

### WITTGENSTEIN ON EMOTION

Wittgenstein achieved celebrated insights in tackling many philosophical problems, from metaphysics to epistemology and to philosophical psychology. Some critics, however, hold that when it comes to an account of emotion, Wittgenstein merely propounded what James propounded and what James denied. This is so, such critics would say, despite the fact that he often argued against James. For example, they would say, consider his following comments,

“Remember at this point that the personal experiences of an emotion must in part be strictly localized experiences; for if I frown in anger I feel the muscular tension of the frown in my forehead, and if I weep, the tensions around my eyes are obviously part, and an important part, of what I feel. This is, I think, what William James meant when he said that a man does not cry because he is sad but he is sad because he cries.” *BB* 103.<sup>1</sup>

The purpose of this paper is (1) to decide whether the critics who maintain that Wittgenstein only stated what James propounded and what he denied are correct in believing so and, (2) to critically evaluate Wittgenstein's analysis as an independent analysis of emotion. To this end, let us begin with James' theory of emotion.

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## I

1.0 James' theory of emotions is essentially a *physiological* theory. For our purpose, James' theory can be summarised as follows :

*The perceived object (either mental or physical) is followed by the bodily changes—the visceral, the muscular and those above and beneath the skin. The feeling of these changes as they occur IS the emotion.*

For example, the perception of an 'exciting' object (e.g. a tiger) is followed by the bodily changes (e.g. perspiration, increase in the heart-beats, etc.) and the feeling of these bodily changes as they occur is the fear. This is the central claim of James' theory; he explains and develops this thesis in his essay "The Emotions" and his later works.

According to him, the bodily changes that follow the perception of an exciting object have a great variation—there are changes in the facial expression, in the muscular part and in the visceral part. For example, in grief, there is a pang in the breastbone, suffocation of the heart, tears and sobs. In case of fear, there are bodily changes of quickened heart-beats, shallow breathing, trembling lips and the visceral stirrings. But though there is a great variation in the bodily changes, James' final choice is the visceral part. To conceive an emotion as *felt*, James thought, the changes in the visceral part are a *sine qua non*... 'On the visceral and organic part of the expression,' James Claimed, 'it is probable that the chief part of the felt emotion depends.' If the sensations from the visceral are removed *imaginatively* from a given emotional experience nothing is left behind...no mind-stuff out of which an emotion can be constituted (*Principles*, 451-2)

Further, though the bodily changes, including the changes in facial expression, are present in any given emotion, they are not always the same, they are not characteristic of a given emotion. The facial expressions, in particular, vary from individual to individual and from occasion to occasion. There is no facial expression characteristic of an emotion of a certain sort. James writes.

... every one of us, almost, has some personal idiosyncrasy of expression, laughing or sobbing differently from his neighbour, or reddening or growing pale where others do not (*Principles*, 448). This fact, that there is a great variation in the facial expression is acknowledged by James, but in itself, this issue is not of primary importance for him. The questions of description: "By what expression is each emotion characterized?" are of subsidiary importance (*Principles*, 453). Elsewhere, he writes.

"a question such as what is the 'read' or 'typical' expression of anger, or fear?" have no objective meaning at all (*Principles* 453)- The questions, of primary importance for James are the causal questions, not that of classification and description.

As we have seen, his theory is this that, the perceived *object* is followed by the bodily changes the feeling of which is the emotion, and since he claims that his analysis is essentially a causal analysis, it follows, that for him the perceived object is also the cause of an emotional experience, say that of fear, the perceived object — the fire, is also the cause of the fear. The cause of a child's fear is the fire present before him, which is also the present object of his fear. Also, since James realizes this fact by getting on to a higher logical level (*Principles*, 448), the claim that the object of an emotion is also the cause of an emotion, is and ought to be a logical claim.

In short, we can say that the major claims of James' theory are,

a) The visceral part of the body is a *sine qua non* for us to conceive an emotion as felt. If the sensations from the viscera are absent, an emotion is absent.

b) Considering the fact, that the analysis of an emotional experience (in which a perceived object is followed by the bodily changes as they occur), is essentially a causal analysis, it follows that the perceived object is also the cause of the emotion.

c) Though the question, "By what expression is each emotion characterized?" is not of considerable philosophical importance, it is clear that there is no 'typical' or 'characteristic' expression of each emotion.

Now, if we want to prove that the critics who believe that Wittgenstein only states what James propounded or denied are mistaken in so believing, we must show that Wittgenstein critically takes up and refutes these major claims of James. Since the claims (a) and (b) are satisfactorily accounted for in the philosophical literature<sup>2</sup>, I shall concentrate on the third claim, namely the claim that there is no typical or characteristic expression behaviour of an emotion .

1.1 Wittgenstein's views on this topic are found in various works, *Philosophical Investigations*, *Zettel*, *Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology* and *The Blue and the Brown Books*. A considerable part of *Zettel* and *Philosophical Investigations* is reserved for the arguments against the following claim of James — there is no 'characteristic' expression-behaviour (facial expression). Of course, expression-behaviour includes much more than mere facial expression, but Wittgenstein limits it only to facial expression (Z 225, RPP 836). Against the above claim of James, Wittgenstein argues,

*Emotions have a characteristic expression-behaviour (facial expression)* (Z 488 & RPP 836). This claim in itself logically implies another claim — each emotion has a facial expression characteristic or typical of it. For, if each emotion does not have a characteristic facial expression, then how can it be true that all emotions have a characteristic facial expression? The claim that emotions have a characteristic expression-behaviour seems to be a true claim. For example, we can say that a smile is typical of joy and a cry characteristic of sorrow. Now given that all emotions have a characteristic expression-behaviour (facial expression), does it follow that a characteristic or typical facial expression is conceptually related to an emotion? In other words, is the claim that all emotions have a typical facial expression a conceptual claim? But before taking up this issue, I want to say something about another related but less important issue in this connection — verbal expression of emotion. According to Wittgenstein, occasionally, a facial expression of an emotion may include a speech act. A speech act may be declarative in form (in other words, an assertion or a statement) for example, “I am very angry at you” or “I am very frightened”. It may be an exclamation or an interjection like “Oh, no”, or “ugh”. But for Wittgenstein, as opposed to some moderns, like Green, a declarative sentence like “I am angry at you” in the first person present is expression of an emotion *simpliciter* rather than a statement about emotion, provided that it occurs in certain context and is spoken in an appropriate tone of voice. He writes,

“No, no! I am afraid”

“I am still a bit afraid, but no longer as much as before.”

To each of these sentences a special tone of voice is appropriate and a different context (*PI* IIix)

But this claim is compatible with another claim, namely, a declarative sentence of the above form may not always be an expression *simpliciter*; sometimes it may be a statement about emotion. Wittgenstein writes,

Is it, then, so surprising that I use the same expression in different games? And sometimes as it were between the game?... When it is said in a funeral oration "We mourn our..." this is surely supposed to be an expression of mourning; not to tell anything to those who are present. But in a prayer at the grave these words in a way may be used to tell someone something (*PI* IIix)

Thus, sometimes a declarative sentence may be an expression of emotion and sometimes a statement about it. No doubt, there are serious debates going on in philosophical circles over this issue, but as Lyons' analysis shows the issue — whether emotions have characteristic expression-behaviour—can be satisfactorily discussed without going into controversies that surround the issue of the verbal expression of an emotion.<sup>3</sup>

Having clarified this point, let us proceed to the issue under consideration — emotions have characteristic expression-behaviour (facial expression). Wittgenstein writes,

Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face. This belongs to the concept of emotion (*Z* 225). At another place he writes,

An emotion... has characteristic expression which one would use in miming it (*RPP* 836).

From these comments, it is clear that for Wittgenstein, the link between the characteristic expression and the emotion itself is a conceptual link. Now it is plausible to ask *in what sense* behavioural typical or characteristic of an emotion implies (and provi-

des us with sufficient grounds to say) that the connection between emotion and facial expression of it, is conceptual connection? It may be said that in the following sense a typical facial expression may be conceptually related to an emotion.

It can be said that heat is typical of fire, in the sense that heat is a *natural concomitant* of fire. In the same sense, facial expression of certain sort is typical of an emotion — it is the natural accompaniment of an emotion. For example, a smile is typical of joy and looking daggers typical of anger. This is one sense in which a facial expression may be said to be typical or characteristic of an emotion.

In another sense, typical or characteristic means *commonly or frequently found as concomitant of*. This Lyons explains with an example,

an acrid smell might be said to be typical of fire insofar as it is a concomitant of most types of fire.<sup>4</sup>

So to speak, commonly, whenever fire is there, an acrid smell is present. By analogy, a smiling face is commonly found as a manifestation or expression of joy. This is what Green seems to have in mind when he says,

Behaviour which is described in defining emotion-terms must be typical. Reference to unusual or esoteric emotional behaviour would not be helpful.<sup>5</sup>

Now, in which of these two senses of 'typical' or 'characteristic', is a facial expression related to an emotion, so as to provide a conceptual link between emotion and the expression typical of it?

Wittgenstein's remarks in *Philosophical Investigation*, *Zettel* and *Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology* suggest that in the

first sense of 'typical' or 'characteristic', facial expression is related to emotion so as to provide us with a conceptual connection (that is, with a connection sufficient to hold that whenever a facial expression of a certain sort is present, an emotion of a certain sort is present and *vice versa*) But the point is, is it not the case that there is no static facial expression of emotion? That there is no 'always the same' expression of an emotion? If this is so, then how is facial expression of an emotion to be interpreted? Yes, say, a smile is typical of joy but at one time it is monstrous laughter, at another just movements of the lips. This objection can be answered by pointing out that just as the degree of heat varies according to the intensity of fire, so does facial expression of emotion vary with variation in the degree of intensity of emotion (anger flares up, abates, vanishes). Indeed, it may be claimed that from the changes in facial expression, it follows that the degree of intensity of emotion has changed. Wittgenstein writes,

Fear, is there alive in the features. If the features change slightly, we can speak of corresponding change in the fear (PI 537).

This may be granted (of course hesitantly); it may be true that the changes in facial expression correspond to changes in emotion. But this in itself, is not a major objection. The fundamental objection is of a quite different sort. If there is a conceptual connection between emotion and the behaviour typical of it, then the typical behaviour ought to be fairly (clearly) distinctive of the emotion in question. Now apparently, all emotions do not have a fairly distinctive facial expression. In fact, it seems to be the case that the same facial expression is typical of more than one emotion. For example, a cry is typical of both grief and fear. Not only this, a facial expression may be typical of phenomenon other than emotion. A cry is not



only typical of fear and grief but also of pain. If the typical facial expression of an emotion is not fairly distinctive, then how can it provide us with sufficient ground for the ascription of an emotion? By observing someone cry, one cannot judge with certainty whether the person crying is frightened or is sad or is in pain. Also, seeing someone smile, we often fail to judge whether he is joyful or is contemptuous. Wittgenstein himself entertains and recognises such possibility. But still he holds that what this objection proves is that typical expression-behaviour, since it is not fairly distinctive, cannot in itself be a sufficient condition for the ascription of an emotion. It is often true that a psychological state can not be individuated and described as an emotional state simply by reference to typical or characteristic facial expression. But, if the circumstances in which the characteristic expression occurs are also accounted for in defining an emotion term, then a facial expression typical of emotion will also be distinctive of that emotion by virtue of the circumstances in which it occurs, and hence a sufficient condition for the ascription of an emotion. Typical expression in itself cannot be fairly (clearly) distinctive of an emotion and hence cannot provide sufficient ground for the ascription of an emotion but it can be fairly distinctive on account of the circumstances and hence indicative of a certain emotion. Wittgenstein writes,

It might now be asked whether this word (fear) would really relate simply to behaviour... and this may be denied. There is no future in simplifying the use of this word in this way. It relates to the behaviour under certain external circumstances. If we observe these circumstances and that behaviour we say that a man is... or has...

Pain-behaviour or the behaviour of sorrow. —These can only be described along with their external occasions.

(If a child's mother leaves it alone it may cry because it is sad; if it falls down, from pain). Behaviour and kind of occasion belong together ( Z 523 & 492).

Thus, for example, a cry (a typical expression of emotion) is fairly distinctive of an emotion (say, sorrow) only if the circumstances under which it takes place (a child's mother leaving it alone) are also taken into account. A facial expression taken out of its surrounding or its context may not be fairly distinctive of an emotion. Indeed, if certain circumstances do not occur, a facial expression may be quite differently interpreted. For example, a smile of a soldier in war is not a manifestation of joy but rather an expression of his malicious attitude at the suffering of his enemy. Thus, in different surroundings or the circumstances, a facial expression (a smile) typical of an emotion, may be interpreted quite differently. An expression becomes the expression of emotion due to its context. Wittgenstein says,

Now suppose I sit in my room and hope that N. N. will come and bring me some money, and suppose one minute out of this state could be isolated, *cut out of its context*; would what happened in it not be hope? —Think, for example, of the words which you perhaps utter in this space of time. They are no longer part of this language. And in different surroundings the institution of money does not exist either.

A coronation is the picture of pomp and dignity. Cut one minute of this proceeding out of its surroundings: the crown is being placed on the head of the king in his coronation robes. —But in different surroundings gold is the cheapest of the metals, its gleam is thought as vulgar (PI 584). (emphasis mine).

What Wittgenstein wants us to note is this — any emotion, e.g. hope or grief, has a temporal duration, a past and a future are necessary for the ascription of an emotion. However short may be, an emotion has a temporal duration. Another point he wants us to note is that, if the event — crown is being placed on the head of the king in his coronation robes — is cut out of its context and put in other surroundings, where the values we hold dear have no objective significance it would lose its meaning and importance. By analogy, in the emotional context, if facial expression is cut out of its surroundings, it would not be indicative of the emotion. But given that facial expression is observed along with the circumstances, does it follow logically that it will be indicative of an emotion of certain sort? May it not be the case that surroundings or the circumstances in which the expression-behaviour occurs may at times fail to make the expression-behaviour fairly distinctive of an emotion? If this is the case, then, facial expression along with the surroundings cannot be indicative of the emotion since it is not fairly distinctive of the emotion. A child's cry, when its mother leaves it alone, may be an expression of sorrow or may be an expression of his fear. On knowing that a child's mother has left it alone, one can say that it is sad but another can say with equal plausibility that it is frightened. This is equally true of other emotions. Take for example, contempt. Someone's switching off the Radio when Salil Chitpa's music is announced on the Radio-4 or his never buying Salil Chitpa's records cannot be said to be contemptuous. It can be the case that the person who behaves in this way is simply not interested in this composer's music. Simply by observing his behaviour in a given circumstances he cannot be ascribed such 'evil' psychological state as contempt.

Thus, facial expression along with its surroundings may sometimes not be indicative of the emotion.

As one can expect, to repel the force of the above objection, the next Wittgensteinian move is to extend the argument further, this time by characterising the circumstances and the surroundings themselves as fearful, hopeful, etc. So to speak, according to Wittgenstein, a cry in fearful circumstances is fear and someone saying something in a hopeful situation is hope. He writes,

An expectation is embedded in a situation, from which it arises. The expectation of an explosion may, for example, arise from a situation in which an explosion is to be expected (*PI* 581).

Like expectation, for Wittgenstein, emotions such as hope, fear anger or grief are embedded in a situation or in the surroundings. The situation or the surroundings themselves are fearful, joyful, etc. Thus, the characteristic expression-behaviour along with the characteristic circumstances is indicative of an emotion. An emotion term is to be defined by reference to characteristic facial expression and characteristic surroundings or the circumstances. But, this sounds pretty circular. On this analysis, an emotion should be defined and explained with reference to and in terms of characteristic facial expression. The facial expression is construed or is said to be characteristic of an emotion as it occurs in certain circumstances and the circumstances are in turn defined and explained in terms of the emotion itself. Before discussing the problem of circularity, let us briefly recapitulate. We started with James' claim that there is no characteristic expression of an emotion and Wittgenstein's contention that emotions have characteristic expression-behaviour (facial expression). Then we went on to analyze Wittgenstein's contention. We noted that

(a) since typical or characteristic expression-behaviour is not also fairly or clearly distinctive behaviour of an emotion,

in itself, it can not be a sufficient condition for the ascription of an emotion. Facial expression may be typical of more than one emotion, and for this reason, if it is indicative of an emotion, it must also be a fairly distinctive expression of an emotion.

(b) to counter the above objection, Wittgenstein argues that typical expression in itself is not a sufficient condition for the ascription of an emotion, it must be observed along with the circumstances in which it occurs. But this will not do, since the circumstances along with the behaviour sometimes may not be indicative of an emotion. The emotion present may often be other than argued for (by reference to facial expression occurring in certain circumstances).

(c) to defend the validity of the second move, it is further argued that not only facial expression is characteristic of an emotion, the surroundings or the circumstances themselves are also characteristic of an emotion. The characteristic facial expression along with the characteristic surroundings or the circumstances is indicative of the emotion. It is argued that the surroundings or the circumstances themselves are fearful, hopeful, etc. Just as an expectation is embedded in a situation, the emotions are also embedded in the surroundings or the circumstances. This last move, I said, makes the argument viciously circular. In part two, I shall discuss the problem of circularity and other fundamental objections against the Wittgensteinian argument.

## II

2.0 Wittgenstein (also, Kenny) argued that typical expression and the characteristic circumstances provide us with the conditions sufficient for the ascription of an emotion. Cry (facial expression) and the fearful circumstances are, thus, sufficient for the ascription of fear. The problem with this sort of explanation

of an emotion-term is that it is viciously circular. For, this kind of explanation of emotion tries to give an explanation of an emotion *in terms* of the emotion. Fear is explained by reference to fearful circumstances and fearful behaviour. Expressions such as "hopeful circumstances" and "symptoms of hope" are freely (but necessarily) used in explaining the emotion-term 'hope'. This objection can be answered by saying that it is not necessary to use such expressions (e.g. fearful occasions and fearful behaviour) since this can be explained otherwise. But if the phenomenon in question can be explained otherwise, that is, if it is susceptible of different explanations, then why is this sort of explanation imposed on the phenomenon that can be adequately explained otherwise? Thus, the problem of circularity cannot be resolved just by saying that the expressions used in explaining emotion need not be used in that way. Wittgenstein and his followers thus fail to answer adequately this major objection against their claim the emotions have characteristic expression-behaviour.

Before discussing the most powerful objection against this claim of Wittgenstein, I intend to discuss another equally powerful objection. The claim that each emotion has a characteristic expression-behaviour is just a wrong claim. It is true that emotions such as anger, fear, joy, etc., usually have a typical facial expressions. But, it is equally true that there are other emotions like love, contempt and pity which do not have any characteristic expression-behaviour. Take for example, love. If the beloved is happy and is flourishing, love is expressed in a smile, if the beloved is insulted, love is often expressed in a facial expression akin to that of anger—looking daggers; or again if the beloved is seriously ill, love is expressed in a cry. Thus, there is no expression typical or characteristic of love. This is also true of other emotions like contempt and pity.

Wittgenstein's claim of typical expression—behaviour is, thus, a false claim. Kenny aptly remarks,

there is, again, no particular form of behaviour which is characteristic of an emotion in the way in which eating is characteristic of hunger.<sup>6</sup>

2.1 As we have seen, Wittgenstein's last move in defence of his claim was to characterize the surroundings of the circumstances as fearful, hopeful, etc. He claimed that emotions are embedded in the surroundings and the circumstances. This observation is apparently very unfortunate for Wittgenstein's theory. The surroundings, the circumstances themselves are not fearful, hopeful or joyful, but rather the agent's believing them as such makes them fearful, joyful, etc. The world is not directly related to the agent, it is related to the agent through his intentionality—in other words through his beliefs and thoughts. If the agent believes the circumstances to be dangerous, he is frightened. An emotion generally depends on the agent's believing certain state of affairs to obtain or not to obtain. Also, the third person's ascription of an emotion to the subject depends upon his believing the subject's construal as a plausible construal of the object. Believing that the advancing bull is a serious danger to one's well-being, if the agent tries to avoid it the emotion fear should be ascribed to the agent only if the third person who ascribes fear to the subject of the emotion, also believes that the object construed as dangerous is really dangerous. If the third person does not believe the object as dangerous, the subject's behaviour may strike him as a deception rather than the expression of fear. Claire Armon-Jones says,

*A fortiori*, the third-person's evaluation of an agent's emotion as warranted depends upon agreement over the agent's

construal as being a plausible construal of the object (e.g., that x can be construed as menacing or dangerous).<sup>7</sup>

Also for this reason, the behavioural evidence is not sufficient for the ascription of an emotion. For, the interpretation of the behavioural evidence may vary from person to person.

Thus, the surroundings, or the circumstances are not themselves fearful, it is the agent's believing them to be so that makes them fearful or hopeful. Just as James spoke of the object as "exciting", Wittgenstein spoke of the circumstances as fearful and joyful. Also, for the above reason, it is clear that if the emotion is *embedded* anywhere, it is embedded in the agent's psychological state and not in the situation or in the surroundings. For, if it is embedded in a situation or in the surroundings, then in a given situation, as such, all subjects must experience the same emotion. But, obviously, this is not the case. James very correctly remarks,

Jokes at which one explodes with laughter nauseate another, and seem blasphemous to a third. And occasions, which overwhelm me with fear or bashfulness are just what give you the full sense of ease and power (*Principles*, 449).

Further, there are dreams and other delusional states in which the surroundings are very different than what really are. My hoping in dream, that N. N will come and give me some water before I die may have as its surroundings, the desert of Kalahari, whereas the *actual or the real* surroundings may be my boat-house in the middle of the Dal lake. Wittgenstein's claim that the emotion is embedded in a situation is, thus, obviously a wrong claim.

Another source of discontent is his unwillingness to define and to explicate the terms, the context, the surroundings and



the circumstances. Undoubtedly, by bringing in the notions of the context, the surroundings and the circumstances, he correctly pointed out that an emotion has a temporal duration, that it is extended over a period of time however short the duration might be. Now, he did not further explicate clearly whether these surroundings, these circumstances are psychological, physical or both. From his scattered comments in the Investigations, it can be said that for him the context, the surroundings and the circumstances seem to be the situation in which the subject of the emotional experience is. He gives an example,

Remember this case : if one urgently wants to make some remark, some objection in a discussion, it often happens that one opens one's mouth, draws a breath and holds it; if one then decides to let the objection go, one lets the breath out. The experience of this process is evidently the experience of veering towards saying something. Anyone who observes me will know that I wanted to say something and then thought better of it. In this situation, that is. — In a different one he would not interpret my behaviour, however characteristic of the intention to speak it may be in the present situation (*PI* 591).

Thus, it appears that for Wittgenstein, the present situation in which the person is, are the surroundings and the circumstances. However, his unwillingness to acknowledge and explain this interpretation of the terms in question, sometimes leads to confusion.

## 2.2 A Wittgensteinian counter-attack :

So far so good, a Wittgensteinian follower would retort in haste. It may be true that there is no characteristic facial expression of an emotion and that the surroundings or the circumstances are

not themselves fearful or joyful. But this does not show that the surroundings or the circumstances are not significant in the explanation of an emotion. There is something uniquely true in Wittgenstein's analysis. Despite the above claims being true, the surroundings or the circumstances are still important and necessary for the explanation of an emotion. This is so, they would insist, because the subject's believing that his present psychological state is an emotional state is dependent on his being in a certain situation. They would say, one labels one's psychological state as an emotional state only after consulting the situation. The subject's beliefs, thus, depends on his circumstances and the surroundings. The surroundings and the circumstances are, thus, determinative and constitutive of an emotional state. Here, a Wittgensteinian follower sounds reasonable. But still, I think, there is something problematic about the claim that the subject's beliefs ultimately depend on the situation. If we analyse the nature of beliefs, we can distinguish between two kinds of beliefs –

- (a) –beliefs regarding the situation (the Situation-beliefs) and,
- (b) –beliefs regarding psychological state (the phenomenological beliefs). In a given situation, the agent believes the situation as dangerous. It is the agent's believing the situation or the circumstances as dangerous that makes the situation or the circumstances dangerous. For the sake of brevity, this first kind of beliefs may be called *S-beliefs*. The second sort of beliefs are the phenomenological beliefs. These beliefs are about the psychological state of the subject. By holding these beliefs, the subject is able to identify his psychological state as an emotional state. These second sort of beliefs may be called *P-beliefs*. Now what a Wittgensteinian follower says is true of *P-beliefs* but not of *S-beliefs*. The *P-beliefs* are dependent on the circumstances or

the surroundings; these beliefs about one's psychological state are dependent on the situation and his *S-beliefs*, but the *S-beliefs* are not dependent on the circumstances or the surroundings. The *S-beliefs*, as we have seen earlier, makes the circumstances or the surroundings as they are. It is the agent's believing the situation as dangerous that causes him to be frightened. The characterization of the circumstances or the surroundings as such is, thus, dependent on the *S-beliefs*, whereas, the agent's identifying a psychological state as an emotional state, his holding the *P-beliefs* is dependent on the circumstances or the surroundings. A Wittgensteinian proponent is, thus, not entirely justified in holding that the beliefs are dependent on the circumstances or surroundings. The *S-beliefs* are both independent of and constitutive of the circumstances and the surroundings.

Now the interesting question is, how and why Wittgenstein did not take into account this important fact that the characterization of the circumstances and the surroundings is dependent on the subject's *S-beliefs*? Perhaps, Wittgenstein was led astray by his following remarks:

Let us forget entirely that we are interested in the state of mind of a frightened man (Z 523).

This was fatal to Wittgenstein's analysis of emotion. The above remarks perhaps prevented him from taking into account the *S-beliefs* and the *P-beliefs*. For this reason, just as James went deeper and deeper beneath the skin to find out what an emotion is, Wittgenstein went out far beyond the countryside to find out what an emotion is. These above remarks forced him to hold that the circumstances and the surroundings in themselves are fearful, joyful, etc. This observation leads us to the final part of this essay.

2.3 If the above argument is true (and indeed it is true), together with the fact (as we examined earlier) that Wittgenstein is wrong in arguing against James that emotions have a characteristic expression-behaviour, then how one can correctly claim that Wittgenstein has provided us with a new insight into the analysis of emotion? His critics, as we noted earlier, would still insist that Wittgenstein says nothing new. Here, I think, a Wittgensteinian follower can point out that such critics lack adequate knowledge of the theories of emotion, traditional or modern. It is true that the distinction between the object and the cause of an emotion is not a unique Wittgensteinian contribution, since Hume had already hinted at and made this crucial distinction (though perhaps in a naive and wrong way). But, none of Wittgenstein's predecessors, a Wittgensteinian follower can correctly claim, had pointed out the importance of the surroundings or the circumstances. The unique contribution of Wittgenstein was to point out this important fact that the surroundings or the circumstances should be accounted for in any analysis of emotion. As we saw earlier, a Wittgensteinian follower can correctly point out that the subject's *P-beliefs*, by holding which, the subject identifies his psychological state as an emotional state, are dependent in an important way on the situation. Also, he can say that though the *S-beliefs* are independent of the circumstances or the surroundings, those beliefs are about the circumstances or the surroundings. It is true that Wittgenstein ignored beliefs and was wrong in arguing that (a) there is a characteristic expression-behaviour (facial expression) and (b) the circumstances and the surroundings are in themselves fearful or joyful, but this should not undermine the validity of the claim that by emphasising the importance of the circum-

stances or the surroundings, Wittgenstein has provided us with a new insight in this area.<sup>8</sup>

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NOTES

1. References to Wittgenstein's works are given in parentheses as follows : to *The Blue and Brown Books* by BB and the page number, to *Philosophical Investigations* by PI and the paragraph number in Part I or the page number in Part II; and to *Zettel* by Z and the paragraph number: to *Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology* as RPP and the page number, and to William James' *Principles of Psychology-II* as *Principles* and the page number.
2. Please refer to, Miyashitha, A., 1978, "Wittgenstein on Emotion" in *Wittgenstein and his impact on Contemporary Thought*, Holder & Co., Vienna, pp. 449-454, Kenny A., 1963, *Action, Emotion and Will*, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., p. 74 and Cannon W. B. in M Arnold (ed.) *The Nature of Emotion*, 1963, Penguin Books Ltd., pp. 43-52.
3. W. Lyons, 1980, "Emotions and Behaviour" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, pp. 410-18, for the discussion of the issue of the verbal expression of an emotion, please refer to, W. Alston, 1967, "Expressing" in *Philosophy in America* ed. by Max Black, George Allen and Unwin, J. Benson, "Emotion and Expression" in *Philosophical Review* 76 (1967) pp. 335-357, and O. H. Green, "The Expression of Emotion", *MIND*, July, 1970.
4. Lyons, W., *Ibid.*, p. 412.
5. Green O. H., *Ibid.*, p. 552.
6. Kenny, A., *op cit*, p. 48.
7. C. Armon-Jones, 'The Thesis of Constructionism' in *The Social Construction of Emotions* ed., by R. Harre, Basil Blackwell Ltd., (Oxford, 1986), p. 43.
8. The author is thankful to Dr. T. C. Potts, Mr. Chris Coope and John Rae for their helpful comments on the earlier version of this essay.

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