

SCHOPENHAUER ON WILL : A CRITIQUE

The concept of 'Will' occupies the central place in Schopenhauer's intellectual framework which provides the analytical basis of all his philosophical arguments. Despite being born in the Kantian tradition Schopenhauer adopted a fundamentally different approach in his critical metaphysical and epistemological theories and it is essentially his concept of 'Will' which makes him so different from Kant. But again it is also the 'Will' that marks his deep influence on the subsequent great modern thinkers as Nietzsche, Freud and Wittgenstein. The beauty of Schopenhauer's *Will* lies in its *role* as an unifying thread in his logical system which begins from the concept of *Will* as the *thing-in-itself* and ends in the *negation* of that very Will. In this marvellous intellectual endeavour Schopenhauer travelled a long way and in his long journey in search of the truth Schopenhauer demonstrated his remarkable ability and ingenious power in providing a logically infallible system that gives a unity to all the diverse *elements* in this *matrix* of the *Will*. The essence of this paper will be to argue that this unity will break down if the relationships between different elements of the matrix are not unique. In fact we shall show that there are cases where Schopenhauer was unable to provide such unique relationships whereas in some other cases the relationships are not sufficiently strong to be defensible.

Schopenhauer took some pride in identifying his concept of *Will* with Kant's *thing-in-itself*. While Kant maintained that though the *noumena*, the *things-in themselves*, exist as the

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ground of all phenomena, yet we cannot know them; they are beyond our knowledge, nor we can ever say anything 'positive' about them. Thus the concept of the noumena or things-in-themselves in Kantian philosophy is somewhat 'negative' – it is the unknown and unknowable. (Hence the problem of bringing out a satisfactory link between the noumenal self and the phenomenal self is left in Kant's theory as a mystery.) But Schopenhauer not only thought that something 'positive' could be said about the thing-in-itself, he really believed that there is a good argument for the conclusion that the thing-in-itself is Will. He argues as follows: There is a possibility for us to have a direct knowledge of the Will in the consciousness of ourselves. But the object of that consciousness cannot be mere phenomena; rather it is something different from the phenomena in the respect that it is an object of direct and unconditioned knowledge. For the same reason it is not bound to the principle of sufficient reason and so must be other than mere phenomena. Therefore, Schopenhauer concludes that it must be the thing-in-itself. But, as we shall argue later, this does not constitute a consistent proof of the proposition that the Will is in fact the thing-in-itself.

In the *WAR* Schopenhauer tries to establish that the whole world is the objectification of one and the same Will. He claims that no philosopher before him, not even Kant, had proper appreciation of this feature of Will. Whether or not his claim is justified, Schopenhauer is said "to have reversed the whole process of German philosophy, and to have looked at man from the side of irrational action and passion, things to which Kant's ethics and Hegel's system had done scant justice.¹ It may perhaps be admitted that Schopenhauer's concept of Will if had not reversed the traditional German philosophy in his life time, it had subsequently revolutionized the mode of philosophical thinking in many dimensions.

Schopenhauer by rejecting Kant's unrecognizable 'thing-in-itself' maintained that blind and irrational Will was the essence of the world. Therefore Schopenhauer's philosophy of irrationalism being a reversal of the traditional approach a la Kant, shows the ultimate reality as antithetical to all reason;² and as what constitutes the metaphysical essence of the world.³ This ultimate reality which Kant gave up as unknown and unknowable, Schopenhauer identified as the Will and went on to emphasize its presence in all forms of life and in all modes of existence.

The main characteristic of the Will, according to Schopenhauer, is a perpetual striving which has no end whatsoever, and this is inherently irrational. Schopenhauer's conception of the Will is such that it can never rest content. It is a 'blind Will.' The 'blind will' never sets any definite object before it, and no object can possibly satisfy it. Indeed one of the reasons why Schopenhauer calls the Will 'blind' is that it has no definite object which it strives to attain. As soon as it seems to attain its object it moves away from it in its search for an unattainable ideal. Thus the will as the thing-in-itself by nature is free from all aims and limits.⁴

But if freedom from all aim is the real nature of the Will which is the thing-in-itself and which is also a blind striving, then how can we accept this world which is the self-objectification of that Will and is also full of purposeful activities. To say that the world, which is full of purposeful activity, is the objectification of a sheer blind, aimless Will is not only hardly convincing but also contradictory to itself.⁵ Either the world being the manifestation of a blind Will must be a chaotic one which it is not, or, the Will as the thing-in-itself must possess a definite aim behind its self-objectification into a purposefully active world. Schopenhauer never bothered to explain further

than to say that it is inexplicable how the self-objectification of the Will in the phenomenal world takes place.

The Will as the thing-in-itself is quite different from its manifestations. It is entirely free from all forms of phenomenal appearance which are foreign to the Will in itself. The Will as the thing-in-itself lies outside the province of the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms, and is consequently groundless. Further, the Will itself is free from all multiplicities, whereas its manifestations in time and space are innumerable. The Will as the thing-in-itself is one; but not in the sense in which an object is one nor in the sense in which a concept is one. It is one as that which lies outside time and space, these later being *principium individuationis*, i.e., the conditions of the possibility of multiplicity.⁶ Although the particular phenomenon of the Will has a temporal beginning and end, the Will as the thing-in-itself is not affected by it. It is self-caused and self-determining.⁷

After having identified the thing-in-itself with the Will, Schopenhauer tries to explain the whole world as the objectification of that Will. In this scheme of analysis Schopenhauer first begins with the human body as the highest and the clearest manifestation of the Will. For he maintains that the Will is objectified in its highest degree in the human Will. At the same time he also seems to believe that although the Will finds its clearest and fullest objectification in man, man alone does not express its full being. The full significance of the Will is presented in its various manifestations, that is, right from the human-beings through the *animal* and *vegetable kingdom*, down to the *unorganised nature* – all taken together. According to Schopenhauer, the difference lies only in the degree of its manifestations.

It seems however that Schopenhauer's notion of the "degrees" of the manifestation of the Will is somewhat confusing and

misleading. For instance, suppose that A, B, C and D – who are all human beings in whom ‘anger’ is present in some degree. Now the same emotion of anger is expressed in varied degrees in each of them; that is, A becomes more violent than B during the state of anger whereas C and D’s anger is lesser than even B. Here we understand that the same anger is expressed but in different degrees in all four cases. But if in the same way we accept Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the degrees of manifestation of the Will in different grades, there is an implausible consequence. There is no common denominator between a man and a stone such that we can conceive any difference between them as merely a difference in degree only.

The human will, as mentioned already, has been placed at the top of all the gradations. Schopenhauer assigns the privilege of knowing the will to human beings alone, because we are something more than mere subjects of knowledge. For, were we mere knowing subjects, “a winged cherub without a body”⁸, the transition from the world as mere ideal representation to what it is an ideal representation of would not have been possible. Being the knowing subject, we know everything in this world as ideal representation. In as much the same way we also perceive our body as an ideal representation. And this is the peculiarity that distinguishes ourselves from other objects, since in other respects there is no difference. This peculiarity which makes a human being something different from the other objects also gives him the privilege of acquiring double knowledge of his body, that is, one can know one’s body as ideal representation and also can know it as it is in itself, i.e., as will.

According to Schopenhauer, every particular act of Will is followed by a movement of body.⁹ But this does not mean that the relation between the act of will and the movement of the body is a causal one. Rather it is a kind of identical relation, as

he holds. The two are, according to Schopenhauer, one and the same thing, but given in two different ways—that is immediately given as will, and also given as ideal representation in perception. In this way Schopenhauer argues that the whole body is nothing but objectified will, i.e., will become ideal representation. In a sense he calls the body the “objectivity of will”.¹⁰

Just as every act of will is at once also a visible act of the body, every visible impression upon the body is similarly an impression upon the will. “My body and my will are one” — Schopenhauer terms this a “philosophical truth.”¹¹ We cannot know this will in us as a whole or as a unity. Nor can it be known in its nature completely. This will can be known only in its particular acts, and therefore only in time, the latter being the form of the phenomenal aspect of the body, just as it is the form of every object. Hence it follows from this that the will is the knowledge *a priori* of the body, and the body is the knowledge *a posteriori* of the will.¹²

Since one's body is a condition of the knowledge of his will, nobody can imagine his will apart from his body. The will in its highest objectification, that is, in human beings, manifests itself in both ways—as the subject as well as the object of knowledge. It is because of this that Schopenhauer says that the object becomes one with the subject and this union is a miracle. However, the knowledge of the identity of will and body its elf being the most direct knowledge, it can never be demonstrated.¹³

In order to establish that the human body is the objectified will, Schopenhauer proceeds to give a teleological analysis of the body.¹⁴ Everything in the body is taken as the visible expression of our principal desires. The various parts of our body correspond to these desires through which the will expresses itself. For example, the principal desire of hunger and sex are objecti-

fied in teeth, throat, bowels and in the organs of generation.¹⁵ Similarly the will to know builds the brain, just as the will to grasp forms the hands.¹⁶

Therefore, these pairs—the forms of will on the one hand, and the different parts of the body on the other, are but two sides of the same reality. This is best seen, as Schopenhauer maintains, in *emotions* where the feeling and the internal bodily changes form one complex unit.¹⁷ It may be argued however that this identity between will and body, as seen by Schopenhauer in emotion, cannot always be established. Let us take a few examples of emotion like anger, fear, joy etc., which are generally found to be expressed in some typical behaviour of the person undergoing that particular emotion. When a man is angry, we see a frowning face or when somebody is happy we see him or her smiling. Similarly, we can also say that while a smiling face indicates the happy mood of the person smiling, a gloomy face, in contrast is a good indication that the man is upset. But it will be a great mistake to draw the conclusion from the above example that the human body and will are identical. For we can cite some other example where we do not see a proper correspondence between the two. Take an example of the complicated mental state of someone who comes to know that his wife died during delivery but has given birth to a charming boy – here the person may be very happy to know that he has got a son but is extremely broken to know about his wife's death (whom he loved very much). He may remain silent, with a gloomy face, may even cry, but that does not mean that he is unhappy to get a son, though his crying or not smiling may seem to indicate so. Nor can we say that he is happy to know that his wife is dead when we see him holding the baby very eagerly.

Therefore, it is not always necessary that a particular act of will is followed by a particular movement of the body in an emotional state. Nor is it true that a particular movement of the body is always in correspondence with a typical emotion or mental state. For instance, a person may be trembling out of great fear while another may be so out of anger. Hence, trembling is not a typical sign to represent anger or fear, rather it may represent both.

Thus knowing bodily reactions in an emotional state is not the same thing as knowing the state of mind. and hence mind and body are not identically related to each other as so emphatically claimed by Schopenhauer.

Nevertheless, there can be some kind of relationship between the body and will. For instance, there may be a relationship of implications which can be stated as follows : If 'a' stands for will and 'b' stands for body, then, 'a' might imply 'b' ($a \rightarrow b$) even though they are not the same thing. At the same time, if 'b' also implies 'a' ($b \rightarrow a$), then the relationship between 'a' and 'b' can be stated as one to one. In other words, a one to one relationship between 'a' and 'b' means that 'a' implies 'b' as well as 'b' implies 'a' though they are not the same thing. Therefore, even if mind and body are not identically related as claimed by Schopenhauer (i.e., $a = b$), we can still think of a possibility for that. A particular reaction of body need not necessarily imply a particular state of mind though, however, such a relationship might exist or happen contingently. Similarly, a typical emotion may not necessarily lead to a particular bodily movement though that kind of relationship too may exist occasionally. Thus, to prove the existence of an identical relationship between body and will is not a kind of logical identity as Schopenhauer claimed but a contingent one.

Having discussed the relationship between the will and body let us now see how Schopenhauer looks at the relationship between the will and intellect. Schopenhauer maintains that the will which as the thing-in-itself is unconscious, constitutes the real nature of human beings. But it seems to be contradicted when it is further said that man, whose essential nature is consciousness, is constituted by unconscious will. In order to establish this Schopenhauer wants us to believe that intellect, which conditioned consciousness, is only a product of the will. He compares the intellect to a parasite¹⁸ which absolutely depends upon the will.

In line with his teleological analysis, according to which every part of the body is a visible expression of our principal desires, Schopenhauer explains that the brain, whose function intellect is, is formed by the presence of the will to know in us.¹⁹ Intellect is said to be a mere accident of our being which can never directly enter into our inner nature. According to Schopenhauer the intellect is produced by the will in the organism only in order to know the phenomenal world (which includes the physical body) presented by the thing-in-itself under the forms of knowledge. However, Schopenhauer's this explanation does not tally with his earlier description of the intellect as a parasite since a parasite merely lives off another but gives no useful return, whereas the intellect here serves the purpose of knowing the phenomenal world to the organism which otherwise is just impossible.

The organism, according to Schopenhauer, being the immediate manifestation of the will, is primary while the intellect is only a secondary phenomenon. He uses a couple of simile to explain the relationship between the will and the intellect. According to him, if a plant is taken as a symbol of consciousness, the root would stand for the will which is essential and original

and the 'corona' may be compared with the intellect which has sprung from the will. Here the point of separation/contact of the will and the intellect is the *I* which belongs to both. 'This I' is the self-conscious individual, which is said to be the 'connecting link of the whole phenomenon'. Because in the self-consciousness only the individual comes in contact with the phenomenal world as well as with the will in time, i.e., the will known in its particular act under the form of time. For this reason the individual is also said to be the "temporal starting point" of the phenomenon.²⁰

Hence the intellect is said to be a servant of the will and merely serves the end of self-preservation of the individual. However, the most appropriate comparison in Schopenhauer's opinion regarding relationship of the two, i.e., the will and the intellect will be that of "strong blind man who carries on his shoulders the lame man who can see".²¹ In a sense this example does some justification to some of the things Schopenhauer wants to say about the relationship between the two, that the will is blind and unconscious but having the efficacy whereas the intellect, though knowing, is unable to take action by itself. This comparison helps in bringing out what he wanted to say about the fact that the will or the functioning of the will without the intellect is blind and irrational but no intellect nor its function is possible without the will. Here the will like the strong blind man is carrying the intellect like the lame man who can see on his shoulders.

Thus in opposition to the usual view (traced back to Anaxagoras) according to which intelligence is the origin of everything, Schopenhauer holds that it is the unconscious will which constitutes the metaphysical substratum of the organism.²² Hence, the will which is treated in other system as the last, is the very first with Schopenhauer.²³

But what surprises us is the fact that the will which is so far explained by him as the very first, the 'master' so to say in his word, is at times governed or ruled by the servant, that is, the intellect. According to Schopenhauer the intellect can even manage to deny either temporarily or permanently the will of which it is a mere objectification. Hamlyn has rightly called it therefore a paradox²⁴ Schopenhauer tries to solve the problem by giving some degree of autonomy to the operation of the intellect. For him the intellect, though is granted with a degree of autonomy, is ultimately in the service of the will. It is because the intellect is also like everything else a mere objectification of the will and therefore subject to its dominance. Like other organs objectifying our other needs, the brain is the objectification of the intellect; and so it may function in ways which are different from other organs functioning. The brain may be given some autonomy from the will in functioning but yet the brain's functioning also depends on the functioning of the organism as a whole since the organism as whole is the objectification of the will. In this sense, the intellect ultimately depends upon the will which is manifested as the will-to-live in the organism.

It needs to be emphasized at this point that in Schopenhauer's philosophy the relationship between the will and the intellect assumes a very crucial role. It determines to a large measure his epistemology, metaphysics and ethics.²⁵ In spite of this, however, it is also true that Schopenhauer was not successful in portraying a single and an unique relationship between the two. Instead, as one goes through his writings one eventually comes across with different relationships at various stages in the development of his argument. So it becomes rather confusing or even puzzling too. For instance, at some point Schopenhauer argues that the intellect cannot know the will as the thing-in-itself²⁶ whereas at some other point he seems to believe exactly the

opposite that the intellect can know the will as the thing-in-itself. Similarly, intellect being considered by Schopenhauer as the servant²⁷ of the will has also been allowed to deny the will, at times.²⁸ It is therefore probable that one might even find some more patterns of the will and intellect relationship in Schopenhauer.²⁹ This multiplicity of the relationship between the will and intellect gives rise to a number of conceptual problems that arise mostly from the fact that all different patterns may not be logically consistent with each other. The fact that Schopenhauer first assumes a given pattern and then in the course of his argument he changes or reinterprets the pattern being assumed suggest not only that he failed to carry out his inquiry with one single pattern but also that it may lead to various ambiguities in his basic philosophical standpoint. If it is not to be so then it must imply that there is some unifying principle that binds all possible patterns into a single and an unique pattern or relationship and hence there is no logical flaw in his analysis.

So far we have seen how Schopenhauer attempted to modify in his own way the Kantian approach. And it has been remarked that the "uniqueness of Schopenhauer's system does not derive from any exceptionally novel insights, but from the manner in which he was able to weave extremely diverse strands of thought into a single encompassing system".³⁰ It is true that Schopenhauer exhibited an originality and inventiveness in the subsequent development of the Kantian philosophy and will always be accredited with the honour of introducing a drastic change in the structure of the thought of his time. Nevertheless, it must not make us ignore the shortcomings in his endeavour to modify the Kantian thought.

As we have already seen, in his attempt to bring out a satisfactory link between the noumenal self and the phenomenal self through the identification of body and will, Schopenhauer was

only partially successful, that is, the relationship is only a contingent one and not a logical one as was thought by him. Similar or even worse is the case with his attempt to identify the thing-in-itself with the will. Strictly speaking we are not given any reason for the identification apart from that one of his own reason for thinking that there is a thing-in-itself. Even his reason for thinking that there is a thing-in-itself does not and cannot justify the fact that it must be the will alone and not anything else. One possible reason why Schopenhauer believes in the existence of a thing-in-itself may be because we can have another kind of knowledge which is different from ordinary knowledge or conditional knowledge of phenomena. This we can have directly and unconditionally; and the same we know when we act so. This is to say – we know that we act directly and unconditionally and anything known conditionally is a mere representation. Thus, what we can know directly and immediately, that which is unconditional, cannot be representation. Hence Schopenhauer believes it must be something beyond representation and so it is the thing-in-itself. However, we cannot help saying that to prove that there is something different from representation does not necessarily imply that thing must be the thing-in-itself. And this is what Schopenhauer perhaps failed to see. Even if we agree with him that we can know in an unconditional way that we act and that that knowledge is different from our knowledge of phenomena, it does not necessarily follow that we can also know that which is beyond phenomena. The relationship between the non-phenomenal and the phenomenal still remains unclear. Therefore, it is a mere assumption that anything non-phenomenal must be the ground of phenomena (which Kant said earlier) or beyond the phenomena and so it is the thing-in-itself. This shows that Schopenhauer's argument for believing in the existence of a thing-in-itself and his identification of it with the will becomes the same thing. Before trying to establish that

there is a thing-in-itself and it is the will, Schopenhauer should have proved the premise that anything that is not a representation is a thing-in-itself and also that anything that is a thing-in-itself is the will.³¹

In order to justify his claim for the identification of the thing-in-itself with the will, Schopenhauer draws out difference between human beings and the rest of the objectifications of the will. For, he maintains that it is human beings alone who can act in *true* sense and can have a direct and unconditional awareness of that fact, whereas the rest of nature though being the objectification of the same will cannot do so. All this seems to be rather confusing and perhaps might only help those critics who maintain that Schopenhauer was not a very systematic thinker at times.³² At any rate it often becomes difficult to understand how different arguments fit together in Schopenhauer's system of thought. And this is very true in the present issue. For he maintains that the whole world is the objectification of the same will and yet he talks about *four distinct grades* wherein he places human beings at the very top. Again he says that only human beings can act in a true sense and not the other manifestations of the will. However, what all these facts can at best teach us is that we can learn different aspects of our action and the will and also know the position of the human beings in Schopenhauer's estimation of things but it is far from justifying the claim that the will is the thing-in-itself.

Obviously then the question which might arise is that what is the relevance of Schopenhauer's concept of will within his philosophy as well as in relation to other philosophers. Within his philosophy the concept of will plays the pivotal role because it provides the basis of his anti-intellectualism. Schopenhauer's major achievement lies in that. His anti-intellectualism has brought out a reversal of traditional German philosophy which

was during his time at the height of Rationalism. Whether Schopenhauer's claim that no philosopher before him, not even Kant, had proper appreciation of the concept of will is true or not, is certainly true of him that he had exceptional influence on subsequent thought. Undoubtedly the parent source of modern anti-intellectualist stream of thinking is Schopenhauer, if Nietzsche, Freud and Wittgenstein could be regarded as being influenced by him. In relation to Kant, in particular, his concept of will has a special significance because it is with the help of the concept of will Schopenhauer put forward a remarkably original proof of the existence of unconditional knowledge. But he mistook this proof to be a proof of the thing-in-itself which is unknown and unknowable in Kant. Even if Schopenhauer could not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of Kant's indeterminacy, he has contributed positively towards the advancement of our domain of knowledge. But within his own domain of thought, Schopenhauer could not provide a logically consistent analysis. The various manifestations of will and their relations to one another could not be shown to be unique or one-to-one by Schopenhauer. This logical inconsistency has reduced the uniqueness of his concept of will to a large extent.³³

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NOTES

1. Mo., C. T. J., "Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance", *The Monist*, Vol. VII, 1896-97.
2. In this context we may refer to Schopenhauer's reaction to Hegel whom he used to call as 'clumsy charlatan'. For Hegel whatever is rational is real and whatever is real is rational. In contrast, Schopenhauer asserts that the world is not an embodiment of any such rational principle. Intellect, according to him, is the servant of will, which he takes to be the source of all forms of Rationalism, whether metaphysical or Scientific.
3. Patrick Gardiner remarks : " In Schopenhauer's conception of existence there was an explicit and uncompromising reversal of the traditional approach. He made it his object to show, not that the world is governed according to some beneficent teleological principle or that it is the embodiment of certain fundamental rational categories, but that, on the contrary, what lies at its centre is something antithetical to all reason and value, namely, a blind unconscious force or striving he termed 'Will' For Schopenhauer, in fact, all forms of rationalism-metaphysical and scientific alike-involve an illicit projection into the ultimate nature of reality of principles whose actual source and spring is the human intellect alone". See Patrick Gardiner, "Irrationalism" in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (ed.) Paul Edwards, (Collier McMillan, London, 1967), Vol. IV, p. 214.
4. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* (trans. by E. S. J. Payne; 2 vols., Indian Hills, Colorado : Faloon's Wing Press, 1958; paperback, New York : Dover, 1969), Vol. I, p. 164.
5. Bryan Magee, *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, Oxford University Press : New York, 1983), pp. 237-8.
6. *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I, p. 112.
7. Schopenhauer himself says, "What Kant opposed as thing-in-itself to the mere appearance (to which appearance I give the more explicit name of "presentment") and held to be absolutely unknowable—that this thing-in-itself, I say, this substratum of all appearances, i. e., of all Nature, is no other than that which is immediately and perfectly familiar to us, in the inner most depths of our being, as *will*; that consequently this will, far from being, as all former philosophers assumed, inseparable from knowledge, and a mere result thereof, is radically different from and completely independent of knowledge (which is of quite secondary and later origin), and can therefore exist and manifest itself without it, as in point of fact it actually does in every department of Nature below the animal kingdom; that this will, as the sole thing-in-itself, the only truly real, the alone original and metaphysical, in a world where all

- else is appearance merely, i. e., mere presentment, lends to everything whatsoever the force by which it comes to exist and operate....". See, Arthur Schopenhauer, "The will in Nature" (tr.) in Jekyee, W. (ed.) *The Wisdom of Schopenhauer* (London, Watts and Co. 1911) p. 17.
8. *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I, p. 99.
 9. *Ibid*, p. 100.
 10. *Ibid*.
 11. *Ibid*, p. 102.
 12. *Ibid*, p. 100
 13. *Ibid*, p. 102.
 14. *Ibid*, p. 108.
 15. It is in such ideas of Schopenhauer that one can see a direct relationship between his ideas on sexual instincts and Freud's concept of 'Libido'.
 16. *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. II, p. 259.
 17. Apart from this direct objectifications of the will in the human body, Schopenhauer also gives examples of indirect objectification. With reference to the nervous system he observes : "... the whole nervous system constitutes the antennae of the will, which it stretches within and without". See, Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, (trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp: 3 Vols. 7th ed. : London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd.,) Vol. II, p. 482.
 18. "... the intellect is a mere accident of our being; for it is a function of the brain, which, together with the nerves and spinal cord connected with it, is a mere fruit, a product, nay, so far, a parasite of the rest of the organism; for it does not directly enter into its inner constitution, but merely serves the end of self-preservation by regulating the relations of the external world". *The World as Will and Idea*, Vol. II, p. 411
 19. "... the brain also, like everything else, is will". *The World as Will and Idea*, Vol. III, p. 7.
 20. "This I is the *pro tempore* identical subject of knowing and willing... It is the temporal starting-point and connecting link of the whole phenomenon, i. e., of the objectification of the will : it conditions indeed the phenomenon, but is also conditioned by it". *The World as Will and Idea*, Vol. II, p. 413.
 21. *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. II, p. 209.
 22. "... for he (Anaxagoras) arbitrarily assumes a *Nous*, and intelligence, a creator of representations, as the first and original thing". *The World as Will and Idea* Vol. III, p. 2.

- “Schopenhauer, on the contrary, regarded reason as present only in man, a mere epiphenomenon in reality as whole”. See, Maurice Mandelbaum, *History, Man and Reason*, p. 324.
23. “... all philosophers before me, from the first to the last, place the true being or the kernel of man in the *knowing* consciousness, and accordingly have conceived and explained the I, or, in the case of many of them, its transcendental hypostatis called soul, as primarily and essentially *knowing*, nay, thinking, and only in consequence of this, secondarily and derivatively, as willing ...”. *The World as Will and Idea*, Vol. II, p. 409.
 24. D. W. Hamlyn, *Schopenhauer*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley), 1980, p. 102 and p. 169.
 25. Wayne Sheeks, “Schopenhauer’s Solution of the Intellect-Will Problem” in Michael Fox (ed.) *Schopenhauer : His Philosophical Achievements*, (Sussex, 1983), p. 68.
 26. *The World as Will and Idea*, Vol. I, p. 166.
 27. *Ibid*, p. 422.
 28. *Ibid*, p. 367.
 29. Wayne Sheeks, “Schopenhauer’s Solution of the Intellect-Will Problem”, in *Schopenhauer : His Philosophical Achievements*, p. 68.
 30. M. Mandelbaum, *History, Man and Reason*, p. 322.
 31. D. W. Hamlyn, *Schopenhauer*, p. 93.
 32. D. W. Hamlyn, “Schopenhauer on Action and Will”, in *Idealism : Past and Present*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture, Vol. 7, 1972-73, p. 127.
 33. I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor P. A. Griffiths of the University of Warwick for valuable suggestions and to Prof. Mrinal Miri and Dr. C. P. M. Namboodiry for helpful comments.