

**POST-UDAYANA NYAYA REACTIONS TO
DHARMAKĪRTI'S VADANYAYA : AN EVALUATION**

In the post-Udayana-Nyāya tradition¹ attempts were made to rebut Dharmakīrti's views concerning *Nigrahasthānas* as expressed in his *Vādanīyā*. Principally there are two such attempts, viz the *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodha*² of Vardhamāna and the *Nyāya-Sūtra-Vṛtti*³ of Viśvanātha, representative of two trends reacting to Dharmakīrti. This paper* aims at understanding their arguments and evaluate their significance.

In the post-Udayana era of the *Nyāya*-school one comes across discussion of different issues concerning *Vāda* in general and *Nigrahasthānas* in particular in the three major works,⁴ viz. the *Tārkika-rakṣā* of Varadarāja, the *Anvīkṣā* of Vardhamāna and the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha. Of them, for the reasons to be explained later, we shall concentrate here only on the last two. While dealing with them in their chronological order the first section of the present study deals with the contention of the *Anvīkṣā*. The second section considers the arguments of the *Vṛtti*. In both these section, we shall not only study their arguments against Dharmakīrti but also explain their philosophical stand-points. This will enable us to place them in their proper perspective, and assess and examine their importance in the last section.

As stated earlier, we shall not deal in this paper with the *Tārkika-rakṣā*. This is for the following two important reasons :

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1) Broadly speaking, post-Udayana *Nyāya* reactions to Dharmakīrti's *Vādanīyāya* fall chronologically into two groups : (a) prior and (b) posterior to the advent of *Navya-Nyāya*.⁵ Further, both these kinds of reactions fall into two major camps : (i) those which take the shape or form part of an independent treatise, as evidenced by Varadarāja's *Tārīkī-rakṣā* or Vardhamāna's *Anvīkṣā*, or (ii) those which form part of an elaborate commentary written to explicate the contention of Gautama in his *Nyāya-Sūtras*. This trend is illustrated by Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*. Being a post-Udayana reaction to Dharmakīrti we should have normally taken note of Varadarāja's contention in this paper. However, in contrast to Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha, Varadarāja seems more to fall in line with post-Dharmakīrti *Nyāya* reactions to *Vādanīyāya* till Udayana in an important respect. In any of such reactions, no matter whether advanced in the form of an independent treatise like Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāya-Maṇjarī* or as a part of a full-scale commentary like Vācaspati's *Nyāya-Vārtika Tātparyā-tīkā*⁶ or Udayana's *Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparyā-tīkā Pārisuddhi*⁷, a prolonged attempt seems to be made to elaborate and defend the views either of Vātsyāyana or Uddyotakara as the chief, if not the sole, exponent of Gautama, and dispose of Dharmakīrti's views concerning *Nigrahasthānas* on the ground that they do not merit any serious attention. This sort of an almost dogmatic refusal to take cognisance of Dharmakīrti's views on the theme is also evidenced by Varadarāja's *Tārīkī-rakṣā* and in consequence it falls more in line with *Nyāya* reactions to Dharmakīrti till Udayana, although it is written in the post-Udayana era of the *Nyāya* tradition. Therefore, it does not seem to merit an independent treatment.

2) In some of the post-Udayana reactions to Dharmakīrti, on the contrary, no matter whether in the form of an indepen-

dent treatise or part of an elaborate commentary, one notices a differential trend in so far as they concentrate upon such issues as the following and proceed to consider their importance in the changed intellectual atmosphere that came in vogue with the advent of *Navya-Nyāya*⁸ :

- a) What should be an appropriate definition of *Nigraha-sthāna*s ?
- b) In which context should *Nigrahassthānas* be taken a serious note of ? and
- c) What should be basis of their classification ?

On this count, too, Varadarāja's *Tārkika-rakṣā* does not seem to merit any serious separate treatment not only because it was written prior to the advent of *Navya-Nyāya* but also because it is almost silent about the above-mentioned issues. Vardhamāna's *Anvīkṣā* as well as Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, on the contrary, though written posterior to Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintā-maṇi*, the pioneering work of *Navya Nyāya*, are alive to these problems. Yet, they seem to deal with them following divergent, though not exactly opposite, tracks. Both the works, format wise, seem to be indebted to Udayana. The *Anvīkṣā* avowedly follows the route of Udayana's *Nyāya-Pariśiṣṭa*,⁹ whereas the *Vṛtti* is in accordance with the *Pariśuddhi*.¹⁰ Of them, again, while the *Anvīkṣā* represents a thematic treatment of *Nigraha-sthānas* in a commentary on the line of *Nyāya-Bhūṣaṇa*, the *Nyāya-Maṇjarī* or the *Pariśiṣṭa*, wherein different themes, issues, problems, topics, concepts etc. from the *Nyāya*-tradition are discussed and the views of the adversaries are criticised, *Vṛtti* represents the trend of the literal-commentary to the *Nyāya Sūtras* on the pattern of the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*,¹¹ the *Nyāya-Vārtika*,¹² the *Tātparya-ṭīkā*, the *Pariśuddhi* etc.,

where the consideration is not merely to concentrate on a certain theme, but rather to explain each *Sūtra* of Gautama.

Although the time during which the *Anvīkṣā* and the *Vṛtti* were written the controversies between the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas were not as live and strong as they were till the time of Udayana, yet the impact exerted by them on the intellectual atmosphere had not died down completely. Moreover, philosophical debates between adherents of different philosophical trends continued to be carried on. Hence, importance of the consideration of such *Padārthas* as *Vāda* acknowledged by the *Prācīna-Nyāya* had not disappeared completely. And yet in the then prevalent intellectual atmosphere their treatment was required to be refined in such a way that hitherto discovered points of weakness and vulnerability do not continue to infect it. Hence, attempts were made in the *Anvīkṣā* and the *Vṛtti* to refine and modify the tradition in such a way that the stronger points of the prevalent tradition could be highlighted and the reasons plausible according to *Nyāya* tradition of non-acceptance of Dharmakīrti's contention could be brought out. In order to carry out such an exercise more refined terminology of the *Navya-Nyāya* was taken help of wherever feasible. Nonetheless, it is also important to note that though the foundations of *Navya-Nyāya* were laid, the scheme of the *Seven Padārthas* accepted by it does not seem to have taken profound roots and in consequence the reduction of the *Sixteen Padārthas* of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*¹³ to the *Seven Padārthas* of the *Navya-Nyāya*¹⁴ was not attempted then as it came to be done much later at the hands of Nīlakanṭha, Dinakara, etc. It is in the juncture-period of the disappearance of the *Prācīna* and advent of the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition that both these works were written. Hence, one finds that the discussion of *Vāda-Padārthas* in general and *Nigrahasthānas* in particular is pursued therein

within the framework of the *Sixteen Padārthas* of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* and yet their interpretation is attempted with the help of the technical language of the *Navya-Nyāya*, wherever feasible. Thus understood, both these works represent a new mode of defending the tradition of *Prācīna-Nyāya* in the Post-Udayana era of the *Nyāya*-tradition.

With this background we turn to the consideration of the arguments of the *Anvīkṣā* regarding the nature and status of *Nigrahasthānas*.

I

Anvīkṣānayatatvabodha : A Philosophical Study –

As pointed out earlier, *Anvīkṣā* is a thematic commentary on the fifth chapter of the *Nyāya-Sūtras*. It consists of two sections, viz. *Jāti* and *Nigrahasthāna/s*, dealing with the last two *Padārthas* accepted by *Prācīna-Nyāya*. In the present context we shall concentrate only on the second section of the *Anvīkṣā*, i.e., *Nigrahasthāna/s*.

Before we turn to analyse the arguments of the *Anvīkṣā*, an explanation about the intention behind its being written appears to be essential. For that would enable us to answer two important questions :

(a) Why Vardhamāna feels that refinement in the discussion of *Nigrahasthānas* is essential, and (b) granted that it is essential, how it is to be brought in while interpreting the *Nyāya-Sūtras*. The following reasons seem to have prompted the *Anvīkṣā* being written :

(i) Vardhamāna wrote the *Anvīkṣā* obviously to interpret the fifth chapter of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* in a modified way. Although he has respect for his predecessors like Vātsyāyana, Udayana,¹⁵ etc. and makes use of the important points put forth by them, yet he also seems to be aware of the fact that it

is not merely enough to defend the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* against the *Nyāya-Vārtika* or conversely.¹⁶ For, that will not bring in precision and clarity essential for rebutting the opponents like Dharmakīrti. Hence, use of the prevalent technical terminology of *Navya-Nyāya* is necessary for interpreting the *Nyāya-Sūtras*. Accordingly, he makes use of such terminology in his work wherever needed.

(ii) In the rebuttal of the contention of an opponent an almost dogmatic defence of the views of the predecessors is not enough. At times, it is equally essential and important to show their limitations. Knowing this, Vardhanāna seems to point out some of the inadequacies of his Nyāya predecessors while defining *Vāda*, *Kathā*, *Nigrahasthānas*, etc. He criticises their definitions to be more inclusive and vague, and hence pleads strongly for refinement in them. Of course, while doing this, according to him, enough care should be taken to ensure that the distinction between three kinds of determiners of *Vāda* etc., should not be ignored. They are :

- a) direct determiners (*sākṣāt-niyāmaka*)
- b) primary determiners (*pradhāna niyāmaka*) and
- c) derivative determiners (*gauṇa-niyāmaka*).

The requisite precision and clarity should never be attempted to be brought in at the cost of ignoring such vital distinctions. This aspect lacking in the works of his predecessors is sought to be introduced with the help of the refined language of the *Navya-Nyāya*

Similarly, while modifying the prevalent interpretation of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* additional varieties of *Nigrahasthānas*, if any, should also be considered and incorporated, in the absence of which the discussion of them is likely to remain incomplete, and

thus may jeopardise comprehensiveness of the consideration of *Nigrahasthānas*. Consequently, he seems to introduce certain newer species of them too.¹⁷

(iii) Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, since Dharmakīrti in his *Vādanīyāya* criticises the *Nyāya* theory of *Nigrahasthānas* in general and Uddyotakara's in particular, if the *Nyāya-Sūtras* are to be interpreted, it is essential to react to Dharmakīrti's view. But while doing this countercriticism of Dharmakīrti's view should not be the only aim.¹⁸ Rather, on careful closer scrutiny one is likely to notice that re-interpretation of the tradition is the primary objective of Vardhamāna's work. However, it also becomes clear that while on the one hand Dharmakīrti's philosophically important points are acknowledged tacitly, yet, on the other hand, an attempt is also made to criticise Dharmakīrti showing indirect redundancy of his theory, and thus bringing out non-dispensability of the contention of the *Nyāya*-tradition. That is why the *Nigrahasthānas* accepted by Dharmakīrti are still shown to be subsumable under those accepted by the *Nyāya*-tradition and in this way showing superiority and importance of the treatment of *Nigrahasthānas* at the hands of the *Nyāya* predecessors of Vardhamāna seems to be the principal aim behind writing the *Anvīkṣā*.

With this, we wish to outline the theory of *Nigrahasthānas* according to the *Anvīkṣā*. Here our task is two-fold : one, to capture the modifications Vardhamāna introduces while interpreting the *Nyāya-Sūtras* and mark his departure from his predecessors. And two, to comprehend his criticism of Dharmakīrti's theory of *Nigrahasthānas*. We shall deal with these points in the same order. For, unless one knows his theory, it is not possible to assess and evaluate his criticism of Dharmakīrti's view.

Vardhamāna's Theory of Nigrahasthānas

Vardhamāna seems to hold that *Nigrahasthānas* should be considered within the context of *Kathā* in general and *Vāda* in particular. For, the former is the generic (primary) (*pradhāna-niyāmaka*) determiner of it whereas the latter is the direct determiner (*sākṣāt-niyāmaka*) of it. Further, by *Vāda* he seems to mean both *Vijigīṣu-vāda* and *Tattvabubhutsu-vāda* as well, and *Kathā* is constituted of four elements, viz.

i) *Vādi* who seeks to establish a thesis without giving rise to fallacies and guarding against blemishes (*Hetvābhāsa śaṅkā nirāsa* and *Kaṇṭakoddhāra*).

ii) *Prativādi* who attempts to advance his own thesis (*Prativādi siddhānta sthāpanā*).

iii) To expose weaknesses in other's arguments together with attempting to establish one's own thesis (*Paroktadūṣaṇasahita svapakṣa sthāpanā*).

iv) Adjudication of success etc. (*Jayādī vyasthāpanam*).¹⁹

In the light of these constitutive conditions Vardhamāna defines *Kathā* as that in which while *Vādi* puts forth his thesis with the intention of establishing it, *Prativādi* proceeds showing faults in *Vādi's* arguments and attempts to establish his own contention instead.

This does not, however, mean that the traditionally laid down determiners of *Kathā* in general and *Vāda* in particular should be neglected. While formulating the definition of *Nigrahasthāna* they have a significant role to play. For, the determiners of *Vāda* are derivatively the determiners of *Nigrahasthānas*, i. e.,

i) The thesis put forth must be in accordance with the accepted *Pramāṇas* and appropriate *Tarka* (*Pramāṇa-tarka sādhanopālambha*).

ii) The thesis sought to be established must not be inconsistent with the philosophical position of the school to which one subscribes (*Siddhāntāvirūddha*), and that

iii) It should be sought to be advanced with the help of an argument with five constituents (*Pañcāvayavopapanna*).²⁰

On the background of these three kinds of determiners acknowledged in the *Nyāya* tradition it is interesting to enquire into Vardhamāna's definition of *Nigrahasthāna/s*.

A *Nigrahasthāna*, according to him, is that (context) wherein one (arguer) fails to understand the reason prompting the discussion (*kathā-uddeśa*), the results and consequences of the discussion (*kathā-phala*), the motive of the discussion (*kathā-prayojana*), or the purpose of the discussion (*kathā-hetu*) on account of absence of an indicator of appropriate knowledge of any (one) of them (*Yathārtha jñāna viraha liṅgatvam*).²¹

On this background it is easy to understand his objections to his predecessors' theory of *Nigrahasthāna/s*. They are :

(1) According to Vardhamāna, predecessors' definition of *Nigrahasthāna* seems to be incorrect. For, *Nigrahasthāna* is not differentiated from *Chala*, *Jāti*, etc. and hence their definition of it is too inclusive (*Ativyāpta*). Rather, *Nigrahasthānas* like *Niranuyojoyānuyoga*, etc. should be used for differentiating *Nigrahasthānas* from *Chala*, *Jāti*,²² etc. Otherwise, the definition of *Nigrahasthāna* remains either *Avyāpta* or *Ativyāpta Tūṣṭita*.

(2) It is incorrect to understand *Nigrahasthāna/s* in terms of faults of arguments instrumental to the establishment of a thesis (*Sādhana-dūṣṇa*) as Dharmakīrti does. For, when one indulges in a discussion/debate different arguments pertaining to variety of subjects are used. And one cannot be held to be defeated just because he has used variety of arguments, which

apparently seem to be inconsistent. It is, therefore, not the argument which is so much at fault but rather the person resorting to such arguments. Hence, a person is defeated on account of his failure to recognise proper use of arguments.²³

(3) One's failure to respond (*Ananubhāṣaṇa*) in itself does not constitute to be a *Nigrahassthāna* for it may be due to such contingent factor as the audience turning violent (*Sabhā-kṣobha*).²⁴ Hence, it is the reason behind one's not arguing further which should be taken into account rather than merely the fact that one does not argue further.

(4) To define *Nigrahassthāna* in terms of *Apratipatti* and/or *Vipratipatti* too is incorrect. For, *Apratipatti* and/or *Vipratipatti* could at the most be used as classificatory clues rather than as defining marks. The definition of *Nigrahassthāna* should be free from defects of its being either too wide or too narrow.

Further, even *Apratipatti* and/or *Vipratipatti*, as marks classificatory of *Nigrahassthāna*, need to be understood in a refined way. It is the individual who is defeated²⁵, since the faults—*Apratipatti* and/or *Vipratipatti*—of comprehending the subject matter in an incorrect way lies with the individual. Thus understood, *Apratipatti* means lack of proper knowledge of the motive behind the discussion resulting in improper use of words in their proper context, while *Vipratipatti* means knowledge contradictory of it.²⁶

Thus, *Nigrahassthānas*, broadly speaking, are of two kinds, viz. *Apratipatti* and *Vipratipatti*. And twenty-two kinds of *Nigrahassthānas*, discussed in the *Nyāya-Sūtras*, could be classified under these two heads. Such a classification of *Nigrahassthānas* could be shown to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. For, the *fundamentum divisionis* of them, mentioned above, could be shown to be an appropriate basis of their

classification, especially since it revolves around the consideration of internal (*Prasajya-pratiṣedha*) and/or external negation (*Paryudāsa*).²⁷

(5) Unlike his *Nyāya*-predecessors Vardhamāna seems to hold that *Hetvābhāsas* are not only a kind of *Nigrahassthānas* but also that the latter arise due to the former. For *Hetvābhāsas* are indicative of defective *Hetus* on account of lack of proper comprehension on the part of the individual involved in the discussion and hence he is declared to be defeated. Going a step further, he also seems to hold that along with defective *Hetus* other *Sādhanābhāsas*, like *Paksābhāsas*, *Sādhyaabhāsas*, *Lṛṣṭāntābhāsas* too lead to *Nigrahassthānas*. For, they too are related with defective *Hetu* and thus indicate failure of knowing the subject-matter properly on the part of the individual in whose arguments they figure. Thus, in the context of *Kathā*, *Hetvābhāsas* are *prima facie* *Nigrahassthānas* and directly fallacies of *Hetu*.²⁸

Further, other varieties of *Hetu-doṣas*, viz. *Ātmāśraya*, *Anyonyāśraya*, *Cakraka*, etc. too should be added to the list of *Hetvābhāsas* primarily and *Nigrahassthānas* derivatively.²⁹

(6) Consideration of different *Nigrahassthānas* at the hands of the *Nyāya* predecessors, according to Vardhamāna, is perhaps incomplete. Certain other sub-varieties should be added for bringing in greater comprehensiveness in their consideration. For instance, *Pratijñāhānī* and *Pratijñāsanyāsa*, etc. are of five kinds, whereas *Hetvantara* or *Arthāntara*, etc. are of four kinds.³⁰

Having briefly taken account of Vardhamāna's theory of *Nigrahassthānas* and the rationale behind its refinement, it would be interesting to understand his criticism of Dharmakīrti, our main point of interest. It is to this that we now turn.

Vardhamāna's Criticism of Dharmakīrti

Following are the grounds on which Dharmakīrti is criticised in the *Anvikṣā* :

(a) Vardhamāna seems to bring out four kinds of incompleteness in Dharmakīrti's theory of *Nigrahassthānas*: (i) The basis of *Nigrahassthāna/s*, viz. *Asādhā nāṅgavacana* and *Adoṣodbhāvana*,³¹ provided in the *Vādanyāya*, is incorrect. For, instead of defining *Nigrahassthāna* it rather tells us what leads to it. On the contrary, in the *Anvikṣā* an attempt is made to give both the genera and the differentia of *Nigrahassthāna* through its definition. Hence, Vardhamāna claims definitional superiority for the *Nyāya* treatment of *Nigrahassthānas*. (ii) Since neither differentia nor genera being provided through the definition of *Nigrahassthāna*, it becomes very difficult for Dharmakīrti to correlate different kinds of *Nigrahassthānas*. Thus, a unificatory principle not being provided, the treatment of *Nigrahassthānas* at his hands remains scattered and incoherent. On the contrary, in the *Anvikṣā* an attempt is made not only to spell out the direct (*ākṣāḍ*), primary (*Pradhāna*) and the derivative (*Gauṇa*) determiners (*Niyāmaka*) of *Nigrahassthānas*, but an appropriate relation between them also is ascertained. Hence, the theory of *Nigrahassthānas* put forth in the *Anvikṣā* is claimed to be more comprehensive as compared to that of *Vādanyāya*. (iii) The so-called definition of *Nigrahassthāna* given by Dharmakīrti does not take into consideration negation – internal or external – of comprehension, i.e., either lack of proper cognition (*yatkārtha pratipatti abhāva*) or contradictory cognition (*viruddha pratipatti*), whereas Vardhamāna claims that his definition of *Nigrahassthāna* revolves around the notion of *Pratipatti*³² and hence is held to be supplying a classificatory clue to it as well. (iv) The two kinds of *Nigrahassthānas*, viz. *Asādhānāṅgavacana* and *Adoṣodbhāvana*, given by

Dharmakīrti, are neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive.³³ On the other hand, the kinds of *Nigrahasthāna* accepted by *Nyāya* not only fulfil this requirement but all the twenty-two *Nigrahasthānas* acknowledged by it remain properly classifiable under them. Thus considered, Dharmakīrti also seems to score poorly on the count of classification of *Nigrahasthānas*.

(b) Dharmakīrti's criticism of the *Nyāya* predecessors, like Uddyotakara, too, seems to be irrelevant and hence dispensable. For, he fails to show twenty-two *Nigrahasthānas* accepted by the *Nyāya* to be reducible to those accepted by him. On the top of it all, he himself admits that his consideration of *Nigrahasthānas* is incomplete³⁴ and hence for its comprehensiveness accepts some of the *Nigrahasthānas* like *Apratibhā*, given by the *Nyāya* tradition.³⁵ Moreover, *Nigrahasthānas* at the hands of Dharmakīrti are considered within the limited context of *Tattvanirṇāṣu-vāda* alone and hence seem to be inflexible. The *Nyāya* treatment of *Nigrahasthānas*, on the contrary, treating them in both the contexts, viz *Tattvabubhutsu-vāda* and *vijigīṣu-vāda*, i.e., the general framework of *Kathā*, appears to be more flexible and inclusive. Accordingly, Vardhamāna seems to hold it to be philosophically more valuable, precise and comprehensive in nature.

c) Moreover, Dharmakīrti seems to have failed to comprehend importance of such *Nigrahasthānas* as *Apratibhā*, which could have been used as a unificatory principle in his framework, and thus correlate the two *Nigrahasthānas*, viz. *Asādhanaṅgavacana* and *Adoṣodbhāvana*, acknowledged by him under one heading. Thus, the *Nyāya* perspective concerning *Nigrahasthānas* seems to be superior to that of Dharmakīrti.

Having discussed above Vardhamāna's objections to Dharmakīrti's treatment of *Nigrahasthānas* in the *Vādanyāya* and its

rationale, we now turn to the consideration of the theme at the hands of Viśvanātha in his *Vṛtti*. This is our task in the next section.

II

The Vṛtti on Nigrahasthānas

On careful study one finds that by and large the interpretation of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* in the *Vṛtti* seems to be nothing else but a rationalization of the stand of the *Nyāya*-tradition along with circumvention of the limitations of the predecessors. Something of this kind is perhaps natural to happen especially because the living and creative opposition from the Buddhists camp had died down by that time. What remained to be considered was historical and intellectual relevance of *Nigrahasthānas* as they were discussed in the *Nyāya* tradition. As a result, one does not notice sharp opposition to the Buddhist contention on the theme in Viśvanātha's work. Rather, there seems to be an unconscious attempt to imbibe in the *Nyāya* tradition some of the points advanced by such Buddhist opponents as Dharma-kīrti without mentioning his name. There is also an attempt at re-interpreting the thrust of the *Nyāya* tradition on the theme without giving up allegiance to it, although *Prācīna-Nyāya* had then ceased to be living trend within the fold of which the *Nyāya* - Buddhist Controversy concerning nature and status of *Nigrahasthānas* was carried on over couple of centuries.

As mentioned earlier, by the time the *Vṛtti* was written intra-school or inter-school philosophical controversies concerning the nature and status of debates had dried down. In fact even the tradition of *Prācīna-Nyāya* was not taken seriously by the adherents of the *Nyāya* school themselves as much as it once used to be taken. As a result, Viśvanātha's writing a commentary called *Vṛtti* on the *Nyāya-Sūtras* seems more a matter of

academic and historical interest. And yet, while doing this sort of an exercise he has focussed attention on some of the important points in the light of which we wish to proceed :

(1) In the *Vṛtti* Viśvanātha clearly acknowledges some of the absurdities and dogmatic elements in the thoughts of the *Nyāya* predecessors. For, he states that a detailed discussion of such *Padārthas* as *Nigrahasthānas*, etc. can at the most serve the purpose of instructing novices and sophomores in the art of debating.³⁶ That is, the discussion of *Nigrahasthānas* can hardly be said to be philosophically illuminating. Secondly, the move on the part of Gautama to speak of *Hetvābhāsas* as the thirteenth independent *Padārtha* on the one hand and to subsume them under the sixteenth *Padārtha* called *Nigrahasthāna/s* on the other is too inscrutable to understand and make satisfactory sense of.³⁷ The only reason, perhaps, to discuss them separately may be that while the *Padārthas* like *Jāti*, *Nigrahasthānas*, etc. have no significant role to play in one's epistemic enterprise, those like *Hetvābhāsas* necessarily have. Thus understood, Viśvanātha's writing a brief commentary on the first and second section of the fifth chapter of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* seems more a matter of an academic exercise indulged in order not to give an impression that he had totally ignored it. This may also be done, in so far as debates and discussions used actually to go on, to show that the theme of *Nigrahasthānas* disussed by the *Prācīna-Nyāya* has historical interest to serve and continues to be important from the point of history of ideas.

(2) In the *Nyāya*-tradition up to Udayana, interpreting the *Nyāya-Sūtras* two camps were seen—one following the *Bhāṣya* and another the *Vārtika*. And in Udayana, too, in his two works, viz. the *Parīśiṣṭa* and the *Parīśuddhi*, an attempt is made to defend the significant points of one predecessor against those raised by another.³⁸ But in the *Vṛtti* it is seen for the first time

that Viśvanātha not only acknowledges the faults of the predecessors but attempts also to give them up by bridging up the gaps by trying to bring the two warring camps³⁹ together. For, he clearly sees the fact that the divergence in the interpretation of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* generated by the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika* facilitated the opponents like Dharmakīrti. He seems to be aware of the controversies between his predecessors of the system and the opponents, especially like the Buddhists. Hence, a due care seems to be taken while interpreting some of the varieties of *Nigrahasthānas*, like *Apārthakam*⁴⁰, *Aprāptakālam*,⁴¹ *Paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇam*⁴², *Niranuyojyānuyoga*⁴³ etc. And, at times, one finds that Dharmakīrti's views are twisted in such a way that they could be fitted in the *Nyāya* framework easily for bringing in the homogeneity in the tradition.⁴⁴

(3) Following the prevalent tradition, he states that there are three kinds of *Kathās*, viz, *Vāda*, *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā*.⁴⁵ Taking into consideration the nature of means used and the objectives sought to be accomplished, *Kathā* should be defined. For, communicability-context is essential for each one of them. Hence, he defines *Kathā* as that which is carried out with the help of the rules of arguments and in which either establishment of truth or one's own victory or opponent's defeat are aimed at.⁴⁶ Thus, on the one hand, in his view, *Vāda*, *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā* could be correlated and yet their distinction could be recognised on the other. Eventhough the use of an argument having five constituents (*Pañcāvayavī Anumāna*) is the minimum condition for each one of them, it is on the basis of the use of *Pramāṇa* and *Tarka* by *Pakṣa* and *Pratipakṣa* that they could be distinguished.⁴⁷ Further, since *Pañcāvayavī Anumāna* is the necessary condition of *Kathā* in general, the fallacies related to *Anumāna* too are applicable to all the three kinds of *Kathās*

equally. Hence, *Hetvābhāsas* have an important role to play on the general level of *Kathā*.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, *Nigrahassthānas* alone could be located in *Vāda*, i.e., one variety of *Kathā*, and hence they too need to be considered separately. Thus, consideration of *Hetvābhāsas* on two levels – as an independent *Padārtha* and as a kind of *Nigrahassthāna* – seems to be in order.⁴⁹

(4) According to the *Vṛtti*, following the prevalent tradition, there is a distinction between two kinds of *Vāda* – *Tattvabhutsu-vāda* and *Vijigīṣu-vāda* – and use of *Chala*, *Jāti* and *Nigrahassthāna*s is prohibited in the former but not in the latter. The use of them is permitted in *Vijigīṣu-vāda*,⁵⁰ since it is meant for training of the beginners and not helpful for the establishment of the truth. There is a marked difference between *Vāda* carried out between a teacher and pupil, between adherents of different schools aiming at the establishment of truth. Hence, *Nigrahassthānas* have an educative importance in teacher-pupil debates.⁵¹

(5) Lastly, *Nigrahassthāna* indicates a defeat of the person in a debate and consists of either *Vipratipatti* and/or *Apratipatti*.⁵² The basis of the consideration of *Nigrahassthāna*s should not involve exigencies – like one's fainting and hence keeping mum (*Ananubhāṣaṇa*), etc. but rather only of those cases where either opposing cognition or lack of cognition is the cause of it.

Thus, in the *Vṛtti* attempt is made to criticise Dharmakīrti and his followers sympathetically while re-interpreting the *Nyāya* tradition to bring out its historical relevance.

Uptil now we gave a sketch of the main contention of the *Anvīkṣā* and the *Vṛtti* regarding the nature and status of

*Nigrahasthāna*s in response to such opponents as Dharmakīrti. However, from a methodological point of view it is necessary to critically consider the points made by the defenders of the *Nyāya* tradition and assess their acceptability. This would enable us to see their philosophical significance and contribution they made to the furtherance of thought. It is to this that we turn in the next section.

III

Critical Evaluation

Turning to the critical evaluation of the responses of the representatives of the post-Udayana *Nyāya* adherents to the points raised by Dharmakīrti and his followers regarding the nature and status of *Nigrahasthānas*. In this sort of an attempt one finds that while there are some points of agreement between them, there is also an important divergence. First coming to the points of similarity on the basis of which both the *Anvikṣā* and the *Vṛtti* criticise Dharmakīrti :

(1) Both Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha agree with their *Nyāya* predecessors on the view that *Kathā* is of three kinds, viz. *Vāda*, *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā*, and *Nigrahasthānas* are to be located in the context of *Vāda* primarily. However, it is not denied that *Nigrahasthānas* could be considered along with *Chala*, *Jāti*, etc., too, in the context of *Kathā* in general. In other words, *Vāda* is of two kinds, viz. *Tattvabubhutsu-vāda* and *Vijigīṣu-vāda*, and *Chala*, *Jāti*, etc., are permissible in *Vijigīṣu-vāda* if not in the *Tattvabubhutsu-vāda* as well. And *Nigrahasthānas* could be located in both the contexts. The only difference that lies is the treatment of *Nigrahasthāna* is such that while in the context of *Tattvabubhutsu-vāda* it is a positive hindrance, in the context of *Vijigīṣu-vāda* it is a boon in disguise. Again, in the latter context *Nigrahasthānas* are said more to be instrumental

to the defeat of the adversary rather than one's own victory. Thus, contextually they have a differential role to play.

On the contrary, Dharmakīrti rightly insists that *Nigrahas-thānas* have an important role to play only in the context of *Tattvanirṇāṣu-vāda*, i.e., *Vāda* proper. For, the other two varieties of *Kathā*, viz. *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā*, or the other kind of *Vāda*, viz. *Vijigīṣu-vāda*,⁵³ where defeat of the adversary is the sole aim and where resorting to methodologically foul means is freely permissible, is not philosophically worthwhile, especially since such a kind of *Vāda* does not aim at discovery of truth. Merely defeating somebody in a debate is not an important consideration,⁵⁴ and hence the other variety of *Vāda*, viz. *Vijigīṣu-vāda* or of *Kathtās*, viz. *Jalpa* and/or *Vitaṇḍā* are not worthy of seriously being entertained as a means of discovery of truth.⁵⁵ Moreover, if defeating an adversary somehow and anyhow is the solitary aim, independent of discovery of truth, then various kinds of *argumentum ad hominem*, physically assaulting somebody, pushing, pulling, etc. could also profitably be added to the list of acknowledged *Nigrahas-thānas*.⁵⁶ Further, points of philosophical interest are never intended to be inquired into in this way. Instead of concentrating upon the nature and status of such debates and the factors which are beneficial or obstructive to them, it is futile to indulge into enlistment of number of *Kathās*, species of *Vāda* and varieties of *Nigrahas-thānas*. For, nothing of this kind is methodologically rewarding and can hardly enable us to stipulate context-free determiners of *Nigrahas-thānas*, and that of *Vāda* as well. Thus, Dharmakīrti seems to be right in holding that no philosophically interesting purpose would be served in the dual consideration of *Vāda* and the role of *Nigrahas-thānas* in them.

(2) Secondly, for *Naiyāyikas* in general and Vardhamāna or Viśvanātha in particular *Nigrahas-thānas* means a point of defeat

or a failure in argumentation. It may be because of the lack of appropriate knowledge (*Apratipatti*) or due to misunderstanding (*Vipratipatti*) of the persons involved in the debate. Thus, according to them, a *Nigrahassthāna* is envisaged to figure in a similar fashion both from the side of a *Vādin* or *Prativādin*. Further, it is said to revolve around victory or defeat in a debate. This, however, is a mistake on two counts: (i) As pointed out by Dharmakīrti, discovery of truth involves a twin exercise⁵⁷ – (a) establishment of viability of truth i.e., establishment of one's own position (*Svapakṣasthāpana*) and (b) unviability of untruth i.e., disestablishment of the position of the opponent. Just any one of them would not make up for both. (ii) The role of *Vādin* and *Prativādin* in the discovery of truth is not analogous but rather differential, and accordingly that which might occasion occurrence of a *Nigrahassthāna* legitimately from each side cannot be the same as *Nyāya* advocates imagine. For, a *Nigrahassthāna* would arise from each of their side according as they fail to perform their appropriate role. Thus considered, whereas what would constitute to be a *Nigrahassthāna* from one side is failure to spell out proper determiners of establishment of truth (*Asāadhanāṅgavacana*), while from the other side failure to spot illegitimate determiners to be such (*Adoṣodbhāvana*).⁵⁸ Both of them may originate from ignorance or lack of intelligence (*Apratibhā*).⁵⁹ But to say that is too simplistic and hardly spells out differential responsibilities of *Vādin* and *Prativādin* in the discovery of truth.

(3) Thirdly, both Vardhamāna and Viśvanatha, in agreement with *Nyāya*-adherents, seem to be dogmatic and uncompromising on the following three counts, and accordingly their view seems to be alike questionable –

(a) They seem to insist, in conformity with the *Nyāya* tradition, that an *Anumāna* appropriated in any form of *Kathā* must

necessarily be *Pañcāvayavī* and that this nature of it must be accepted by anybody irrespective of the school of philosophical thought to which he adheres.⁶⁰ They also seem not to question Vātsyāyana's principal contention that conclusion of every argument must be jointly yielded by all the *Pramāṇas* which *Naiyāyikas* accept, especially because its premisses are held to correspond with the *Pramāṇas* accepted by them.⁶¹ Secondly, they also seem to accept, in conformity with the view of the adherents of *Nyāya*, that while debate between a teacher and a pupil, or that between adherents of like-minded trends of thought could be conducive to the discovery of truth, such a debate between adherents of unlikeminded schools cannot be. Both these views, however, are untenable. The former because it seeks to dogmatically universalise the *Nyāya* view concerning *Anumāna*, while the latter because it simply rules out the possibility of adherents of unlikeminded schools of philosophical thought being seriously engaged in cooperative discovery of truth. For instance, debates between adherents of *Nyāya* and Buddhism and their contribution to furtherance of philosophical thought can hardly be ignored, however the *Nyāya* adherents may like dogmatically to disregard their significance.

(b) The dogmatic subscription to the view on the part of Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha, that debates/discussion are basically of three kinds, that these three kinds are on par with one another, and that *Nigrahasthānas* are envisaged to play a differential role depending on the purpose for which one engages oneself in a debate, too, likewise is questionable. For, while *Vāda* proper concentrates merely on establishment of one's own position, perhaps independently of the consideration whether it is shown to be so questionably or otherwise, *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā* concentrates merely on defeating an adversary by any means – fair or foul. Each of them involves fallacy of omission,

although of a different sort. *Vāda* seems to undermine the importance of dis-establishment of a counter knowledge-claim, while *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā* seem merely to concentrate upon dis-establishment of a counter knowledge-claim, but caring nothing for the establishment of that knowledge claim which one intends to put forth. Each of these approaches, thus, amounts to mistaking part for the whole, – the task that appropriately lies in front of each party indulging in a philosophically interesting debate.

(c) Further, if *Nigrahasthānas* are those points in debate/discussion reaching which one forfeits one's right to continue to debate, then their exploitation cannot be permitted in one kind of debate and prohibited in another coherently, and at the same time both these kinds of *Vāda* cannot simultaneously be treated to be equally interesting varieties of a philosophically appropriate debate. The prolonged exercise of rationalization through which *Nyāya* adherents take the prospective readers of their respective treatises seems to smack the rat of dogmatism, rather than allowing unbiased and free intellectual air to circulate.

(4) Generically determining conditions like *Apratipatti*, *Vipratipatti* or *Apratibhā* cannot be uniquely and unequivocally connected with occurrence of *Nigrahasthānas*. For, conditions like failure to comprehend, ignorance, irresoluble differences of opinion, etc. are hindrances in any epistemic enterprise, and debates indulged into with the intention of discovery of truth are not the solitary exception to it. Hence, to seek to reduce any *Nigrahasthānas*, no matter whether accepted by *Nyāya* or Buddhist adherents, to *Apratipatti* or *Vipratipatti* as Uddyotakara seems to do or its dogmatic defence is irrelevant and methodologically indefensible. Dharmakīrti's *Asā dhanāṅgavacana* and *Adoṣodbhāvana*, on the contrary, seem to be more appropriate *Nigrahasthānas* in the domain of philosophically interest-

ing debates leading to discovery of truth, no matter whether they are indulged in intra-systematically or inter-systematically.

(5) Lastly, coming to the consideration of *Hetvābhāsa*s, *Naiyāyikas* seem to consider *Hetvābhāsa*s on two levels, viz., as an independent *Padārtha* and as a kind of *Nigrahasthāna*. The only difference in their treatment is seen according to the approach from which they are considered, – i.e. in the context of *vāda* *Nigrahasthānas* are primary, but since fallacies of *Hetu* (*Hetvābhāsa*s) arise in arguments, which opens the possibility of *Vāda*-context, *Hetvābhāsa*s too need to be considered. Thus, upto Udayana and under his influence upto Vardhamāna in the *Nyāya* tradition *Hetvābhāsa*s are subsumed under *Nigrahasthānas* particularly in the context of *Vāda*, while, on the other hand, they were treated to be an independent *Padārtha*. No one till Viśvanātha did even faintly suspect that there is a serious kind of double-think in this. Rather everybody kept on mixing between reverence (for Gautama) with truth (what should defensibly be the case). At the hands of Viśvanātha, for the first time in the entire *Nyāya* tradition, a serious question of methodological impropriety came to be raised in his *Vṛtti*.⁶² But he too, unfortunately, did not stick to this point till the end, and in consequence seems to have failed in understanding the implications of it; otherwise he would not have blindfoldedly reiterated the tradition while explaining the nature of *Hetvābhāsa*s as a kind of *Nigrahasthāna*s.⁶³

Dharmakīrti, on the contrary, seems to be succinctly clear in so far as he never allows the distinction between *Hetvābhāsa*s and *Nigrahasthāna*s to be undermined or subsumption of the former under the latter, especially because whereas the former has something basically to do with validity of an argument, the latter with the methodologically appropriate decision as to

when does one forfeit one's right to continue to participate in a philosophically interesting debate. In other words, while the former revolves around the logical aspect of an argument, the latter with its rhetorical use in debate. The determiners of each of them are different, i.e. *Hetvābhāsas* arise due to the non-fulfilment of the condition of *Trairūpya*, viz. *Pakṣa Sattva*, *Sapakṣa Sattva* and *Asapakṣāsattva*,⁶⁴ whereas *Nigrahasthānas* arise due to either *Asādhānāṅgavacana* or *Adoṣobhāvana*. Hence, the attempts of both Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha not only of imbibing but of mixing between these two important considerations appear to be both misleading and indefensible.

Turning to the differential points brought forth by Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha. For fear of undue length of the essay we shall concentrate on one representative point from each of them. First turning to Vardhamāna. The point of appropriate definition and classification of *Nigrahasthānas* is pertinent as far as it goes. But in so far as it amounts to be a sophisticated rationalization of the view handed down by the *Nyāya*-tradition, it smacks more of dogmatic defence rather than unbiased acceptance of the views even of a philosophical adversary, in so far as they merit subscription to it. To say that what Dharma-kīrti and his followers say does not deserve serious attention in so far as it is indefensible is one thing; to refuse to accept it, however reasonable, smacks the rat of dogmatism – and that too on the part of adherents of that school of philosophical thought which claims itself to be exclusive custodian and forerunner of any defensible methodologically appropriate consideration. This is something which is unfortunately deplorable and indefensible as well, being unconducive to genuine conceptual growth.

With reference to Viśvanātha too one does not notice unfortunately a differential trend. Consider for instance, the reason

as to why Gautama might have dealt with the theme of *Nigrahasthānas* and the subsumption of *Hetvābhāsas* under *Nigrahasthānas*. He claims that this is more paedagogic and educative interest, serving the need more of novices and sophomores. But if this is so, is similar consideration at stake with reference to other *Padārthas* as well? If not, why are topics which merit advanced treatment and those which are meant for the convenience of beginners treated on par in the same treatise? Unfortunately, Viśvanātha or any other later *Nyāya* adherent has no satisfactory answer. Thus, the so-called differential points raised both by Viśvanātha and Vardhamāna too unfortunately lapse into dogmatic and sterile rationalization and defence of the tradition.

We pointed out above the combined and distinctive shortcomings of the exercises carried out by Vardhamāna's *Anvīkṣā* and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti* to respond to Dharmakīrti and his followers, and assessed their intellectual worth. Before we close we turn below briefly to outline the morals to be learnt from the point of view of the growth and development of philosophical ideas from such instances :

(a) Merely *prima facie* imbibing the view of a philosophical opponent without appropriate modification in one's own substantive position – even at the cost of incurring wrath of fellow adherents – or continued rationalization of the tradition is intellectually less rewarding as compared to undogmatic and open-minded acceptance of the views of a philosophical adversary. For, the latter is more conducive to intellectual growth than the former.

(b) Through dialogues, discussions and debates are important from the points of view of intellectual advancement it is too rigid to claim that any intellectual development worth the name

is impossible to be brought out without such debates. For, although *Vāda-Sabhās* did contribute their mite to conceptual growth and clarification, it would be too idle to claim that with their stoppage such a phenomenon would automatically come to an end. Newer modes of dialogue and discussion continue to be devised rather than gathering under one roof at a specified time and indulging in prolonged debates.

(c) Establishment of truth is not a monopoly of the adherents of a particular school/system, nor does it depend upon age. Quest after truth is unending, although better and better modes of articulating various facets of truth would continue to surface and may perhaps outwit the hitherto accepted ones. No one can legitimately claim to have chanced upon any final and irrevocable truth, although quest after truth is interminable and discovery of better and better truth always possible, final truth being no one's exclusive property.

(d) Though the sixteen *Padārthas* accepted by the *Prācīna-Nyāya* came ultimately to be reduced to the seven *Padārthas* accepted by *Navya-Nyāya* the relative importance of such traditionally *Padārthas* as *Nigrahasthānas* etc. came to be missed in the process and their contribution to the conceptual growth and development came either to be sidetracked or ignored altogether.

One, however, interested in studying and assessing the relative importance of such exercises from the point of view of intellectual growth cannot afford to be dogmatic or blind to the nuances which contributed to such a kind of development. In this essay we hoped to concentrate on such aspects and bring to surface their importance to the extent to which it deserves serious attention. Assessment as to what extent we have

succeeded in our task be better left to the judicious discretion of the competent and conscientious scholars.*

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NOTES

1. Those interested in the Nyāya reactions to Dharmakīrti's *Vādanāyāya* prior to Udayana or of Udayana as well, may please refer to my book *Vādanāyāya : A Glimpse of the Nyāya-Buddhist Controversy*, Sri Sad-guru Publications, New Delhi, 1988, Ch. VII, pp. 166-205.
2. Henceforth abbreviated as the *Anvīkṣā*.
3. Henceforth abbreviated as the *Vṛtti*.
- * Paper presented to the Second World Conference on Dharmakīrti held in Vienna from 11th to 16th June, 1989.
4. Even though in the Navya-Nyāya tradition the *Padārthas* like *Vāda* or *Nigrahasthānas* are considered in the works like *Dinakarī*, *Nīlakaṇṭhī*, etc. we are not going to consider them here. For, there they are dealt with from an altogether a different i. e. reductive perspective. To consider those works here, lies outside the scope of the present paper. We hope to return to the issue sometime later.
5. Advent of Navya-Nyāya is understood with Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* being written.
6. Henceforth abbreviated as the *Tātparya-tīkā*.
7. Henceforth abbreviated as the *Parīśuddhi*.
8. See *supra* note 5 on Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. The various commentaries written on it also subscribe to Navya-Nyāya.
9. Henceforth abbreviated as the *Parīśīṭa*.

10. Although Udayana considers the nature and status of *Nigrahasthānas* in his two different works, viz. the *Parīśuddhi* and the *Parīśiṣṭa*, it is clear from the number of references to *Parīśiṣṭa* occurring in the *Parīśuddhi*, that the latter is chronologically posterior to the former.
 11. Henceforth the *Bhūṣya*.
 12. Henceforth the *Vārtika*.
 13. *Pramāṇaprameya tattvajñānānīḥ śrye yasādhigamaḥ* / the *Nyāya-Sūtras*, I. i. 1 (p. 28).
 14. *Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānya, Viśeṣa. Samavāya* and *Abhāva*. For this see relevant sections of such works as *Tarkasāgraha* and various commentaries on it or *Bhūṣya-pariccheda* and various commentaries on it. For reduction issue see *supra* note 4.
 15. This could be seen from the second *Parīśiṣṭa* of the *Anvikṣā*.
 16. In the *Prācīna-Nyāya*, works like *Tātparya-tikā* advocate the views of the *Bhūṣya*, whereas works like the *Parīśuddhi* defend the view of the *Vārtika* on the nature and status of *Nigrahasthānas*.
 17. See *infra* note no. 30.
 18. Just as Uddyotakara's *Vārtika* opens with this very contention that the aim of writing this treatise is to criticise opponents like Dinnāga, one at least *prima facie* does not see any such moto of *Anvikṣā*, though if one reads it in between the lines this could be seen very well. Be that as it may.
9. *Tadida ... caturvidham ... svoktisambhavaḥ* / the *Anvikṣā*, p. 103.
 10. *Pramāṇatarkasāadhanopālanibhaḥ ... vādaḥ* / the *Nyāya-Sūtras*, I. ii. 1. (p. 335).
 21. ... *Kathakoddṣya ... nigrahasthānatvam* / the *Anvikṣā*, p. 77.
 2. *Yadyapi chalajāṭyāni ... lakṣaṇārthamāhnikārthaḥ* / *Ibid*, p. 76.
 3. ... *vā dipuruṣanigrāhakatvāt / ... puruṣaṇi nigrāhayati* / *Ibid*, p. 78.
 4. *Navā sarvatra nigrahasthāre ... ca sambhavāt* / *Ibid* p. 76.
 5. *Tasmādvākyamavākyaṇi vā puruṣaṇi nigrāhayati* / *Ibid*, p. 78.
 26. *Athoddeśyakathāka ... vipratipattiḥ* / *Ibid*, p. 76.
 27. ... *prasaṅgapratīcchāparyudāśāhye ... bhāvaḥ* / p. 78 and also, ... *Atra paryudāsanayā ... nigrāhyaḥ* / p. 115.
 28. *Na caiva ... nigrahasthāntarāntarānāpi ... niyamāt* / *Ibid*, pp. 4-5 and also
H etvābhāsāḥ ... sūtrārthaḥ / *Ibid*, p. 126.

29. *Ibid*, pp. 126–27.
30. *Ibid*, pp. 78–88, 89–98.
31. Saugatā ... dvayornigrahasthānatvam / *Ibid*, p. 78.
32. Tarhi yathā apratipatti ... virodhaḥ / *Ibid*, p. 78.
33. *Ibid*, p. 78.
34. *Ibid*, p. 78.
35. *Ibid*, p. 78.
36. ... prakārabhedena pratipādanam śiṣyabuddhi / the *Vṛtti*, p. 57.
37. *Ibid*, pp. 57–58. Note also that Viśvanātha refuses to accept subsumption of *Hetvābhāṣas* under *Nigrahasthānas* – see p. 58 of the *Vṛtti*.
38. See for instance the *Nyāya-Pariśiṣṭa*, p. 94.
39. the *Vṛtti*, p. 57–58.
40. *Ibid*, p. 1179.
41. *Ibid*, pp. 1183–84.
42. *Ibid*, pp. 1195–96.
43. *Ibid*, p. 1198.
44. See commentary on the *Nigrahasthāna* called *Nyānam* in the *Vṛtti*, p. 1185.
45. The *Vṛtti*, pp. 1101–02.
46. *Ibid*, p. 1159.
47. *Ibid*, pp. 331–34.
48. *Ibid*, p. 1200.
49. *Ibid*, pp. 58, 1200.
50. *Ibid*, pp. 343–44.
51. *Ibid*, p. 57.
52. *Ibid*, pp. 1191–92.
53. Chalavyavahārd ‘pi ... satāmācāraḥ / the *Vādanīyā*, p. 68.
54. *Ibid*, pp. 66–69.
55. See also Viśvanātha’s *Vṛtti*, p. 1179.
56. Tattvarakṣaṇārtham ... nakhacapetaśāstra prahāradīpanādi ... tattvarakṣaṇopāyaḥ / the *Vādanīyā*, p. 69.
and ... anyattu na yuktamiti neṣ yate / p. 5.

57. Tasmājjigīṣatā ... nirākartavyāḥ / *Ibid*, p. 71.
 58. Asādhanaṅga ... neṣyate / *Ibid*, pp. 4-5.
 59. ... tadabhyupagamyā apratibbhyā ... vā / *Ibid*, p. 5.
 60. See for instance their explanation respectively of the *Nigrahasthāna* called *Nyūna*.
 61. Vātsyāyana; *Agamaḥ pratijñā*, heturanumānam, udāharaṇam pratyakṣam, upamānamupanayaḥ, sarveśām ekārtha samavāye sāmārthya pradarśanam nigamamiti / *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, 4. i. 1.
 62. The *Vṛtti*, pp. 57-59.
 63. *Ibid*, p. 1200.
 64. ... trirūpahetuvacanasamudāyaḥ ... / the *Vādanīyā*, p. 59.
or ... sādhanasya siddheryannāṅgam – asiddhaḥ, viruddhaḥ.
anaikāntiko vā hetvābhāsaḥ ... / p. 64.
- * I am immensely indebted to Prof. M. P. Marathe for his valuable help at various stages of completing this essay.

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