

## A CRITIQUE OF JAYARĀSĪ'S CRITIQUE OF PERCEPTION

The view developed in the *Tattvopaplavasīmha* of Jayarāśī (8th century A. D.) aroused considerable interest in the last few decades of twentieth century Indian philosophy. According to Jayarāśī, in order to assert something one must have sufficiently warranted supportive grounds or *pramāṇas* as they are called in Indian philosophy and that these *pramāṇas*, in order to produce valid cognition (*pramā*), must be free from different kinds of blemishes—such as over-coverage (*ativyāpti*), under-coverage (*avyāpti*), absurdity (*asambhava*) and interdependence (*itaretarāśraya*) etc. Unfortunately there is no such nondefective *pramāṇa*, according to Jayarāśī. Since this is the case, we have no legitimate and rational basis of knowing anything with certitude, be it material like four elements (*bhūtas*) or non-material like soul (*ātman*), liberation (*apavarga*) etc. The inevitable outcome of such a philosophical position is a kind of pure, unmixed and thoroughgoing scepticism, the upsetting of all assertions or principles and suspension of any judgement regarding knowledge altogether. In his philosophical treatise *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, Jayarāśī examines different *pramāṇas* one by one and refutes them all as absurd and ambiguous. He opens his criticism with the *Nyāya* definition of perception and subjects it to a searching critical analysis, demonstrates its many logical blemishes (*doṣas*) and finally rejects the justifiability of perception as an instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). And with the rejection of the validity of perception, the existence of four

material elements (earth, water, fire and air) also stands rejected because it is only through the evidence of perception, holds a Carvak, that the existence of the material elements can be ascertained.

In this paper we propose to discuss Jayarāṣi's critique of the Nyāya view of perception only. And in fact, while criticising the Nyāya definition of perception, Jayarāṣi criticises the possibility of valid knowledge in general. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part contains a straightforward exposition of Jayarāṣi's arguments against the possibility of perception and the second contains an assessment of the strength and weakness of Jayarāṣi's arguments.

## I

### *Jayarāṣi's Arguments*

Gautama, the author of *Nyāya-Sūtra*, defines perception<sup>1</sup> as "the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact independently of words (*avyapadeśya*), invariably related [to the object] i.e., non-erroneous and is of a definite or determinate character (*vyavasāyātma*). This definition contains four necessary conditions - (1) the contact between the sense-organ and the object, (2) the contact is not due to words (*avyapadeśya*), (3) it is non-erroneousness (*avyabhicāritva*), and (4) *vyavasāyakatva* or definiteness or determinateness. It is to be noted that the last two characteristics, i.e. the third and the fourth, are both the necessary and sufficient conditions for any piece of valid knowledge in general (*pramā*) and not for perceptual cognition alone. Jayarāṣi in his *Tattvopalavastimha* refers to another book called *Lakṣaṇasāra*<sup>2</sup> which contains refutation of the term '*avyapadeśya*' in connection with the definition of perception. Unfortunately the work *Lakṣaṇasāra* is not extant; but Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Prof. R. C.

Parikh, the joint editors of *Tattvopaplavasim̐ha*, attribute the authorship of this work to Jayarāṣi himself. So he (Jayarāṣi) does not feel inclined to criticise the appropriateness of this term 'avyapadeśya' in the *Tattvopaplavasim̐ha*. Instead, he concentrates attention and applies his negative dialectic to the other three conditions of perceptual cognition. Again, among these conditions, he takes up the third (i.e. *avyabhicāritva*) and the fourth (i.e., *vyavasāyātmakatva*) conditions for discussion first and then he goes on to discuss the justifiability of the 'sense-object-contact' (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*). The reason for this priority is perhaps this: The third and the fourth conditions are necessary conditions for any piece of valid knowledge, be it perceptual or non-perceptual. So, a refutation of the justifiability of these two conditions in the context of the definition of perception would *ipso-facto* apply to other cases of cognition gained through other means of valid knowledge; viz. inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) etc.

Now, valid knowledge (*pramā*) is defined by the *pramāṇavā-dins* as that which is 'non-erroneous' (*avyabhicāri*). But what makes a piece of cognition 'non-erroneous'? An answer to this question requires understanding of the meaning of the term 'non-erroneous'. This gives rise to the following consideration;

Does non-erroneousness (*avyabhicāritva*) mean the cognition produced by non-defective causal factors?

If it is argued that the non-erroneousness or truth of a cognition is known or established by non-defective causal factors or conditions (*aduṣṭa kāraṇa sandehotpadyatva*), then the question will crop up: how the non-defectiveness of causal factors is known or established? It cannot be established by perception<sup>8</sup>, since the senses which are indispensable conditions

of perception are beyond the scope of perception : they are too subtle to be perceived (*atīndriya*)<sup>4</sup>. It cannot again be established by inference<sup>5</sup>, since *liṅga*, which is said to be the heart of inference, is beyond apprehension, and a thing which itself is not established cannot be used for establishing other things. Precisely the argument stands as follows :

A particular cognition is non-erroneous if it is produced by non-defective causal factors, and a causal factor is said to be non-defective if it produces a non-erroneous cognition. This is a clear case of interdependence (*anyonyāśraya*). Again, senses are admitted as substances which are the loci of qualities like proper-functioning as well as disturbances.<sup>6</sup> Obviously the cognition produced by them cannot always claim to be non-disturbed. So, 'avyabhicāritva' or 'non-erroneousness' of cognition means a kind of cognition which is caused by non-defective causal factors remains un-established. And what itself is not established cannot be regarded as a sufficient warrant for establishing something else. Hence, *avyabhicāritva* in the sense of *non-defective causal factor* cannot serve as a defining characteristic of valid cognition.

Does 'avyabhicāritva' mean a kind of cognition devoid of sublation or contradiction (*bādharahitva*) ?

According to Jayaraṣi valid cognition cannot be defined in terms of the absence of sublation or contradiction because the precise meaning of this term in the context of knowledge remains undefined. What is meant by a cognition 'being devoid of sublation or contradiction' ? Is it on account of the fact that cognition is right (*yathārtha*) or does it mean the absence of deficiency or inadequacy of causal conditions operating in the production of 'sublating cognition' (*bādhaka jñāna*) ? There are some cases in which, despite the presence of inadequacy in

causal conditions which could have produced the sublating cognition, the cognition takes place. On the other hand, sometimes it is also seen that inspite of the presence of the deficiency of the said causal conditions, the sublating cognition is not produced. Jayarāśi cites the example that there is no contradiction when we cognize distant mass of sunrays (*marīcinicaya*) as water. Moreover, there is no logical necessity that the contradicting cognition would arise immediately even when the said causal conditions for the production of it are present. It may be the case that the place is a familiar one or the cogniser stands nearby. The sublating cognition (*bādhajñāna*) may also be produced with a difference of time, such as, after a year or so, or, sometimes on account of the deficiency of the necessary causal conditions, it may not arise at all. So, it cannot be maintained on *sufficiently warranted ground* that the cognition is non-erroneous, since no sublation or contradiction has arisen.<sup>7</sup> Our inability to apprehend the contradiction does not necessarily imply or establish the real non-existence of 'sublation' or contradiction as such. To be precise, what the sceptic Jayarāśi intends to mean is perhaps this : our non-apprehension of contradicting (sublating) cognition is not a sufficient condition to imply the non-existence of *contradiction* and that the *contradicting cognition* is erroneous. It does not guarantee that the said cognition is non-erroneous, since it cannot avert the possibility of non-production on account of the vitiating causal conditions.

The sceptic Jayarāśi further clarifies the point. He asks : Does the absence of sublation or contradiction which makes of particular cognition non-erroneous hold good for the reason that all people do not apprehend the contradiction or that with reference to the different conditions of one and the same cogniser ?<sup>8</sup> If the first possibility is accepted, then everybody would become

omniscient. But this is contrary to secular '*lokavyavahāra*' i.e. all people are not omniscient. Now, if we accept the second alternative, that is, the non-production of contradiction depends on the cogniser's non-apprehension of contradiction among his different cognitions – then it is unjustified for the simple reason that an erroneous cognition of diamond rays and of mirage and the like is cognised even when there is non-production of a contradictory cognition for the perceiver on account of his going to a different place or his death or on the similar grounds.<sup>9</sup>

It may also be the case that due to the nature of necessary and sufficient causal conditions, erroneous cognition arises in such a way that it prohibits the production of contradictory cognition, and it is on account of this complex situation that a particular cognition is said to be uncontradicted just as a cognition is recognised as *valid* in the *pramāṇa*-theorists' philosophy. Thus, according to sceptic Jayaraṣi, "a cognition whose cause is defective and about which one has the cognition 'it is false' that cognition alone is untrue".<sup>10</sup> So, absence of sublation or contradiction cannot serve as *sallakṣaṇa* of valid cognition and thus to define valid cognition in terms of this is not acceptable.

Does '*avyabhicāritva*' mean a kind of cognition which has the efficiency of successful activity?

Next, Jayaraṣi considers whether '*avyabhicāritva*' or 'non-erroneousness' could mean efficiency which leads to successful activity (*pravṛtti sāmāthyā*). It is a fact of common experience that after cognising an object, we are either tempted to get it or avoid that object. If we are successful in attaining the thing, then we consider our cognition to be 'nonerroneous' (*avyabhicāri*). But if we fail, then we consider our cognition as 'erroneous'. Is *successful practice* the intended meaning of the term

'non-erroneousness' (*avyabhicāritva*)? This is, the sceptic argues, not an appropriate interpretation. Jayarāṣi argues that if 'non-erroneousness' means practical efficiency, that is, a connection of the said cognition with a fruit (metaphorically which means garland, sandalwood etc), then we must consider whether the practical efficiency (*pravrttisamarthatva*) is known or unknown. If it is said to be not known, then the question<sup>11</sup> arises: how can we ascertain the 'nonerroneousness' of such a cognition? If it becomes impossible for the cogniser to apprehend the practical efficiency in case of a particular cognition, then also it becomes obviously impossible on his part to assert the truth of the said cognition. If, on the other hand, it is said that practical efficiency is something that is known, then also difficulties arise. Generally it is held that the criterion of truth is successful practice. A cognition is known to be non-erroneous if practice based on the assumption of its truth results in the attainment of the desired end. If I judge that the substance before me is water and subsequently wish to confirm this judgment I may drink it to quench my thirst. If I then judge that my thirst has been quenched, I am in a position to confirm the initial cognition by noting its agreement with the subsequent cognition by way of the fact that one property of water is that it quenches thirst.

But Jayarāṣi here asks: Whether the later apprehended water is identical with the previously cognised water or with the class or set of it? The sceptic submits that it cannot be the same<sup>12</sup> water as previously cognised, since the continuity may cease to exist on account of the impacts and impulses of the fishes and buffaloes. In other words, there is no guarantee for the absence of causal factors which would disturb the continuity of water. There is no surity that it is the water of the same set<sup>13</sup> either because sometimes it so happens that having false cognition of

water, people may accidentally reach the real water and thus if this view is right then the clear and distinct *false cognition* must be accepted as *non-erroneous*. But this is something which is patently absurd.

It may, however, be urged by the *pramāṇa* theorists that erroneous cognition never allows a person to obtain water at the same time and place whereas the non-erroneous cognition does so and on account of this reason it may be claimed that the said cognition is not erroneous (*avyabhicāri*).<sup>14</sup>

But Jayarāṣi points out that if this contention is accepted, then the cognition caused by an object that is about to vanish and the cognition of the sun, the planet (which are beyond our reach) would be false. Even in case of cognition of water, there is no warranted ground that we surely obtain water connected with that place and time since due to earthquake, volcanic eruption etc., the water of the place under consideration may cease to exist or disappear.<sup>15</sup>

What Jayarāṣi intends to mean is that the *exact nature of the object of a practically efficient cognition cannot be described*. It cannot also be argued that the said water has the class character (*jāti*) of water, since there is nothing as class-character.<sup>16</sup>

Now in connection with this comes another question :

Can we know the successful practice which makes a cognition valid ?

Jayarāṣi answers this question in the negative. He argues that the truth of practical efficiency cannot be perceptually apprehended on its own right, since there would not be any contact with anything which occurred before and then vanished.



It is an admitted view of the Naiyāyikas that a unit of cognition lasts for two moments and perishes there after. When we perceive an object, we generally exercise our will to get it and only then successful achievement would appear. Evidently it becomes difficult to observe how the successful practice can be perceptually apprehended to exist in a unit of cognition which cannot exist at the time of perception. The cognition of the practical efficiency cannot be established by perception, because it does not have any object like the cognition of 'the whole mass seen by pressing the eye with a finger' (*keśonduka*). This kind of cognition does not have any object corresponding to it; neither the negation of it, nor its presence can be established. A non-existent thing is not entitled to be an object of cognition in the proper sense of the term. If it were so, it would not be different from the case of illusion and in that case refutation of all accepted principles becomes obvious.<sup>17</sup>

Now comes another important question : Is *avyabhicāritva* the *lakṣaṇa* of cognition ? If for the sake of argument, we assume that a cognition is valid by virtue of its own presence or existence, then the *pramāṇa* theorists must accept that all cognitions are valid. This is something absurd, even from the Naiyāyikas' own standpoint. A cognition cannot be right by its mere presence. For, if we cognise a snake in place of a rope, then nobody would deny that there is the presence of snake-cognition, although this cognition is false.

Now, if, as an alternative solution, we admit that the truth of a cognition depends not on its own existence or presence, but on another thing, then we must consider first whether that another thing is known or unknown. The first alternative cannot be accepted, since on this hypothesis, past, future, inferential and intuitive (*pratibhā*) cognitions, which are accepted by the Naiyāyikas themselves as valid, would be erroneous for the

reason that there is no known favourable causal conditions for their ascertainment. To put the matter more technically, the sceptic Jayarāṣi argues : 'either you (*pramāṇa* theorist) know a thing you are judging about or you do not know'. If you know a thing, then you cannot judge it falsely since you know it, so that there is no false knowledge. This is something absurd. Again, if you do not know it, you cannot make any judgement at all, since your mind is blank of that of which you know nothing. Jayarāṣi's argument may be put in a slightly modified way. If you know both A and B, then you obviously cannot confuse A with B. If you know A and not B, then obviously you cannot compare A with B. And if so, then you must suspend judgement.

There may be some thinkers who may counter the above argument by saying that false judgement is the belief in 'what is not'.

But the sceptic argues that to think or to know means to think of 'something'; to think of nothing is equal to 'not-thinking' or 'not-knowing' at all. In other words, non-existence cannot be an object of our knowledge.<sup>18</sup>

But a little reflection would at once reveal that the very first argument put forward by the sceptic is based on a watertight distinction between knowledge and ignorance. It rests on the forgetfulness of the fact that in between knowledge and ignorance there is a process called 'getting to know' or learning a thing which we did not know before. This also makes us aware of the fact that valid knowledge is something where there is an element of novelty, (*anadhigata artha-adhigantṛ-pramā*).

Is the term *vyavasāyātmika* (definiteness) necessary?

It had been stated earlier that in addition to 'non-erroneousness' (*avyabhicāritva*), the term 'definiteness' (*vyavasāyātmatva*) is also used as a necessary condition in the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of valid perceptual cognition. Jayarāṣi, in order to show the absurdity (*asambhava*) of this definition, subjects this term (*vyavasāyātmatva*) to a searching criticism. Cognition (*jñāna*) has many species. A widely prevalent classification brings forth the distinction between *pramā* and *apramā* (valid and invalid cognitions). Among erroneous cognitions (*apramā*) doubt is included. Doubt (*saṁśaya*) occurs when we have a cognition of a subject having no specific *prakāra* or predicate characterising it, say for example, the cognition of an object whether it is a man or a pillar. There is no feature of certitude in this cognition. The object may be characterised either by manness or by pillarness. But in doubtful cognition, firstly, the predicates must be mutually incompatible and secondly they must be referred to the same subject.<sup>19</sup>

Now Jayarāṣi raises questions : Is anything revealed in such doubtful cognition or not ? If we say that something is revealed then, according to Jayarāṣi, the question arises : Is it a substance, or an attribute ? If it is a substance which is said to be revealed in the cognition, then we must consider whether it is real or unreal. If it is real, then the saying that 'the cognition is doubtful' becomes non-sensical. If, on the other hand, it is accepted as unreal, then the cognition non-erroneousness (*avyabhicāritva*) is sufficient to exclude the possibility of such cognition and the additional qualification, viz., *vyavasāyātmatva* (definite) turns out to be an unnecessary condition.<sup>20</sup>

If the revealed thing is taken to be an attribute, then the question arises again : Is it real or unreal ? If it be real, then it is futile to say that the cognition is of the nature of doubt, its being the cognition of real water. On the other hand, if it is

assumed to be unreal, then as discussed above, it is enough to say that valid cognition is *avyabhicārt*-non-erroneous. In other words, the term *vyavasāyātmaka* or definite becomes superfluous over and above the term *avyabhicāri* to get a non-defective definition of valid cognition. Again, if both the attributes in the case of doubtful cognition – a man or pillar – are assumed to be revealed, then the question persists : Are both these attributes real or both unreal, or is one of them real and the other unreal ? If the first, then their cognition should be ‘non-erroneous only’ and not of the nature of doubt; and if both be unreal, then the cognition should be ‘erroneous’ and not of the nature of doubt. If one of them be real and the other unreal, then one and the same cognition should be both ‘non-erroneous’ (*avyabhicāri*) and ‘erroneous’ (*vyabhicāri*), which is a manifest contradiction (*asambhava*).

If to avert these difficulties doubtful cognition is considered to be something which reveals the form of doubtful objects then does such an object exist or not ? The so-called doubtful cognition can no longer remain doubtful if the object of doubtful cognition is said to exist, since it would be just like the form of real water revealed in the uncontradicted apprehension of water. If it is argued that the doubtful object in doubtful cognition, in fact, does not exist, then the condition of ‘non-erroneousness’ is *adequate* to eradicate such cognition and the condition ‘*vyavasāyātmakatva* (definiteness)’ in the definition of perception becomes superfluous. If, for the sake of argument, we say that nothing in fact is revealed in the doubtful cognition, then such a view of cognition cannot be distinguished from illusory cognition.<sup>21</sup>

It is evident from the above discussion that the use of the term ‘definiteness’ (*vyavasāyātmakatva*) as a *lakṣaṇa* of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* as advocated by the *pramāṇa* theorists

cannot be justified. Thus, Jayarāṣi proves that neither 'non-erroneousness' nor 'definiteness' can serve as a necessary condition of the definition of valid cognition, and as neither of them is a necessary condition, their conjunction cannot serve as a sufficient condition for the definition of valid perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) cognition in particular and valid cognition (*pramā*) in general. In this way Jayarāṣi prove that the *Nyāya* definition of perception as a species of valid knowledge does not have any logical leg to stand upon.

## II

### *Some Difficulties in Jayarāṣi's Arguments*

Some reflection, however, shows that Jayarāṣi's criticism of the *pramā* or valid knowledge is not so well-grounded as it appears to be. There is twofold incoherence between theory and practice. Jayarāṣi refutes the knowledge claim of his philosophical opponent and prescribes 'suspension of judgement' on account of the absence of any viable ground or evidence for knowledge. Now, the same charge could be brought against Jayarāṣi himself. It may be asked : Does he know that the evidence is inadequate ? If the answer is the negative, i.e. if it is said that Jayarāṣi does not know that the evidence for knowledge-claims is inadequate, then he has no ground to refute the contention of his contestant (*pratipakṣa*). On the other hand, if he says that he does know, then as a matter of fact, he must accept that there is a satisfactory criterion or adequate evidence and he will no longer be a sceptic and would turn out to be a *pramāṇa* theorist.

Now, a follower of Jayarāṣi may argue that the above quibble does not make any sound criticism of Jayarāṣi and is based on a misunderstanding of Jayarāṣi's point of view. The

sceptic Jayarāṣi is never inclined to assert that 'knowledge cannot be reached.'<sup>22</sup> In an assertive statement there is an expression of the *belief* of the speaker. Speaking implies believing; if there is no believed content, there cannot be any speaking and whenever we speak, we assert.<sup>23</sup> The sceptic Jayarāṣi makes no philosophical assertion; his negation of the thesis of the *pramāṇa*-theorists is not a logical negation, 'but a *refutation*, a *prasajya-pratiṣedha* which is compatible with not asserting a thesis of one's own'. Having reached the general suspension of judgement, Jayarāṣi is inclined to try to look for 'counter arguments and counter-counter arguments'. And when all *pramāṇas* or supportive grounds for the claim of valid knowledge are refuted, his own arguments are no longer necessary; these are only *ad hoc*. In fact, what is said by Jayarāṣi either in an affirmative or in a negative form, should be understood as negations of their opposite, which is not equivalent to asserting anything at all.

But there is another general charge that can be levelled against Jayarāṣi's philosophical position. His scepticism finds a limit when it leads to practical difficulties in actual life, or to quote from Hegel "Its deeds and its words belie each other continually". The absolute sceptic's attitude "announces the nullity of seeing, hearing and so on, yet it itself sees and hears. It proclaims the nothingness of essential ethical principles and makes those very truths the sinews of its own conduct".<sup>24</sup> If we ask Jayarāṣi: 'Do you have father or grandfather? He would not be able to argue since he does not believe in any *pramāṇas*. On the other hand, he cannot deny his existence as a son or grandson of somebody. Here lies the limit of sceptical thinking i.e., when it is applied to action or practice.

Moreover, there are a few other specific arguments which expose the difficulties in Jayarāṣi's sceptical position.

To start with, we have seen already that while criticising the appropriateness and necessity of using the term 'definiteness' (*vyavasāyātmakatva*) as a definiens of valid perceptual cognition, Jayarāṣi refutes its necessity assuming the term non-erroneousness (*avyabhicāritva*) as a sufficient condition for the purpose. But prior to this, he has shown absurdity (*asambhavatva*) of the term non-erroneousness and refuted its necessity in connection with the definition of valid cognition. Now, what had previously been refuted by Jayarāṣi himself as unnecessary and absurd was used later on by himself as a sufficient ground for refuting another definiens' justifiability. This makes his standpoint logically self-contradictory.

Again, Jayarāṣi argues that even if, for the sake of argument, we admit the practical efficiency as a criterion of truth, the so-called truth-claim of the *pramāṇa*-theorists cannot be proved. It can neither be proved by perception nor by inference since truth is not perceived in any instance of cognition. The universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) between truth and volitional success, which is an indispensable condition for valid inference of truth from successful practice, cannot be ascertained.

But from day to day experience we may say that it is not always quite impossible to apprehend truth of a cognition directly. We can very easily, without the interference of any third entity or operating relation, distinguish our cognition of 'a cat' from that of 'a dog'. From *Nyāya* standpoint, it may, however, be argued that in such cases of cognition the truth or non-erroneousness is directly apprehended. And if it is apprehended in one example, or instance, we apprehend the universal and particular's concomitance in that instance. In view of this, there would be no logical difficulty in establishing the invariable concomitant relation (*vyāpti*) between 'non-erroneousness' and 'practical efficiency' or volitional success and consequently the

sceptical charge of Jayarāṣi that the invariable relation can neither be known by perception nor by inference seems to be unwarranted.

We have seen that while refuting the term 'vyavasāyātīka' as a definiens in the definition of valid perceptual cognition in particular and valid cognition in general, Jayarāṣi takes the case of doubtful cognition (*saṁśayajñāna*) as an instance and asks : Does such cognition reveal something or not ?

In reply to this we may say that for *Nyāya*, each and every case of cognition – be it erroneous (*apramā*) or non-erroneous (*pramā*) – reveals its object – *wrongly* in the first case and *rightly* in the second case. Even in case of illusory cognition of 'snake in a rope', the perceiver is definite or sure, at least so long as the illusion lasts, that the object before him (rope) is characterised by *snakeness* and not indefinite as either snake-ness or ropeness. But in case of doubt we are not sure about the exact *prakāra* (qualifier) of the object cognised (*viśeṣya*). To cite an example : We are not sure or definite about manness or pillariness in the case of a doubtful cognition whether the yonder object is a man or a pillar. In this case of doubt the man and the pillar stand as the *prakāra* (qualifier) in relation to its *viśeṣya* (*qualificandum*). Jayarāṣi, while refuting the *Nyāya* view, fails to distinguish a case of illusion from a case of doubt. The *Nyāya* theory of illusion is known as '*anyathākhyāti*' – i. e., illusion consists in cognising something as something else'. Vātsyāyana, thus, says that a *avyabhicārī* or right perception is the perception of an object as it actually is. According to this interpretation doubtful perceptions also are *avyabhicārī*. On perceiving the common characteristic of dust and smoke in a distant object, one has a doubt : Is it dust or is it smoke ? If it is actually dust, the perception is non-erroneous



in its first part and if it is actually smoke, the perception is non-erroneous in its second part. Since the object actually is either dust or smoke, the perception is in fact invariably related to the object. In short, according to Vātsyāyana, only the illusory perceptions of something as definitely something else are to be considered as erroneous. Perception in the form of doubt being short of definite knowledge is not, therefore, excluded by the word *avyabhicārī*. Nevertheless, the instrument of such perception cannot be regarded as *pramāṇa* because definite knowledge alone is the result of *pramāṇa*. That is why Gautama excludes perception in the form of doubt by using the expression "of a definite character".<sup>21</sup>

In the light of this, Jayarāṣi's refutation of the term "*vyavasthāyātmaka*" seems to be unwarranted. As a matter of fact, Jayarāṣi is not only a *vaitandika* but a *kutārka* (bad debater) who uses *chala*. "*Chala* is the rebuttal of words (or arguments) of an opponent by way of inventing a meaning contradictory to the meaning intended" (*vacana vighāto'rtha vikalpopattya chalam : Nyāyasūtra*, 1.2.10). In our expository survey of Jayarāṣi's arguments against the possibility of valid cognition (*pramā*) and means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), we come across the trickery of arguments where he, without trying to understand the intended meaning of the terms used in the *Nyāya* definitions, assumes the twisted meaning and shows the absurdities and ambiguities of the definiens. Vātsyāyana<sup>22</sup> condemns such bad argumentations on the ground that a user of *chala* has no valid supportive reasons for giving preference or in selecting one among different alternative meanings of the words used in any argument and thus it is only a false accusation. And, as a matter of fact, unless the actual contexts of use of intended sense of the word or words used by the speaker are grasped, its proper meaning would not be clear. "The utterer

produces something by his utterance – with a complex audience directed intention, involving, say, getting the audience to think that he has a certain belief”.<sup>28</sup>

Jayarāṣi twists the proper meaning of *pramā-lakṣaṇa* as well as *pramaṇalakṣaṇa* as upheld by *Nyāya* philosophy and “deliberately distorting the position of the opponent disregards regulation and selects a meaning at random. Therefore, objections raised on the basis of such deliberate distortions are futile”.<sup>29</sup> A good debater in philosophy would understand that the incapability of defining or describing something in particular (distorted sense) does not necessarily mean that the object is *false* or excludes all the possibility of the cognition of such an object to be valid. “To read an another simply in order to refute him is not the proper way to understand him”.<sup>30</sup> And, in fact, the spirit of philosophy lies neither in mere rebuttal of the opponent’s views nor in ignoring opponents’ merits and spirits but in understanding others’ view with due sympathy and intellectual honesty.<sup>31</sup>

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## NOTES

1. *Indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānaṁ avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyatmakam pratyakṣm-Nyāyasūtra. 1.1.4.*
2. *Avyapadeśyapādasyasādhutve lakṣaṇasāragrantha syollekhaḥ - Tattvapaplavasiṁha, p. 20.*
3. *Na pratyakṣena; Nayanakuśalāderatī ndriyatvāt | - Tattvapaplavasiṁha, p. 2.*
4. See : S. C. Chatterjee : *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*. ( University of Calcutta, 1960 ) p. 132.  
Cf. *Sarīrasmyuktam Jñānckaraṇamatīndriyamindriyaman-deratīndriyatvāt - Tarkabhāṣā, p. 19.*
5. *Nāpyanumāna; lingāntarāSnavagateḥ | Nanu idameva jñānam lingaṁ tadutthaṁ tasya viśiṣṭatāṁ gamayati; Yadyevam itaretarāśrayatvaṁ duruttaramāpanipadyate | - Tattvapaplavasiṁha, p. 2.*
6. *Indriyāṅgāṁ gūṇadoṣāśrayatve tadutthe vijñāne doṣāśaṅkā nāti varttate puṁvyāpārotpaditaśabdavijñāna iva. - Ibid.*
7. *Dṛśyate hi bādhaka jñānotpādakakāravakaikalyād bodhanutpādh, yathā dāre marīcinicaye jalajñāne jāte bādhā na saṁpadyate a-bhyāśdeśāvasthitasya kārakopanipāte satyutpadyate | sā copajāyamānā saṁvatsarādi kālavikalpena sañjāyate, kadāccica kāravakaikalyannaiva saṁpadyate | Na caitāvatā tasya yathārthatā upapadyate. - Tattvapaplavasiṁha, p. 2.*
8. *Bādhāviraḥ kiṁ survapuruṣāpekṣayā, āhosvit pratipatrapekṣayā ? Tadyadi sarvapuruṣāpekṣayā ... tadvirahopya ... sarvajñāḥ syuḥ | Bhavantu nāma sarve sarvajñāḥ ko doṣaḥ ? Asarvajña vyavahārābhūvaprasaṅgaḥ. - Ibid, p. 2.*
9. *Pratipatturbādhaka jñānāSnutpādeSpi deśāntaragamana-maraṇādinā māmaricyādiviparyaya jñānadarśanaḥ, Ibid. p. 3.*
10. Jayarāsi in *Tattvapaplavasiṁha* (p. 3) quotes from *Sābarabhāṣya* : *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1. 1. 5, " Yatra ca duṣṭāṁ kāraṇāṁ yatra ca mithyeti pratyayaḥ sa eva asamīcināḥ pratyayaḥ " ityeta devāṁ samīcināḥ,*"
11. *Pravṛtṭiḥ kāyasthā krīyā tatsāmarthyāṁ avyabhicāritāṁ gamayati, Taktiṁ avagatāṁ, anavagatāṁ vā ? Yadi nāvagatāṁ, tad 'asti' iti*

- katham vetsy? AthāSvagataṁ, tadavagatervyabhicārita kathamava-*  
*gamyat iti pūrvoktamanusartavyam - Ibid p. 3.*
12. *Tadyadi pratibhātodakaprāptyaḥ, tadayuktam; pratibhātodakasya*  
*avasthānaṁ nopapadyate, Jhaṣamahi śaparivartanaḥ Sbhigatopajātā-*  
*Svāyavakriyānyāyena pratyastamaya sañbhāvāt. - Ibid.*
13. *Atha tajjātīyodakaprāptyaḥ, evaṁ tarhi asatyodaka jñāne S pi jāte*  
*kvacittoyamāsādayanti pumāṁsaḥ tadapyavitathāṁ syāt. - Ibid.*
14. *Atha taddeśakāla saṁlagnamndakaṁ na prāpayati mithyājñānaṁ,*  
*samyagjñānaṁ tu taddeśakālasaṁ lagnamudakaṁ prāpayati tena*  
*tadavyabhicāriti cet. - Ibid.*
15. *Yanna prāpayati tad vyabhicāri tarhi mumūrṣu - pad arshotpāditaṁ*  
*iñānaṁ cāndrārkaśrahanakṣatrat arakādi sañvedanaṁ ca vyabhicāri*  
*prāpnōi. Na ca taddeśakāla saṁlagnodakaprāpakatvamasti,*  
*deśasyāpi udakavad vināśasambhavāt. - Ibid, p. 4.*
16. *Jayarāsi in his Tattvopaplavasimha refutes the independent existence*  
*of class character (jāti).*
17. *Avidyamānasya viśayārtho vaktavyaḥ—kim ākārapakatvena vā,*  
*mahattvādidharmopetatvena vā, sattā mātreṇa vā sahotpādena vā?*  
*Sarvasya pratyastamitatvāt katham asau viśayaḥ? Tad-viśayatve*  
*keśondukādi - vijñānasyeva mithyātve bijamauvesaṇīyaṁ | ātmasat-*  
*tāmātreṇa mithyātve sarvasya mithyātvaṁ apadyate tataḥ tattvo-*  
*paplavaḥ syāt. - Tattvopaplavasimha, p. 9.*
18. *Atha nirviśayena bādhyate, na kiñcid vidadhāti pratiśedhati vā*  
*nirviśayatvād eva - Tattvopaplavasimha, p. 16.*
19. *J. N. Mohanty : "Nyāya Theory of Doubt" in the Visva - Bharati*  
*Journal of Philosophy ( Vol. III, No. 1, 1966 ), p. 19.*
20. *Tasmin sandehajñāne jāte kiñcit pratibhāti āho na pratibhāti? Tadyadi*  
*pratibhāti, sa kiṁ dharmi, dharmo vā? Tadyadi dharmi pratibhāti sa*  
*tattvikah vā? Yadi tattvikah, nāpanayatā tadviśayavijñānasya.*  
*Atha tattvikah; tadā vyabhicāripadena apanītatvāt na vyavasāyāt-*  
*makapadamupādeyam. - Tattvopaplavasimha, p. 19.*
21. *Atha na kiñcidapi pratibhāti : na tarhi tasya indriyārtha sannikarṣa-*  
*jatvam, bhrañtodaka vijñānavat | Tasmād vyavasāyātmakapadamapi*  
*anupādeyam. - Ibid., p. 20.*

22. Arne Naess : *Scepticism* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1968), p. 6.
23. See : K. C. Bhattacharyya : *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, (Progressive Pub., Calcutta 1958), p. 30.
24. As quoted by Professor J. N. Mohanty in his 'Foreward' to B. Bhattacharyya's book *Absolute Skepticism : Eastern and Western*, (Prajñā, Calcutta, 1967).
25. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya ; *Nyāya Philosophy* (Literal Translation of Gautama's *Nyāya Sūtra* and *Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya*) Part I, Indian Studies ; Past and Present, 1967), pp. 54-5.
26. *Ibid*, p. 151.
27. *Ibid*, p. 152.
28. Strawson, P. F. (ed.) ; *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, (London, Methuen, 1971), p. 185.
29. M. K. Gangopadhyaya, *op. cit.*, p, 153.
30. B. Russell : *Our Knowledge of the External World*, (Allen and Unwin, London, 1961), p. 56.
31. I am deeply indebted to Paṇḍita Paresh Chandra Pañca Tīrtha of Dārīkanāth Catuspāthi, Alipurduar, Jalpaiguri, who taught me the *Tattvopaplavasīmha* of Jayarāśi.

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