

## CRITIQUE AND IMAGINATION

### *Introduction*

The present essay has a two-fold objective, the first internal and the second, external. The internal or interpretative objective is to suggest a certain mode of understanding the unity of the critical philosophy of Kant and the external or theoretical objective is to open out the possibility of a critique of cultural reason on the basis of such an understanding. For both the tasks, the faculty of imagination would prove pivotal. In fact, I shall be arguing that imagination provides an indispensable clue to the articulation of the unity of the critical enterprise as a whole. The perspective I hope to develop builds up from the *Critique of Judgement*.<sup>1</sup> As the third critique is a relatively neglected Kantian text, I shall in the introduction, briefly indicate, what I take to be its strategic role in an attempt to have a comprehension of the critical project as a whole.

The Critique of Judgement, even where it is taken into account, has generally been appropriated from a limited point of view, as the site of Kant's theory of aesthetics. I do not wish to minimise the importance and interest of Kant's theory of aesthetic judgement but I would like to suggest that apart from this limited concern, the Critique of Judgement, especially the two introductions, has a much larger relevance in the context of the nature and method of philosophy in the Kantian perspective.<sup>2</sup>

More specifically, I believe that the third critique is valuable in three contexts of philosophical reflection :

1. *Anthropological* in so far as it provides an all important clue for understanding the philosophical anthropology of Kant. I am of course referring to the notion of a reflective

judgement and the associated idea of its universal communicability based on what Kant calls 'common sense'.

2. *Methodological* — At this level, I find the notion of reflective judgement extremely significant. As is well-known, Kant distinguishes between a logical determinant judgement and an aesthetic reflective judgement.<sup>3</sup> Abstracting from the specific purpose to which this distinction is put, I shall attempt to use this distinction as the basis for the distinction between *significance* and *symbolisation* on the one hand, and *cognition* and *comprehension* on the other.<sup>4</sup> These two distinctions will prove fundamental for the theory of culture I am attempting to move towards.

But apart from this matter of a distinction between two types of judgement, the faculty of judgement itself is of great importance; on the one hand, judgement as a faculty different from both understanding and reason, points to certain distinctive aspects of human nature as understood by Kant.<sup>5</sup> In this sense, the faculty of judgement provides a distinctive point of entry into Kant's philosophical anthropology. On the other, the notion of reflective judgement, as a form of the investigative procedure of reason, will throw light upon the methodology of the critique itself,

3. *Systematic or architectonic* — Insofar as the general theory of judgment thus provides an understanding of the methodology of critical reason, it could be claimed that the Critique of Judgement provides us with a perspective on the unity of the critical programme as a whole.

#### *The Anthropological dimension of Critique*

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant formulates the basic questions of Philosophy, as:<sup>6</sup>

What can I know.

What ought I to do.

and What may I hope for.

In his *Lectures on Logic*,<sup>7</sup> Kant again recurs to this formulation of the basic problematics of philosophy, but he does

not merely repeat it; instead, he adds a very significant comment upon the earlier formulation, for Kant, now, suggests that all these three questions depend upon of fourth, namely what is man? It is in this sense that they are reducible to anthropology. In the *Lectures on Logic* Kant does not answer his own question what is man. It is true that in his lectures on anthropology, brought together under the title "*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of view*"<sup>8</sup> we do have Kant's views on the nature and powers of man. But this empirical or in Kant's terms, 'pragmatic anthropology' does not help us very much in our search for a grounding of the critical problematic, for, by its very nature, such a pragmatic anthropology takes men to be an empirically constituted subject and it is clear that at this level we cannot raise the transcendental question of the constitutive powers of knowledge and action. It is this notion of the constitutive nature of reason that may serve as the philosophical-anthropological basis of the critique. From this point of view, we may have to work out the required foundations within the critique itself, rather than look for it outside. But in our search for such foundations, we can very well consider the contribution of all the three critiques, and particularly the *Critique of Judgement*, instead of confining ourselves only to the first critique.

It may be remembered that the Critique of Reason makes an all important contrast between an archetypal intellect and the human discursive intellect;<sup>9</sup> in fact, not merely a two fold distinction between the divine and the human, but a *three-fold* distinction between the divine, the human and animal intelligence, i.e., between the archetypal, the discursive and the purely ectypal, can be made. Man's intellect is neither archetypal nor ectypal, but constitutive. Experience, in the humanly significant sense, is the result of ordering the manifold of sense according to pure principles of order and relation i.e., the categories. But the categories are pure and unmixed with sense and hence their applicability

to the sense manifold has to be mediated by way of imagination and its function of schematization. Here Kant distinguishes between an empirical or reproductive imagination and a transcendental or productive imagination. Pure imagination is the ground of the possibility of knowledge itself and as such, i.e., as a transcendental faculty, occupies a vital place in the economy of human nature. The *Critique of Judgement* gives further importance to imagination in its teaching that imagination bridges the gap between sensibility and understanding not merely in the form of schemata, but also in the form of reflective judgement. According to the third critique, sensibility may be in harmony with the understanding, either by way of a rule of the understanding itself, in which case, we have objective cognition in the form of a *determinant judgement*, or there may be a spontaneous play of harmony between sensibility and understanding, and we may experience this harmony as a pure delight.<sup>10</sup> Both kinds of harmony, it may be noted, is brought about by imagination. So, once again in terms of the *Critique of Judgement*, we can see the centrality of imagination in the architectonic of the critique. It is this centrality of imagination in the critical enterprise as a whole that I wish to focus upon now.

#### *Imagination and the Transcendental Deduction*

It is hardly necessary to comment upon the central place of the complex movement of thought which Kant calls "the transcendental deduction" in the critical programme as a whole and not merely in the first projection of it in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. However, because of the fact that in the first critique, the transcendental deduction is moved into such a central place, the formulation of the deduction in the *Critique of Pure Reason* has a certain exemplary significance for us. Hence our first task is to see the role of imagination in the transcendental deduction of the categories, and I suggest that this may be aided if we first briefly remind ourselves of the immediate as well as the larger objectives of the deduction.

The immediate objective, of course, is the justification of the employment of the pure concepts or categories and simultaneously to mark out the limits of their proper employment (The Analytic and the Dialectic). But in the very movement of such a justifying/limiting operation, we are led to a transcendence, a similar justification/limitation of the perspectives of rationalism and empiricism. But the deduction has other and larger ambitions also; firstly, it suggests that in so far the conditions of possibility of knowledge and experience have to be formulated in terms of an overall framework which has to include both the unity of consciousness and the things in themselves, i.e., insofar as the possibility of experiences presupposes both the subject and the object, each irreducible to the other and yet together necessary elements of the objectivity of our knowledge, the transcendental deduction suggests that it is necessary as well as possible to have a simultaneous solution of the problem of the self and the problem of the external world, what may be called Hume's problem and Descartes' problem. It may be mentioned that it is this which is the basic issue involved in the transcendence of empiricism-rationalism debate. But the deduction makes a further move also possible. The application of the categories is an exercise of autonomy, but this autonomy itself originates certain conceptual necessities. This idea of grounding obligation in freedom pre-figures the essential structure of the *Critique of Practical Reason*.<sup>11</sup>

But there is a problem here, for on the one hand, it is easy to appreciate the immensity of its ambitions, on the other, it is equally clear that the argumentative structure of the deduction does not at all seem to be what we expect of logical arguments. The description of this movement of thought as a '*deduction*' is sorely perplexing, for there are no clear sense of what are the premises, what are the rules of inference and what exactly are the conclusions; the crucial terms seem to be used in a number of senses and it is not at all clear how the transitions are affected. Partly

this is because we are sensitive only to the logical or argumentative aspect of what Kant calls 'a deduction'. Perhaps, it may be useful to remind ourselves that in his time, deduction also had a jurisdictional sense or meaning, as in grounding or justifying a right. I suggest it may be useful to revive this jurisdictional overtones of the transcendental deduction by thinking of the whole movement as concerned with an *epistemic right*, the right to employ the pure categories of the understanding to the content of sensibility. I suggest that the notion of an epistemic right may be given some substance in the following ways:

1. A right is meaningful only within certain limits of its proper exercise. Similarly, we are justified in applying the categories only within the limits of our experience. An attempt to apply them outside these bounds gives rise to various transgressions of epistemic claims.
2. A right is justifiable only if it can be shown that it is necessary for the achievement of something essential and proper. Similarly the categories are essential for objective cognition, and insofar as rationality is an essential part of human nature, the categories have a primordial functionality for beings such as men.
3. And lastly, a right is meaningful only insofar it can be based on a certain power to exercise it. Similarly the faculty of imagination grounds this capacity to apply the categories within the limits of the sense-manifold.


Given this framework of an epistemic right, we may formulate the issue of the transcendental deduction somewhat as follows:

The sense manifold  $\xrightarrow{\quad ? \quad}$  Objective judgements

The question now becomes, how can we, on the basis of representations in us, make judgements claiming objective validity i.e., valid not only for us, but for all men? That, as a matter of anthropological fact, we do so, i.e., that human

beings do make such claims, is not in dispute; in other words, what we are here concerned with is not the *quaestio facti*, but the *quaestio juris*,<sup>12</sup> as Kant puts it. That we do so would be a point in empirical anthropology and indeed an obvious and trivial one. But that we are *justified in doing so* that, in this sense, there can be a deduction of our epistemic right, is far from trivial and it is also an issue that cannot be settled by an empirical anthropology, for it is precisely this epistemic right that founds any empirical discipline whatever. The transcendental deduction is thus a *justification* of our epistemic practices.

It is also known that the Metaphysical Deduction is the opening move or the overture to the transcendental deduction proper. Using our schema, we may write the the Metaphysical Deduction into the schema as below:<sup>13</sup>



The Metaphysical Deduction takes the first step towards the transcendental solution. Objective judgements are possible only if the form of such judgements are common to all, for to be objective in the Kantian sense, is to be inter-subjectively valid; in so far as representations in us are, by their very nature, subjective, such subjective content could become inter-subjectively accessible only insofar, as their *form of articulation* is something which has a common accessibility — i.e., the content requires to be categorised, where the categories, precisely because they are *the form* of our thought, have a common relevance and significance for all subjects. But wherefrom do we get the categories and connectedly, can we give a complete and systematic enume-



ration of such forms; can there be a derivation of the forms of objective cognition which would be systematic, being based on a principle, rather than merely a groping and stumbling upon them, as happened with Aristotle?<sup>14</sup> It is this task which the Metaphysical Deduction sets up for itself in its derivation of the categories of the understanding from the logical forms of judgement.

But strangely enough, inspite of his claim that the derivation of the categories is methodic and based on a principle unlike in the case of Aristotle, the actual derivation in the Metaphysical Deduction does not explicate the method or the principle involved. Kant merely presents a configuration or table of twelve forms of judgement and he also provides a clue namely, that judgement involves synthesis.<sup>15</sup> In a judgement form, there is a type of formal synthesis and this provides a clue to the corresponding type of objective synthesis i.e., synthesis of the manifold of content. The movement of thought which goes from a given case to a rule is different from logical or determinant judgement which subsumes a given instance under a rule. Later on, in the *Critique of Judgement* Kant introduces the notion of a *reflective judgement*. Given a configuration or pattern, the reflective judgement makes sense of the pattern by hitting upon a maxim which will render it intelligible. The reflective judgement is heuristic and innovative. I am suggesting that the methodology of the Metaphysical Deduction is that of the reflective judgement.

Reflective judgements as well as determinant judgements have both a component of imagination. We have already seen how in a determinant judgement, a category or pure concept of the understanding is applied to certain sense given content and how this is possible only in terms of the schematization of the category by the imagination. As distinguished from the local or determinant judgement, in a reflective judgement, a maxim is arrived at on the basis of a certain natural harmony of imagination and the under-





standing; it is this harmony of imagination with the understanding which leads to the discovery. Thus in both kinds of operation we can see the role of imagination; in the one case, i.e. the determinant judgement, imagination is applicative, whereas, in the case of reflective judgement, imagination is innovative. A determinant judgement *contextualizes*; given a general concept, it applies it to a specific instance. But a reflective judgement *de-contextualizes*; given an instance or a pattern, it discloses the role of its intelligibility. Human experience requires both a contextualizing as well as a de-contextualizing power or competence.

After these comments called forth by the first step of the Metaphysical Deduction, we may pick up the main thread and resume our consideration of the major movement of the transcendental deduction.

*The transcendental deduction: the objective deduction*

We may re-utilise the scheme as so far filled out.



*The Subjective Deduction*

The subjective deduction shows that only when representations are all referred to the same consciousness, can they be called *my* experiences; one of the pre-suppositions of experience is the *unity of self-consciousness*. But since the self is the pre-supposition of all objective cognition, it itself cannot be thought of as a substantial unity. As Kant expresses it, the unity of consciousness cannot be thought of as the consciousness of unity, as a something.<sup>18</sup> Hence there can be no judgement of self-consciousness — it is not the object of knowing. Instead, the unity of self-consciousness is expressed by the faculty of imagination in the form of the *unity of apperception*. Hence, imagination provides the pre-suppositional basis for all objective cognition. Since it is originative of experience, Kant calls it productive imagination and since it is the ground of experience, it is not empirical but *transcendental* or *pure imagination*.

The categories are different forms of unity, whereas the unity of apperception is the basic or original unity itself. In this sense, we may also say that the categories are the different articulations of the unity of self-consciousness. Furthermore, the categories are 'pure' concepts meaning thereby that they are non-sensuous. In order that they may be applied to sensuous content, they must be as it were, made sensuous. Kant therefore speaks of needing a middle term between the categories and the manifold of sense, i.e., something which is at once pure in the sense of not being derived from sensibility and yet sensuous in the sense of not being discursive but intuitive.<sup>17</sup> And this, we are told, is time as the pure form of our intuitions. The categories are now taken as different forms or *determinations of time*.<sup>18</sup> This process of, as it were, 'translating' the categories in the medium of time as a pure a priori form of sensibility is schematization and schematism is the function of imagination.<sup>19</sup> Insofar as categories cannot be applied without such schematization, imagination, in the sense of the faculty responsible for schematization, becomes one of the transcendental roots of cognition.

It has been said sometimes that the doctrine of schematism is an artificial and laboured piece of architectonic machinery on the part of Kant and that Kant's resort to it is comparable to the Ptolemaic resort to epicycles. But as against such a denigrating understanding of the role and function of the doctrine of schematism in the critical programme, I feel that it is an essential part of the enterprise as a whole.<sup>20</sup> This necessary role of the doctrine can be seen if we, for a moment, pause to reflect upon the *symmetry* of the transcendental movement as a whole. On the one hand, the transcendental deduction proceeds *from above*, from concepts to data. This downward movement is balanced, on the other hand, by the movement of the schematism argument, which proceeds from the data to concepts. If the deduction is concerned to show the *applicability* of concepts to sense experience, the argument of schematism is concerned to

show that data have a certain *suitability* to receive this rational order, for insofar as *time* is the very form of sensibility, *the serial order* given to data by the temporal form, makes the content of experience, fit to receive the rational ordering of the categories.

The idea of schematism is Kant's response to the problem of heterogeneity between concepts and intuition, between the understanding and sensibility. Unlike Leibnitz, Kant does not deny the heterogeneity; in fact he insists upon the recognition of the two sources of our knowledge as the point of entry into the critical programme itself. But once the heterogeneity of the two sources is recognised, the problem of how they can come together in making knowledge possible arises unavoidably. And indeed much earlier than the schematism chapter, in the transcendental aesthetic itself, we have been prepared for the task. For the aesthetic itself has made the distinction between a *a priori* element in sensibility itself and its a *posteriori* content. It is precisely because there is an a *a priori* factor in sense experience itself that sense experience has the particular character and significance it does. Moreover, the fact that there is already an a *a priori* factor in sense itself prepares the ground for sensibility being equipped to receive further a *a priori* determinations by way of categories. In this sense, within the structure of the aesthetic itself, there is a pre-figuration of the schematization problem and its resolution. This pre-figuration of the schematization problem from within the aesthetic is further reinforced by the overall thrust of the *Analytic*. If the *Aesthetic* suggests that there is an a *a priori* element in sensibility, the *Analytic* suggests, in counter-point fashion, that within the sphere of the understanding, i.e., the realm of concepts, we must recognise an a *a posteriori* element for the a *a priori* of the categories have to be applied and only in their meeting with the content of sense experience that the pure concepts of the understanding become epistemic powers. Without this applicability to content the pure concepts are empty.


I suggest that one way of appreciating the need and functionality of schematism within the overall philosophical economy of the first critique is to look upon it as the *convergence point* of the demands of *applicability* (concepts to data) and of *suitability* (from the data to concepts). But the exigencies of the problem of heterogeneity extends beyond the limits of the first critique itself, for we require a similar mediation between theoretical reason and practical reason. It is true that Kant holds that there can be no schematism in the sphere of practical reason; in the place of *schema*: we are told that there can only be a *Type* in practical reason.<sup>21</sup> We may have to understand this notion of a type and ask ourselves whether in a different form, imagination may not be involved here also. But this is only a movement within the sphere of practical reason. We may also have to ask whether there are mediations between theoretical reason and practical reason and whether here also imagination may not be involved.

*The interface between the first and second critiques*

The critique of pure reason has explained how the idea of nature as an objective domain of relationships is accessible to the human mind. We have seen that the objectivity of our experience is made possible by imagination which schematizes the categories and applies them to the manifold of sense. Here imagination correlates understanding, the faculty of concepts, with sensibility, the faculty of intuitions. But the critical meaning of objectivity is not exhausted merely by this correlation of understanding and sensibility. For Kant, to be objective means to be accessible to all beings with the same epistemic powers; in other words, objectivity means inter-subjective accessibility. Nature is objective since it is inter-subjective. The critical or 'copernican' meaning of objectivity holds that it is the function of inter-subjectivity rather than the latter being a consequence of the former. That would be an instance of dogmatism, which first seeks to comprehend objects as

they are in themselves. As against such a view, the critical view holds that the objectivity of our cognition must be seen as a function of the inter-subjective processes of experience. If so, a second pre-suppositional principle would be the idea of inter-subjectivity. But it must be noted that the inter-subjectivity we are looking for is the *pre-supposition* of all empirical cognition; hence it cannot be merely an empirical or 'natural' inter-subjectivity; on the contrary, it must be the pure idea of a community of transcendental subjects, i.e., the *kingdom of ends*. The question now becomes how is this idea of community made available to us. It is this question of a pure community that moves us into the argumentative world of the critique of practical reason.

*The transcendental explication of the idea of community*



Here again, we start from the subjective phenomena of feelings, impulses etc., and the question becomes: how on the basis of these subjective states, are we enabled to act in accordance with an objectively binding moral principle i.e., how do we transcend the subjectivity of impulse and act in accordance with a pure principle of obligation? As

before, it is to be noted that there is no question whether we do so, i.e., we do have an idea of a purely binding obligation in the form of the moral law. The question for transcendental ethics is not to dissolve this sense of ought in the acids of scepticism, but to show how this is possible.

Taking our point of departure from this acknowledgement of obligation, Kant points out that the very sense of obligation or duty implies in the sense of being intelligible only on the presupposition of the freedom of the will (ought implies can). I can recognise a pure obligation, i.e., something as binding upon me, not because I have this or that interest or desire, but because it is intrinsically imperative and in this recognition of the ought, I become aware of my autonomy. This awareness of autonomy is an awareness of my essential will as free of all empirical inclination and desire — it is the awareness of myself as a noumenal subject. This is not, strictly speaking, a *knowledge of myself*, for such a cognition of a noumenal being would be impossible. This awareness therefore is a feeling of reverence but there is a very special and *sui generis* feeling for here, it is, as it were, the very determination of my reason by the moral law which is felt as a feeling of respect for the moral. The moral law is not based on this feeling; to think so would be to undermine its very nature altogether. If anything, it would be more correct to say that the feeling of reverence is the effect or consequence of the recognition of the moral law, but we must take note that when we speak of causality here, we are thinking of the causality of freedom, rather than causality of nature. We may not be able to say how exactly it takes place, but we do know *that* it does take place. Here again it is to be noted that this capacity for the feeling of reverence for the moral law is a distinctive aspect of human nature; once more a subjective capacity becomes essential to being what we are.



Respect is ultimately respect for subjects or persons and hence the feeling of respect gives rise to an idea of the kingdom of ends, the notion of a community of free subjects. This is not, of course, a concept of the understanding, but it is a product of imagination, what Kant calls "the type of practical reason". This, is not to be taken as merely the schematism of the first critique. Strictly speaking, there can be no schematism here, for we are not to do with sensibility. But the *function of schematism* is to make possible the applicability of the pure concepts to sense experience; it is to fulfil one of the conditions of the possibility of cognition. But here also, moral action is possible only in terms of respect for a universally binding norm and the notion of a kingdom of ends gives us precisely this symbolic type of a community of moral subjects. The type of practical reason is the symbolic medium in which the universality of the moral law could be recognised and this symbolic type, not being a concept, may be regarded as the function of imagination.

*The transition to the Critique of Judgement*

Imagination plays a vital role in the formation of both the idea of objective nature and the idea of community. But the idea of nature explicated so far is purely the idea of a transcendental framework of categories — it is purely the idea of a formal unity. But we must concretise this idea of nature as a formal unity into the idea of nature as an organic unity. We must think of nature, not merely at the abstract level as the constituted domain of the categories, but also at the concrete level as a system of empirical laws, or as an organic unity. Similarly, the pure idea of community, the transcendental kingdom of ends must be 'naturalised'. In other words, both Nature and Community must be concretized. It is this concretization of both which is taken up in '*The Critique of Judgement*' and here again we find imagination as essential to this step of concretization.

*Nature and Community in the Critique of Judgement*

We have already observed that the *Critique of Judgement* has a certain essential place in the development and deepening of the critical philosophy as a whole. As such, its significance need not be restricted only to the sphere of the aesthetic judgement which is, of course, its *prima facie* concern. Looked at merely from this angle, it may appear that the third critique is merely the opening up of a new problematic, namely, the phenomenon of taste, to the critical concern. But the essential continuity of the third critique with the earlier projections of transcendental philosophy is not so clearly revealed to our view if we look at it thus as mainly an attempt to extend the territory of critical investigations.

This deeper connection and inner bond with the first two critical programmes becomes more visible only if we look upon it as responding to certain inner tasks which arise from within the earlier framework. From this point of view, I suggest that the *Critique of Judgement* may be seen as a concretisation of the ideas of nature and community. The first programme relates the critique of judgement to the first, while the second relates it to the critique of practical reason.

We have already seen that from within the framework of the critique of pure reason, nature can be comprehended only as the transcendental domain of the constitutive function of the pure categories of the understanding. But while this transcendental constitution of objectivity is necessary, yet Kant seems to have felt that it cannot be also a sufficient condition of possibility of science as an ongoing human enterprise. Thereby an entirely new question, a dynamic question of accounting for the progressiveness and developing character of science arises at the threshold of our critical investigation.<sup>22</sup> This point can be also seen in terms of a point of criticism which is usually brought forward against the achievements of the first critique. It is said that

the critique of pure reason gives us a static picture of knowledge in general and of scientific knowledge in particular, whereas critics like Karl Popper, have maintained that the very essence of science is its growth.<sup>23</sup> From within the limits of the first critique, this progressiveness and developmental character of scientific knowledge remains unthematized. The issue therefore is whether this growth of science can be given a certain transcendental grounding or whether we should leave it merely for a psychological-empirical analysis.

As H. W. Cassirer notes in his *Commentary on the Critique of Judgement*, this raises an altogether new question for transcendental philosophy, for here, Kant is suggesting that science as an ongoing human enterprise requires in addition to the abstract constitutive principles of the first critique, also another presupposition i.e., we must be able to think of nature as an organic system of empirical laws, for merely the constitutive principles are not restrictive enough.<sup>24</sup> For example, insofar as the category of cause is an *a priori* constitutive category, it follows that knowledge of phenomena must be in conformity with the causal form; this is what is meant by saying that the category is constitutive of experience. But there may be an ultimate irreducibility of many kinds of causal laws between which there are no broad empirical affinities. As far as the understanding goes, it is possible that the causal complexity of the world may be so great that there is no organic or systematic inter-connections between the various causal connections; in other words, transcendental laws are too formal or general and hence leave open the possibilities of an unmanageable complexity and multiplicity. But such radical diversity would seem to be antithetical to the possibility of science as a human project. We therefore may have to assume further conditions which would offer us some hope of a certain organic unity and simplicity of laws.<sup>25</sup> But such pre-suppositions, while they differ from the constitutive principles, are in their own fashion and manner transcen-

dental. They are not merely empirical or psychological assumptions, but rather they are the pre-suppositions of the possibility of science as a human enterprise.<sup>26</sup> While we can and must differentiate them maxims regulative of inquiry from the constitutive categorical principles, yet they must be given a transcendental status. It is thus that the unity and organic conception of nature as a system of empirical laws is distinguished by Kant as an achievement of reflective judgement from the determinant judgement. Kant speaks of the reflective judgement as concerned with formal purposiveness of nature in the sense that in the light of this requirement, we are to conceive of nature as fitted to fulfil the demands of progressive inquiry. We are permitted to conceive of nature as having an affinity with our understanding such that we may in this sense think of it as purposive. But the purposiveness that is allowable here is to be distinguished in two important respects from absolute or dogmatic teleology. First of all, the kind of purposiveness we are concerned with here is the fittingness of nature for the comprehensibility of its relationships as a system of laws. While of course, the requirements of classificatory systems do not exhaust the full range of the matter, yet the classificatory ideal is a very good example of the point. That phenomena should allow of being comprehended by us in terms of a classical order of genera and species, that the taxonomic divisions should be applicable to nature illustrates the subjective purposiveness Kant is having in mind here.<sup>27</sup> We have to presume that nature is such that our classificatory models have a real applicability. But this purposiveness is secondly, 'formal', in the sense that we are primarily concerned with the *system of laws*; at this stage, we are not raising the issue of an individual object itself as an organism. Rather, it is with the organic unity of our knowledge of nature that is the concern here. Hence like transcendental principles in general, we are here concerned not so much with phenomena as with *our knowledge of phenomena*.

As having a transcendental function, reflective judgement cannot be reduced to mere empirical, in this case, psychological beliefs and assumptions. This means that the postulate of economy of basic principles, the various maxims of systematic inquiry cannot be thought of, in Humean fashion, as mere habits of imagination. It is true that imagination is involved in the exercise of reflective judgement, but as we saw in the case of constitutive categories, it is a productive rather than a reproductive imagination which is involved here. But the more important point to note here is that as a transcendental achievement, reflective judgements too can be approached within the framework of our earlier discussion of epistemic rights. It may be remembered that we remarked that the concept of an epistemic right involves the three questions of limits, function and competence. Insofar as the exercise of reflective judgements may be conceptualized as an epistemic right, we can raise, firstly, the issue of limits of such judgements. In connection with this, we remember that Kant qualifies the validity of reflective judgements as subjectively valid. Reflective judgements are subjective not in the sense of being arbitrary or merely personal; in fact they are 'objective' in the sense of being a condition of possibility of science as we know it; but they are subjective in the sense of being regulative and not constitutive. In other words, the finality that we are here concerned with is relative to the modes of our comprehension of nature; it is a validity relative to the kind of beings we are, rather than an objective determination of objects. As Kant explicates it, we have to assume as if an intelligence greater than ours has so designed phenomena that we would be able to have a systematic comprehension but this does not mean that we can assert as a metaphysical truth that there is such an infinite intelligence.<sup>28</sup> As he further describes it in another context, it is 'a purposiveness without a purpose'.

While their merely regulative 'as if' status is a limitation of reflective judgements, within such limits, they perform

an indispensable function. The indispensability of reflective judgements for our modes of inquiry follows from the point we have already made regarding the need for the maxims of simplicity and systematic unity or affinity. As we have seen, merely the constitutive *a priori* principles of the understanding are not enough to specify nature as a system of organic connections comprehensible by an intelligence such as ours. For this purpose we have to presuppose principles of affinity between the empirical laws themselves but such a presupposition is however essential for only in the light of maxims suggested by such a perspective, can there be a progressiveness in our understanding of nature. Now, it has been remarked by many that the progressive or developmental character of science, its dynamic growth, is an essential feature of scientific inquiry. The reflective judgement of the formal purposiveness of nature is precisely designed to meet such a demand and hence it fulfils an essential function in inquiry. But reflective judgement, if it is to fulfil such an essential functionality, must be based on an irreducible competence. The principle of formal purposiveness cannot be merely an empirical or psychological determination, for it is the presupposition or condition of possibility of an empirical science. Even psychology or the empirical understanding of mental processes, in its own way has to make use of such maxims in its undertakings. Like the constitutive categories of the understanding, the principle of reflective judgement also cannot be reduced to empirical psychology. Kant's general argument against 'psychologism' retains its force here also. But at the same time, reflective judgement cannot derive its principle from the understanding, for if it were to do so, it would be a determinant and not a reflective judgement. It may be remembered that for Kant the essential difference between a determinant and a reflective judgement is that while the former subsumes a given case or an instance under a pre-given concept, the latter discovers a principle of intelligibility given only a case. If the formal

purposiveness were a concept given to the faculty of judgement, nothing more is left to judgement except to apply it. There-by judgement would be merely determinant. Hence the principle of reflective judgement must be intrinsic to the faculty of judgement and cannot be given to it by the understanding. There is another reason also why the principle of formal purposiveness has to be irreducible. The principle of formal purposiveness does not have a constitutive validity unlike the categories of the understanding; it regulates inquiry but does not determine the objects.

Kant seems to be having these two points in mind when he writes "The reflective judgement which is compelled from the particular in nature to the universal stands, therefore, in need of a principle. This principle, it cannot borrow from experience because what it has to do is to establish just the unity of all empirical principles under higher, though likewise empirical, principles, and thence the possibility of the systematic subordination of higher and lower. Such a transcendental principle, therefore, the reflective judgement can only give as a law from and to itself. It cannot derive it from any other quarter (as it would then be a determinant judgement). Nor can it prescribe it to nature, for reflection on the laws of nature adjusts itself to nature and not nature to the conditions according to which we strive to obtain a concept of it".<sup>29</sup>

Since the principle of formal purposiveness does not determine nature, it cannot be a principle of transcendental cognition. At the same time, such a principle is essential for cognition and hence there must be a power or competence irreducible to the understanding, which however, is functional for it. Such a power can only be transcendental imagination. We have already seen how in the context of objective cognition, productive imagination is involved in the function of schematism. But now in the context of reflective judgement also, we get a clue to the function of imagination.



In our previous discussion of the transcendental deduction in the first critique, we saw that objective cognition of phenomena is possible only insofar as we are able to conceive of nature as a domain of categorial principles of order and relation; i.e., any fact or phenomenon can be regarded as objective and hence as a possible datum for science, only insofar as we are able to conceive of it in terms of the *general terrain* of lawful order. This general terrain is not something which is given to us in sense experience; rather it is only the basis of such a constituted domain can any content of sensibility be given. In this sense, nature is something constituted by the legislative application of the categories. We also saw a further transcendental presupposition of objective knowledge, namely, the idea of intersubjectivity. Insofar as objective cognition implies the accessibility to all with similar epistemic powers, we require also the idea of a community of knowers. These two presuppositions, namely, the idea of Nature and the idea of Community are the transcendental framework principles of experience.

But the present discussion of the critique of judgement has taken up one step further in our search after the roots of cognition, for the present discussion has suggested that the developmental and progressive character of science as a human enterprise also requires us to be able to think of nature not merely as a formal domain of categorial principles, but also more concretely in terms of an organic system. In other words, the transcendental conception of nature has to be concretised and in this concretion, imagination in the form of a reflective judgement of formal purposiveness has a vital role to play. If the first concretion is of the idea of nature, the second is of the idea of community. The critique of practical reason had provided us a certain accessibility to the notion of a pure inter-subjectivity in the form of the idea of a kingdom of ends. Reflective judgement concretises this notion also. Here we are told that when imagination comes into a spontaneous accord

with the understanding, i.e., when our faculties harmoniously work together, this natural harmony is experienced as a free delight. Now, since understanding and imagination are structural, i.e., essential properties of all men, this feeling of pleasure, unlike merely the feeling of the agreeable is not privative. On the contrary, since all men have the same structure, this free delight is universally communicable. The universal communicability of a free delight in beauty gives rise to the idea of a *community of taste*. Taste is a matter of feeling; hence here, the idea of a pure kingdom of ends is concretised as a community or republic of taste. In fact, Kant even suggests that this capacity for a judgement of taste is distinctively human, for man shares sensibility with animals and reason with other rational beings. The distinctiveness of man is that he is a being who recognises the validity of judgements of taste.<sup>30</sup>

Taste, understood, in the Kantian sense, is the capacity to recognise a *communicability of feelings*.<sup>31</sup> Such a communication is possible only within a community of like minded subjects. In other words, taste is possible only within a community of like minded subjects. In other words, taste is possible only for being who has the capacity for culture. If so, then, Kant's suggestion that the judgement of taste is distinctively human can be grounded in the claim that what makes taste itself possible is culture.

If so, a new transcendental question seems to be emerging on the agenda of our tasks: what are the conditions of possibility of culture. An attempt to respond to this issue within the framework of transcendental philosophy could be called the Critique of Cultural Reason.<sup>32</sup>

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NOTES

1. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*: (Trans.) James Creed Meredith, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1911.
2. *Ibid.*, The importance of the first, longer Introduction for the understanding of the Critical Philosophy as a whole has been emphasised by H. W. Cassirer in his commentary on the *Critique of Judgement*.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
4. The distinction between signification and symbolization has been further worked out in my 'Towards A Critique of Cultural Reason' (being published by the Indian Council for Philosophical Research, New Delhi. The relevance of this distinction for aesthetics is explored in my article 'Symbols of Transcendence: Towards A Theory of Communication in Art' (to be published in The Journal of the Indian Institute for Advanced Studies, Simla.).
5. This specific significance of judgement is the central theme of my 'Towards A Critique of Cultural Reason' mentioned above. See further 'Political Judgement' by Ronald Beiner, Methuen, London, 1983.
6. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, (Trans.) N. K. Smith, Sec. 833, p. 635.
7. Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, in Immanuel Kant: Collected works' (ed.), E. Cassirer, Vol. VII, p. 343.
8. Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology From A Pragmatic Point of View*, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Sec. 596, p. 486.
10. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, pp. 42-43.
11. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Practical Reason* (Trans.), L. W. Beck, New York, 1956.
12. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason* (Trans.), N. K. Smith, Secs 2 & , pp. 106-115.
13. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason* (Trans.), N. K. Smith, Secs 2 & 3, pp. 106-115.
14. *Ibid.*, B. 107, p. 114.
15. *Ibid.*, B. 103, p. 111.
16. *Ibid.*, B. 422, p. 377.
17. *Ibid.*, B. 177, p. 181.
18. *Ibid.*, B. 177, p. 181.
19. *Ibid.*, B. 179, p. 181.

20. For a similar account of the importance of schematization, see Nathan Rotenstreich '*Experience and its Systematization*', Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, particularly Chap. II.
21. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Practical Reason* (Trans.), L. W. Beck, New York, p. 1956.
22. *Ibid.*, *The Critique of Judgement*, pp. 20-22.
23. K. R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, Routledge and Kegan Paul & Co., London.
24. On this point of view the significance of Reflective Judgement, see the two opposing interpretations suggested by H. W. Cassirer (Commentary on the Critique of Judgement) and Nathan Rotenstreich (*Experience and its Systematization*).
25. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, pp. 22-25.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-25.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-25.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-25.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-25.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
32. The theme of a critique of cultural reason along the lines suggested herein has been taken up for more extended treatment in the following :
  - (i) *Towards A Critique of Cultural Reason* (being published by the I.C.P.R. New Delhi).
  - (ii) Reflection and Constitution in Kant, Hegel and Husserl: *JICPR*.
  - (iii) The consequences of such a project of a critique of cultural reason for political theory have been worked out in '*The Primacy of the Political*' (*Unpublished monograph*).