

**ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF REFERENCE (2)**

*Beyond the Phenomenological Theory of Reference.*

In the previous part, I suggested that Husserl's theory of intentional reference, by way of the noematic meaning of the act, depends upon a certain inner duality in the noema itself: within the noematic meaning complex, we can distinguish a predicative part, which characterises the object and an indicative or purely demonstrative part which secures the identity of the object. It is this complex whole of indication and characterization that secures intentional reference. If this is so, I further suggested that we must distinguish two modes of meaning; meaning in the sense of expression and meaning in the sense of indication. In the present section, I wish to bring out how Husserl himself makes precisely such a distinction between two modes of meaning but I shall also point out how this distinction between two modes of meaning at the level of language is connected with certain other dualities in Husserl; in particular, I shall concentrate on two other polar distinctions:

1. the distinction between speech and writing.
2. the distinction between intentional experience and discourse.

I shall try to suggest that these polarities are not unconnected; on the contrary, they give a specific articulation to the phenomenological project and I shall end this section by anticipating certain inner tensions or aporiae which arise from these contrasts, tensions which anticipate the movement of deconstruction.

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In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl introduces what he calls the double meaning of a sign; he points out that a sign may mean either as an expression (Ausdruck) or an indication (Anzeichen).<sup>36</sup> The function of an expressive sign is to express a meaning or 'Bedeutung'. The meaning of an expression, for Husserl, is neither a factual entity nor a mental state or event. Essentially, Husserl has two arguments for the view that meaning is not to be identified with the factual entity. (i) A sign may have meaning in the sense of expressive meaning and yet there may be no factual entity corresponding to it. (ii) Even where there is a corresponding entity, the referent is mutable and contingent, whereas the meaning is self-identical and invariant.<sup>37</sup> If, on the one hand, the meaning is not to be equated with the object, nor, on the other hand, is it to be identified with the mental state or event, here also, two considerations have to be kept in mind—(i) meanings, unlike psychological states or events, are immutable and constant; (ii) mental states are variable from person to person and relative, whereas meanings are shareable.

Hence, meanings are neither physical nor mental; this, of course, was also Frege's position. But there is a certain paradox involved in Husserl's conception of expressive meanings. The connection between an expression and its ideal meaning can be established only by the meaning-intention of the user of the expression. The eidetic essence is given in intuition and hence available only to the intuiting consciousness. No one else can perceive this connection between the sign and its meaning, since this connection is given in my consciousness. To any one else, the sign that I use can only be an external indication and not the expression of an ideal meaning. The paradox, as Derrida points out, is that the expressive sign is meaningful only in interiority. The issue is not merely that Husserl's theory seems to lead to what may be called the private language hypotheses; the point is

the much more unsettling consequence that Husserl's expressive signs are not expressions. This goes against Husserl's own definition of a word as a bodily entity animated by a soul, which is its meaning. As Derrida puts it, it is a soul without body; it is a voice without sound (the voice that keeps silence). This is the phenomenological voice, the voice of the phenomenological subject, the subject that still remains after the phenomenological reduction of the real world.<sup>28</sup>

Two comments may be made about this critique of Husserl—

1. Derrida shows how Husserl's later notion of transcendental subjectivity is already implied in Husserl's notion of expressive signs.

2. More importantly, for our present purpose, Derrida's criticism brings out the fact that Husserl's theory of expressive signs, implies the other duality between intentional experience and linguistic or discursive expression. It is this latent duality which really leads to the aporia of an expressive sign not being an expression at all.

Since Husserl's idea of a double meaning of a sign is structured by the contrast of expression and indication, the collapse of the notion of an expressive sign would also lead to the dismantling of its correlative, namely, the indicative sign. But apart from this, Derrida also brings up certain difficulties about the notion of indicative signs on its own.<sup>29</sup>

According to Husserl, an indicative sign has no ideal content; it has no meaning in the strict sense. Since an indicative sign has no ideal content, its meaning is always its referent. The referent of an indicative sign is generally given through perception, just as the meaning of an expressive sign is given through the presence of an essence.

The first comment that we can make upon this characterization of an indicative sign is that, although the intention is to contrast the indication from the expression, yet the paradoxical result is that the similarity is stressed. Just as the meaning of an expressive sign is given in the *presence* of an essence before the subject, so also the meaning of an indication is given by the presence of the object in perception. In both cases, meaning, whether it be that of an expressive sign or of an indicative sign, is defined in terms of immediacy and presence. It is in this intimate bond of a sign and its meaning that the significance of language is seen. From the point of view of this immediacy and presence before consciousness, the difference between the two sets of signs—expressive and indicative—recedes into the background. If, formerly it appeared that all expressions are indications now, in a converse paradox, it appears that all indications are expressions. Taken together, these two paradoxical outcomes collapse the distinction between expressive signs and indicative signs. We now come to see that it is not a question of reversing the relationship—of privileging the indicative over the expressive, as nominalism seeks to do in reply to the Platonism of the ideal content over the real referent. Merely to reverse the signs of this hierarchy would still leave us within the double binds of the opposition itself. Instead, what is required is to collapse the distinction itself, as it were, in a subversive move through which, if all expressive signs turn into indicatives, all indicative, in a reverse paradox, turn into expressive signs. This play of cross cutting paradoxes calls into question the terms of the opposition itself.

But Derrida makes a different point of criticism also in connection with Husserl's theory of indicative signs. He holds that the meaning of an indicative sign is, as much an ideal content as that of an expressive sign and that this ideal content

is not given or determined by the presence of any objects.<sup>40</sup> The upshot of Derrida's critique of Husserl's indication is that indicative signs behave exactly in the same way as expressive signs do. So, Derrida rejects Husserl's distinction between expressive signs and indicative signs and affirms their essential unity. This, of course, would have far reaching implications for understanding the concept of 'sign' itself.

The first polarity at the level of signs is that between expressive signs having an ideal meaning or sense and indicative signs which have only a referential function. But this polarity is imposed on a deeper dichotomy, namely, the dichotomy of spoken and written signs. The first distinction between expressive and indicative signs is a distinction which can be made at the level of spoken signs themselves; in fact, the characterization of expressive signs as calling up an ideal content or essence in the consciousness of the subject suggests that the model which is implicitly operative here is spoken language. Within this stratum there is a certain privileging of the expressive sign as in some sense, truly significative, whereas the indicative sign is a purely referential index or pointer.

But when we come to the distinction between speech and writing, the privileging of one of the terms in the pair, namely, the spoken sign, is much more clearly seen.

In our previous discussion of Husserl's account of linguistic reference, I suggested that his theory of linguistic meaning is a reflection of an antecedent structure of meaning acts. Specifically, I had said that linguistic meaning, which Husserl calls 'Bedeutung', is the noema of an intentional act lent to the act of utterance. It is this pre-linguistic act of intention which vivifies the speech act. There would, of course, be profoundly difficult problems in understanding properly the relationship between

intention and expression. We shall soon turn to some of these problems but what I would like to note at this juncture is that if one approaches linguistic meaning from this point of view, as a reflection of an antecedent structure of intentions, then, by the very logic of such a presupposition, it is speech which is likely to be the chosen paradigm of linguistic meaning, for in the phenomenon of speech, the closeness and intimacy of the relation between the utterance and the meaning seems to be peculiarly self evident. One hears oneself speaking, such that the expression and its meaning, the world and its sense, seem to be given together in a simultaneous experience.

This privileging of speech over writing is no modern sentiment or prejudice; on the other hand as Derrida has argued, and also Ricoeur in a different way, this goes back to the very 'origins' of Western thought, in what Derrida has called 'logocentrism' and 'phonocentrism'.<sup>41</sup> In this, as in other issues, the articulation and expression of attitude gets its voice most powerfully and clearly in Plato, particularly in *Phaedrus* and the *Seventh Epistle*.<sup>42</sup> But what is up for immediate comment in this context is that this attitude is built into the very notion of the sign as in De Saussure's structural linguistics.

De Saussure writes : " Language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first. The linguistic object is not both the written and spoken form of words. The spoken forms alone constitute the object. But the spoken form is so intimately bound up with the written image that the latter manages to usurp the main role. People attach even more importance to the written image of a vocal sign than to the sign itself. A similar mistake would be in thinking that more can be learned about some one by looking at this photograph than by viewing him directly ".<sup>43</sup>

We may say that for De Saussure, the written sign is a signifier of a signifier (the spoken word) and, as such, external and merely parasitical upon speech. The same attitude which may be called 'phonocentrism' insofar as it gives primary place as signifier to the spoken form, is also to be seen at work in the two other thinkers discussed in the present study, namely, Frege and Husserl. For them also, the model of sense and reference is the use of language in speech. For Frege, the written form is useful only as a script or a notation, a sign of a sign. In Husserl, this is all the more clearly seen; for Husserl's signs are animated by meanings and since meanings are presented as eidetic essences, the most pellucid example of a sign is where an expression immediately correlates with an essential meaning or ideal content. This immediacy of union of expression and sense is given in speech. Hence, for Husserl, the paradigmatic instance of language is speech and written signs are only arbitrary markers of meaningful sounds. In Husserl, the necessary link between 'phonocentrism' and 'logocentrism', the emphasis on speech and the primacy of the presence of a meaning or an essence is particularly clear.<sup>44</sup> It is because meaning is primordially an affair of the presence of something before consciousness, that at the linguistic level, the spoken word is the privileged instance of language.

But as in the case of the previous dichotomy, here also, in the opposition of the spoken and the written sign, there are subversive tendencies at work in the very setting up of the opposition, tendencies which dismantle the oppositional contrast itself. This is the moment for which Deconstruction lies in wait, in watchful attention to the 'implosion' of the opposition set up by the theory itself; this is the moment of reversal or peripeteia, which, when caught, leads to a dismantling aporia of the distinction itself.

In Husserl, we can see in a particularly arresting manner, this turning of tables and reversal of the order of primacy as between the spoken and the written signs. The main trend of his theory of meaning, of course, foregrounds the immediate presence of meaning in the moment of the spoken utterance; it is when one hears oneself speak that a single consciousness embraces the expression as well as the meaning. Although even this speech act is not the ultimate foundation of meaning, for Husserl, since the act of expression itself is grounded in a meaning intention, yet, speech comes closest to the silence of the phenomenological consciousness. In this sense, the indwelling principle of language, that which animates it as meaningful discourse, is the spoken word. In this, of course, Husserl conforms to the major semantic presupposition of a long body of Western tradition. But what is particularly instructive about Husserl is that in the very attempt to formulate the principle of speech and relate the written form of expression as ancilia to the spoken, a counter argument is released, an opposing line of reflection is opened up which, as it were, from within the manifest claim of the primacy of speech, subverts precisely this *de jure* primacy and installs in its place, the *de facto* primacy of writing and the dependence of meaning upon writing. It is this inner dialectical reversal of roles that Derrida exposes in his close study of Husserl in his 'Introduction' to *The Origin of Geometry*.<sup>48</sup> Husserl's late study *The Origin of Geometry* has many layers of significance in the development of his phenomenology. At the most obvious level, this study is an addition and contribution to the basic theme of his theory of the life world, suggested in the *Crisis*. In that text, Husserl had argued that the Galilean mathematization of nature is founded on an antecedent givenness of the life-world and that the uncovering of this formation of the scientific view of the cosmos will have to show the origins of geometry. The present essay seeks to carry out precisely this project; at another level,



Husserl's study is also an addition to what he himself had termed 'genetic phenomenology' which would explicate the formation of various constituted domains of objectivity and thus serve as an essential corrective and supplement to the static phenomenological analysis of the *Ideas*. But what makes *The Origin of Geometry* an important text for us is that it makes Husserl's recognition that language, and more specifically writing, is a necessary condition for meaning.<sup>46</sup> Husserl's investigation starts off from a phenomenological query: how does geometrical ideality (just like that of all sciences) proceed from its primary intra-personal origin, where it is a structure within the conscious space of the first inventor's soul, to its ideal objectivity? Husserl first suggests that it is in the contact of reciprocal understanding that the first stabilization of meanings takes place. It is in the communicational community that the repetition of structures by each transforms it into something common for all; in other words, meanings are stabilized in the inter-subjective communication of subjects, each having an access to the meanings by way of acts of intention. Even this goes a point beyond the earlier passivity of expression, *vis-a-vis* intention, for that view had limited itself to the position that an act of expression, a linguistic act, is a reflection of an antecedent noematic intuition and it is precisely by way of being such a receptive reflection that it constitutes itself as a linguistic meaning. But now, Husserl is recognising the active role of communication in building up a commonly accessible ideal objectivity; it is the production and reproduction of a repeated communication that the objectivity of a meaning is made available. But Husserl proceeds further and shows how actual communication is not sufficient to establish the objectivity of geometrical knowledge, for what is still lacking is 'the persisting existence of ideal objects even during periods in which the subjects are not wakefully related. It is at this point that the importance of writing which Husserl describes as

'communication become virtual' is apparent, for it is only through the detachment from any actual subjectivity, which writing makes possible, that the objectivity and communicability of scientific knowledge can be finally secured.<sup>47</sup>

But this introduces a startling and upsetting new trend of thought, for, as Derrida points out, language is no longer simply expression; on the contrary, it constitutes the object and is a concrete juridical condition of truth. Even more surprisingly, in its permanency and its independence of any actual objectivity writing must be considered as the telos of language 'the possibility of the appearance of truth, is co-extensive with the possibility of its disappearance; in its quest for foundational certitude, transcendental phenomenology reaches a point at which it begins to undermine the very project which set it in motion'.<sup>48</sup>

What Derrida is alerting us to in Husserl is the moment of an internal subversion from within phenomenology itself. In the very attempt to ground the possibility of meaning by an analysis of speech and a relegation of writing as a mere supplement to speech, a contrary train of reflections is released and the condition of meaning and of language is seen to depend on the previously relegated supplement. But Derrida is not intent on usurpation of primacy by one of the elements in the opposition; it is not to exalt the previously repressed and to repress the previously exalted that he argues; such an argumentation would merely amount to a local non-significant coup and by the very fact of claiming for a reversal of roles within the hierarchy, it would not call the principal of logocentrism into question; as it were, it would amount to only a negative logocentrism, its shadow. But the point of Derrida's deconstructive argumentation is to call the hierarchy itself into question, to bring the principle to the point of breakdown and not to claim a new position within the principle. That is why, the total effect can be seen,

not at the level of any one opposition, but at the level of the systems of structures of opposition, on the ensemble of all the structures and privileged relationships sponsored by a theory. We must, therefore, move on to the next, and in a sense, the most fundamental level of contrast in the Husserlian theory of language—the opposition between the level of intention and expression — the opposition of the phenomenological and the linguistic.

We now come to the most basic and founding distinction of all in Husserl, a distinction and correlation which in a sense dictates the form and significance of the other polarities that we have briefly considered above — the contrast between expressive and indicative signs and that between the sign as spoken and the sign in its written inscriptional form. These two distinctions are laid over the more fundamental and basic contrast and correlation between meaning as intention and meaning as expression. Husserl introduces this basic distinction by way of a strange detour.

In section 124 of the *Ideas* entitled "*The Noetic-Noematic Stratum of Logos : Signifying and Signification*" Husserl introduces two senses of meaning : meaning in the sense of meaning content of an intentional act (what we have called in the previous discussion 'act meaning') and meaning in the sense of the meaning of an expression.<sup>49</sup> Husserl writes : "originally these words (i.e. sense, meaning etc.) concerned only the linguistic sphere, that of 'expressing'. But one can scarcely avoid and, at the same time, take an important cognitive step, extending the signification of these words and suitably modifying them so that they can find application of a certain kind to the whole noetic-noematic sphere, thus the application to all acts, be they now combined with expressive acts or not".<sup>50</sup>

Here Husserl is suggesting that we may think of meaning at two levels; first, in the sense of meanings of pre-linguistic acts of intention and secondly, in the sense of meanings of linguistic expression. We may call them the pre-discursive and discursive levels of meaning and also in terms of a phenomenological and semantic levels of meaning.

But what is peculiar about this passage is that, on the surface, it seems to be suggesting that the semantic or expressional sense of meaning is the basic form and the meaning of an act is an extension from this discursive level.

This is curious; for apart from the fact that the rest of the argumentation in the section clearly suggests that the phenomenological level is the founding stratum and that expressive meaning is a reflection of this antecedent prediscursive meaning, the whole thrust of the phenomenological method and its guiding principle of the return to the given as given, is exactly the opposite of this suggestion. In terms of the spirit and intention of the phenomenological method, it is the experiential prediscursive meaning that is primary and discourse or language is intelligible only on the basis of that primacy of experience.

But there is another implicit suggestion also in the passage which speaks of an extension or extrapolation. Now, the metaphor of extension, of further steps, etc. imply a certain equivalence or consistency between the two levels and indeed Husserl himself articulates this presumption in two places in the same text. Firstly, he brings the idea of parallelism and of correlation between the two levels and secondly, and more importantly, he articulates a principle of universal expressibility. "Anything remembered as remembered, anything phantasied as phantasied is also explicitable and expressible. Anything 'meant as meant'"

anything in the noematic sense, pertaining to any act, no matter which, is expressible by means of 'significations'."

But here too, there is a counter-force moving against the principle of expressibility which leads to the very opposite of the principle, namely, that there is a certain incompleteness in the expression of an intuitively given presence and furthermore this incompleteness, this non-congruence, is essential to thought and discourse.

In passing, the intention of the above remarks is not to suggest that Husserl makes contradictory or conflicting claims; rather what I want to get at, is, seeing these conflicts as symptoms I want to inquire into the 'causes' or 'motivations' of these symptoms; in other words, I want to see the basic polarity of the intentional and the discursive as an opposition which, in the very articulation of itself, deconstructs itself, by releasing such contradictions and conflicts immanently. Borrowing a hint from Derrida, we may sensitize ourselves to these immanent aporiae in Husserl by a careful attention to the metaphors and figures in terms of which the argumentation is unfolded. Husserl himself is alive to the metaphoricity of the passage and he is also, as it were, 'unconsciously' aware that these metaphors suggest mutually conflicting ideas and meanings. Immediately after introducing the metaphors of stratum, stratification, mirroring, reflecting and picturing, Husserl remarks "To be sure, these locations... imposed upon us are to be taken with care since their metaphorical use can easily lead to error".<sup>51</sup>

It seems almost as if at this moment, the deconstructive forces immanent in the problem are raised to the level of preconscious awareness in Husserl. But he wishes us to look away from the metaphors and consider the phenomena themselves. But this is ...5

precisely what we find ourselves powerless to do, for the idea of "a consideration of the phenomena themselves" cries out to be explicated and its explication throws precisely the issue before us — the relationship between the intentional and the discursive. If the articulation of this distinction is inextricably caught up in the web of metaphors, it looks as if the idea of "a consideration of phenomena as in themselves" is a function and outcome of these metaphoricities of the argumentation. Far from being a principle independent of the figures and ruling them, it itself is the fine spray cast by these rapidly moving figures, analogies and tropes. Such being the case, the advice to look beyond the metaphors is a call for repression; instead, we must follow the play of these figures and the forces let loose by them.

From this point of view, we may begin with the basic geological metaphor of strata and stratification. Husserl speaks of the sphere of expression as a stratum, as the stratum of the logical and conceptual.<sup>19</sup> By the figure of 'strata', he seeks to convey essentially two sets of ideas: (i) the expressive is a domain or order having its own structure organised by rules and laws specific to it; (ii) on the other hand, the stratum of linguistic or discursive meaning rests upon or is founded upon a base structure of intuitive acts. One may think of these two structures in terms of base and super structure, where the super structure, though an organised totality in itself, having principles of its own specific anatomy and physiology, its own structure and functioning, yet as a totality, is essentially referred to an earlier or antecedent organization as a condition of its own possibility. Given these connotations of the geological metaphor, *prima facie*, it seems perfectly appropriate to the particular case on hand. But yet Husserl alerts us to the points of misfit and mislocation, which throw us on to other models and other metaphors. The first point is that dislocation has to do with the principle of

expressibility that we have already noticed. Husserl holds that insofar as every intentional meaning, every noetic act with its noematic sense can be expressed, the expressive order enters into the structure of the pre-discursive intensive acts. The superstructure is not mere outer layer, covering a stratum which does not undergo any transformation by coming into contact with it. On the contrary, expression enters into intention and co constitutes it anew. Husserl, therefore, remarks "expression is not something like a coat of varnish or a piece of clothing covering it over; it is a mental formation exercising new intensive functions on the intensive substratum".<sup>22</sup>

But in the very rejection of the idea that expression is a mere covering over of the underlying intensive processes which may be presumed to keep their self-sameness untouched by this supervening stratum, Husserl evokes another figure—that of a clothing, which suggests an altogether different line of reflection. We may now think in terms of something woven (*texte*) by the crisscrossing of warp and woof. Meaning may now appear as a fabric into whose production both intention and expression are together involved. Husserl now speaks as per the metaphor of clothing or fabric, of "an inter-weaving" of acts of expression and other acts". The strata are now interwoven and together constitute the order of meaning. Expression is not to be thought of as merely founded or super-imposed on an antecedent order of pre-linguistic sense; on the contrary, every intensive act enters into the order of expression such that intention and language inter-penetrate. With this inner relation between sense and expression, we have to think in terms of a coincidence or reciprocal parallelism between the two and indeed Husserl himself begins to think of the relationship between experience and language on the register of a parallelism and

mirroring and correspondence. But these models, too, in their own way, release other forces of disruption and dislocation.

The metaphors of reflection and mirroring and of medium suggest a certain receptivity, a passive permeability of discourse by sense. For discourse or language to serve as a medium of reflection of meanings, it must allow itself to be imprinted by sense. The expression must give itself up as a vehicle for the underlying meanings; as such, the order of expression must be a receptive and unproductive. Expressivity is not a power or a work, but a receptivity or non-productivity.<sup>64</sup> This non-productivity or sterility of expression is demanded by the basic phenomenological predilection for the immediacy and presence of sense as the telos of language, but on the other hand, this idea of the passivity of expression hardly fits in with the insight which started this line of thought, namely, the essential involvement of discourse or language in every act. The idea of the necessity of expression for every act of meaning would require that we think in terms of a more active or formative model for language. And indeed Husserl himself points out the breakdown of the models of correspondence, parallelism and mirroring and reflections. If discourse lends itself to be imprinted by sense like a perfect transparent medium, one would expect a complete coordination between sense and expression: if discourse is a medium, the whole of the order of intensive experience would be reflected in it.

But Husserl points out the gap, the incompleteness of the fit between the sense of experience and the expression of it in language. The gap between experience and discourse is first presented, as if it is a more contingent failure of congruence, a *de facto* lack of fit, which, although characterizing ordinary language, may be remedied in terms of a structure and more disciplined scientific discourse. Husserl's example is taken from



daily life. Husserl writes "an expression is incomplete (with reference to an experience), as when, with respect to a complex event such as the arrival of a carriage perhaps, bringing long-awaited guests, we shout in the house" the carriage, the guests.<sup>55</sup>

Husserl's point here seems to be that the fullness and richness of the experience is almost totally overlooked or passed over in the expression. The utterance could hardly be said to mirror the complex intentionalities involved in the situation. But it may appear that this is purely a negligible fault or deficiency to which discourse is liable because, in such practical contexts, the pragmatic demands of action fore-shorten the expressive powers of language; for purposes of practical exigencies of action any close fidelity of language, of our utterance to the experience, is an unwanted distraction. But it is possible to restore the expressive potentialities of language which are here suspended for the sake of action. Hence, the postulate of expressibility of all senses may be still acceptable 'in principle' as it were.

But Husserl moves decisively at this point to show that the incompleteness is essential to the very possibility of language. The incompleteness he is now bringing to our notice is not a mere *de facto* lack of fit, but an essential, functional or necessary discursive incompleteness, an incompleteness which is the condition of possibility for thought, for conceptuality.

Husserl points out that the level of linguistic expression can serve as the medium of logical or rational thought, because of its conceptuality. It is given a certain dimension of generality that every linguistic expression, by the very fact of using linguistic signs, has a generality.<sup>56</sup> This expression of general meanings is the condition of the possibility of rational thought. In this sense, discourse is the basis of logos. But because of this

generality, there will always be an incompleteness, a lack of perfect congruence between the specificity of experience and the generality of language. But unlike the earlier incompleteness, this absence of fit is essential for thought. Rational thought would not be possible without the conceptuality introduced by discourse and thus, paradoxically, language could articulate the meaning of experience precisely because of this lack of correspondence.

The point can now be made that the problem of the relationship between experience and discourse, of sense and expression, appears to be structurally unstable; to bring out or emphasise a certain aspect or quality of this relationship, we are led to use certain models, certain schemas, but precisely these devices of exposition, these articulating images, throw up antithetical ideas and release opposite tendencies of thought. In these perturbations and reversals, the primary thematic idea of a duality of levels, of the level of intention and that of expression, of experience and language—this root principle itself which is a manifestation of the theme of phenomenology, is called into question. We have seen this interior subversion operating at three levels or in three contexts—the two senses of a sign, as expression and indication, the duality of the spoken and written and finally the master organising duality of intention and discourse. At each level or in each one of these sites, the two-step disconcerting process of a first inversion of the order of importance and a second dissolution of the binary opposition itself takes place. What is first thought to be supplementary and secondary reverses its positional significance and is seen to regulate the first rather than be merely regulated by it. But at the next turn of the argument, a more fundamentally disturbing possibility suggests itself namely, the dissolution of the binary schema itself.

In the particular case of language or discourse, the schema of the relationship between experience and expression itself is called into question. But if this schema is abandoned, in what new ways, according to what other possible metaphors, can we order the problem of reference? If the phenomenological way of Husserl is to be given way, to what other form of reflection, other way of thought about language, does it give way? How should we think of language and reality, of meaning and reference, beyond the limits of phenomenology?

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NOTES

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37. *Ibid.*
38. J. Derrida; *Speech and Phenomena*, p. 70 (trans.), D. Allison, Evanston, North Western University Press, 1973.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-96.
40. *Ibid.*
41. J. Derrida; *On Grammatology*, Introduction (trans.) Gayatri Spivak,
42. J. Derrida; Plato's Pharmacy in 'Desseminations' (trans.)
43. F. De Saussure; *A Course in General Linguistics*, p. 23 (trans.) Wade Baskin, McGraw Hill, N. Y. 1966.
44. J. Derrida; *Speech and Phenomena*, Preface by Newton Garver.
45. J. Derrida; Edmund Husserl's 'The Origin of Geometry': An Introduction, Stony Brook, N. Y. 1978.

46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*
49. E. Husserl; *Ideas Towards A Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, Chapter III (trans), F. Kersten, Martinus Nijhoff, Boston, 1983.
50. *Ibid*, Sec. 124, p. 294.
51. *Ibid*, p. 297
52. *Ibid*,
53. *Ibid*,
54. *Ibid*, p. 296.
55. *Ibid*, p. 299
56. *Ibid*, pp. 299-300