spent after enlightenment in functioning and operating as an exemplar, teaching the concerned how not to leave hope and the path of self-reliance

and realising deliverance from pain in their lives following his teaching, must have, in the course of time, led his followers to adopt the maxim: surrender to the Buddha is a great envious solace for the helpless innocent sufferers (*Buddham Saranam Gacchāmi*)⁷⁹. Apart from the Buddha, the Bodhisattvas⁸⁰ were known to be the exalted persons, who had suspended their own personal final deliverance from pain and suffering till their fellow-beings are elevated at least to their height. It is this kind of impersonal deliverance of multitude of people from pain and suffering for which they strived tirelessly that made them respected and in surrendering and following whom people saw great relief and solace in their lives, otherwise filled with agony and pain. But the followers of the Buddha also did not forget the importance of *Dharma* in self-control and self-regulation as the very basis of not only seeking deliverance from pain and suffering in personal life, but also of laying a respectable foundation of social life without stratification and discriminatory hierarchy. It is this sort of understanding that must have led Buddha's followers to adopt the second maxim: surrender to the path of *Dharma* (*Dhammam Saranam Gacchāmi*) as outlined by the Buddha is a matter of great consolation and solace in the lives of innocent sufferers. But, thirdly, they also must have realised that the characteristic feature of human life could never be realised in living in isolation like a Leibnizian Monad and caring only for selfish personal deliverance from pain and suffering- even at the cost of torturing others - but in mutually helping one another in self-reliant emancipation from pain and suffering. Thus, a society was sought to be established such that in it each one is trying to be as much self-controlled and self-reliant without discrimination as possible; but is also willing and prepared to help others to be so, in order that a society of such members may self-reliantly and together accomplish emancipation from pain and suffering. It was designed to be a society of members who are willing and prepared to compute their strength, so that together they may be able to tide over their personal weaknesses and vulnerabilities. It is for this reason that the third maxim: surrendering to such a society (*Sangham Saranam Gacchāmi*) is a matter of great relief and consolation for the innocent sufferers, who otherwise are more than likely to be discriminated against and exploited, victimising them for their personal weaknesses and vulnerabilities, which, left to themselves, they would never have been able to contain within themselves. It is a matter of great pity and regret that in course of time this original insight and its appropriate rationale was lost and the followers of Buddhism in this sub-

continent came to substitute personal deliverance from pain and suffering for the social deliverance and in consequence became lost to the importance of combination of philosophy and social as well as religious reform, and instead came to engage themselves in rigmaroles and prolonged ritualistic practices of Tantrism, thriving at the same time as social parasites unconcerned about the good of society in the face of their own personal glory and importance.

(4) Lastly, in persistently refusing to succumb to the lure and temptation of adopting simplistic account of reality either in terms of universal mechanical causation or through universal biologism the Buddha and his followers sought to bring to the notice of the concerned that in the world twin sort of universality is at play. On the one hand, so far as physical world is concerned, inclusive of large extent of animal life excluding human, it is seen mostly to be universally governed by causality exemplified in emergence (*Tadutpatti*) or else set-theoretic inclusion (*Tādātmya*), wherein our account of their nature is the account of the kind of them. That is, what is largely at stake in such accounts is that individual differentiations are more a matter of space, time, size, weight etc. which do not seem to alter their internal structure and composition. On the other hand, so far as human world is concerned, there is stronger case for unpredictability and indeterminacy originating from purposiveness and teleology - misplaced or legitimate - that is at stake. Here an account of their nature in terms of their kind is risky and is wrought with the danger of the ship-reck of facile universality on the hard rock of counter-intuitivity much more strongly than what is the case in the physical world, although even there we cannot arrogate ourselves in misplaced self-complacency that we have fathomed into the nature of things without remainder. Especially so far as human life is concerned, a twin play of causality and purposiveness is noticeable and hence there is not only a need to distinguish between *Sakāranatā* (events and phenomena happening causally) and *Sahetukatā* (events and happenings taking place on account of our own volitional - legitimate or otherwise - making) but equally importantly there is a necessity of requisitioning services of both the sort of universalities to understand human life in its intricacies. In doing so, it is also necessary to understand and realise that much of the pain and suffering we experience is basically for two reasons: First, our failure to understand that human life is not governed by unilinear or unipolar kind of universality but rather the bi-polar kind of

universality, and coherent comprehension of their interplay is more likely to furnish an illuminating insight into human nature. Secondly, it is also equally important to understand that we not only make ourselves miserable personally but also socially, and hence the simplistic pattern of allocation of responsibility only individually is blind to the fact that we ourselves make innocent sufferers victims for their no fault. It is, therefore, our foremost duty and concern to help them with priority, even at the cost of our personally suffering inconveniences, annoyances and agonies. It would be a height of carelessness and irresponsibility to leave them to their plight on the basis of a misplaced and counter-intuitive explanation that such suffering of theirs must be the inevitable consequence of their previous deeds - done either in this life or the previous one. Through insisting on drawing a line of demarcation between *Sahetukata* and *Sakāraṇatā* the buddhists were drawing concerted attention of the concerned to this sort of counter-intuitivity, irresponsibility and rationalised escapism from our obligation that had plagued human race shamelessly. It is again a matter of great pity that this insight of theirs came in this sub-continent to be drowned in the ocean of the loud noise of the dogmatic and committed defence of the position they were lonely fighting against.

We cannot claim arrogantly that we have been in a position to take account of all the aspects of the buddhist approach concerning *Duḥkha* and analysis of human nature. But, nevertheless, we hope and trust that the ones to which we have drawn attention of the concerned on the basis of our limited understanding, deserve seriously to be taken into consideration. Even if this much is accepted, our efforts would be amply rewarded.⁸¹

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. i.e. *Aṣṭāṅga-āyurveda* (eightfold science of life), viz. *Kāya-cikitsā* (medicine), *Śalya-cikitsā* (surgery), *Śālākya-cikitsā* (diseases of the part above the supraclavicular region), *Kaumāryabhr̥tya* (obstetrics and pediatrics), *Bhūtavidyā* (psycho-therapy), *Agadatantra* (Toxicology), *Rasāyanna* (vitalization) and *Vājīkaraṇa* (virilification) - *Caraka-saṃhitā* with *Caraka-pañjikā-tikā* of Swamikumara; vol. 1. Shree Gulabkunverba Ayurvedic Society, Jamnagar, 1949, p. 186.
2. Dasgupta, S.N.; *A History of Indian Philosophy*; Vol.1 Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1975; pp. 270-273. See also, Swamikumara; *op.cit.*, p.94.
3. Vṛddha Vāgbhata; *Aṣṭāṅga-Saṃgraha* (AS) , (*Sūtrasthānam*); Jalukar, D.S. (ed.); Vaidyaka Grantha Bhandar; Nasik, 1964, p.2.
4. Shreesankara; *Nidanapañcaka*; *Sampraptivijñāna*; Athawale, A.D., Joshi, S.G.; and Rajawade, N.s. (ed.); Shreemat Atreys prakasana; Pune, 1962.
5. Isvarakṛṣṇa; *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* (SK) with Gaudapada's *Bhāṣya* (SKB) ; Mainkar, T.G. (ed.), Oriental Book Agency; poona, 2nd ed. 1972, p. 36.
6. A philosopher's advice is not a substitute for medicine or psycho-therapy. Generally, no philosopher *qua* philosopher is competent to cure or prevent physical or psychological diseases and/ or disorders.
7. This is how critical evaluation of the philosophical position of Cārvāka and other naturalists like Makkhali Gōśāla at the hands of adherents of various trends of philosophical thought have characterised their positions and launched scathing attacks on them in their treatises for centuries.
8. Dasgupta, S.N.; *op.cit.*; Vol.I, pp. 53-57.
9. Santarakṣita; *Tattva-saṃgraha* (TS) with *Pañjikā* (TSP) Kamalaśīla; Shastri, D.D.; (ed), Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1981, Vol.1, K.537-39; pp. 226-28.
10. Āryadeva; *Chatuḥsatakam* (CS) with Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti* (CSV); Jain, B.C.(ed); Alok Prakasan; Nagpur, 1971, K.265-69, pp.86-91. See also, Nāgarjuna; *Madhyamakasastra* (MS) with his *Akutoḥbhaya*, *Madhyamakavṛtti* (MV) by Buddhapaṇita; *Prajañāpradīpavṛtti* (PPV) by Bhavaviveka, *Prasannapadā* (PP) by Candrakīrti; Pandeya, R.N.(ed); Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1989, Vol.II, Ch.17, K.30, p.45. See also, Chinchore, M. R., "Kṛtapraṇāsa and Akṛtābhyagama : An Analysis,

- Defence and Rationale of the Buddhist Theory of Action"; *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*; Vol. XVIII, No.2, pp.231-270.
11. Nakamura, H.; *Indian Buddhism : A Survey with Bibliographical Notes*; Motilal Banarsidass; Dilhi, 1987, pp.291-293. See also, TS and TSP *op.cit.*; Vol.II; K.3566-3597; pp. 1111-1117.
 12. Sharma C.D.; *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*; Motilal Banarsidass, Dilhi, 1976, pp.41-42.
 13. *Ibid*; pp.62-64, 67-68.
 14. *Ibid*; pp. 152-168.
 15. The proper study of the physiological nature of plants and animals through veterinary sciences, biology, botany, zoology, etc. originated and developed hoping to make use of such studies in the better understanding of human nature, structure and constitution.
 16. Haribhadrasūri; *Ṣaddarsanasamuccayah* (SDS); Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book Depot; Banaras, 1867; K.83-85; pp. 74-75. See also, Mādhavacarya; *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*; Sharma, Uma Shankar (ed.), Chowkhamba Vidyabhavana; Varanasi; 1984, p.9.
 17. Like Cārvākas.
 18. Like Sāṃkhyas and Jainas. For Sāṃkhya see Vācaspati; *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* (STK) with Īśvara Kṛṇa's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, Dravid, R.S.; (ed.), Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1937; pp. 171-174. and for Jainas see Umaswati; *Sabhasyatatattvārthadhigamasutra* (STS); Bariya, G.D. (ed.); Shreemad Rajachandra Ashram; Agas, 1932; Ch.I. K.4-8, pp. 21-31, and Ch.II, K.24, p.96.
 19. TS and TSP, *op.cit.*; Vol.I. K.330, p.156. See also, MS and PP, *op.cit.*; Vol.II, Ch.17, K.32, p.47.
 20. Chattopadhyaya, D.P.(ed.); *Carvaka/Lokayata*; Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 1990 pp. 85-86.
 21. It could perhaps be argued that such a kind of unmitigated naturalism was put forth by some as an antidote to misplaced and self-arrogating theory of *Puruṣārthas*, according to which nothing was unachievable through human efforts alone. We need not, however, go into details of it here. See also, Jain, Sagarmal; *Ṛsibhāṣita: Eka Adhyayana*; Prakṛta Bharati Academy, Jaipur, 1988; pp.42-44.
 22. Gautama; *Nyāya-darsanam* (ND); with Vatsyayana's *Bhāṣya*, Udyotakara's *Vārtika*, Vacaspati Misra's *Taparyatikā* and Visvanatha's *Vṛtti*; Amarendramohan (ed.); Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt.

- Ltd., Delhi; 2nd ed., 1985; pp.862-878.
23. An example of cursed Ahalyā from *Rāmāyana* could be held to be of this kind of reductionism.
 24. SK and SKB, *op.cit.*; K.1, pp.35-36. See also, STK, *op.cit.*, pp.121-123.
 25. STK, *op.cit.*; pp.182-186; See also, SK and SKB, *op.cit.*; K.62-64; pp.193-196.
 26. SDS, *op.cit.*; K.49, pp.49-50. See also, STS, *op.cit.*; ch.I, K.7, p.26 and ch.II, K.24, p.96.
 27. STS, *op.cit.*; Ch.V., K.29, pp.277-278. See also, Swamikumara; *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*, Upadhye, A.N.(ed.); Shree Paramaśruta Prabha-vaka Mandal; Agas; 2nd. ed. 9178; k.267, p.168.
 28. ND, *op.cit.*, III.i.4; pp.716-725 and IV.i.19-21, pp. 940-57.
 29. Mādhavācārya; *Jaiminiyanyāmala*; Apte, M.C.,(ed.); Anandashram Mudranalaya, Poona, 1892; I.i.1, pp.11-14.
 30. Kumārila; *Slokavārtikam*; Shastri, D.D (ed.); Tara Publicaations; Varanasi; 1978; K.9-11, p.5.
 31. Sankara; *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*; Motilal Banarsidass; Varanasi; 1964,II.i.26, p.167.
 32. TS and TSP, *op.cit.*; Vol.I; V.i.330; pp.156-157 and V.i.543; pp.229-230.
 33. *Majjhimanikāya* (MN); Bhikṣu Jagadisha Kashyapa,(ed.); Pali Publica-tion Board, Bihar Govt., Nalanda; 1958; Vol.3, pp.334-338. See also, Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-Vārtika* (pv); with Manorathanandi's *Vṛtti* (PVV); Shastri, D.D. (ed.); Bauddha Bharati; Varanasi, 1968; ch.I, K.178; p.62. See also, Johnson, E.H.; (ed.), *Ratnagotravibhanga (Mahāyanot-taratantrāsātra)* (RGV); Bihar Research Society; Patna; 1950. Ch.II, K.57 p.88. o73
 - 33 a. *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* with Haribhadra's *Āloka*; PP. 160, 168. See also, Śāntideva; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*; PP. 163, 277.
 34. TS and TSP, *op.cit.*; Vol.II,K.3510,p.1099.
 35. Asaṅga; *Yogācārabhūmi*; part I; Bhattacharya, Vidhushekhara; (ed.); University of Calcutta, 1957; pp.24-28; see also, Samtani, N.H.; (ed.); *Arthaviniscaya-sūtra* (AVS) with *Nibandhana* (AVSN); K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1971, p.121.
 36. PV and PVV, *op.cit.*; ch.I,K.69, p.31. See allso, MS and PP; *op.cit.*, Vol.II, Ch.23,K.1, p.167 and PPV, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, Ch.27, K.22, p.274.

37. MN, *op.cit.*; Vol. I; p.183, *Samyuktanikaya* (SN); Bhikṣu Jagadisha Kashyapa, (ed.); Pali publication Board, Bihar Govt., Vol. II, pp. 258-261. See also, AVS; *op. cit.*, p. 108. See also, CS; *op. cit.*; K.258 p.66. See also, Nāgārjuna; *Dvādaśamukhaśāstra*; Shastri, Aiyaswami; *Visva Bharati Annals*; Vol. VI; p.47. See also, Vasubandhu; *Abhidharmakośabhaṣya* (AK and AKB) Pradhan, P.; (ed.); K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna; 1967, Ch. VI, K. 16-17, p. 343.
38. MN, *op.cit.*; Vol. I. p. 183. See also SN, *op. cit.*; Vol. II, pp. 258, 295, 409. See also *Dhammapada*; Sankrityayana Rahulabhadra, (ed.); Mahabodhi Society, Sarnatha; 1933, Ch. XX, K.5-7, pp. 123-125. See also, CS, *op.cit.*; K.292, p.88. See also, PV and PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch. I, K.253-257, pp.86-87. See also, TS and TSP, *op.cit.* Vol. II K. 3331-3339; pp. 1051-61.
39. PV and PVV, *op.cit.*; Ch. I, K.178-179, p.62.
40. Jaini, Padmanabha; (ed.) *Abhidharmadīpa* (AD) with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*; K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute; Patna; 1977, K.141-142, pp. 106-108. See also, PV, *op.cit.*; Ch. I, K.69, p.31 and Ch. III, K.274-283; pp.344-347; See also, TS and TSP; *op.cit.*, Vol. I, K-484-489, pp.209-211 and vol. II, K. 2314; p. 776.
41. Contrast between *Sautrantika* and non-*Sautrantika* understanding of *Anityatā*. See also, Chinchore, M.R.; "Some Epistemological and Social Implications of Kṣāṇikā", *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. LXVII, pp. 57-76.
42. Cf. Dharmottara; *Paralokasiddhi*; Roebich; G.N. (tran. Eng.) *Indian Culture*, Vol. XV; No.1-4; pp. 223-228.
43. AVS with AVSN; *op.cit.*; pp.159-160, 258-259. See also, Bagchi, S. (ed.); *Mulasarvastivādinayavastu*; The Mithila Institute; Darbhanga; 1967, Ch. I; *Bhaiṣajya Vastu*; pp. 1-172.

In *Aśtāngasmgraha* Vagbhata also haies the Buddha to be a great physician in the very opening stanza.
44. AVS with AVSN, *op.cit.*; pp. 45, 159-160. See also, Vaidya, P.L. (ed.), *Samādhirājasūtra* (SRS), The Mithila Institute, Darbhanga; 1961, Ch. 32, K.174-177; p.207. See also, Śāntideva; *Sikṣāsamuccaya* (SS), Vaidya, P.L. (ed.); The Mithila Institute; Darbhanga; 1961, Ch.3, K.7, p.32 and Ch.6, K.10, pp.71-79. See also, Ghosaka; *Abhidharmāmṛtaśāstra*; Bagchi, p.c.; (ed.); *Visva Bharati Annals*; Vol. V, Ch.15, Section 21, p.124.
45. For example, Nāgārjuna's *Yogasatoka*, *Aśtāngasamhita* of Vagbhata along with its auto commentary known as *Vaiduryabhāṣya* and Chandran-

andana's *Vrtti* on it.

46. For example (Asaṅga's) *Vogācarabhūmi*, *Dasabhūmikasūtra*, *Srāvaka-bhūmi*, *Samādhirajasūtra* and *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāparamita* etc.
47. Among them some are known as *Kriyā-tantras* (Texts on ceremonies), others as *Caryā-tantra*s (Texts on cults) and some others as *Yoga-tantras* (Texts on Meditations), also called as *Vajrayāna* practices. Examples of the last are *Kāraṇḍavyūhasūtra*, *Kālacakratānta*, *Hevajra-tānta*, etc.
48. MN, *op.cit.*; Vol.I, pp.241, 306 and Vol.II, 265, *Dīghanikaya* (DN); Bhikṣu Jagadisha Kashyapa, (ed.); Pali Publication Board, Bihar Govt., Nalanda, 1959. Vol. III, p. 106. See also, Asaṅga; *Abhidharmasamuccaya*; Pradhan, P. (ed.); Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan, 1950, pp. 43-62. See also, PV and PVV, *op.cit.*, K.181, p.63.
49. MN, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, p.323; and Vol.III, p.127. See also, AD, *op.cit.*, K.136-137; pp.93-96. see also, AVS and AVSN, *op.cit.*, p.15. See also, PV and PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch. I, K.204-206, pp.70-71.
50. SS; *op.cit.*, Ch.3, Part 7, p. 32 and Ch.6, part 10, pp. 71-79.
51. Aiyaswami Shastri, N. (ed.) *Ārya Śālistambasūtra* (ASS), with *Pratītyasamutpāda* *Vibhaṅganirdeśasūtra* (PSVNS); Adyar L.S. No.76, Adyar Library; 1950; pp.5-13. See also, SRS, *op.cit.*; Ch.32, K.174-177, p.207.
52. AK and AKB, *op.cit.*; Ch.V, K.7-8, pp. 281-282. See also, Vaidya, P.L. (ed.); *Aṣṭasahasrika prajñāparamita* (AP); with Haribhadra's *Aloka* (APA); The Mithila Institute, Darbhanga; 1960; p.319.
53. MS, *op.cit.*; Vol.II, Ch.25, K.21-24, pp. 233-242 and Ch.27, K.20, pp. 272-273.
54. AD, *op.cit.*; p.234. See also, PV and PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch.I, K.141-143, p.52 and Ch.I, K.272, p.91.
55. *Paṭisambhidha māgga* of the *Khuddakanikaya*; Bhikṣu Jagadish Kashyapa; (ed.); Pali Publication Board, Bihar Govt. Nalanda, 1960, pp.12, 366, 400. See also, MS, *op.cit.*; Vol.II; Ch. 26, pp. 243-256.
56. TS, *op.cit.*; Vol.I; K.496-498, p.213. See also PSVNS; *op.cit.*; pp.21-27, 61-64. See also, ASS, *op.cit.*, pp.1-13. See also, AVS, *op.cit.*, pp.146-47. See also, AK, *op.cit.*, Ch. III, K.19, p.130.
57. AK, *op.cit.*, Ch.VO, K.54, p.371. See also, PV and PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch. I, K.191-194, pp.66-67. See also, *Prajñākaragupta; Pramāṇavārtikālakāra* (PVA); Sankrtyayanna R.B.; (ed.) K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna; 1953, pp.119-123, 157-158.

58. Vaidya, P.L.; (ed.); *Daśabhūmikasūtra*; The Mithila Institute; Darbhanga; 1967. pp.31-34. See also, AK and AKB, *op.cit.*, Ch.III, K. 20-28, pp.130-141.
59. AVS, *op.cit.*, pp.275-276. See also, Asāṅga; *Mahāyānasūtrā-lankāra* (MSL), Bagchi S.(ed.); Mithila Institute, Darbhanga, 1970, pp.58, 167. See also, AP, *op.cit.*, p.398.
60. Ak and AKB; *op.cit.*, Ch.VI, K.54., pp.60, 370-71. See also, SRS, *op.cit.*; Ch.32, K.203, p.211. See also, RV, *op.cit.*, Ch.I, K.18-19, pp. 16-17. See also, Haribhadra; *Akḥisamayalankāravṛtti Sphutartha* (ASVS); Tripathi, R.S. (ed.); Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Varanasi, 1977, pp.27-28, 27-29.
61. PVA, *op.cit.*, pp.52-53. See also, PVV, *op.cit.*; p.20. See also, AK and AKB, *op.cit.*, Ch.VII; K.33. pp. 414-415. See also, o73 AD, *op.cit.*, p. 207. See also, MSL, *op.cit.*, k K.1, p.1 See also, TS, *op.cit.* m Vol.1, II K.3566-3573; pp.1111-1112.
62. AS, *op.cit.*, p.1. See also, Asaṅga; *Srāvakabhūmi*; Thakur, A.L.; (ed.) K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1973. pp. 8, 253. See also, *Mul-asarvastivādinayavastu*; *op.cit.*; p.194.
63. MN, *op.cit.*, Vol.1.I, Ch.9, pp.62-75. See also, DN, *op.cit.*, Vol.1.II, Ch.9 pp.227-235. See also, RV, *op.cit.*, Ch. I; p.12. See also, AVS, *op.cit.*, pp.15, 231-233. See also, AKB; *op.cit.*, pp. 196-199.
64. Maitreyaṇātha; *Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra*; Pandeya, R.C. (ed.); Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1971, p.177. See also MN, *op.cit.*, Vol 1, pp. 74-75, 174, 380.
65. MN, *op.cit.*, Vol.1.I, Ch.8-11, pp.54-89.
66. De Silva Padmasirii; *Buddha and Freudian Psychology*; Lake House, Columbo, 1973.
67. *Srāvakabhūmi*, *op.cit.*, pp. 261-262. See also, SN, *op.cit.*; Vol. IV, pp. 222-223. See also, DN, *op.cit.*, Vol.1.II; pp. 95-96, 233-234. See also, MN, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 62-75.
68. *Yogacarabhūmi*, *op.cit.*, p.49. See also, MSL, *op.cit.*, p.155. See also, AP, *op.cit.* m, p.125.
69. AP, *op.cit.*, p. 2-3. See also, *Srāvakabhūmi*, *op.cit.*, pp. 150-151. See also. DN, *op.cit.*, Vol.1.II, pp. 34-43.
70. Chinchore, M.R.; "Kṛtapraṇāsa and Akṛtābhyāgama"; *op.cit.*, Note 10.
71. MS, *op.cit.*, Ch. 24, K.11, p. 197 and Ch.27, K.16-23, pp. 269-274.

72. For example, Vasubandhu's *Vijnaptimatratāsiddhi*.
73. Kātyāyanīputra; *Jñanaprasthanasastra* (JPS), Santi Bhikṣu Shastri (ed.); Visva Bharati; Santiniketan; 1955 pp. 125-126. See also, ASS, *op.cit.*, pp. 4-6.
74. AP; *op.cit.*, pp.479-492. See also, Vasubandhu; *Vimsika and Trimsika* with *Vijnaptimatratāsiddhi*; Levi, Sylvain (ed.); Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion; Paris; 1925, K. 2-5, p.13. See also, TS, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, K. 1900-1901, p. 653. See also, PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch. II, K.320-325, pp. 196-197 and K.389-393, pp. 214-215.
75. PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch.II, K.341-344, p.202 and K.365-368. pp. 208-9. See also, *Jñānasrinibandhavalī*; Thakur A.L.(ed.) K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1959, *Sākarasiddhisāstra*; pp.367-390.
76. PVV, *op.cit.*, Ch.II, pp.216-217, 252-255. See also,MSL., *op.cit.*, pp.37-41, 55-75. See also, DN, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp.1-7.
77. That is whyt we often find expression like *bahujana hitāya bahujana sukhāya lokānukampāya* etc. in the Pali *Tripitakas*. MN, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, pp.26, 262, Vol.II, pp.38-40, SN, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, p.170 and Vol.IV, pp. 76,117. See also, RV, *op.cit.*, K.18-21, pp. 16-20. See also, TS, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, K.3485-7, p. 1093 and K. 3639-40, p.1129.
78. It is noteworthy to understand that *Karuna*, *Maitri*, *Mudita* and *Upekṣa* were accepted as necessary characteristics of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas. See also, *Anguttarnikaya*, Bhikṣu Jagadisha Kashyapa (ed.) Pali Publication Board, Bihar Govt., Nalanda, 1957, Vol.IV & V, pp.134-135. See also, MN, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, pp.346-348 and Vol.III, pp.144-148. See also, DN, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 141-142. See also, SN, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, pp.103-106. 073 See also, AVS, *op.cit.*, pp. 16,196. See also, AD, *op.cit.*, pp.426-430. See also, AKB, *op.cit.*, Ch.VIII, K.29-30, pp. 452-453. See also, MSL, *op.cit.*, p. 118.
79. AKB, *op.cit.*, Ch.IV, K.32, pp. 216-217 and VI. K.72-74, pp.386-87. See also, *Dhammapada*, *op.cit.*, K.190, p.86. See also, AD, *op.cit.*, p.125. See also, JPS, *op.cit.*, pp. 37, 49.
80. MSL, *op.cit.*, pp.30, 79-86. See also, ASVS, *op.cit.*, pp. 30-31.
81. I am deeply indebted to Prof.M.P. Marathe who helped me at various stages in writing this paper.

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